INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS CHANGE: INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?

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

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June 2, 1988

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June 2, 1988

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ABSTRACT

INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS CHANGE:

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Homo sapiens seek stabilisation and tend toward a state of equilibrium in life and, in times of rapid change, attempt even more to achieve a relative condition approaching a normative status quo. International systems tend also to focus on stabilising behaviour in a like manner as a quantitative enlargement of the individual phenomenon. Within the European context, expansion (integration), as an attempt to maintain stability, may not be achieving the hoped for success because of the do ut des phenomenon. Single collectivities attempt a best possible relationship based on particularistic motives. Theories have yet to focus on the social dimension of integration and tend to selectively single out the more readily available economic and political aspects. Effective, expanded society is the product of mutual feelings, often unarticulated, with higher degrees of consonance more prone to integrate, given the extensive range of compatibilities, than non-European societies exhibiting dissonance. Individuals, fundamentally motivated by needs, respond to needs in similar fashions, developing linkages. But how can authority shift if the authoritarian state is unwilling to relinquish same? The opposite to authoritarian prejudicial subjectiveness is objective humanistic liberalism, a product highly correlated with education and exposure. Collectivities grow organically from within, through cognition, and during rapid

change, international accommodation may develop most effectively only on this basis. An adequate assessment and projection of European Integration may be possible only by determining the causation and degree of the individual commitment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

Change is an ineluctable endemic feature of life and evidenced by the very fact that the form of today's life, its patterns, modes, and expressions have substantially altered from the form that existed previously.[1] Change is taking place singularly, on the biographical level as well as in the aggregate, collectively, on the societal level.[2] The latter portion of the twentieth century may be unique in man's historical experience in that the degree of change has both accelerated significantly over previous historical periods and may now have permeated significantly all levels and functions of global society.[3] The very mercurial nature of life places both man and society in the position of having to constantly and continually make adjustments for the maintenance of a homeostatic equilibrium. The quest for an equilibrium status on the intra-societal level mandates a degree of rapprochement analogous with the conceptualisation of integrated society; an obverse state is one of isolation. A significant mutational result of change, in the modern epoch, is the development of interdependencies, dependencies which fall in the material, the security, or the social realm of consideration.[4]

--Materially: economically interdependent society has become the hallmark of advanced domestic economics.

--Security: interdependencies evidenced by bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements have become requisite

features of international life and

--Socially: interdependencies or alignments of previously autonomous cultures are producing global societal mono-characteristics to a degree heretofore unknown.

An attempt to curb the proliferation of these interdependencies, an effective retreat to a state of isolation, would produce ex consequenti a net reduction in the gains these interdependencies have thus far achieved with a corresponding retardation of further expansion of such linkages. An antipathetic motion, as such, is the all consuming nature of change. The causation of change is essentially modernity,[5] and its effect on collective group status is one of abnegating traditional parameters tending toward a state of homogenisation. Singular societies intra-group homogenisation is in this respect synonomous with integration. This paper will attempt to make a subjective locative assessment of integration relating to European societies. Material, security, and social considerations fall within the realm of economic and politics, and align themselves with the concepts of man in society. It is the argument here that all three considerations are essentially amorphic and interrelate, and function tria juncta in uno necessitating an analysis of European integration to take an holistic telos.[6]

The question of European integration, or conversely that of European disintegration, is essentially a question with ramifications extending to the very consideration of the existence of Europe. The cui bono of the question is

more than an admanum consideration for European society per se. Its import has considerable ramifications for world society, for although being played out on a European stage, the audience is global. The drama is by no means inelaborate; to a great degree the action impends with that world audience, as in many respects the action relates to telekinesis drawn from that audience. And it may be that the adfinem of the production will have a concatenate effect on the casual observer. This synoptic depiction is purposely aimed at highlighting the fact that, in the transparent world of today, action is interlinked, and, in an age of globenascence, suum cuique action is unimaginable. Total communications at the present level of modernity with its expansions of knowledge[7] has heightened the stakes and to a great degree changed the rules in the economic, political, and social game of life. For Europe, the idea of integration has been for the most part a consideration aimed at stabilising conduct but may now extend to the consideration of life itself.[8]

This century under Germany, the last century under France, and in previous centuries under Austria or Spain or Holland or Italy, individuals with philosophies and ideologies attempted unification. These ideologies were more or less designed for, and often amounted to, a conceptualisation of the integration of Europe. The idea of an integrated Europe is the idea of a Utopia.[9] Six hundred years ago, it seemed utopian to wish to liberate the peasants of Switzerland from the power of the Hapsburgs and

unite in a Helvetian Republic. Five hundred years ago, the unification of France seemed utopian as did the unification of Spain with the expulsion of the Moors from Europe. Four hundred years ago, the unification of England and Scotland in a Great Britain seemed utopian. Three hundred years ago, the liberation of Hungary from the Turkish domination seemed utopian, as did two hundred years ago, the restoration of Greece. A century and a half ago, the unification and restoration of Poland, Rumania, and Jugoslavia and one hundred years ago the unification of Italy seemed utopian, as did forty years ago, the unification of the Aryan cultures.[10] Today the utopian ideal has extended to the creation of the European Communities with an 'ever increasing unity'[11] of European individuals.[12] Some movements have been successful; others have not. In some respects, the reality of an integrated Europe has already flourished; in others, the idea has not yet begun to germinate.[13]

In the first instance, the primary consideration must be given to the 'why' of unification. This critical consideration is one of peace, specifically peace maintenance. Latterly that has been expanded to prosperity, the concept of the benefits of peace, being essentially economic, political, and social in nature. Such benefits are the domestic gains achieved by intercommunal activity normalising the intra-societal environment and are so extensive that a certain minimum of agreed order in the international system appears to be desirable.[14] If the

stakes of the peace game brought about by technological advancement have increased to the point of possible total European hydragination, the necessity for integration becomes more apparent. It is not only a consideration of finding an optimal condition in which to conduct life, it may also be, now, one that extends to the continuance of life itself.

The focus of this paper is on the INDIVIDUAL, as it is ultimately he who integrates. It will be argued in this paper that integration is achieved individually in only one way, the way it has always taken place - through socialisation.

Aristotle's early analysis traced the theoretical beginnings of man from singular society to the society that he knew at that time, the City-State.[15] For him, the City-State encompassed a unit of a few thousand individuals - citizens. Today the process of socialisation has brought the level of human societies to that of nations. Nations being anything from a few hundred thousand to several tens of millions of individuals. The process of socialisation allows for integration functioning as a series of movements not dissimilar to the workings of a ratchet. Growth is from small to large. If socialisation has brought society to the level of nations, the next logical, intra alia, movement of the ratchet would produce some sort of meta-national society. A meta-national society would be the effectual outcome of further integration in Europe.

By far the greatest contribution to the understanding

of integration has been made as a direct result of the total wars which characterised the first half of this century. It was motivated by the desire to identify, and control, the causality of adverse international relations. International relations often "arises out of inequality and adversity between states in terms of resources, development, ideologies and standards of living."[16] Disparities are frequently causational to an attempt to 'normalise' relations *via* the achievement of an international system "achieving consensus of a kind."[17] The international system, a product of international politics, is essentially a "ceaseless struggle" tending toward a stabilising consensus. States are fundamentally the principal actors in the arena of international politics.[18] As such, states exhibit alongside their internal regulatory obligations, obligations in the external sphere adjunct to their position within the international system. The operational elements are those of inequalities, interests, and governments, functioning as a tripolitic *modus operandi*[19] ameliorated by regimes and systems. The theory hypothetically postulates integrated society as an alternative to conflict.

Theories of integration are essentially (a) reductive or (b) systemic in nature. The (a) reductionalist theories generated by the body of economic literature,[20] which postulated gains in trade, or disadvantages of trade diversion, are generally descriptive in nature, and relate to theoretical expansion of, for example, a given customs union area. These reductive approaches to integration do

little to encapsulate the operational imperatives of integration. This is so, as the reductionalists persistently proposed theories, hypotheses, and techniques minimalising the systemic uncertainty, combined within their general equilibrium formulations.[21] The (b) systemic theories are primarily the result of political thought,[22] descriptive of interrelations within entities and venture modestly into the area of hypothetical generalisations as to the 'hows' of integrational development.[23] Both of these schools of thought summarily overgo the individual as central to the primary focus of the consideration.

In order to understand the creation of multi-national society, it is necessary to understand nations, groups of individuals. This paper will review the literature with regard to the salient elements that comprise the nation. In the final analysis, what is important and what functions as the operational imperative for nations is the concept of COMMUNICATION - interaction between individuals on a frequent, meaningful, and coherent level. This implies identification. Modern society is characterised by a high degree of centralisation. Centralisation has aided the nation-building process, and simultaneously may tend in and of itself, to discourage the continuation of further socialisation leading towards international integrated society. Modernisation mandates a high degree of LITERACY, roughly synonymous with education, which has fallen into the hands, and is essentially the function, of these centralised governments.

Primitive and non-literate societies tend on an individual level, to educate the young, the new incumbents into society, locally, imbuing them with local values and traditions. As modernity advances, the necessity increases for specialised education. Where once the child was educated and initiated into society by its immediate family, modernity requires the introduction of collective educational institutions which implement collective, less specific, more generalised, values and traditions. Modernity has forced a situation in which the kin group has lost its primary importance as socialisation has changed its motive from specifics to general universal, having been taken over by centralised society or at least indirectly central governments. This not only means the loss of kin identity, but also the creation of a void being filled with a community or national identity.[24] Modernisation has been instrumental in the creation of nation and could, theoretically, on the same grounds, be instrumental in the creation of multi-nationalities. If individual identification relates to successful socialisation, the logical question follows, what sort of education are Europeans today undergoing? For inherent within the creation of a collective identity, with standarised values and ideals, is the opposing notion of otherness, the significant detrimental notion of xenophobia.

This question suggests that knowledge of other groups is paramount to an essential pre-condition for the development of identification and ultimate integration

linkages. The amount of education along these lines being conducted in Western European countries may be directly related to an ultimate integrated European environment. This analysis will show that there is little coordination, and, with few exceptions, there is fundamentally little dedication to the idea of further integration, i.e., of allowing an optimal condition to evolve by the domestic governments that would produce within the young the idea of an integrated European.

This paper is not designed to argue the case either for or against European integration. It is an attempt to analyse the international system today, in light of change, to determine overall movement. In this respect, it exhibits a degree of uniqueness in that it loosens the ties of a strictly mono-dimensional approach to the question of integration by opening the parameters of the consideration to incorporate multi-dimensionality, specifically, economic, political and social perspectives and thus examines the process as what it is, multi-dimensional in substance.[2][3]

The problem with such a macro approach is that of clarity, and specificity, clouding an otherwise complex consideration. This will be overcome by focusing centrally on the individual, as homo politicus, homo economicus, and homo socius. Aspects of the individual who, as the chief participant, is the central focus of integration. His attitudes and actions are salient in the final analysis.

Looking further, this paper examines the European Economic Community as the primary actor on the international

stage promulgating European integration. On a cognitive level, the preliminary outcome shows little positive integration resulting by its activities. If integration is ultimately an individual phenomenon, the question would suggest an examination of the degree of Community endeavours directly affecting individuals. One could summarily conclude that the reason why integration in Europe is not going forward with a higher degree of intensity may be because there is a lack of fundamental commitment to a European end by the domestic states who comprise and dominate the community. In order to understand this, it is essential to understand the State. Classical Theorists posit man as living in a state of nature. If this is so, the individual associates, for security, in a pact with the State. In return for security, the State is allowed the opportunity to exercise sovereignty in exchange for individual loyalty. This system is legitimised within the society, and, in European society, especially since the beginning of the last century.[26] The state is viewed by nationals as a security provider.

States have become identified, if not frequently synonymous, with nations, and each exercises its own sovereignty. Each nation state with its own bureaucratic system possesses various elements which comprise an overall power structure, jealously guarding its own identity.

Perhaps the most notable stumbling block in the wider process of socialisation has been the advent of literacy, where each nation state is fundamentally identified with a

specific highly developed language with its related thereto body of literature, producing formal differences between nation-state units. Previously, prior to the advent of literacy, language was of little significance. For example, in early England, subsequent to the Norman invasion, the then spoken Saxon as the lingua franca was the medium by which individuals integrated, while the overlay of French continued, forming the foundation of modern English. Indeed, linguistic and other cultural borrowings took place. Since the advent of literacy this degree of flexibility has been lost. It is the direct result of modernity and may be essentially countered by an effective initiation of language studies in the domestic States' school systems. Why it is not being done may be the reason why Europe is not integrating, i.e., it may be an intentional or implied action by the State to protect the State's sovereign autonomy.

In a world where international systems are changing, when regimes are constantly at flux with each other, it may be becoming more and more difficult for States to justify their position within the eyes of their various nations. Technological advancement requires further knowledge, often necessarily gleaned from external national societies, making it increasingly more difficult for States to function autonomously. Economically, an example of this was demonstrated very dramatically by the first oil crisis where an outside party, indeed a non-European group, significantly altered the economic production-employment-inflation

equilibrium of European countries. The States of Europe were powerless to avert the ensuing catastrophic ramifications. Politically, an example of this on the domestic population may be seen by the effect of third parties on the State itself. In Britain, strategic defence necessitates a functional radar system. The failure of the home economy to produce a successfully viable NIMROD system necessitated the purchase of an American system. The expertise for its own defence (to the chagrin of the State) could not be found domestically. Further, the 1987 British parliamentary elections on June 11th witnessed repeated interference designed at influencing public opinion from non-national elites. (American President Reagan frequently criticised Labour candidate Kinnock's nuclear defence posture and effectively endorsed the Conservative Prime Ministerial candidate.)

Looking at systems change, it becomes quite apparent that Western European society possesses a great number of similarities, perhaps in the final analysis, more similarities than dissimilarities. The fundus of European society is fundamentally Christian, democratic, and capitalistic in nature. These all reflect values held in common. It may be reasonable to assume that if integration were to take place, it would be more probable amongst groups with higher levels of similarity than between groups with lesser or divergent similarities.

The concepts put forward in this paper are essentially

consistent with an organic growth model, whereby integration is dependent upon the individual, a function of communication and puissantly pending on literacy. As a substantive paradigm, it posits integration as a sui generis function of monad development, as growth from the particular to the universal. This is in counterdistinction to a structural arrangement of universal to particular growth.

As a result of technological advancement brought about by modernity, integration may be not only desirable, but absolutely necessary. If the process of socialisation is responsible for integration, and if it has always been accomplished through ever increasing degrees of intensive communication, then the end result - European integration - would be achieved by the logical follow-through of that socialisation process. In the literate age, it may necessitate directional education designed at initiating the young with a pan-European mentality, or at least directional education decreasing the construction of 'otherness' notions as evidenced by current educational practices. If the reason why that is not being done is domestically political, then both the problem and the solution may have been identified.

Is the nation-state the optimal vehicle for society in the twenty-first century? The Functionalists[27] postulate international society on a need basis. The idea being not far from the surface, that incremental transference of

loyalties and sovereignties go from the domestic entity to a multi-national entity. To manage a series of international regimes as foreseen by Functionalistic theory, a central agency would require the means to control and protect its client States. However, experience has demonstrated in the post-war period that, the greater the potential managerial powers of a central agency, the stronger the incentives of states to engage in a struggle to control it. It appears as if Functionalism will be successful only to the degree that the domestic units wish it to be. The implication is that to overcoming these obstacles may mean addressing the fundamental requirement of modernity - education.

> The Governments of the advanced industrial societies are . . . working, so it seems to me, on a wrong set of assumptions. They cannot get back to full employment or human social services or good industrial relations on the present basis . . - the effort should be directed instead to explaining and educating, to presenting honestly to the public how circumstances have changed, what the new range of choice is, what are the policies that governments are capable of carrying out.[28]

If it is the case, that despite temporary and occasional setbacks, the tendency is for society to grow, in a series of ratchet movements, it is imprudent to assume that man can go back for any appreciable length of time. Society can hardly demodernise nor can it reach a deliteracy level. With the advent of modernity, literacy has become related to the idea of integration by way of promoting a greater degree of collective identity, essentially the necessary ground work for an effective

socialisation to continue above the nation level.

The why of individual-collectivity construction has remained constant throughout history.[29] The how is unique to each age. If socialisation is to continue, a multi-national level of socialisation appears to be the next step in the ratchet mechanism. Modernity may be the vehicle, as it introduces change. The nation-state of today, as the focus of the nation may be the obstacle; however, the problem may be two-sided. On the one side, there is the societies' lack of trust in a multi-national political arrangement to offer significant levels of security mandated by modernity and, on the other side, the lack of desire by the state to promote that multi-national society. For a multi-national society to evolve, a new level of systems change must take place. The chief actors which would promote that change are the individuals in society collectively, which are responsible for underwriting that course of action. In the democratic setting, the onus lies heavily upon the shoulders of the individual, the ultimate integrator.

If organisations create webs of interdependence and associations produce new points of identification that transcend the territorial nation state, the problem facing mankind, if multi-nationalism is to result, is the development of an alternative to existing forms of territorial integration.[30]

As integration is fundamentally a one-on-one phenomena. It is difficult to empirically access its

state at any given time as individual 'feelings' constantly vary. Further, because of its multi-dimensionality, and because it is fundamentally a process through time, any given measurement would soon be superceded by new events and new feelings. Consequently, and primarily because of its elusiveness, an analytical framework must be employed if any meaningful assessment is to be made. Such a framework must by necessity be open-ended enough to allow for the incorporation of any new events which may affect the process of integration, but yet such a framework must be realistic enough to afford a general paradigm for effective analysis.

The term "integration" as a political consideration has effectively been misemployed to the extent as to have created a term with ambiguous connotations.[31] The word "integration" itself comes from the Latin verb integrare meaning literally to bring (back) together or to enlarge and enhance. The Latin noun integralis implies a total agreement.[32] "Integration" as a term has the further suggestive connotation of the act or process of unification into a whole or single entity, specifically, the bringing together of elements in a community.[33] The employment of the term "integration" in a consideration of the political integration process, especially with relation to integration in the European sense, necessitates a more precise definition. This is fundamentally the problem with the employment of integration methodology. Quite simply stated,

"integration" is a multi-dimensional term and in political economic literature, it is more often than not utilised as a mono-dimensional term. To more adequately fixate on the process of integration, a continuum may be imagined, ranging from a point of total non-integration to a point of total integration.

Non-integration <----------> Integration

Mono-dimensional postulations of integration set simple criteria as a measure of integration, as in the above scale, such as age, sex, hair colour, size, weight, nationality, or employment status, etc. These may be employed to determine the integrated state of a single characteristic.[34] But unfortunately, integration may not be measured so simplistically. Societal integration is essentially composed of a fluid set of elements, the interplay of which varies in magnitude depending upon condition, time, and place, producing a concatenate plexure of diverse and sundry characteristics.

In considering the total process of integration three distinct delineations of integrational characteristics may be isolated (1) the political delineation (2) the social delineation of mass community, and (3) the transactional delineation. Each of these three groups represents a different delineation of activity in which the consideration of aspects of integration may be viewed.[35]

(1) The political delineation may be viewed by, for example, the types and decisions made by supra-national organisations. Within the European context, the European Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and Euratom are examples.[36] (2) Mass attitudes toward other political units constitute the measure of mass community, and is a social delineation of activity. Masses are considered to be integrated if they have a high recording of mutual good opinions about other countries.[37] Given the populations of Europe and their various operational assumptions, this paper will put forward this social delineation of activity as fundamental and most salient. (3) The transactional delineation may be viewed in terms of events - for example, inter-governmental events could be measured by agreements, state visits, notes - occurring between European governments excluding actions taking place within the framework of an international organisation.[38] Here integration is high when inter-governmental cooperation is high, and when mass feelings about other people are positive, and when many decisions <u>are made</u> by supra-national organisations.[39]

This is consonant with the literature which postulates three dimensions by which the phenomena of integration may be measured, namely, the economic, the political, and the social dimension.[40] The suggestion is that economic integration would constitute high intra-national trade, social integration would include

the unification of masses, specific groups or elites, and political integration would encompass a wide array of phenomena including more decisions on the international level.[41] Literature also suggests that the consideration of integration is not single and simple, that, in actuality, it is a complex multi-dimensional activity.[42] The author of this paper is of like opinion.

The limitations of mono-dimensional observation and assessment of integration may be seen in the following analysis considering the three dimensional areas of integration, those being (1) the political (2) the level of mass community or social level and (3) the inter-transactional level.

(1) The Political Dimension of Integration

Viewed as an activity between nations, integration as a political consideration may be subdivided into two subsidiary dimensions; (i) the number and importance of decisions undertaken within the political area of international considerations and (ii) the mode of decision.[43] (i) The more political the decision, and the more political the group making those decisions, determining the degree of integration is an indication of importance of these decisions. Within the terms of the European Community, the political decisions concerning the community market, for domestic industrial production and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), for agricultural decisions, would suggest a high degree of

political integration.[44] However, considerations of a community defence vis-à-vis third parties have more or less been taken out of the realm of community considerations and, hence, would receive a low political integration status. Contrasting the Constitutional change envisioned by the European Parliament dated 14th February 1984, encompassing a wider European Union, specifically referencing the free movement of people, services, goods, capital and advertising, etc. would, if adopted and put into force, achieve a significantly high community wide rating for important political decision-making. (ii) The mode of decision deals with the degree of integration and the type, as in community decisions. Supra-national integration would exist when the Community organisation was given autonomous competence for action, action that would be equally binding on all Community members regardless of domestic opinion.[45] Here the degree of integration would be advanced when programmes could be formulated and put into force with only a majority vote. However, in a situation where each of the members carry a veto ability, the Community, in terms of functioning actuality, receives a low integrational rating. In the practical sense all important decisions and competence lie within the hands of the European Heads of State. Leo Tindemans, in The Report on European Union Brussels 1976 made reference to L'Europe à plusieurs vitesses, essentially being a two-tier system of cooperation operational within the

framework of the European Community which essentially postulated a situation where nothing within the Community would be totally binding upon all. If the two-tier system were an operational reality, this system could be considered as evidence of an effective breakdown of the European Community as an integrational organ operational within Europe, or at least as departing from the original goal of concerted and unified action. The idea of a two-tier system suggests the idea of a Europe à la carte, an idea refuted in the Tindemans report, as each country was seen as being bound by the agreement of all as to the final objective to be achieved in common. Only the time sequence for each individual country was allowed to vary under the two-tier system. In practice, what has evolved is something akin to L'Europe à geometrie variable, which essentially allows each participant to take what it wants and not to give consideration to the unit as a whole. An example of this would be the **Airbus** , a project ostensibly between Britain and France. Britain and France benefit from a European project, a project which is not even subscribed to by, for example, Denmark or Italy.[46] What has developed, is that within the community, there is a convergence of interests on smaller levels.[47] Consequently the idea of a developing supra-nationality, with regard to this consideration of the political dimension of integration, leaves much to be desired with reference to the European Community. Rather than an effective development of an integrational overall

unit within the European Community, where unanimous decision making is required, there is a reduction of issues to the most common denominator level."[48]

(2) Integration as Considered on the Social Level

This area of consideration of integration is by far the most important, if integration is considered ultimately as a one-on-one relationship. This implies that what is important, in the final analysis, is what the individual thinks, essentially, his degree of overall individual commitment to others. Referring to German integration in the 19th century, Schiller made the emotive proclamation to the German people, highlighting this degree of commitment: Wir wollen sein ein einzig Volk von Brüdern.[49] In the social sense a politically integrated group is one in which every member of that group thinks in terms of an US. US connotes solidarity and a binding relationship, especially vis-à-vis third parties. It incorporates a communal identity with circumscribed duties and obligations. This dimension considers integration not as essentially something that takes place on the governmental level or in political offices or as a function of bureaucracies; it connotes the notion of integration as a posture taken by the individual members of the group collectively - as brothers.[50] With regard to this term of reference, the social dimension of integration suggests a change in the political conscious knowledge of the individual in degrees going toward a normative collective feeling.[51]

The social dimension of integration also has subdimensions, one of which is the importance attached to the term solidarity; essentially who are to be considered brothers and who are to be considered strangers? Here the emphasis is on loyalty to the group. The group outsider is considered after the fashion of do ut des, an essentially cost and utility analysis. This consideration weighs every transaction with third parties to determine the worth received. This is evident in international relations by the degree and proliferation of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. It is more or less the consideration of what is received in return when something is given to another. In the case of the European Community, the implication is that integration has not yet reached the degree envisioned by Schiller's brotherhood. Here the classical principle of trade seems to be operational. In other words, what are the net results received by me when I conclude a given action with them. This appears to be the operated motive in the EEC's agricultural political considerations or indeed the general utility of membership by EEC members themselves. In a truly integrated community, the consideration of benefit of one group vis-a-vis another group is not of major importance, for the consideration of groups implies a low degree of social integration.[22] However, within the community, this is exactly what is being done. The Europe Barometer frequently tests European opinions in relationship to European membership, as it did in May

1984.[53] The question was asked, in general terms, if it was thought that there was a general profit to be made by the domestic country as a result of European membership. Although from country to country and from time to time the answers are essentially different, at the point of this sample, forty-six percent of the respondents answered in the affirmative. Therein Luxembourg registered 73%, Holland 67%, and were amongst the most favourable returns. i.e., individuals that thought that their individual country membership was profiting their individual country. Britain at 32% and Denmark at 39% were amongst the most negative, which means, in general terms, that they have a higher particularist group orientation than that of an European orientation.[54]

Further considerations of a social "community" feeling may be extended the idea of a common myth. Common myths or autostereotypes are notions or ideas held in common which symbolise collective ideology. This would symbolise a vision of a collective future,[55] and perhaps, a political organisation for the achievement of that goal. This would imply that nationalistic symbolism found in flags, hymns, holiday costumes, jokes, etc., must be ultimately supplanted by collective symbolism. Here the problem is the suggestion that to create a collective symbolism would imply a degree of artificiality. However, if European integration were a goal and if it were to be achieved on the level of

political community realisation, the end point of unencumbered solidarity must justify the means and hence be actively sought.[56]

(3) The Inter-Transactional Dimension

The third dimension found within the integration process is the inter-transactional dimension. Integration on this dimension connotes essentially the physical connectiveness of persons found within the overall collectivity, where contact implies integration, as in the trade in goods and services, credit, technology, ideas, banking, insurance, etc. The number of people going over international borders, tourists, the exchange of production workers, as well as the exchange of information through letters, telephone, telegraph, newspapers, magazines, electronic media, etc. are determinants of the inter-transactional dimension. The criterion here is that the greater the frequency of interaction, the greater the degree of integration.[57] This dimension of integration is the easiest to analyse. It lends itself to simple measurement and a compilation of empirical statistical data on transactions and transactional flows. The development of a ratio between transactions within a given group and outside the group (a foreign domestic ratio) allows for accessible transactions information. Within any given economy, the greater the degree of transactions, the higher the degree of interdependence. The implication is that the greater the alignment of price levels, salary levels, and credit

levels, through developing interdependence, the greater the degree of similarities.[58] Under this consideration, the European Community would be considered highly integrated. In 1983, the ten members of the European Comunity traded 50.3% of their production with EEC partners, but this overall percentage is comprised of fluctuations ranging from 40.9% for the UK to 72.3% for Ireland. However of interest is that if this type of consideration were termed an indicator of integration, that is, the more one sells to and buys from another being a determinant of the degree of integration with that other, it would suggest that Germany with its exports of 48.1% to the Community and imports from the Community of 49.1% compared with the EFTA country of Switzerland who imported 49% of its exports to the Community and imported 66% of the imports from the Community, is not as highly integrated with the Community as Switzerland.[59]

The ambivalent nature of the possible answers to the questions inherent in the political, the social, or the inter-transactional dimension suggests that no dimension in itself is sufficient to explain the integration process nor is any specific dimension alone sufficient to be used as an indicator of integration. The integration process must be viewed multi-dimensionally. The inherent complexities of the consideration necessitate an holistic paradigm, incorporating all dimensions, structured

loosely enough to tolerate ambivalance.

The political dimension suggests that peace *via* the vehicle of integration is a process of political amalgamation. European history has shown that the Swedish-Norway Union or the Austria-Hungarian Union were political arrangements that did not abate international tension or conflict, a result at odds with the underlining tenet of the proposition. The transactional level, specifically relating to trade in Europe, shows that the high degree of trade between Germany and Britain (indeed the UK was Germany's strongest single trading partner in 1913) did little to avert the effects of 1914, again, a result not consistent with the proposition.[66] This paper puts forward the suggestion that the most often overlooked dimension, that dimension which, potentially at least, offers the most ambivalance may be the most important dimension. This is the dimension of the mass community, the social psychological level of integration.

It is salient what one thinks of another, *not what one is told to think* of another, *nor what one specifically does* with another. To understand integration, one must understand the forces that aid or deter the process. Considering integration in the form of an organic growth model, the forces that control or restrain society are fundamentally akin to political conceptualisations of societal actions. The relationships viewed as transactions are likewise akin to

economic conceptualisation of social actions. Both of these are, in effect, subsections of social actions. To conceptualise upon these forces, it is consequently necessary to develop a theoretical approach to integration narrowly enough constructed to focus upon and project the phenomenon but wide enough to encompass the multi-dimensional aspect of its nature.

Views of Integration

Theories are to be used primarily as an approach providing a common language or framework of communication for those engaged in research.[61] They are helpful because they carry with them the possibility of providing minimal standardisation of word meanings, concepts, categories, and patterns of explanation among those accepting a given intellectual orientation.[62] Such an approach is not simply a singular image of the world but an intellectual outlook. It provides descriptions, explanations, and often predictions about the empirical world with reference to which it is constantly being refined and reformulated.[63] Karl Popper has suggested "theories are nets cast to catch what we call 'the world' to rationalise, to explain and to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer."[64] However, the attempt to refine a theory must not exclude the possibility of exogenous factors heretofore unknown and perhaps unquantifiable which may play an influential role in the results. Developing a paradigm for integration must by necessity be expansive rather than

restrictive. It must not be restricted to solid dimensions, confined to specific sorts of activities. It must go further to use those dimensions as an aid to highlighting the individual's specific contribution.

Several formidable theories regarding integration in the international system do exist, but, it is argued here, these theories are restrictive inasmuch as they do not develop a centrality around the cognitive formation of individual's feelings.[65] The three most prominent are those of (1) Federalism, (2) Functionalism, and (3) Neo-Functionalism.

(1) Federal Theory, frequently accorded prominence,[66] in practice developed through the American experience,[67] posits group activities toward common goals preferable to singular endeavours.[68] However, based on a plurality of control centers, it itself is not integrational,[69] as integration would suggest a migration toward one common center. The theory does not address the creation of a developed collectivity feeling sufficient enough to supplant particularisms.[70] Whatever else may be its merits or demerits, a federal system is a structure which clearly multiplies the opportunity for more administration, extending not only the practical participation in politics, but diminishing the central pole fixation necessary for integrated society.[71] (2) Functional Theory[72] is a growth model based on social interaction approximating historical reality with the notion of

spill-over effects, where relations are based and instensified on past successes. It postulates a process of integration being accomplished apart and outside the realm of domestic political units,[73] wherein lies its weakness. Doing such, it is an optimistic formulation of the integration process based, appropriately enough, on a collective abatement of common problems.[74] It omits, essentially, the reality of the political world outside, assigning 'high' and 'low' political status[75] to issues indicating the control maintained over those issues by domestic units.[76] (3) Neo-Functionalism ex hypothesi Functionalism attempts to address the political deficiencies[77] by suggesting that the impulse for integration stems from regional interests slowly developing community attachments. The problem with this theory is that the regional units often hold domestic priorities higher than the Neo-Functionalist theory implies.[78]

Modern Developments

The need to combine the various theories on integration within one framework was underlined by the work of Karl Deutsch and stated in his Social Causal Integrational Model.[79] Deutsch postulated a model of integration based on all three dimensions intermingling to the extent of creating a common net of ever-increasing transactions which actuates within the individual the sense of commonality. This knowledge unleashes a social psychological education process assimilating diverse

individuals into a singular unit. The development of communities, he saw[80] as the result of needs which are ultimately institutionalised affording protection and assurance to the individual, culminating in ultimate unified political organisation. He postulated political union as a Functional result of integration, commencing in the transactional dimension carrying over into the social dimension and terminating in the political (institutional) dimension. Deutsch's analysis couples all three dimensions into a growth model. Its weakness is in the failure to explain the social psychological education process which leads toward integration and the propagating of its advancement. Despite this weakness, he did isolate the importance of the polis or central focusing point for the consideration of integration to develop. One of the variables that he implied as being salient may be agglomerated as an elite theory (leadership) which crystallises and conceptualises the idea of integration and sets it in motion. In the European experience, an example of leadership of this sort is shown by the endeavours of Churchill or Schuman[81] which added the crystallisation necessary for the ultimate establishment of the European Community.[82] A further variable is encapsulated within the idea of the consideration of a disturbing influence or a domestic unit that reaches threat potential. Again within the European Community experience, the potential of the further development of a

situation in which any given European country threatened to dominate the rest of Europe was a fundamental underlining ideal in the creation of the European Community (keeping France and Germany apart).[83] This, and the threat of non-European intervention in Western Europe, is theoretically postulated as grounds for keeping intra-European dialogue going in the face of apparently insurmountable obstacles.[84]

In reviewing the various theories on integration,[85] what is apparent is that the trend towards the idealistic world arrangement, the utopia which first postulated, in real terms, a united Europe, was the direct result of international conflict. This idealism devolved slowly into a more rational and pragmatic methodology the further removed in time from World War II. For perhaps a period of ten years most definitely commencing with the first oil crisis of the early 1970's, integration theory within the Western European context has been at a standstill. This may be directly related to the perceived degree of integration and the lack of progress thereof, by the individuals of Europe themselves. Indeed the new theoretical impetus, termed Neorealism relates highly to the old pre-world war concept of international society organised in a balance of power framework along pluralistic lines.[86]

Political theory plays an important part in the reality of political relations.[87] States' actions are guided by assumptions and expectations which relate to a

concept of cause and result. Such assumptions, as hypotheses, offer the framework for action between States. Behind the often highly technical problems of European integration, political thought undergone by European domestic governments, is in the last analysis, an operational framework or hypothesis. Often assumptions are applied by States as rules, and are frequently promulgated by leaders as reality, and applied as laws. But as international relations are fundamentally social relations, they must be viewed as being within the social framework, that is, not as hard and fast laws, but more as philosophies or models or frameworks for inter-relations. If a state's action is motivated by anything other than an altruistic group motive, it is hardly surprising that meaningful steps towards a greater degree of integration are not achieved. The premise which functions as a modus operandi for a given domestic government has a direct bearing on the outcome of interaction. The apparent loss of momentum within the European community toward significant increases in European integration within the current period may be the result of the lack of a comprehensive holistic multi-dimensional hypothesis governing action. Integration is now on the multi-national level. Any hypothesis which operates as a foundation for action must be based on a multi-dimensional analysis founded within the social dimension. It is in the social dimension, if a stable international environment is to be maintained,

where integration must be achieved.

The political dimension relates directly to the social dimension either by the concept of an elite push or a population pull. Elites are a product of a given population.[88] They may reflect an underlying mood or ideology of the population or they may advance individual ideas but eventually for acceptance those ideas must be seeded within that given population. The transactional dimension of integration relates to the social because it is here that free interchange develops fluidity only to the extent of acceptance within the multiples of individuals. As Deutsch has pointed out, all three dimensions relate and the common denominator hinges around the development of community, which is, in the final analysis, the product of an individual endeavour.

The thrust of this paper is to look at the problem of integration and to assess the progress or the lack of progress within the current epoch within the Western European context. The homeostasis is afforded by a focus on the individual as the most common and salient denominator in the integration equation. Integration will be viewed as a process through not only time but place. Given the apparent prevailing state of mis-education leading the inherent bias of democracy against the cosmopolitan expansion of thought and culture, public opinion is left with the intellectually inferior role of responding with tidal waves of emotion to gross caricatures of political reality, the sad

consequences of which[89] are all too apparent in a historical review of European history. As the general opinions of large numbers of persons are almost certainly a vague and confusing medley, action cannot be taken which effectively solves European problems until basic individual opinions have been factored down, essentially made to develop a degree of conformity. The making of one general <u>will</u> out of the multitude of general wishes is an art well known to the political elites and political steering committees. To a degree, it consists essentially in the use of symbols and verbiage which assembles emotions which frequently are detached from ideas because feelings are much less specific than ideas and very much more poignant, the steering of same allows for the creation of a homogeneous <u>will</u> out of a heterogeneous mass of desire.[90] This may amount to social engineering.

The principal concern of mankind may be simply stated, <u>hostility abatement</u> - peace. Johan Galtung, has defined integration as "the process whereby two or more actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, the actors are said to be integrated."[91] Such integration reduces hostility from inter-society to the more manageable intra-society level. The form of such action, the essential structure, is essentially of secondary importance.

In a period of history in which the Darwinean luxury of evolution may not be any longer operational, the idea

of integration in Europe must be germinated either positively or negatively within the social dimension in order to achieve flourishing in time to avert international conflagration. If war is endemic, every new and succeeding member of society must be converted to the idea of peace. It can only be conducted on the individual level. This paper analyses the problem of conceptionalising integration along the lines of the Deutschian analysis.[72] It attempts to go further to explain or at least to isolate the conditions essential for a multi-dimensional integration framework of analysis comprehensive enough to afford a general paradigm. It attempts to avoid the pitfalls of being confined to specific theory and instead it will attempt to isolate the conditions necessary for integration to take place. In order to do this, it will first focus on the process of socialisation in chapter two, examining the idea of community and its development via that process. In chapter three, it will go on to identify theoretically and nominatively the individual need structures and define the core entity, the first consideration of nationality. In chapter four, it examines theoretically and historically the development of the nation and ultimately the nation state in Western Europe as an answer to the needs of society. The hypothesis is suggested that man and society have specific needs and man's specific national identity was developed through his handling of those needs collectively. Chapter five

posits the continuation of the process to create a European society. In light of modernisation and over-all globulised systems change, the possibility of a continuation of the factors which created the nation may ultimately lead to some sort of supra-national unity. Chapter six will focus separately on the economic, political, and the social nature of the individual in society. The individual is the missing variable in the overall consideration of holistic integration. Chapter seven will examine the German model of integration and apply it when possible to the modern movement.

This paper, refering frequently to the German model, uses Germany, as an example of an integrated society which owing to its comparatively late development, offers well documented evidence of the interplay of multi-dimensional variables and their effects on the individual. Its reference may highlight parallel or missing current European developments. Remembering that socialisation allows for integration and that societies develop from small to large, the German model as an example of integration to the level of nation, may be instrumental in yielding insight to the interplay of variables potentially yielding meta-nationality. Chapter Eight highlights the building of consensus of opinion through knowledge and Chapter Nine summarises and focuses on the process of Education.

Why must the focus and the very thrust of

integration be aimed at social considerations?"[3] The answer is apparent: the political dimension alone does not fully encapsulate the process and the transactional dimension only describes that which is readily empirically testifiable. Only an overall consideration coupled with the social dimension, despite its inherent validity problem, can be employed to explain what fundamentally is the social process of integration.

The most prominent integrational actor in Europe today is the European Community. The Community prides itself on the lowering of restrictive barriers to inter-community trade. Effectively the free-trade area created by the community today is very comparable to the free trade area that existed in Europe during 1870's and the 1880's. The European Economic Community has as one of its goals free travel for Community citizens without the necessity of passports. Again the condition is similar to the Europe prior to World War One, when private travel did not mandate documentation. The progress forward made by the Community in the field of integration in many respects takes on the characteristic of a large step backwards. The reason for this as put forward by this paper is the fact that the EEC's actions are politically state-based and as such, are formal integration attempts to achieve specific ends. In this instance, the achievement of negative integrational advantages - the undoing of what states themselves have done - is not

positive integrational - the assistance of individuals to socially integrate. Political actions of this nature are not necessarily directly causal to the triggering of the free social responses amongst populations required to create an effective "we" feeling or a feeling as Scheller termed, of Brotherhood.[94]

CHAPTER ONE NOTES

[1]For an excellent analytical discussion, see Warren Ilchman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy in Change. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1971).

[2]Change is discussed at length throughout the literature. For an introduction to the phenomena, reference is made to p. 9ff, "The Principle of Growth," etc., in Bertrand Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916); Edward H. Spicer, Human Problems in Technological Change. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952), especially p. 13ff.: "Change in the Modern World"; the introduction and case studies in Martin Kolinsky, Continuity and Change in European Society. (London: Croom Helm, 1974); and, for an introduction as to changes' effect on the individual, see Glenn Pearce and Patrick Maynard, ed., Conceptual Change. (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1973) on conceptualisation, p. 31ff., linguistic importance, p. 1ff.: conceptual change, p. 127ff; and Gene Summers, Attitude Measurement. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1970. Summers attempts an analytical assessment of attitudes and their evaluation (p. 127ff.), behavioural predictions (p. 468ff.) which are affected by the impact of change.

[3]See K. Waltz, "National Independence," in Ray Maghoori and Bennett Ramber, ed., Globalism versus Realism: International Relations Third Debate. (Boulder, Colarado: Westview Press, 1982), p. 81.

[4]Social relations have to do with dependencies and interdependencies. See the seminal work, Ward Hunt Goodenough, Cooperation in Change. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963 (1976 edition), Forward (p. 7ff.), cooperation in change (p. 35ff.), and identity (related to attitude) change (p. 215ff.), and the difficult concept of 'Change and Social Control' (p. 346ff.). The questions of dependence (see especially 'call for order' by Kurt Waldheim, p. 9, 1975) is treated in J. Tinbergen, et.al., Reshaping the International Order: A Report to the Club of Rome. (London: Hutchinson of London, 1977), and a study on "Public and Private Learning in a Changing Society," in Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State. (London: Temple Smith, 1971), especially chapter 7, p. 201ff.

[5]Modernity is essentially the name given to change taking place in the current historical period. For an interesting dicussion on both its singular and collective effects on individuals, see especially chapter 3, p. 62ff., and chapter 5, p. 89ff. in C.R. Badcock, Madness and Modernity. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). For its effects on society, politics, and religion, see Peter L. Berger, Facing Up to Modernity. (New York: Basic Books, 1977), especially chapter 6, Critique, p. 70ff.; and see also Modernity's general effects in the excellent work, S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, and Modernity. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973).

[6]For a discussion on the need to synthesise disciplines, see David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962);

K.W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1963); G.A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, The Politics of Developing Areas. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 3-66.

[7]Shirley Williams attributes this to what she calls cumulative knowledge. Politics Is for People. (London: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 172.

[8]Although dated, for an excellent backup argumentation, see Clarence K. Streit, Union Now. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939); In What Are We to Do with Our Lives? (London: William Heinemann, Ltd, 1931), H.G. Wells calls this an open conspiracy (Chapter II, p. 10) and defines the danger of traditional forms of government and economics as a nightmare, the conspiracy being the awakening of mankind from such a nightmare of struggle for existence and the inevitability of war (pp. 147-48).

[9]"The desire for the creation of a united European power is not new. As early as 1305, Pierre DuBois, a lawyer from Normandy called for a European state. Throughout the centuries that followed, DuBois had many followers . . . and, of course, a number of rulers tried to create a unified Europe and nearly succeeded." Etienne-Sadi Kirschen, Financial Integration in Western Europe. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 1. For efforts before the Treaty of Rome, see E.S. Kirschen, et.al., Economic Policy in Our Time. (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., 1974).

[10]See the consideration of Count Couden Hove-Kalergi entitled "Europe Must Unite," originally printed 1939-40 in George Catlin, One Anglo-American Union. (London: Andrew Decers, Ltd., 1941), p. 29.

[11]The idea of a united Europe is an age-old idea which had inspired men as diverse as William Penn and Sully. See Alan Watson, Europe at Risk. (London: George C. Harrop and Co., 1972), p. 182; Etienne-Sadi Kirschen, Financial Integration in Western Europe. op. cit. p. 1; and, for effects before World War II, Kirschen, et.al., Economic Policy. op. cit.

[12]Through a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated rise in standards of living, etc., see U. Kitzinger, The Challenge of the Common Market. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962) and D. Praig, "The Treaty of Rome," in J. Calman, ed., The Common Market: The Treaty of Rome Explained. (London: Anthony Blond Publishing, 1967).

[13]Today's utopian idea is best summarised by L. Barzini. "Europe clearly evolved one common will, speak (sic) with one calm majestic voice, have a clear idea of its identity and goals, cultivate and defend its economic prosperity, and pursue a single foreign policy in its own interest (and the world's). It should therefore forget its trivial disputes and rivalries, put its own house in order, set up authoritarian common democratic institutions, arrange its financial affairs according to more or less uniform

criteria, adopt one currency, and set up one redoubtable defence establishment." The Impossible Europeans. (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1983), p. 23.

[14]This has been developed by H. Bull in The Anarchal Society. (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[15]Aristotle, Politics. (London: J.M. Dent and Sons, 1942).

[16]J.D.B. Miller, The World of States. (London: Croom-Helm, 1981), p. 9.

[17]Loc. cit. p. 10.

[18]Loc. cit. p. 16.

[19]Loc. cit. p. 31.

[20]General reference is made to Parts II and III of A.K. Cairncross, Factors in Economic Development. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1962). For a review and bibliography, see Ertl, European Economic Integration. Unpublished Master's thesis, University of Exeter, Devon, 1979. Of more modern vintage, reference is made to Werner Hildenbrand, ed., Advances in Economic Theory. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Econometeric Society Monographs, 1985), especially chapter 9, pp. 235-52 and en passant Part VII on the industrial organisation.

[21]To bring in a degree of stabilisation, an effective 'subjective' focus is the subject well treated in Jack Wiseman, ed., Beyond Positive Economics? (London: Macmillan, 1983), especially chapter 6, p. 87ff. N.B. the Philips Curve theory, and its noticeable disfunction as a result of the second oil crisis, (1978-81) in western European economies when both inflation and unemployment increased, is an example.

[22]See Gordon K. Douglass, ed., The New Interdependence. (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1979), chapter 1: "National Interests and International Order." For an example, see Richard Bailey, The European Connection. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983). "Britain Shunning the EMS," p. 91ff.

[23]See as a general overview, H.K. Junckerstoff, ed., International Manual on the European Community. (St. Louis, Missouri: St. Louis University Press. 1963), especially chapter VI, p. 145ff.; and Henry G. Aubrey and F.A. Praeher, Atlantic Economic Cooperation. (New York: Praeger, 1967, first edition), p. 35ff.

[24]This is social genetics. For a good discussion about social genetics, see Ernest Gallner, Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 29ff.

[25]It would probably be accurate to develop an approach to the study of international behaviour on the basis of social-psychological concepts incorporating all dimensions as argued by H.C. Kelman, "Social-Psychological Approaches of International Relations," in International Behaviour, a Social-Psychological Analysis. (New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1965), section one, pp. 14ff.

[26]This is primarily the reasoning of the eighteenth century school, although foundations go much before that date. See, for a comprehensive overview in summarisation form, John Bowle, Western Political Thought. (London:

Jonathan Cape, 1968), especially book three onwards.

[27]Functionalism will be discussed later in this paper. Here an apercu may be gleaned from D. Mitrany, first noted in The Progress of International Government. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1933).

[28]Williams, Politics Is for People. op. cit. p. 172.

[29]For further material on the conceptualisational changes in the consideration of society, see John Rex, ed., Approaches to Sociology: An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), especially p. 187.

[30]For a good review, see James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1981), p. 282.

[31]Examples of the various usages of the term "integration" are given in Henry Teune, "Integration," in Giovanni Sartori, ed., Social Science Concepts. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 235-64.

[32]See Duden, Worterbuch der deutshen Spracke. (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1921).

[33]E. M. Kirkpatrick, ed., Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary. (Edinburgh: Chambers, 1983), p. 654.

[34]This example is given by Daniel Frei in "Integrationsprozesse," in Werner Weidenfeld, Die Identitat Europas. (Darmstadt: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1985), p. 113ff.

[35]Amongst others, see Barry Hughes and John E. Schwarz, "Dimensions of Political Integration and the Experience of the European Community," in International Studies Quarterly. 16(Sept. 1972):263-94.

[36]Political amalgamation levels are measured and recorded in W.E. Fischer, "An Analysis of the Deutsch Socio-Causal Paradigm of Political Integration," in International Organizations. 23(Spring 1969):254-90.

[37]See Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations Theories and Evidence. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 214-15.

[38]Hughes and Schwarz, "Dimensions of Political Integration," op. cit. p. 285.

[39]This is not to imply that intergovernmental cooperation is synonymous with integration. It does mean, however, cooperation may be more prone to a postliminary integration than not. However, when decisions are made by supra-national organisations binding on the domestic entity, a degree of integration has been achieved. See, for a historical analysis of the modern period, F.H. Hinsley, Nationalism and the International System. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), chapter eight, especially pp. 113-14.

[40]See Leon Lindberg, "Political Integration as a Multi-Dimensional Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate Measurement," in International Organizations. 24(Autumn 1970):649-732 and Joseph Nye, "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," in International Organizations. 22(Autumn 1968):855-80.

[41]Sullivan, International Relations Theories and

Evidence. op. cit. p. 215.

[42]For a useful three dimensional conceptualisation of integration, see Leon Hurwitz, "Contemporary Perspectives on EC Integration: Attitudes, Non-Governmental Behaviour and Collective Decision Making," in Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration. (London: Aldwych, 1980), pp. 3-23. A major problem is that empirical evidence readily available, frequently economic in nature, because of its accessability, could potentially assume an importance grade in excess of non-verifiable information, often political motives, and hence effectively bias the outcome of consideration.

[43]Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-be Polity: Patterns of Change in the European Community. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp. 69-74: and Ernest B. Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory. (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1975): and Llewellyn D. Howell, "The Dimensionality of Regional Integration," in International Organizations. 29(Autumn 1975):997-1020.

[44]The primacy of politics in the EEC was made clear by their first President, Walter Hallstein: "We are not in business at all - we are in politics." See "EEC Comission Press Release," (Bruxelle: 22 May 1961).

[45]Yao-Su Hu, Europe under Stress: Convergence and Divergence in the European Community. (London: Butterworths, 1981), p. 109ff.

[46]For an up-to-date review of the 'success' of the project and its industrial ramifications, see Keith Hayward, "Airbus: Twenty Years of European Collaboration," in International Affairs. 64(Winter, 1987-88):11-26. See also a report by Leo Tindemans to the European Council, entitled "European Union." (Luxembourg: Commission of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76, 1976).

[47]Yao-Su Hu, Europe under Stress. op. cit. and Ray Maghoori and Bennett Ramberg, ed., Globalism versus Realism. op. cit. p. 195ff.: "Transnationalism, Power Politics, and the Realities of the Present System."

[48]Peter Bender, et.al., Die Identität Europas. (Stuttgart: Carl Hansen Verlag, 1985), p. 116.

[49]Loc. cit. See the general text, Die Identität Europas. "We want to be one single brotherhood."

[50]This is basically a non-logical attitude. This is what Machiavelli meant when he said, "I conclude, therefore, that when a prince has the goodwill of the people he should not worry about conspiracies: but when the people are hostile and regard him with hatred he should go in fear to everything and everyone." The Prince. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1514, 1961), p. 105. Note also what Merritt and Puchala said: "An understanding . . . requires not only knowledge of how government officials and foreign policy elites perceive and react, but also and to an increasing extent information about how the 'man in the street' thinks about, feels about, and responds." R.L. Merritt and E.J. Puchala, ed., Western European Perspectives in International Affairs. (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. vii. Concerted

responding is action of 'brothers'.

[51]The normative sociological dimension is dicussed in Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Phantom Europe: Thirty Years of Survey Research on German Attitudes toward European Integration," in L. Hurwitz, ed., Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration. op. cit. pp. 53-74 and Amitai Etzioni, "Social Psychological Aspects of International Relations," in Lindzey Gardner and Elliot Aronson, ed., The Handbook of Social Psychology. Volume 5. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 538-601.

[52]There are always groups in society but when group status begins to dominate over collective status, the collectivity is sacrificed to the particularistic interest and is analogous to disintegration. The idea of groups within a whole is best appreciated by the idea of cells in a body, and is associated with William James. See Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James. (London: Humphrey Milford, 1935), especially part III, vol. 1. Also Josiah Royce, William James and Other Essays. (New York: Macmillan, 1911), "Introduction," p. 19ff.

[53]Europa Barometer. (Brussels: EEC, May 1984, no. 21), table 17.

[54]In other words, that their collective group is not receiving sufficient benefit from association. It is a question of orientation. See Josephine Klein, The Study of Groups. (London: -Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1956), chapter 1, p. 1ff., chapter 5, p. 57ff., p. 108ff. and chapter 12, p. 158ff. Also, see the consideration of group orientation applicable to larger collectivities in A. Paul Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962), part two.

[55]Based on a concept inherited from the past. See, for the development, Lewis Spence, An Introduction to Mythology. (London: George G. Harap, 1921), p. 11ff.

[56]The emotional feelings nations have towards others are related to the corollary phenomena of national character; is it possible to say such exists or indeed is justifiably valid? The answer may be yes, for like individuals undergoing the same sort of socialisation, being exposed to similar stimuli, do produce similar patterns which may be objectively characterised of societies as a whole, but not as a subjective rule. See, amongst others, Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policies. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1982), chapter 2: "The Human Dimension of Foreign Policy and National Character" in section 3: "Societal Determinants"; and Maurice A. East, "National Attributes and Foreign Policy," in M.A. East, S.A. Salmore, and C.F. Hermann, Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1978), chapter six.

[57]Wilfried Preno, "Trade, Interdependence and European Integration," in L. Hurwitz, Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration. op. cit. pp. 77-94; Karl Deutsch, "International Communications," in Public Opinion Quarterly. 20(1956):143-60; and Robert Rosecrance,

et.al., "Whither Independence?" in International Organizations. 31(1977):425-71 and Donald J. Puchala, "International Transactions," in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold, ed., Regional Integration, Theory and Research. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 128-59.

[58]This is a primary tenet of basic trade theory. The classic work is Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950); empirically set out in Jaroslav Vanek, General Equilibrium of International Discrimination. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965); called for, amongst others, early on, by Lord Avebury, in Free Trade. (London: Macmillan, 1905); defined by, amongst others, Harry G. Johnson, New Trade Strategy for the World Economy. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969); and G.D.N. Worswick, The Free Trade Proposals. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960); requiring international structures, notably GATT, see Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial Diplomacy. (London: Michael Joseph, 1965); which may be needing reorganisation, see John Evans, The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of the GATT. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), especially chater 16, p. 299ff; leading toward cost, price, and other standardisation. See Herbert Giersch, ed., On the Economics of Intra-Industry Trade. (Tubingen: Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel. J.C.B. Mohr, 1979), especially pp. 3-10.

[59]For an interesting comparative discussion, see Peter Bender, Die Identität Europas. op. cit. p. 119: and for statistical data, reference is made to the appropriate OECD publications.

[60]Evidenced by historical statistics first noted in literature by Jacob Viner in reviewing general UK, German 1913/14 trade in The Customs Union Issue. op. cit.

[61]See, for a conceptual framework's importance, constituting "a beginning and a promise for the future," the discussion of "will" in G. Catlin, A Study of the Principles of Politics. (London: MacMillan, 1930), p. 19ff. See also David Easton, "The Point of View of the Author," in M. Black, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prenctice-Hall, 1961), pp. 311-63.

[62]O.R. Young, Systems of Political Science. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 11.

[63]K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (London: Hutchinson, 1968), especially chapters 3 and 4. See also E. Nagel, The Structure of Science. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1961), chapters 2,5,6.

[64]K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. op. cit. p. 59.

[65]See a discussion of the social sciences, in David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 13ff.

[66]Reginald J. Harrison, Europe in Question. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), pp. 42-74: and Paul

Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, ed., "A Conceptual Typology of International Organization," in International Organization. (London: F. Pinter, 1978), pp. 118-36; as well as "Federalism: The Conceptual Setting," (1978), pp. 326-44; and Carole Webb, "Theories of International Cooperation and Integration," in James Barber, et.al., ed., Politics between States: Conflict and Cooperation. (Milton Keynes: Open University, 1975). See also Bernard Burrows, et.al., ed., Federal Solutions to European Issues. (London: Macmillan, 1977), especially Conclusion and p. 224ff.

[67]Primarily by the The Federalist Papers, originally a series of eighty-five essays published in the New York press from October 1787 until August 1788 under the signature, 'Publius,' written by Hamilton (51), Madison (26) and John Jay (5) (Hamilton and Madison collaborated on three), is the classic statement of the political principle of Federalism. See Alan Pendleton Grimes, American Political Thought. (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1955), p. 119ff., and Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1955), p. 67ff.

[68]For a good discussion of Federalism, see Charles Pentland, International Theories and European Integration. (New York: Macmillan, 1973), especially part one, chapter two.

[69]Not withstanding the potentiality for growth, as in the United States, toward a greater integrated (centrally controlled) collectivity.

[70]Peter Bender, Die Identität Europas. op. cit. p. 122.

[71]See J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political Theory. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 503; and its possibility by growth through centralisation, Frederic Jesup Stimson, The Western Way. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 62. The inherent implications of growth are a theoretical outcropping of formalised structural relativity outside the realm of this paper.

[72]For Functionalism detail, see David Mitrany, The Functionalist Theory of Politics. (London: Robertson (for the London School of Economics and Political Science), 1975); P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, ed., "Functionalism, the Theory of David Mitrany," in Paul Taylor, et.al., eds., International Organization. op. cit. pp. 236-52; Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration. (London: Croom Helm, 1983); and Mark Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty," in Review of International Studies. 10(1984):103-23.

[73]Monnet himself said that "The history of European unification shows that when people become convinced a change is taking place . . . they act before that situation is established." A. Sampson, The New Europeans. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), p. 82.

[74]See Peter Bender, Die Identität Europas. op. cit. p. 123, for an elaboration of the argument.

[75]Haas introduced the 'high' and 'low' concepts in

E.B. Haas, "'The Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin America," in Journal of Common Market Studies. 5(1967):315. 327-28.

[76]As evidenced in the Federalist discussion of pluralistic society, Functionalism too MAY lead to social and ultimately political integration. However, this is an implied residual and not central tenet of the primary theory. The theory itself has two main streams. (1) structural-functionalism, a framework oriented toward a general theory of society based in anthropological and social thought. See E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1938), pp. 89-97; A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society. (London: Cohen and West, 1979: M.J. Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952): and G.A. Almond and J.S. Coleman, ed., The Politics of Developing Areas. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), "Introduction.") And (2) a more flexible empirical approach suggesting functions as being achieved when needs are met by activity in the system. See B. Malinowski, "Functionalism in Anthropology," in L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg, ed., Sociological Theory. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), pp. 637-50; R.K. Merton, Continuities in Structural Inquiry. (London: Sage, 1981): and R. Firth, ed., Man and Culture: An Evaluation of the Work of Bronislaw Malinowski. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

[77]See, amongst others, Gerhard Mally, The European Community in Perspective. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1973), pp. 29-33: and Phillippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," in L.N. Lindberg, S.A. Scheingold, ed., Regional Integration, Theory and Research. op. cit. pp. 232-64; and Ernest B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968); and R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); and James Sewell, Fundamentalism and World Politics. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966): and Stephen J. Genco, "Integration Theory and Systems Change in Western Europe," in Ole Holsti, Change in the International System. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 55-80; and R.J. Harrison, "NeoFunctionalism," in P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, ed., International Organization. op. cit. pp. 253-69.

[78]This has been noted relatively early in the development of Community affairs. John Pinder applied the economic phraseology "positive integration." See "Positive Integration and Negative Integration: Some Problems of the Economic Union in the EEC," in World Today. 24(1968):90ff. This indicates the necessity for domestic states to do more than just the "negative integrational" removal of trade barriers, etc.

[79]See especially Donald J. Puchala, "International Theory and the Study of International Relations," in Richard

L. Merritt and Bruce M. Russett, From National Development to Global Community: Essays in Honor of Karl W. Deutsch. (Boston: MIT Press, 1981), pp. 145-64; and Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. (Boston: MIT, 1953); and Karl W. Deutsch, Tides among Nations. (New York: Macmillan, 1979).

[80]As elaborated by Kaleri J. Holsti, "Change in the International System, Interdependence, Integration, Fragmentation," in Ole Holsti, Change in the International System. op. cit.

[81]As in Winston Churchill, The European Movement. (London: Hutchinson, 1949); also Anthony Nutting, "The Schuman Plan," in Europe Will Not Wait. (London: Hollins and Carter, 1960), p. 26ff.; or the formidable Jean Monnet, see Max Kohnstamm, Jean Monnet: The Power of the Imagination. (Florence, European University, 23 November 1981), Fifth Jean Monnet Lecture.

[82]The original idea of the 'United States of Europe' is difficult to isolate in literature and appears to have developed through the ideas of the French minister Sully of the court of Henry IV of France in 1610 and in 1795 by Immanual Kant's 'On Eternal Peace'. See Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 1; and developed currency around 1848 in speeches by Cattaneo, Cobden, Mazzini, and Victor Hugo. See D. de Rougemont, Vingt-huit siècles d'Europe. (Paris: Payot, 1961), and P. Renouvin, L' idee de fédération européene dans la pensée politique du XIXe siècle. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).

[83]Called Erbfeindschaft. The Schumann Plan had as its long range goal the object of making future Franco-German War impossible. See D. Coombes, Politics and Bureaucracy in the European Community. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970).

[84]The stepping stone to the EEC was the European Coal and Steel Community. See D. Swann, The Economics of the Common Market. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1981. Given momentum by the 'Relance europiene' at the Messina Conference, 5 June 1955. See F.R. Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-63. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1965). All of which were 'the latest in a series of steps designed to break down the bastions of European national separatism'. See L.N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963). Keeping the dialogue going is a product of fear, Russian military power, American economic power, and fear of Europeans by Europeans themselves. "They knew anything might happen in Europe because everything has happened." Willis, France, Germany, op. cit. p. 223.

[85]The various theories are approaches to the question of integration and any taxonomy presents a problematic because of converging overlap. See P. Taylor, "The Concept of Community and European Integration Process," in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972); and J.S. Nye, Peace in Parts. (Boston:

Little, Brown, and Co., 1971).

[86]Die Indentität Europas. op. cit. p. 128: and Robert Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

[87]An interesting study of "the English School of International Relations" somewhat akin to New Functionalism/Pluralistic systems is found in Sheila Grader, "The English School of International Relations: Evidence and Evaluation," in Review of International Studies. 17(January 1988):1ff. Attention drawn to the conclusion of the article.

[88]Lasswell recognizes the relationship between Environment change and systems change. "Historical and comparative research has often demonstrated high degrees of causal connection between changes in the environment and changes in institution and ideology" (p. 285), and the change in role by elites: "Political elites have been particularly active in obtaining intimate knowledge to further the survival of the politicians rather than to contribute to science or health." In other words, individuals that gain control of the changing situation for their own advantage. Harold Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1947, 1960). Although through authoritarian control, "A nation's elite may believe that they can achieve a more stable equilibrium and can better sustain their positions through authoritarian repression and symbol manipulation." Gabriel A. and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, p. 212, quoted in Warren Lichman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change. (Berkeley, California: University of California, 1971), p. 20. For useful detail, see also William Goode, The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Social Control System. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978) and G. Jowell Field and John Higley, Elitism. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980).

[89]This position is a main subject treated in the book by D. Steven Blum, Walter Lippmann: Cosmopolitan in the Century of Total War. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985).

[90]Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public. A Sequel to Public Opinion. (New York: Macmillan, 1985), pp. 47-48.

[91]Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Integration," in Journal of Peace Research. 5(1968):377.

[92]The need for a multi-dimensional model as a conceptual framework for integration has been emphasized by Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Theory and Political Science," in American Political Science Review. 60(December 1966):869-79.

[93]Ralf Dahrendorf, Life Chances: Approaches to Social and Political Theory. (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1979). "We need a genuinely social, and that means of necessity, historical, concept of what the process of human societies is about" (pp. 23-24). See also by the same author, Essays in the Theory of Society. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968).

**For further material on the phenomena of rapid social change, see Egbert DeVries, Man in Rapid Social Change. (Bloomsbury: SCM Press Ltd., 1961); and Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962).

CHAPTER TWO

Socialisation: The Process

Socialisation and integration are complementary but not synonymous terms. Whereas integration is the bringing together of parts into a contiguous whole, creating an orderly arrangement of elemental components integrated into a harmonious grouping or pattern,[1] socialisation is the process undergone either singularly or collectively which provides the environment necessary for the bringing together of diverse entities in an integrated state. Socialisation relates to individual concoperated coalescence to form groups and the concoporated coalescence of groups to form larger groups. In many respects, the individual is nationalised through the process of socialisation. These characteristics may be viewed in terms of gains, economic, socio-cultural, and political, which are benefits derived through integration. The process of socialisation tends to create similar and ultimately identifying characteristics relating to the plexure of individuals in the socialisation process.

The economic gains of socialisation may be preliminarily summarised as gains in the material standard of living. Socio-cultural gains may be summarised as an expansion in intellectual horizon achieved through knowledge or participation in others' experiences derived through the synergies of interaction. The political gains may likewise by summarised, as gains in security, either economic or physical.

Sociological developments started in organic groups[2]

with a series of individuals which, in a general way, felt solidarity. This is accomplished in either a cognitive or non-cognitive fashion.[3] Essentially, life presents an ongoing series of tensions or conflicts which cause a constant need for new re-evaluation, rejustification, and new assertions or actions, tending toward equilibrium. Individuals or groups treat each other as auxilliary (or adversary) until a general pattern of solidarity develops which moderates the need for much individual or group competition. This is achieved by way of role identification and a general development of tolerance with the whole, resulting in a division of labour with its implied or apparent benefits. Slowly, patterns evolve,[4] mutual reactions and expectations which find themselves very comfortable. Patterns develop through repetition and are coded into habits, leading by way of reinforcement, into rules of expectations and conduct. There is a certain sorting of rights and duties, established by usage and which become almost obligatory action which tends to create a transmission pattern in which the past eventually becomes the future.[5] This is the slow work of consolidation, afforded by the interactions inherent within socialisation, which forms a network of links that, little by little, weave themselves into a permanent organic solidarity. Equilbrium can be maintained by a rigourously defined elimination of competition through a clearly defined division of labour.[6]

The size of the embryonic group existent at the

beginning of the socialisation process is important. The size or quantitative determinants, results in the compatibility of responses to the exposure of stimuli in the socialisation process and ultimately the eventual integration of elements.

These responses may be either positive or negative. Smaller groups may react to stimulus differently than do larger groups and vice versa. Reactions coded into patterns of behaviour are fundamental to, and a determinant of, basic political, socio-cultural, and economic gains. Primarily such gains, the very reason why individuals function in society, are gains made possible through the quantitative expansion in the size of groups. These gains are the product of cumulative knowledge and divisions of labour. Given a condition of freedom, the single individual could possibly exist as an individual apart from sociological considerations without labour divisions or politically defined authority. His cultural and economic attainments would be of his own achievement, and given the limitations of man, these are discreetly restricted to his personal capabilities.

A combination of two individuals creating a basic diodal unit can capitalise on the quantitatively expanded unit by extending capabilities. A combination of three, a triodal unit, when exercising divisions of labour, achieve economic socio-cultural and political gains from interactional increases.[7] At the diodal level, distinct economic behavioural patterns are observable. At the

triodal level, both economic and political patterns are visible. Thus the quantitative determinants at this level of socialisation appear positive. Positive because there are achievement gains made directly related to group size. Given a scarcity of primary resources, and the necessity to share, size may also however, produce negative advantages with group quantitative expansion.

The triodal unity tends to create a group which could be termed primary,[8] a group characterised by intimate face to face association and cooperation.[9] Because of the interactive nature of the triodal unit, all levels of human interchange are apparent. Because of the basic purposive primacy of the triodal unit, the individual forms his fundamental social nature, incorporating common ideals and concepts of purpose.

Psychologically, the result of intimate association is that of a certain fusion of individualities into a common whole. This wholeness may be termed a "we-ness," whereby sympathy and mutual identification are best expressed naturally by the term "we." It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of constant harmony. It is often competitive and self-asserting, however, this is socialised by sympathy with allegiance to a basic conceptualisation of the unit's commonality. Primary groups are primary in that they give the individual his earliest and most complete experience of social unity and form the foundation of expanded socialisation.[10] This primary relationship forms the first phase of society and is

achieved amongst individuals through the medium of communication. The individual's freedom takes on the form of role playing which is a patterned control by which an individual is able to exercise his own response to given sociological situations within accepted parameters. Socialisation is the bringing of any given social act, or of the total social process in which that act is a constituent, directly, and as an organised whole, into the experience of each of the individual organisms implicated in that act. This achieves the reference to which the individual may consequently be regulated and governed in his own individual conduct. The reference constitutes the peculiar value and significance of self-consciousness in the individual organism, which derives as a result in the social context, through the fulfillment of a role.[11]

A role is important. It is a position that can be filled by an individual and is something that has certain distinctive behavioural requirements and expectations attached to it.[12] The distinctive behaviour, termed 'norms', determine action within given groups. Norms (i) are a basic mechanism of social control and supply group structure; (ii) they encourage specialisation by increasing efficiency of the group members' efforts, as no one can do everything equally well; (iii) Norms tend to increase interdependence amongst group members and carry the net effect of strengthening the group; and (iv) Norms tend to be a mechanism by which the culture is sustained and transmitted. "Individuals are mortal, roles are not."[13]

Patterned roles develop nominative action. They prescribe the limits of acceptable individual and societal behaviour. Norms develop from triadic society, that is, from a society which has grown quantitatively enough to allow for the divisions of labour and the resultant dependency-interdependency to develop which necessitates the creation of such. Socialisation extending beyond the triads to groups, tends to expand the interaction complexities.[14] The elements present in the triad are entwined by each new additional quantitative advance. The resulting patterns, roles, and behaviours as well as labour diversifications are dependent upon the interplay of the existing elements and conditions relating to the social grouping and are discretely unique to each indigenous grouping. Repetitive action within the group congeals into ritual, so that any collective alienation from the existing social structure contains - potentially, at any rate - the seeds of new organisation.[15]

Alienation from the accepted social order could find new expression in a new, elementary form of organisation. Fluid forms of interaction become routinised and fugitive patterns are "crystallised" into cohesive units with a sense of solidarity and with more or less definite structure. The resulting collectivity constitutes what has been termed a sectarian association: "sectarian" signifies that such an association exists as a secondary phenomenon which developed as a result of cleavage from an already existing social order.[16] Conflict or hostility frequently provides the

provocation for microcosm development from the previously existing association,[17] and frequently provides the means which afford the opportunity for structural social change. The new associations interact with older associations, exchanging, mixing, producing a constant organisation reshuffle with constant new definitions of roles and relations, and are not dissimilar to molecular movement inside the smallest particles of matter.[18]

Alternative Associations

There are also groupings which do not exhibit significant cohesive structure. Such an organised grouping is termed a crowd,[19] and commences the resemblance of an organised group when its component members become possessed by the same clearly defined purpose whether articulated or not and when the purpose becomes transformed into a collective will, where such is based on a collective group idea. This is often on a tangent to collective or group dynamics and underscores the idea of social organisation based on social interaction and collective idealism. The break-off association, and the spin-off grouping process, develop a nucleus which spells the beginnings of permanent association. It is important to note that the sectarian nuclei reflect a group-coded response to specific and particular needs. The concept of marginality suggests that resulting from the cleavage, spin-offs of individuals develop with lack of just acceptance to the new or the old association and form mutated subgroups, as heretofore mentioned.[20]

Through this process of constant aligning and re-aligning within the socialisation process is developed evolutionary change, whereby evolutionary change is a process of cumulative changes by which a succession of new phenomena develop more or less gradually and over an extended period of time, out of phenomena that already exist. Evolutionary change is cumulative change based fundamentally on systems of encoded information.[21] Cultural forms or habits are generally freely transmitted by accepted patterns of action. Vast quantities of cultural information combine to form a cultural heritage indigenous to the group which is carried from generation to generation embellished and enriched by further interactions. Incorporated into this general body of cultural heritage transmission are the results of individual learning and experience. An important concept of encoded information is that, within any given society, and indigenous to that society, the cultural evolutionary heritage which is being transmitted is highly unique. The overall socio-cultural, economic, and political evolution is the result of a process of change and development in human societies which stem from cumulative change in their stores of cultural information.[22]

The encoding and transmission process, through a series of innovations and selections, continues from the individual through to the world system of societies, the consequences

being different for each human participant. Societal groupings, quantitatively larger than the group level, as a common focus of identity, are a phenomenon of relatively modern vintage and directly related to the process of modernisation. Throughout history, quantitatively most societies have consisted of only a few hundred members and - as late as two or three hundred years ago the majority of societies still fit this description.[23] Because of the quantitative magnitude of society's complexities, the encoding and transmission, especially in light of the modernisation process, has been propelling sociological development to a larger unit other than that of the primary base with an ever increasing speed. All units possess an expanded store of information about how to utilise the resources of their environments for basic need satisfaction in common, however, the qualitative expansion of society redefines, in light of new experience, that information. Evolutionary change is the result of socialisation and is fundamentally the interactional process whereby an individual's behaviour is modified to conform to expectations held by members of the group to which he belongs.[24]

Evolution itself has to do with the explanation of the life-forms with which nature and history present the individual in society,[25] especially in light of (i) the new environments of society and (ii) the changing life-questions brought on by both the new member and the

change (modernisation) which has taken place.[26]

What is found existent in small group structure is, in effect, that which is also of importance to large group structures. The quantitative determinants of the group are a dimension of progressive intensity which refers to an increased frequency and mixity of that which is found in the small node. The greater the number of individuals participating in the process, the more opportunities for interaction. The greater the number of challenges and responses to challenges, the greater the general change, creating a more dynamic and complex socialisation process. A dyad is less complex than a triad, which itself is infinitely less complex than a larger grouping of any given number of members. The growth is an intensification and formalisation of the structures of society, affording a clarification and recognition of expectations and performance of participating individuals within the group setting.

Conflict

Conflict, as a means of eliminating tension, frequently provides the process by which socialisation takes place. Conflict is the confrontation of different positions, ideas, notions, etc., which are in essence the stimulus for social evolution. Conflict is when one individual perceives that the other has frustrated or is about to frustrate some right.[27] It may be singular, taking on the highly personal characteristic of disequilibrium forcing a question

and answer process, or it may be transmitted to a group with the more overt characteristics tending toward hostility. Hostile conflict, once achieved, must be vented either (i) through the satisfaction of one's requirements often at the expense of another; (ii) through a cooperative; or (iii) compromising; or (iv) collaboration_action; or (v) avoidance with most generally the result of the mutation of the original singular or inter-group sociological structure.[28]

Conflict is a major stimulus for the achievement of evolutional change, introducing the individual or collectivity to changes in positions throughout life encountering new role relationships to be learned, new economic and political structures to be mastered, or as precipitator or participator in overall social-environment changes. It is evident at all levels of society, at the individual level in those heretofore treated quantitatively limited organisations, the elementary groups, and in more complex groupings.[29] As differences in the size of a grouping entail differences in the nature of their social relationships, direct human contacts and mediated relationships are fundamentally different.[30] Small communities, which take on essentially a personal character, exhibit conflict and conflict abatement taking place on the plane of direct interactional contact. As small communities tend to have less formal political organisations than do larger groupings, relationships are defined in terms of alliance among individuals and in terms of personal

affinities. In larger communities, conflict is as much collective as individual and is characterised by greater complexity, conducted on simultaneous levels between contending groups and within groups. In a very real sense, inter-group conflict is similar to small group conflict, with the larger group exhibiting complexities of amplification having conflict simultaneously taking place on both macro and micro levels. Conflict is essential as the primary stimulus which changes structural forms, however, it is by no means the only impetus to a process of change. Others may perfectly well originate in the development of a cultural configuration such as the development of science or of religion, ideas, genetic considerations of population or a shift in the physical environment such as the exhaustion of a strategic resource.[31] Structural change in society may also be generated by nothing more than the general advancement of the learning curve. The degree of change indicates the dynamics of society; a society with little change tends toward stagnancy. Socialisation, as the interactional process of the individual in society, affects and is affected by, individual change in the overall social change, and situational changes brought about by the advance of modernity.

During the process of socialisation, the sociological small node, as a result of constant confrontation and equalisational alignments, crystallises with an identifiable set of character patterns, roles, economic, or political

patterns, unique to that grouping. The centre of this, called a polis, generates in almost gravitational consistency the impetus for the propagation of patterns of behaviours. The small nodal gravitational polis provides the natio and correlates highly with ethnie.[32] The ethnie is an aggregate of kinship units, the members of which trace their origin in terms of common descent from a common ancestor or common ancestors who belong to the same categorised ethnic group and form a matrix relatedness.[33] The consideration of the polis of a given societal grouping as natio, as the point of birth of a given society and hence related to that society's ethnie, is a correct consideration, as socialisation is a network of ordered relations in which individuals are organised in many different ways and have their behaviours, attitudes and characters determined by numerous established patterns in the form of institutions, customs, and ultimately in highly organised society law.[34]

Non-Behavioural Characteristics of a Community

The community members' attitudes are as important as their behaviours and the former are often responsible for the latter. The nature of the community is codifed in a set of "value impregnated beliefs."[35] The beliefs give structure and form to society and allow for explanation and justification of conditions through customs, institutions and practice. This is the area of cultural identification stemming from the natio, the collective images and ideas of a community, which are in a way its spiritual and

psychological elements.[36] Culture is the unique-to-the-community frame around which all elements which comprise a social group combine, i.e., collective images, beliefs, ideologies, institutions, technology, and even geographical and demographical factors.

Societies have value impregnated beliefs or myths which are propositions that are either true or false or propositions that are partly true and partly false.[37] Myths and traditional ways of thinking about things, are logically related systems of ideas which are often called ideologies, or they may be single and unsubstantiated propositions. Myths often rest on taboos of primitive societies;[38] ideologies are often generally complex rationalisations of a highly articulated set of beliefs; institutions are patterns of rationalised and systematised organisations which, generally speaking, reflect beliefs. Belief systems are not necessarily consistent and frequently embody contradictory propositions of an ambivalent nature. It is important to note that beliefs may either be the deliberate creation of leaders (elites) or may have historical origins.[39]

Beliefs take on two dimensions: the myth and the ideological, both form collective ideas based not necessarily on an objective knowledge of facts, but more on subjective opinions or a way of thinking, and results from the process of socialisation by way of growth.[40]

What is important is that beliefs, myths, and

ideologies define systems of value and value systems evolve by way of socialisation and lend identifiable characteristics to those involved in that evolutionary process. Every society is based on definitions of good and evil, right and wrong, proper and improper, which together constitute the salient system of values and patterns for normative interaction and thus are identifiable constituents of overall group 'identification'.

Beliefs function as a set of rules of behavioural expectations defining nominative interaction and as such form a set of values.[1] The acceptance or adherence of a society to a set of beliefs is a question of legitimacy of the beliefs within the group. The more deep-seated the belief, regardless of nature, the greater the degree of functioning legitimacy within that community. The developed sociological grouping with its own developed cultural patterns is esentially formed by history and then reinforced through acculturation. Acculturation is a result of socialisation, the inculcating of traditional social behaviour into the new members of society. Uniqueness results from particular events which have occurred in the experience of a given society, each producing its own certain effect which influences the sociological development of that specific community, regardless of similarities with events in the inter-group environment and their respective ultimate in-group development. It is significant to note that the appearance of different factors in social evolution, vary from country to country and from

civilisation to civilisation."[2] Inter-cultural, inter-societal complementariness exercising distinct disequalated results force and form future and further evolution. Most elements occur through conscious phenomenon such as beliefs, images, and attitudes and are thus transmitted from generation to generation by a process of education. Education here does not solely mean formal education, as in modern schools. It has the expanded connotation of cultural transference, perhaps *via* schools, but more with regards to interpersonal relations. Education, whatever method, instills both skills for life in the new generation and an analytical review of past events which is summarised in cultural transmission. In modern societies, this process, primarily due to the sophisticated level of skills required and the complexity of the general body of knowledge, is reinforced, indeed dominated, by formal structural institutional programmes controlled, and dictated primarily, by the majority structure and beliefs. Hence, in today's cultural evolutionary process, transmission has been identified, typed and codified and is transmitted by an *ad perpetuum* process.

Thus some of the elements which compromise and go to make up the sociological grouping are determined by the grouping's treatment of past elements, out of which collective patterns are established and those found desirable used to form the structure of the new society. This is an ongoing process, an unending chain of events, often motivated by conflict and learning, starting with the

self, on to the dyad and triad level, to the group, to the expanded large group, through to the developing natio and on to a nation, that being, the largest sociological human grouping yet developed by and known to man. The process of socialisation occurs at two essential speeds, either rapidly by Transformation or slowly be Accretion. Transformation may be direct, as a result of a coanizant objective by elites or, indirect, as in the result of events or defined action as in the event of public campaigns, war, or the formalised educational process. Accretion is by less defined and less structured more gradualistic processes, as changes in diet, speech, or patterns of behaviour over time.[43]

The socialisation process is one in which the individual learns basic social behaviour and accommodates himself to the dynamics of collective life. Social behaviour is learned through fundamentally cultural influences such as early contacts and environmental influences[44] in the process of socialisation. It may also be learned by desocialisation as in "re-learning" habits of behaviour as in transformational efforts by Health Authorities to discourage the practice of smoking or as in "new learning" such as habits of acceptable behaviour required in new group memberships. The process of socialisation produces on the individual level a modification of behaviour required by the group and characterised by the group as normative parameters of the group. It is essentially a learning process,[45] and is

derived from the individual desire, either cognitive or non-cognitive, to satisfy needs, stemming from concepts of self and especially self concepts relating to the group.

The self concept arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitudes, or uses the gesture which another individual would use in response to himself or tends to so respond.[44] This is the direct result of socialisation. Self is orientated by the process in terms of reference, evaluation, realisation, or actualisation, status or self conceptualisation through arousal, cognitive or latent exposure to the group. Socialisation is the continuing process which, by creating normative patterns, creates out-groupings, a differentiation or gradation of individuals.

Development of Collective Identity

The natio developed through socialisation produces a 'we' of major importance in that along with the development of the 'we', is the simultaneous, although often entirely unrealised, development of the 'they'. What becomes that which becomes unique to 'us', is 'us', anything else is foreign or 'theirs'. The development of 'our' identity, the crystallisation of 'our' characteristic, crystallises and motivates the "other than us" or foreign characterisitics. The further the process of evolution takes either the individual or the group or a whole society, the greater the degree of polarisation of the foreign or non-complementary elements and thus, the growth of the potential chances of

inter-group conflict. A major effect of the process of socialisation, is the means whereby the foregone society acculturates and defines the future society and forms the idea of 'cultural baggage'. The differentiation of that 'cultural baggage' forms the distinct parametorial boundaries of given societies.[47] For the society at large, it produces attitudes and patterned responses to change. The impetus for societal change is modernisation.[48]

The bringing together of small groups into ever-increasing larger groups through greater interactional awareness is integration afforded by the ratchet effect of socialisation. The process of socialisation incorporates the idea of integration, the bringing together of unique sub-groups to form a new encompassing larger group and is the process of social learning.[49] The theoretical approaches to the understanding of how integration occurs outlined in chapter one, are set out in political economics in the three previously described theories. These theories attempt to define integration with only an implied and not a specific focus on the process of socialisation. Specific focus would centre on an unencumbered interplay of need - action response situations and the developed patterns of expectations and performance.

The Federal Theory is suggestive of a high degree of self-sustaining autonomy,[50] essentially maintaining[51] relations in a state of balanced equilibrium as a fixum

formalising recognition of others[52] and otherness. As the nation-state arrangement is both the central fact of modern political life and central to political analysis,[53] it is a theory recognizing the elements of, and not the explanations of, integration.[54] Theoretically, it could potentially allow marginal interaction, leading toward expanded society,[55] but only on a highly remote and ancillary plan as it does not directly address the incorporation of the concept of socialisation. In and of itself, isolation does not lead toward integration.[56] Functionalism, on the other hand, does substantively embrace notions of socialisation by suggesting incremental spill-over purposed through functional need abatement, either systems-requisite or 'individual' request. Such action would form interplays, either inter-group or intrapersonal.[57] The former are based on a general theory of society, microscopic in nature. The latter are based on individual demands, necessitating systems activity which are macroscopic in nature.[58] Functionalism does not per se lead to development beyond sub-governmental cooperation[59] and is limited by its mono-dimensionality. It postulates the developed relationships causal to the ultimate dissolution of the current nation-state structure of society, organising the world not by what divides it, but by what unites it.[61] The nation-state is discounted as a way of organising man's social and political life and, as a result, this reality presents the major liability of the theory.[62] In real

terms, the state does, itself, attempt to satisfy domestic needs and not as suggested by the theory. That is, need satisfaction is achieved through inter-group relations.[63] Neo-Functionalism addresses the political omission of Functionalism, by positing integration as the process whereby political actors in the several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift loyalty toward a new collective centre away from the domestic,[64] achieving ultimately a supra-national status. Its novum is the implied postulation that domestic units agree to integrate, and as such integration is seen more as a contractual political arrangement rather than a sociological evolutionary event.[65] This is basically a legitimate system in which conflict is resolved via authoritarian decisions.[66] This is systems change imagined as a result of a succession of 'low' political considerations[67] dependent upon commitment to a new centre of obeisance by a domestic willingness.[68]

To various degrees, these theories overlook the uniqueness of individual commitment to integration or the political implications of such action. Integration affects the individual and, as such, must be accomplished on the biographical level.[69] The portion of these theories that relate to the biographical level, refer to the individual commitment to integration, however, in general terms, they reflect a group political action and not an individual action. To adequately assess integration in the present

epoch of European development, the effects of integration on the individual and the individual attitudes towards such must be assessed, and to do this the process of socialisation must be taken into full consideration. In previous societal arrangements, integrational development most frequently took place in an environment characterised by less rigidity. This development allowed unencumbered horizontal linkages to evolve.

Modern, increased institutionalisation, hampered by physical parameters sui generis holds nations as clients of their respective states. The essentially unencumbered individual involvement and commitment to the process of integration is necessary for the ratchet effect of developmental, sociological growth. With highly structured society, developmental growth, integration, may only be achieved by incorporating the concept of growth into the societal structure itself and by employing society as the vehicle for the individual conversion to the idea of integration.

Pluralistic community is a community based on the recognition of domestic spheres of sovereignty, and as such, is a theory primarily devoted to the political dimension of social endeavours. The Functional theory, envisioning a community based on the concept of specific-interest-communities, achieves credibility in that functional integration is defined by transactions and hence lends itself to empirical validation . It is chiefly concerned

with the transactional dimension of social endeavours. The Neo-Functionalist theory, more formal in its scope, is suggestive of communities of like interest evolving, in various domestic settings bridging both the political and the transactional dimension. These three approaches to integration emphasise horizontal linkages forming horizontally structured communities. Socialisation in structured societies implies vertical linkages, interests running from top to bottom in given areas forming fundamentally a vertically structured community. A vertically structured community is fundamentally based on the concept of mutual identification.[70] Mutual identification incorporates both the political dimension and the transactional dimension as adjunct to the social cultural dimension and is analogous with integrated society.

Socialisation: Developing Common Identification

What is it that draws people together? Human beings, as animals, require some culture or group and along with the idea of group goes the idea of identification.[71] Identification is a state of mind creating a feeling of loyalty to the group, a people with a sense of collective destiny sharing through a common past and a vision of a common future.[72] Identification has to do with the notion of "my group and your group." What causes Group Identification?

Group identification is fundamentally the product of group differences and the inherent individual ability, given

a variety of options, to choose to formulate and identify with, or to subsume individual identity under that of a chosen larger entity.

The major characteristic of the Nation-States in Europe today is that they hold a belief that each has the right to have its own way.[73] From the begining of recorded history, to the present day, man has been at war, indeed, one could postulate that war is endemic. War is rooted in the idea that man has the right to have his own way, and is based on the concept of individual differences. Organised at the state level with nationalism at its core, States foster the timeless manifestation of their own individuality. Although Europe may be enjoying the benefits of unprecedented peace for a protracted period, the supposition that the basic nature of man has changed is not founded. Individuality has always been evident; individuality is still present. This is apparent in the block system which surrounds Europe. This is apparent in the diplomatic inter-state activity found within Europe.[74] Individuals themselves belong to nations, and either identify, or do not identify, with, those nations. To focus on the causational points of identity a fundamental distinction must be first made.

A State is a legal and political organisation, with power to request obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A nation is a community of people where members are bound

together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national[75] consciousness. Socialisation, although peripherally related to State, is fundamentally the actions of people, and directly causal to, the Nation.

A Nation exists when a group or otherwise a "significant number of people in a community consider themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed one,"[76] In Western Europe, "nation" is a concept which was derived from the eighteenth century notion of popular sovereignty. One group united in will. The common will is a product of a common image and is the result of vertical identification.[77] Images are strengthened by "facts" which constitute "knowledge" of nation-ism. Nation-ism in the modern Nation-State is perpetuated by a formal series of institutional apparatus designed to foster Nation-ism. In essence, then, although the state originally developed its unique posture vis a vis others, although characteristics attributed it by its Nation or Nations, its hermetic action, in effect, intensifies those National characteristics by (1) acting as a buffer between the Nation and outside parties and (2) constantly refeeding those characteristics back into the domestic system.

Uniqueness as WE-ness vs. FOREIGN-ness

The process and the product of socialisation provides both the means and the ends of both individual and collective identification. Individually, it is coupled with emotional and impulsive reactions which develop into a

complex of feelings due partly to the valuations and interpretations of own ideas and partly by primitive instincts and the acquired association of emotion with emotion.[78] Individually, men are normally not aware of the process by which their idea of group identity and their national-ness, with its accompanying emotions, are produced. The layering creation of such ideas and emotions is constantly on the increase by the organisational network found within the Nation-State of today. Identity is a mental picture fairly typical of the mass. The sociological process found within the group formalises the development of the embodied identity in that it produces like human beings in distinction to a group of un-like human beings. Although there are individual differences within groups there is an over-riding group individuality that differentiates it from other groups.

It has been suggested that most of current European tension today resulting in a 'fundamental political and social malaise'[79] may be attributed to a general loss of community, which is in effect, the loss of or blurring of traditional identification. The loss of community may have been brought about by modernisation and its associated developments, but most certainly is exacerbated by 'overspecialisation and uniformity'.[80] The general loss of natural communities which afforded traditional identification resulted. If this is the case, contributing toward the Disintegration of existing European Systems, then the general notion of identity as forming a group of

national awareness is a real portion of a common 'WE' feeling. Indeed, a Nation may appropriately be termed a "self-aware ethnic group."[81] In other words, at the level of Nation, it is self-defining. It is the development through time of "a collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood"[82] which produces some consciousness of kind among members of the groups.

This suggests that identity is triggered by either given or achieved differences.

Identity: given and achieved differences, the product of man in both his physical and social environment.
Commonalities relating toward similarities and differences relating toward xenophobia are either achieved or given. Reactions to given stimuli and conditions taken collectively as a result of the socialisation process congeal into patterns of similarities, which produce a means of identification. Ethnos relates to cultural (perhaps more so than biological[83]) kinship for it is a similarity of cultural attributes in a group that attracts both the term "Ethnos"[84] and the idea of common identification.

The given elements which contribute toward a common identity are first and foremost indicative of the biological characteristics of the individual, such as race and its

identificational characteristics such as colouration, etc.[63] Above that, the location of the collectivity is salient. There is an apparent natural tendency - a tendency having been produced by social circumstances (socialisation) from time practically immemorial - for the individual "to love his birthplace or the place of his childhood sojourn, its surroundings, its climate, the contours of hills and valleys, of rivers and trees."[64] Man, as a subject of immense habitude, exhibits the tendency to revert back to what is known, especially in times of rapid change, as these are the substance and stuff of identification. And inasmuch as these physical identifications are held in common with similar individuals, identification extends to the common core group. As Voltaire has suggested, "Il est impossible d'aimer tendrement une famille trop nombreuse qu'on connait à peine."[65] Identification at this level comes about through common exposure and response to given circumstances. The exposure is given by natural, physical, or biological conditions responded upon collectively through the socialisation process of interaction.

The achieved elements which lead toward common identification relate to the fact that, to a great extent, man arranges his own environment. "Different aspects of the multifarious character of man respond to different calls from without, so that the same individuals and much more the same race, may behave very differently at different epochs."[66] The cathexus of human thought is dominated by

ego-consciousness as much as it is by group-consciousness. Both "are complex states of mind at which we arrive through experiences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego and the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside the group."[89]

The differentiation tending toward xenophobia, the opposition tending toward conflict, is a product of social interaction in the process of socialisation.

The achieved identificational characteristics held in common by the homo erectus is suggestive of the concept of homo multiplex. Man, as individual and unique, is a member of a myriad of groups and alliances, constructs of the socialisation process and may fall broadly into three salient categories:

Homo multiplex =
- homo economicus
- homo politicus
- homo socius[90]

Life for homo multiplex is played out in terms of three levels or aspects: his economic, his political, and his social activities contribute toward his overall definition of self as a societal being and hence contribute toward identity as achieved determinants.[91] Socialisation attributed toward societal growth incorporates group consciousness. And with group consciousness comes group loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people involved in the process, exposed to similar stimuli, responding in similar manner.[92] The concept Eadem sed aliter suggests

the feature of repetitive collective interaction, achieving patterns of similarity and in terms of patterns of similarity resulting in a locus of identification.[93]

Group exposure through socialisation produces togetherness and collectivity crystallises a common overall ideology[94] which itself develops into a philosophy which functions as a cognitive method of analysis and in turn generates a Political, Economic, and Social system as patterned common responses to stimuli.[95] These achieved points of common identification are often very deep-seated as they provide reference for self-life definition.[96] The group feeling is an effective sentiment or sympathy brought about through meaningful interaction which binds a group together through common institutions, and culture, and given that group unity.[97]

The dynamic aspect of achieved identification is composed of essentially all the cultural activities and stimulants of a given collectivity, where culture extends broadly to encapsulate all embraced characteristics of the group. The static aspect of achieved identification represents the existing group system juxtaposed others as[98] point of reference.

The concept of homo multiplex, affording identification through socialisation, incorporates the creation of strong group feelings, a definite solidarity or embryonic kin foundation through like peoples, responding to like stimuli, with like needs and experiencing like results (or a combination of like and dislike, etc.). It is a common

reference to group life experiences.[99]

The homo economicus aspect of the multiplex is, extended to, for example, the desire to expand territory, to acquire economic self-sufficiency, to promote business interests, etc. It provides identification chiefly through a felt emotion. These are emotional appeals motivated by a desire for group advantage over third parties. So also is the homo politicus aspect of multiplex, the wishes of a group to foster their will, to function socially independent and unencumbered to promote interests with a minimum of enforced outside directional definition. This is a desire for an environment in which to play out developed ideologies.[100] The homo socius aspect of multiplex is extended that of intercommunication and exchange on all levels. Homo politicus, economicus, and socius are three distinct identities of man, developed, expanded, and refined by the socialisation process. These aspects of homo multiplex directly relate to man's achieved uniqueness and the relatedness of these achieved uniqueness toward others. These three aspects of man's nature reflect the dimensions of life, and their interplay, the complexity of life.

In Sum

In a societal sense, structure comes from values.[101] A system, social, political, or economic, has structure or form, because of the need to harmonise components. What allows for the functioning of components in a system is some sort of common underwritten norm. The degree of independence or conformity is axiological to the group of

which the consideration has reference. The phenomonon of rapid social change brings about mutations, frequently imputational, through catalyst and inhibitor reactions to stimuli with an impact on participant inter-relations, kinship, and environment.[102]

There are two fundamental theories relating to man's identification toward group. Firstly, the Social-Exchange Theory, namely that man joins society because the group is a means to an end. It posits the individual's goals or needs as only fully met through affiliation.[103] Secondly, the Reinforcement Theory posits group membership as the end in and of itself, that is, that needs such as those for development of an identity can be met only by other people.[104] Both these views highlight the functional relationship defining interaction as ascribed roles, and answers the question long ago asked by Georg Simmel, "How is society possible?"[105]

Role, or Social role,[106] is concerned with the emphasized individual personality in relation to functional normative constraints dictating deviance or conformity to the group.[107] It is the individuals' prescribed reaction to his setting, Political, Economic, or Social, each level of life being distinct but affording interrelational overlays. Individuals exist in society by nature and by nurture for implied biological reasons and for sustenance and actuation.[108] Individuals' existence is paramaterised by roles, the fulfillment of which gives the development of internalised identification. Identification

is a response to either given or achieved stimuli, netting a self-actualised desire to be associated. Identification develops, associated with compliance, whereby the individual behaves in a particular way, not because such behaviour is intrinsically satisfying, but by adopting a particular behaviour because it nets a satisfying self-defining relationship with the group.[109] The most deeply rooted response to socialisation is the internalisation of a value or belief, a role or an identification with (or against) the group. Internalised, it is a part of the individual participants' own system becoming independent of source and becoming extremely resistant to change.[110] It becomes constituent to the individuals' own being.[111]

The beginning point for this analysis of the process and state of Integration in Europe is that of the individual in society. Sociological and psychological literature afford the basis for tracing both the development of the individual in, and the ever changing characteristic of, society. A significant portion of what man is, feels, does, and thinks, is the product of, and reflected by participation in the social environment. To a great degree, personal characteristics of self contribute largely to that development, both singularly and to society at large. The quantitative size of that society determines largely the degree and type of interplay. With quantitative expansion, first-hand association diminishes and the active contact between individual and society centres and concentrates in the realm of the core group. The core group, while

functioning itself as a constituent actor in the overall entity, plays a significant part in defining personality by way of an inter-group counter-positioning of the individual. Equilibration is sought which defines the taken individual stand. With the advent of modernisation, literacy and centralisation, the large group *in loco parentis* effectively assumed the position of permanent posture in participant acculturisation. The formality of the modern system has promoted a perforce *engagement* of a material character, not withstanding the degree of flexibility taken by the individual.

The nature of man in society is one best characterised by the *multiplex* concept. Society, formed through socialisation entails activities economic, fundamentally the abatement of psychological needs, occasionally physical and social, but mostly the fulfillment of spiritual[112] needs. Educed from the concatenate interplay of society is the individual's being, conjoined with associates enshrouded with identities both individual and collective unique to participants. Significant is that the process of socialisation affords the conditions for the definition of self, allowing self to merge collectively through a plexure of relations into society. The process causes independent accomodation between self and society, and society and self.

If the individual both contributes to the formation of, and in return is formed by, society, the next consideration of interest is that which takes place at the merging of

societies, or integration.

CHAPTER TWO NOTES

[1]Dictionary of the English Language Britannica World Language Dictionary. Volume 1. (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1960), p. 660.

[2]See Emile Durkheim, Division of Labor. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1947); A. Paul Hare, et.al., Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction. (New York: Alfred Knoph, 1955), especially early theory, chapter one on Emile Durkheim; and Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology. Translated by H.P. Specher. (London: Peter Owen, 1962).

[3]For a discussion of the non-logical, non-cognitive aspects of thought, see Franz Borkenaw, Pareto: Modern Sociologist. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1936), chapter IV onwards, p. 78ff.

[4]This has been called a "unification of human direction." See H.G. Wells, What Are We to Do with Our Lives? (London: William Heinemann, 1931), chapter VIII, "Broad Characteristics of a Scientific World Commonweal," pp. 45-59.

[5]General thoughts in Durkheim, Division of Labor, op. cit.

[6]For further detail, see the development of the individual in a mass culture in Horst E. Richter, "Der Individualismus," in Lernziel Solidaritat. (Hamburg: Werner Rebhuhn, 1974), p. 69ff.

[7]See Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Translated by Kurt H. Wolfese. (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1950).

[8]See loc. cit.

[9]For a discussion on the changes in the structure of relations from face-to-face to non-face-to-face, see Arvlo Brodersen, ed., Collected Papers of Alfred Schuts. Book II. (The Hague: Marbinus Nijhoff, 1964).

[10]The concept that primary groups apply to both the single individual and to the society as a total unity. See Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962), Part II: "Personality and the Stability of Traditional Societies," p. 55ff.

[11]See G.H. Means, Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934); and A. Paul Hare, Edgar Borgatta, and Robert Bales, ed., Small Groups, Studies in Social Interaction. (New York: Albert Knoph, 1955), especially pp. 5-21.

[12]See Gerhard and Jean Lenski, Human Societies An Introduction to Macro Sociology. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982).

[13]Loc. cit. pp. 49-50.

[14]Expansion being magnitudinal amplifications of essentially the triadal interplay.

[15]See Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang, Collective Dynamics. (New York: Thomas Crowell Co., 1961), especially pp. 179-95.

[16]Loc. cit.

[17]Loc. cit.

[18]Loc. cit.

[19]There are basically two forces contributing toward the formation of a cohesive society, one external, as in authoritarian force, exhibited and utilised by collective societal structure to sustain action, as in states' use of legitimate force, and one internal, the force that controls one's individual action, as in a 'code of morality'. This is frequently that which functions in a crowd. For an interesting discussion on 'change's' effects on the latter (science), see Morris Ginsburg, Reason and Unreason in Society, (London: Longmans, 1947), p. 252ff.

[20]This is frequently the beginning point of new thought and eventually new movements in society.

[21]Lenski, Human Societies, op. cit. p. 57.

[22]Loc. cit. p. 60.

[23]Loc. cit. p. 73.

[24]See Carl Beckman, ed., Problems in Social Psychology, Selected Readings, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), especially part seven, "Socialization."

[25]See John Rex, ed., Approaches to Sociology: An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974).

[26]The exact reasons as to why these changes take place are not fully answered by merely stating that change has created a different new environment. However, the why belongs to the sphere of social philosophy not falling within the scope of this paper. Here we will have to be content with the recognition of the relationship.

[27]In discussing cross-culture conflict in an article by that name in International Management 18(January 1986):17-21, Professor Robert T. Moran makes the observation that conflict "could serve some useful purpose," and that those ideas are becoming more prevalent in the literature suggesting "many people view conflict as a healthy natural and inevitable part of all relationships."

[28]See amongst others, Everet Dean Martin, The Conflict of the Individual and the Mass in the Modern World, (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1932) in which conflict is suggested as affording man and society the opportunity 'to grow up' being requisite to maturity and ultimately individuality; also Harold Proshansky and Bernard Seidenberg, Basic Studies in Social Psychology, (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1965) which demonstrates nicely the cognitive or latent nature of conflict (especially p. 379) and its role (especially p. 384) in personal or societal development; See also Joseph E. McGrath, Social Psychology, (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1964), especially its application to social change, p. 152ff.

[29]For further readings on conflict, see the classic: Georg Simmel, Conflict, Translated by Kurt H. Wolff, (New York: Free Press, 1955); Simmel, The Web of Group Affiliation, Translated by Reinard Bendix, (New York: The Free Press, 1955), chapter 2: "Competition," p. 13ff; Kurt Singer, The Idea of Conflict, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1949); Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change, op. cit. chapter 3, p. 36ff., for a

discussion on the need to open the traditional ideas concerning growth to incorporate, amongst others, the notion of conflict. For a study of the structure of conflict, see Michael Nicholson, Conflict Analysis. (London: The English Universities Press, Ltd., 1970), especially pp. 1-19, 86-102. For its application to the doctrine of cultural relativism, i.e., (1) individuals learn values from experience (2) different values learned due to different learning experiences in societies (3) values relative to societies in which they occur and (4) no universal values, James P. Spradley and David W. McCurdy, ed., Conformity and Conflict. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1980), pp. 4-5. For its application to world society, interlocking systems of cobwebs of states, actors, and systemic processes, see Michael Banics, ed., Conflict in World Society. (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1984), p. 59ff.; and examples in Noble, Astri Suhrke, and Noble, Lela Garner, Ethnic Conflict in International Relations. (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1977).

[30]Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics. Translated by Robert Wagoner. (London: Nelson, 1972), p. 38.

[31]Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1952), p. 493.

[32]From nasci, (to) be born. See Elei Kedourie, Nationalism. (London: Hutshenson University Library, Ltd. 1960), p. 13ff. Among other things, Kedourie gives an interesting etymology of the introduction of the term "Nation" into modern venacular, tracing it from its origins through to the development of the Nation in the sense of the modern meaning of the term as a body of people to whom a government is responsible through legislature.

[33]Parsons, The Social System, op. cit. p. 172.

[34]See Pennock and Smith, Political Science: An Introduction. (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 63.

[35]R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government. (London: Macmillan, 1947), p. 4 and specifically the relation of values to the social system (p. 21) constituting an important portion of culture (pp. 36-50,444-48); and adding social cohesiveness, especially pp. 153-69 in Robert M. MacIver, Politics and Society. Edited by David Spitz. (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

[36]Duverger, The Study of Politics, op. cit. p. 95.

[37]Pennock and Smith, Political Science: An Introduction. op. cit. p. 64.

[38]Taboos of society form the basis for a matrix of repression in a given society and consequently contribute an element toward overall adhesiveness and ultimately intertwine with identification of group. Mores (thou shalt) and taboos (thou shalt not) are perhaps the substance of societies' most vital relationships. See S. Stansfield Sargent and Robert C. Williamson, Social Psychology An Introduction to the Study of Human Relations. (New York: The Ronald Press, 1958), pp. 180-81,240.

[39]For a discussion on beliefs and values, see Roger Brown, Social Psychology. (New York: The Free Press,

1965), pp. 404-05) and expression (pp. 698-702,704-06); also belief systems (determinants of personality and attitudes) in Morton Deutsch and Robert M. Krauss, Theories in Social Psychology. (New York: Basic Books, 1965), p. 164; and attitudes in W.J.H. Sprott, Social Psychology. (London: Social Science Paperbacks, Methuen, 1952/1966), pp. 87-89, 105-24.

[40]For interesting background information on myths, see L.D. Darlington, The Evolution of Man and Society. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), pp. 94,190.

[41]Duverger, The Study of Politics. op. cit. p. 100.

[42]Loc. cit. p. 104.

[43]For a discussion of transformational/accretional change relating to the EEC, see Roy Pryce, ed., The Dynamics of European Union. (London: Croom-Helm, 1987), chapter 1.

[44]Leon Mann, Social Psychology. (Sydney: John Willey and Sons, 1969).

[45]See B.R. Bugelski, Psychology of Learning. (London: Methuen and Co., 1956), p. 53.

[46]See, for a good discussion, G.H. Means, Mind, Self, and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist. op. cit. p. 79.

[47]For the individual, this diffentiation produces points of identification or reference groups. For an excellent, albeit dated, discussion of reference group significance, see H.H. Hyman, "The Psychology of Status," Archive Psychology. 38(1942):1-94.

[48]Of the many excellent works on the phenomena, attention is specifically drawn to Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations. (London: The Free Press, 1976).

[49]See Learning the "Social Norms" in Sargent and Williamson, Social Psychology. op. cit. p. 241ff. For a good analysis of rules, customs, attitudes, values, and other standards found in established social groups, see M. Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1936), but for a highly interesting and specific analysis of social learning relating to the UK and in an attempt to explain the British economic decline, essentially relating to political form incorporated within the society vis a vis other Europeans, see Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present. (London: Croom-Helm, 1982), especially chapter 5: "The Learning Process."

[50]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration. (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 29.

[51]For an applicable argument, see loc. cit. p. 29.

[52]Loc. cit. p. 30.

[53]Loc. cit. p. 35.

[54]Loc. cit. p. 36. Pluralism is a form of "integration where it tends to be defined as a condition of the international system in which Nation-States are preserved."

[55]The Federalist approach to Integration is that

which affords a highly formal legalistic perspective on sovereignty, emphasizing some transfer of formal authority from domestic to multi-national bodies. It implies elite participation in a three part movement (1) elite stage (2) informed public opinion (3) mass acquiescence or acceptance, a process giving way from Federalism to integration (political structural unification). D. Coombes, Politics and Bureacracy in the European Community, (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), p. 31. A pluralistic development by Deutsch's integrational definition is "the attainment, within a territory of a 'sense of community' and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a 'long' time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change' among its populations." K. Deutsch, Political Communities and the North Atlantic Area, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 5. A transformation being "a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties: of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration: of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests: of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it." Deutsch, loc. cit. p. 36. The 'we-feeling' is the emotional attachment element of attitudes. Federalism, identifying the we-feeling and ultimate shift to a central heterogeneous structure suggests the importance of attitude building.

[56]However, in the American experience, it could be argued that the transitional phase of federalism, that of an increased, albeit formal, dialogue interaction, can in and of itself, lead toward a more integrated system, which of course, would be a step beyond federalism.

[57]Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, op. cit. p. 67; E. Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, (Glencoe, Illinois: 1938), pp. 69-97; A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primary Society, (London: Cohen and West, 1979).

[58]Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, op. cit. p. 68.

[59]Loc. cit. p. 70.

[60]Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 51.

[61]Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, op. cit. p. 81.

[62]An argument elaborated by K.W. Deutsch, "The Impact of Communications on International Relations Theory," in A.A. Said, ed., Theory of International Relations, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 84-87; Also see J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1967). According to Functionalist theory, one would expect that societies' needs would be horizontally (between groups) resolved but evidence here suggests that with the increase in domestic welfare expenditures, these needs are being resolved vertically on the State level.

[63]Functional theory does, however, suggest the social-psychological dimension in that it emphasizes its

development by the notion of ties of mutual affections, identity, and loyalty as being the foundation stones of integration, capitalising on the problems all have in common. The hope of functionalists is to work for cooperative solutions to social and economic problems and thus to root out the material causes of war and to promote the establishment of increasingly intensive patterns of social interaction across national boundaries. See L.N. Lindberg, and S.A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970). This approach comes near to the necessity of attitudinal change, brought about through common-problem abatement measures but is hampered by marginalisation of issues due to existent political structures. For further reading, see Paul Thomas Young, Motivation and Emotion. (New York: John Wiley, 1961), especially pp. 516-22; and Donald M. Johnson. A Systematic Introduction to the Psychology of Thinking. (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), pp. 236-38.

[64]See H.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. (Stanford, California: Stanford Press, 1958), p. 16.

[65]Indeed, Haas's definition of integration is "the process whereby Political Actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states." The Uniting of Europe. op. cit. p. 16. Political actors are political elites, as: "It is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have recourse to general public opinion surveys, or even to surveys of specifically interested groups. . . . It suffices to single out and define the political elites in the participating countries, to study their reactions to integration and assess changes in attitude on their part." Haas, loc. cit. p. 17. Neo-Functionalist elite-centred integration is made "over the opposition and usually over the indifference of the general membership" (Haas, loc. cit. p. 17) which indicates a marginal attitude building amongst the masses.

[66]L.N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 5.

[67]H.B. Haas, "The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America." Journal of Common Market Studies. 5(1967):315ff.

[68]L.N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. op. cit. p. 288ff.

[69]Easton states generally that ultimate survival of a political community depends on the existence of some demonstrable support persistence connotative of minimal positive attitude. D. Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 82-89.

[70]The argument here postulates states composed of integrated nations, the existence of which is a formal structure disallowing a free socialisation between the nations of other states.

[71]Colin Williams, ed., National Separation. (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982), p. 43.

[72]John Stoessinger, The Might of Nations. (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 10.

[73]Barbara Ward, Five Ideas that Changed the World. (London: Hammish Hamilton, 1959), p. 117.

[74]Loc. cit. pp. 115-143.

[75]Hugh Seaton-Watson, Nation and State/An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. (London: Methuen, 1977), chapter 1.

[76]Loc. cit. p. 5.

[77]See Graham Wallas, Our Social Heritage. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921), p. 79.

[78]Loc. cit. p. 80ff.

[79]P. Mayo, The Roots of Identity: Three National Movements in Contemporary European Politics. (London: Allen Lane, 1974), p. 1. Her general thesis is that man is a social animal and therefore requires a communal identity. Identification tensions are frequently terms 'dehumanizing' and its resultant conflicts inevitable. See D.E.H. Whitley and R. Martin, ed., Sociology, Theology and Conflict. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), p. 55ff.

[80]Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Reversal. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 53.

[81]W. Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying." in World Politics. 24(1972):319-55.

[82]R. Schermerhour, Comparative Ethnic Relations. (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 12.

[83]Anthony O. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 21.

[84]Loc. cit. p. 21ff. Smith traces the historical background definitional material relating of the term.

[85]Visible and readily discernable physical characteristics take precedent over those less visible as in political orientations or religious persuasion.

[86]Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. (New York: Macmillan, 1944), pp. 4-5.

[87]Loc. cit. p. 8.

[88]This idea has been suggested frequently as in Henry Morley, English Writers. (New York: Cassell, 1887), Volume 1. p. 1; J.M. Robertson, The Evolution of States: An Introduction to English Politics. (London: Watts, 1912), p. 285; Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development. (New York: Everyman's Library, Dutton Press, 1908), p. 128; Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. op cit. p. 11, and is evidenced by the fact in Europe, peoples of the same general racial stock inhabiting the same general temperate physical environment have produced a numerous multi-national society with distinctly different characteristics.

[89]Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 11.

[90]Denoting the development of interests and divisions in society, economic, political, and social, differentiations to be discussed at length in chapter six.

[91]As factors contributing toward identity, Carlton J. Hayes, "Nationalism, Historical Development," in Edwin

R.A. Seligman, ed., Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (New York: Alfred Knoph, 1933), volume 11, p. 240.

[92]See Hans Kohn, "Nationalism," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (New York: Macmillan, 1933), volume 11, p. 63.

[93](Identical but altered). Aptly attributed society by Eugene Kamenka, Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea. (London: Edward Arnold, 1973), p. 18.

[94]An ideology is a body of ideas usually political and/or economic, etc., usually forming the basis of a national or sectional policy or way of thinking and opposed to a philosophy pursuit of wisdom and knowledge, and investigation of the nature of being. See Chambers Dictionary: op. cit.

[95]For a visual depiction of this relationship as well as the text itself, see Feliks Gross, ed., European Ideologies. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), p. 7. This is essentially the evolution of the idea, for the evolution of the idea of Nationalism, see Kamenka, Nationalism. op. cit. Chapter one: "Political Nationalism."

[96]An example would be such things as national songs, flags, folkways, poems, and how they survive changes in government and even territorial migration. Alfred Zimmerman, Modern Political Doctrines. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. i-xxxii.

[97]Applied to defining "nation," see Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism. (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. xvi-xx.

[98]As it relates to national identification, see Harry Elmer Barnes, History of Social Intelligence. (New York: Knoph, 1926), p. 145 and C.J.H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism. (New York: Macmillan, 1926).

[99]As it relates to Nation building, see T.V. Kalijarvi, Modern World Politics. First edition. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press), p. 45.

[100]Thorsten V. Kalijarvi, "Nationalism," in Feliks Gross, ed., European Ideologies. (New York: Philosophical Ideologies, 1948), p. 554 and section XIII.

[101]Robert C. Neville, The Cosmology of Freedom. (London: Yale University, 1974), pp. 68-72.

[102]For an expanded example of this relationship, see Egbert DeVries, Man in Rapid Social Change. (London: SCM Press, Ltd./Bloomsbury, 1961), pp. 47-48.

[103]See S. Schachter, The Psychology of Affliction. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959).

[104]See Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Social Psychology: Second Brief Edition. (Monterey, California: Brooks/Cole, 1977), section C, p. 117.

[105]Georg Simmel, "How Is Society Possible?" American Journal of Sociology. 16(1910/11):372-91.

[106]See R. Dahrendorf, "Sociology and Human Nature," in Essays in the Theory of Society. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), pp. 94-95.

[107]J.A. Jackson, Role. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 2.

[108]Graham Wallas, Our Social Heritage. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1921). See introduction and pp. 15-16.

[109]For an excellent discussion, see Dorothy Emmet, Rules, Roles, and Relations. (London: Macmillan, 1966), especially p. 28.

[110]Elliot Aronson, The Social Animal. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1972), pp. 28-29.

[111]For an interesting discussion on Hegel's thought on identity and the question of identity and legitimation in general, see Raymond Plant, "Hegel on Identity and Legitimation," in Z.A. Pelczynski, ed., The State and Civil Society. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 227ff.

[112]Spiritual needs relating to the principle of thought, frame of mind, from Latin, spiritus. a breath or spirare, to breathe, akin to psychological which is more a direct product of the mind and perhaps less specific, from Greek psyche. butterfly or soul. See Chambers Dictionary. op. cit.

CHAPTER THREE

Integration: The Functioning

Functional theory implies the development of integration through cross-societal linkages, based on needs. Kenneth Waltz suggests[1] that even though such linkages may, in practical terms, be beneficial to those participating parties, they are often prohibited or at least hindered by governmental intervention. Linkages are the substance of integration. Why then this apparent blockage of a natural process? To understand this, one must understand the nature of integration itself.

Organised society constitutes an establishment or regime. Linkages with the out-groups encourage in effect a disestablishment of the present fixed regime. In the wake of the new linkages, an essential antidisestablishmentarianism demonstrates the living organism of government. Although composed of constituent elements, governments as a unit, are frequently interested in their own self-maintenance and existence.

To clarify this phenomenon, this chapter will introduce the notion of nation and nationality and focus on the relationships which, over time, produce a tight social unit defined by specific roles and lubricated by communicational interchange characteristic of, and incorporated within, the twentieth century nation. By so doing, it will develop integration as a construct forming in the crucible of the socialisation process.

Needs

Society is organised into a social cultural system with

a definite structure. The structure is composed essentially of a network of relationships among the members of a society, ordered through time, relating to the various elements found to exist indigenously around the developed society forming its environment. These relationships make it possible for the members to satisfy their own individual needs as well as the system needs of the society.[2] Through this process, the individual achieves personal definition and society, ultimate definition. There is exhibited a high degree of conformity to the group by the individual in society; conformity which creates linkages of major significance.[3] The types of linkages found in human societies are, to a great extent, biologically determined. Needs and wants are developed and expanded through societal interchange, and their arousal, found in complex sets of interacting physiological events, and are the net result of the individual's social behaviour. Of crucial importance is that the <u>society and the individual's position in same, act as an extensions of each other</u> for both need definition and need fulfillment.[4]

Social relationships in all mammalian societies tend to be organised to take account of age and sex differences. Human societies generally speaking develop greater elaborate kinship networks and other complex social arrangements that reflect cultural influences. The social structures in developed societies are an organisational and behavioural product of the interaction of culture and, to some extent, are both biological and genetic.[5] <u>Social structures</u> are

composed of two elements composing the basic building blocks of society (i) the human element and (ii) the roles that the human element fulfill.

The human element, the individual person, has a genetic heritage that is particularly distinctive and partially shared and each individual has a cultural heritage that is likewise partly distinctive and partly shared. The shared portion of both produce the common element found within the social structure. The shared blood produces the kinship community, shared economic functions produce the community feeling of productive relations. The basic group structure itself produces a need for significance and produces a community feeling of cohesion. The interaction of the human element within the society is accomplished according to role patterns.

Role

A role is a position that can be filled by an individual and has certain distinctive behavioural requirements and expectations attached to it.[6] At least five different ways of classifying individuals seem to be commonly involved in giving organisation and structure to society, (1) age-sex groupings[7] (2) family or kinship groupings (3) occupational groupings (4) interest groupings (5) status groupings. Within each grouping are a number of different categories or positions which may be either given or assumed. Each individual in society not only takes or is assigned a position in these groupings, but is further assigned or assumes positions in sub-groupings almost ad

infinitum. Many of the positions, thus ascribed or assumed, change as the individual in society matures, some do not. The contribution that a position makes to the objects and purposes of the community represent essentially the function of the position. The beliefs shared by individuals of the society regarding the functions of the various positions represent one part of the ideology held in common. The common ideology is circumambient to behaviour of the function filled by the individual, which is essentially a personified role.[8] Within a given society people are expected to act in certain ways according to the roles in question. Failure to live up to expected normative behaviour will be criticised by the group, censored or led to ostracisation. Normative behaviour within society may be formal, as in legal considerations, or informal, as in one's anticipation of another's action. A number of different norms combine to shape the parameter requirements of a role, as individuals in society have many roles to fulfill. They are exposed to a myriad of societal parameters in the form of expectations of normative behaviour which are largely learned responses and expectation patterns acquired through the process of individual socialisation into the group.

The primary or basic function of roles are an important mechanism of social control. They harness the individual's energies to those tasks that must be accomplished if the system is to survive and the needs of the members are to be met, and as such, take on a political connotation. The second function of roles is to encourage specialisation.

Specialisation increases the efficiency of members' efforts within the collectivity of the group and assume an economic connotation. The third function of the role is the resultant specialisation which increases the level of inter-dependence among the members of the given group. Interdependence increases the strength of the group and have a social connotation. Further, roles are a mechanism for cultural transmission. They are used for the passing of tradition from one generation to the next and, as such, assume an overall cultural connotation.[5]

Basic roles are usually ascribed to the individual at birth by fixed criteria which are independent of the individual merit such as the criteria of sex, descent, or seniority of age. These criteria are exhaustive in that they can be mutually and universally applied. They are also exclusive in as much as every indvidual in a society belongs to either one or another, i.e., male or female, juvenile or adult, or a selected combination of same. Second to basic roles are those of function roles. These are fundamentally more differentiated, but, as basic roles, they also have extensive implications for the other roles open to their incumbents and for interpersonal relations. These general roles may take the form of occupational roles. They are generally filled indiscriminately and frequently have much wider significance than mere occupation itself. General roles are accorded frequently to those that prove themselves through society as being capable of occupying some economic

considerations and are fundamentally those that add the stimulus to society for the formation of further roles.[10]

Whilst primitive societies are fragile and tightly integrated around a common core of shared values, industrial societies tend toward more loose texturing. They contain within themselves all sorts of conflicts and divergent philosophies. Integration, as such, is not necessarily related to a single centre, but to a variety of regional, ethnic, class, and minority loyalties. This is why industrial societies tend to absorb changes, whether planned or not, more quickly and easily than fragile societies.[11] But for the cohesiveness of the society to be maintained, common notions regarding roles and role expectations must be shared.[12] They are shared when the societal grouping rests on fundamentally compatible moral elements.

Specialisation and differentiation are two aspects of the same sort of change; the one would not occur without the other, but specialisation is largely the question of the technique of work, whereas ideas about who may appropriately perform a task are suffused with the societies' moral belief. In general terms, the moral structure of European society has been, through a period of mutation and growth, handed down in what has been known as the Christian tradition.[13] Ideas of good and evil are inseparable from social experience, and, as social experience relates to economic development, these ideas relate too. The rules that people have adopted to normalise behaviour are

fundamentally, originally, morally based rules. Rules that define roles constitute the customs regulating face to face relations.[14] Within the process of socialisation, these rules are internalised, becoming a constituent part, if not the fundus of non-logical behaviour. Social interaction may be described as the compromise between the input from the individual's biological nature and personality on the one hand, and role, culture, and environment on the other. Individual biological nature relates to individuals in small groups. The interaction of the individual in small groups is associated with the concept of role where role is the product of the societal culture either small groups, family, peers or large groups, the extended community, or society at large, composing an environment.[15]

Out of the requirements of needs, patterned society, in the forming of roles, develops. Roles, as the key to community, are primarily established through tradition by political, socio-cultural, or economic traditions, and, are formed within the Western European context, with an overlay of Christianity providing the moral tone. They (i) provide social control; (ii) they are fundamentally interdependent and; (iii) they are transmittable.

Needs, Roles and Interaction

The social control function is accomplished through the need for fulfillment. Sociological literature attempts typologies of individual need hierarchies,[16] based on expectations and posited on an inherent instinctoid basis.

In decreasing order of strength, these are (1) physiological needs essential to the biological continuation of the system (2) safety needs as freedom from pain and discomfort, and threatening circumstances (3) love and belonging needs including sex, love, desire for children and the desire for acceptance (4) esteem needs such as prestige, fame, recognition and (5) the need for self-actualisation as in self expression, self-fulfillment and the sense of growing or becoming something.[17] To this list of basic needs may be added the meta-needs of (6) the desire to know and understand and (7) the desire for aesthetic fulfillment. Relating to the sociological nature of a needs scale, the constituent members, or indeed the arrangement, are not determined by a natural scientific law. Any one need may take precedence over those below it and lower ones tend to be filled only after the higher ones have been relevantly satiated, for inherited motifs cannot easily be separated from learned motifs, and basic urges as for food and sex can be greatly strengthened or weakened by training and experience.[18] Further, the meeting of one need can be instrumental to the accomplishment or meeting of another, and as such, may be bound up by prestige, ingroup outgroup status or importance, which may be over or under emphasised. The relationship between primary and secondary needs, i.e., fundamental or meta needs depends on circumstance, but the presentation of needs as above, provides a basic, universal, albeit general, guide to human nature.[19] Of crucial importance is that charted horizontally across psychological

development, the number of wants, variety and related saliency of same increases from the physiological to the safety, from the safety to the belonging, from belonging to esteem, and from esteem to self-actualisation.[20] In other words, the intensity of wants, varieties, and salience of actualisation needs are much more intense and psychologically developed. The conclusion is that they are determined by the relation of the individual to, and in, society. They are products of abstract goals, their roots are in (1) biological capacity (2) cultural norms and values (3) personal experience and (4) individual accessibility. What is important is the differentiation between needs and wants, or needs and motifs.

A primary need is something the absence of which, if persistent, will terminate the life or health of the organism. The most obvious need of this sort is food.[21] Needs, in this regard, are seen as taking on the significance of life and death. The more one migrates from the area of viewing the need as a life and death consideration, the less urgent the need and the less primary. Secondary needs or manipulative needs are the product of learning and correlate highly with wants. These are not necessarily biologically induced but are more socially induced. They are derived from the value system of the given society where a value is considered as a conception distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group. Such a value, either explicit or implicit, defines the desirability which influences the selection from

available modes, means, and ends of action.[22] As such, value is defined as that aspect of motivation which is referrable to standards, personal or cultural, that do not arise solely out of immediate tensions or immediate situations.[23] The significance of values, inasmuch as they relate to the priority setting by the individual to non-biological needs, have direct bearing on the setting or society in which the individual is found, and the moral structure of that society. The moral structure of society takes on the formalised aspects of a moral code in the cosmology of a society, some moral values may be stated as universal.[24]

Morals are frequently idolised values as in 'thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself; thou shalt even love thine enemy, and respect him that persecutes you.' The individual may be considered as being at the centre of a series of social circles which are generally of increasing size and possibly overlapping with each other. They may form, for example, a nuclear family, a wider group of relatives, or extended family, a clan, a tribe, his acquaintances or social groups, the people of a village, town or city, or a region. Each series of circles tends to define an activity or implied relationship with other people. Once a boundary of equal regard is past, the degree of subordination of the treatment of others relates to groups' accessibility, the consideration changing the further removed by distance from the primary group. The obligation imposed by a value becomes more and more tenuous,

white shades into deeper and deeper grey, and grey into black. In so doing, values tend to relate to meta-needs and, as such, are competent constituents regulating directly the relationship of the individual to the group. The ambivalence of secondary or meta-needs depends on the setting. This is the primary distinction between secondary and primary needs. Primary needs are universally real. Secondary needs are, in essence, products of the socialisation process.[22] Fulfillment of both is either attempted or achieved by societal intercourse defined by sets of parameters of action synonymous with roles.

Discussion

For the purposes of this paper, needs will be simplified into the primary and secondary category. The salient primary needs are fundamentally biological, and being related to life and life support, may be broken down into the concept of security: either physical or economic. There is another element closely related to the biological but more a neurological need, that is the security necessary for sanity or that of intelligence security. Physical, economic, or intellectual security is achieved, if at all, through patterned societal relations defined in terms of roles. Secondary or meta-needs are themselves created in society and are achieved, if at all, by individuals exercising roles in that society and are, hence, principally culturally structured. For example, whereas the need of economic security is biologically induced, when considered as a primary need, mandating whether or not food would be

eaten to sustain an organism's life, on the meta-need level, this same economic need could become a want. in other words, the type of food eaten, i.e., strawberries, beef, or potatoes, become important, not necessarily for the ultilitarian nutritional value of eating itself. But, inasmuch as the individual is found to exist in society, and there exercises his endeavour to conform with a set of parametorial role requirements for the fulfillment of basic need satisfaction, he is a constituent portion both as giver and receiver of society and a constituent actor in the societal socialisation process.

European society is frequently viewed as being divided into a series of nations. Nations, as distinct and more or less autonomous sociological units, in which individuals are undergoing the sociological process. They are amalgamated societies, constructs of smaller sociological groupings integrated into a definable unit through time. Each step along the process of nation development incorporated quantitative expansion, which redefined the core identity and remodeled roles and interplay within the group to accomodate the newly integrated. The process of connected understanding[26] produces an evolutional change to the group, differences merge into similarities and the unit experiences an expansion incorporating the intermingled old. What develops is an interdependence both physical and psychological between the macrostructure and its substructures.[27] Social integration rests on personal

bonds of social attraction. The particularistic values of the larger entity diffuse into the face-to-face groups which are both incorporated within it and shape the social relations and patterns of conduct via roles and expectations of their members. The result is that the daily social relations in various diverse subgroups reinforce the particularistic values and bonds of solidarity developed in the community at large.

> Penetration of primary groups gives larger groups the capacity to socialise loyalty to themselves into deeper levels of the personality. Rewards of primary group life and loyalties to other members of primary groups become resources at the disposal of the larger group.[28]

Standards of achievement and success in the larger groups become universal particularistic attachments imposed by particular orientations and tend to isolate the subculture.[29]

Integration brings about an awareness of, and an expanded particularistic opportunity to coalesce with, the larger group. The larger or universalistic group provides the setting for mediated goals, both set and achieved, through social exchange reflecting any behavioural orientation.[30] Integrated society brings about compliance with the universalistic, identification with same, and internalisation of collective values.[31] One of the most basic needs, necessary for the functional interaction and ultimate success of a nation as such, as well as the facilitation of and regulation of individual needs, is the need to communicate: the interchange of

abstract ideas with transmission and reception more or less on the same grounds to assure fluid and meaningful understanding. The operational social system is an organisation since. "Communication is the cement that makes organisations. Communications alone enable a group to think together, to see together, and to act together."[32] The organisation is essentially "a larger group of persons linked by . . . complementary habits and facilities of communication."[33] Such communication organisations, or societies. are "clusters of population, united by grids of communication flows and transport systems, and separated by thinly settled or nearly empty territories."[34] "Peoples are groups of persons united by an ability to communicate on many kinds of topics: they have complementary habits of communications."[35] Communications develop a social system in which persons develop expectations about each others' behaviour.[36]

Individuals are socialised into a society and. in turn, the society is conforming to the notions of the individuals who form constituent members of that society. Fundamentally a society fills the needs of the individual people. Man joins the voluntary organisation of society for the fulfillment of the needs both primary and secondary which he possesses. Theoretically, if the society is not capable of fulfilling those needs or at least not to the expectation of individual members, the

society may be changed to so conform to the expectation of the individual need for fulfillment, or the individual may opt for membership in an auxiliary society.

The Consideration of Language

Societal interchange mandates communication, the major element of which is language. Language is a human phenomenon which directly affects the characteristic development of a given group. In traditional societies language developed its group uniqueness through isolation and hence, is highly correlated with group identification. Language is frequently cited as a determinant for nationality and ultimately a determinant of the nation, as "Literacy, education in greater depth, and the vernacular tongue created splits between . . . groups."[37]

In Europe, linguistic communities have evolved to a size apparently suitable for modern nations.[38] Lines of ethnic loyalty were drawn along the frontiers of linguistic unity. "Language therefore is to a modern society what money is to its economy; a universal currency of exchange."[39] Communication developed with the modernisation of society, through the necessity of military and simple services which required the common denominator of mutually understood language. Emerging dominant languages, either single languages or one of a closely related group of languages, became incorporated within the idea of ethnic identity. An increase in the level of modernisation necessitated an ever increasing

well-defined language to afford the exactness required by communication. The advent of public education further highlighted the demands for a specific given linguistic media within a given territory amongst a given integrated people. Modernisation, which was causal to the development of centralised societies, provided the vehicle for development. As nationality evolved, creating a fundamental social bond, European thought became re-orientated around domestic identities. What developed into localised cultural movements was aided by the creation of standardised domestic literary language.[40] The governments which emerged essentially in the form of states within Europe as a result of the national movements, consolidated their central control over the society and reinforced the sense of national identity.[41] Linguistic uniqueness of smaller sociological units, such as tribes or clans, through time, developed a pattern of general linguistic homogeneity or a highly compatible interface.[42]

Language situations are rarely static and their development, moreover, are closely related to other social, political and economic, as well as technical changes. Frequently, in societal development, there have been class structures where a ruling elite spoke a different language than that of the masses.

In early England, and generally throughout the

Continent, French was the universal language of the elites, having supplanted Latin in its universality. With the development of a literature tradition amongst the masses, due to the process of modernisation and its associated mobilisation and associated with the elites' desire for developing an autonomy vis-a-vis Rome, domestic languages proliferated through the various echelons of emerging national society. In Western Europe, with the emergence of political nations, ruled by absolute monarchs, domestic linguistic characteristics developed vertically permeating the developing nation and adding identifiable uniqueness to same. The nation-forming process was mainly linked with the ruling class and educated section of society (CIVES LITTERATI) and the concept of uniform ideological uniqueness (especially CUJUS REGIO EJUS RELIGIO) continued within a developing common language.[43] Synergies of unification aided greatly these achieved differences between national entities.[44]

One school of thought labels language as providing a salient identification for nations:

> Those factors which contributed powerfully, in almost all cases to the formation of a sense of nationality; (are) common descent (that is, the idea of belonging to a distinct 'people'), the occupation of a definite territory, a common language, and more broadly, a common culture.[45]

Another school, most notably led by Arnold Toynbee, negates the idea of language being a criterion for

nationality. Indeed, he condemns those who seek "the criteria of Nationality in the shibboleth of Language".[46] He viewed language purely as a means of communication and not as an end to identification. The argument here is between the concept of language as a factor of identification of the nation and the concept of language fulfilling a function in the nation. It may be both.

Referring to the Greek-city states, H.G. Wells wrote that patriotism (as it relates to nationalism):

> took an intense and narrow form. . . . The new geographical limits of these Greek states added to the intensity of their feeling. A man's love for his country was reinforced by his love for his native town, his religion, and his home; for these were all one. . . . But in the main, patriotism in the Greek home was a personal passion of an inspiring . . . intensity.[47]

The intimacy of Well's Greek city-states is achieved through the inter-communication of language. "A modern emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old phenomena - nationality and patriotism,"[48] emphasizes the fact that, "nationalism is plural rather than singular,"[49] and as, "nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness."[50] it requires interpersonal communication for as much as possible the expunction of human needs through integrated society. It requires language. In his study on Nationalism and the Social Communication, Karl W. Deutsch[51] suggests that a community of language is a

community of information vehicles. Most words of the language, those frequently used, will be recognised and spoken by most members of the group with identical or closely similar denotations; the consideration being two sided, speaking and comprehension. The effects of the community language may be modified by the effects on the community of culture. Speech patterns according to Deutsch, may form speech communities and relate to, not only communities as in the form of nations, but sub-sections of that community. Sub-sections of the speech community are denoted by dialects and social divisions of linguistic specifications. Each, he suggests, has its own language centres and leading groups which set the standard for that linguistic pattern.[52] The answer to the conundrum: Is language an identification factor or just a functional tool? It appears to be <u>both</u>.

> Quoting Bloomfield, Deutsch relates the following:
>
> The main types of speech in a complex speech-community can be roughly classed as follows: 1. literary standard . . . ; 2. colloquial standard, the speech of the privileged class . . . 3. provincial standard . . . spoken by the 'middle' class; 4. sub-standard, spoken . . . by the 'lower middle' class...without intense local difference . . . ; 5. local dialect, spoken by the least privileged class; . . . and the varieties . . . often incomprehensible to each other and to speakers of 2/3/4.[53]

Each type of speech delineates relationships, roles expectations, standards, and values. Each type of speech

further denotes shared commonalities amongst uses.[54]

Characteristically, dialects are fundamentally spoken. Written dialects, other than colloquial literature are practically non-existent.[55] Modernisation and subsequent centralised institutionalisation created the dynamic of national language. Within the general sphere of national language is the allowed use of incorporated dialects. Heterogenic deviations from the norm are conceptualised falling within the whole of the national entity, all of which are constellations within an orbit of formalised language associated with a nation. Its utilisation further differentiates its constituent uses.

Quantitative enlargements of society require greater communicative formalities, standardisations to achieve universality. Integrated societies require a given community understood media for communicative exchange if the benefits of quantitatively enlarged community are to be achieved; those being the satisfaction of human needs via interaction in the socialisation process within groups.

There is no dearth of reference alluding to the linguistic criteria not only affording references for individual identity, but with reference for the demarcation of nations. The language known as Standard English is spoken by diverse elements of the British nations;[56] the standard language French by the French nations; and so on throughout the Nation States of

Europe. The how of this phenomena relates to the development of the nation over time. The why of this phenomena relates to the function of communication, facilitating interdependence within society. Language facilitates the roll-over effect of history. Language permits history to be interpreted and projected to form a common future. People, as a group of individuals within a collectivity, have some objective characteristics in common.

Fundamentally, but not exclusively, is the connection with territory as a place of residence. This objective characteristic is projected *via* the vehicle of language and forms a collective memory affording interpretations of past events which define present location and provides the *fundus* for future projections. Physically, people live in a state of their own. By this is meant that the personnel of states consist largely of individuals who share main characteristics in common. Through the collectivity of these people is ascribed the term nationality, the people bound to the territory of the nation. This projection is not without difficulties for these nations are frequently segments of a single, or compositions of many, different groups of people. Linguistically, for example, the British people may speak English,[57] Welsh, Gaelic, or Scots. Or specific given language may also be divided amongst several territories as German between German (East and West), Switzerland, Austria, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Deutsch

said,

> No person can be born at more than one spot on the map. The actual place of his birth has the size of a bed or a room, not the size of a country. If he finds himself in a "country" or within a set of borders, then no number of births can have created these borders or any unity of the country within it.[58]

This is learned. It is a process of acculturalisation, facilitated by language, leaning upon communality achieved through interpretation of past and present circumstances. A common heritage is an achieved notion. A community of consciousness or community of character is learned.[59] This degree of learning produces common imagery and is frequently bound up with perceptions fostered through the communication media of a given language. Language, then, relates to similar perception and similar perceptions to similar characters.[60] Similarity of character is a deeper conception of community character;

> This no longer means . . . that the individuals of the same nation are similar to each other, but that the same force . . . acted on the character of each individual - no matter how different the other forces may be which are effective beside it . . . While . . . similarity of character can only be observed in the majority of the members of the nation, the community of character, the fact that they all are the products of one and the same effective force, is common to all of them without exception. This effective force, that which is historical in us, is that which is national to us. It is this which wheels us into a nation.[61]

The community concept, either that of community of culture or community of fate, represents, in effect, a community of values, that is, "an assemblage of

reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love."[62] As the community concept is psychological, it incorporates the sense which people are bound together and marked off from others by common sympathies. Quincey Wright defines the community concept as:

> One which manifests cultural uniformity, spiritual union, institutional unity, and material unification in the highest possible degree, and subjectively one with which the members consciously identify themselves.[63]

This high degree of abstraction brought about by various integrating elements necessitates a high degree of conceptualisation articulated by language. The patterns of life which accompanied modernisation have produced the institutional framework for the transmission of national interpretation of the ethnic identity. This is due to the increased tempo of the modern period with regard to the instance of change, whereby change in and of itself is accepted as a fact of life, indeed revolutionary.[64] The modern nation underscores the need to scrutinise the extent to which socialisation intermixes all aspects of society. In a condition of rapid change, one can no longer assume that the knowledge, or practices that served adequately in the past, are sufficent for either the present or the future. Hence, there must be a significant rethink in the process of transmission, in general terms, undertaken through the nation; in specific terms, undertaken by the vehicle of language to produce the modern definition of cultural

heritage.[66] However, language, while being ultimately utilised to define a given society, does very much to facilitate the workings of society. Through language is passed the basic character of a culture. The roots of culture[66] found within European nations stem generally from the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman traditions of the Mediterranean, regionalised and modified through time.

In Europe, societal structure has developed a corporate form, which, again through time, has evolved from the nuclear family[67] to the nation, a process through time in which patterns, prejudices, likes, similarities, values, culture, etc. evolved. Quantitative expansion brought about by integration through socialisation compounds the process. The transmission of these past phenomena constitutes a pattern of identity transmitted by language but also adds in defining in-group, out-group status.

Dissimilarities

One of the achieved dissimilarities between nations is that of their system of beliefs. At a stage of early development during the period of national awakening, the corpus of religious Christian tradition became mutated to accomodate domestic aims. This is a result of the process, through time, intricately intertwined with the development of domestic literature and elite motivation, which afforded nationals a reference point for consciousness, differentiating themselves from others.

Religion, as a belief in, recognition of, or an awakening sense of, a higher, unseen, controlling power or powers, with the emotion and morality connected therewith,[68] produced not only formal institutionalised churches identified with nations, as in the 'Kirk' of Scotland, the Church of England, etc. but also correlates with the moral attitudes of national populations. Morality, the quality of being moral, that which renders an action right or wrong, relating to character or conduct considered as good or evil[69] may relate to a national stereotype. Although in recent experience, European institutional religious attendance may be on the decline, vestiges of the moral-component of religious thought still may afford delineation between nations.[70] Religion, as such, tends to define the environment of the nation and is a major consideration in that a nation needs "a well-defined environment."[71]

A well defined, if not delineated, environment achieves a degree of characteristic crystallisation of ideals permeating the group <u>via</u> linguistic transmission homogenising to a degree the diverse positions of the integrated elements and backed up with aspirations of pressing to acquire a measure of control over the behaviour of its members.

<u>A Well Defined Environment</u>

> If their nationalistic members are successful and a new or old state organisation is put into their service, then at last the nation has become sovereign and a <u>nation-state</u> has come into being.[72]

The basis for this is cultural autonomy. Advanced society, frequently irrational, has an unsurpassed capacity to manipulate human beings by virtue of its uni-dimensionality which permits the permanent suppression of free social-developmental progress.[73]

Nations tend to desire autonomous identity and form states, and states tend to further define the development of the nation. Nations are elastic and malleable. States being institutionalised exhibit the tendency of rigidity: the institutions of state are but another dimension of achieved differences delineating European nations. Referring to Weber, Ralph Dahrendorf, in his Ungewissheit, Wessenschaft und Demokratic noted:

> There are preconditions that restrict the range of knowledge and action and others that enlarge it, depending on whether the principle of certainty or the principle of uncertainty is dominant.[74]

The principles of certainty or uncertainty are positional principles affecting states' actions. The control that the state exercises over the nation is real.[75] The state attempts to determine the posture taken by itself with regard to other nation-states. This may be a reflective, or protective response. Certainty or uncertainty dominating as a operendi motus for states, refers to the argument in question and the position assumed by the state in defense or counter to that argument. Control is salient as is also an element of dominance which directly relates to positions of power.

The destiny of man is accomplished, and his

> freedom realised by absorption within the state, because only through the state does he obtain coherence and acquire reality.[76]

Nationalism which frequently attempts to achieve nationhood often desires self-determination, which is accomplished by the formation of state. The political state then becomes an identifiable feature of the social nation which sought and, potentially at least, achieved it. Although the general tendency in Europe has been that of social nations questing autonomy and developing political domestic states, it is not to infer that other nations are not content, or at least not sufficiently motivated, for such a political development to occur and may choose to live subordinately as accomodating nations within larger nation-states. It is the tendency to merge, which is synonymous with the concept of integration. Generally:

> A nation is a body of people to whom a government is responsible through their legislature when governments derive their sovereignty from the nation.[77]

It is difficult to say who exercises more influence upon whom: the state upon the nation or the nation upon the state, but it is not difficult to see the restrictive parameters placed upon the nation by the state, restricting the nation's further free evolution - nations tend to become hostage to the political regime.[78] States become the <u>custodians of the national good, because of their historical perspective, and fall back on to both religion and language to promote their ends</u>.[79]

Only one language is firmly implanted in an

> individual. Only to one does he belong entirely, no matter how many he learns subsequently . . . for every language is a particular mode of thought and what is cogitated in one language can never be repeated in the same way in another . . . Language, then, just like the church . . . is an expression of a peculiar life which contains it and develops through it, a common body.[80]

As states, in the modern epoch, afford the polis around which institutionalised education is developed, the attitude of the state is then re-fed through the schools and again fed back into the nation. The state's position may be so stated:

> It is in our public schools that the majority of our children are being formed. These schools must be the guardians par excellence of our national character.[81]

This attitude intimates that the State, although it may be a nation's construct, assuming national characteristics, once in place, significantly resocialises the integrated nation (or nations).[82]

National Culture

The concept of culture as a configuration of subjective attitudes, impressions, and a general cathexis of the population of the nation projected towards, and emanating from its ethnie, is its ethnic polis.

This is unique to the given collectivity. The cultural components which comprise the nation are found through that grouping to be unique in themselves. For example, the institutions of government formed within a nation for the eventual control of that nation and the regulation of international relations, frequently their State, is discreetly unique to those populations over

which it exercises sovereignty. This uniqueness and the collective identification and realisation of the entity as being singular, may release the sentiment of loyalty amongst the masses or nationals of that state, coupled with an objective evaluation or perception of performance. Forms, functions, patterns, and character are deemed by the nation as having worth, and patterns of behaviour, satisfying needs are, through transmission, normalised. They evolve from and comply with the collective values providing norms of behaviour. The concern with the whole, in which each cultural item is viewed in the context of its meaning and relation to the other parts, provides an essential perspective to an understanding of the process of socialisation which is undergone by the individual members of the nation. The diversity of those members, their particularisations merging into a universalistic reference system relates to integration.

In the European tradition which, in the current epoch, links significant learning with institutionalised education, is the fact that the demands of modernisation are met by the centralisation of the school system which is responsible for public instruction. Here, if the Nation stamps its character on the State, it would be this generalised character that is re-introduced into the system through the schools. Is it the state that is responsible for perpetuating the national character or is it the nation?[88] It has been suggested that states

tend to function, albeit within the mandates of the nation, more or less autonomously from same.

> Bureaucratic omnipotence tends naturally to convert the holders of key positions in the vast administrative regime into a new variety of notables and nobles which often act more or less of their own accord.[64]

However, it may be that the nation and state interact in a pattern of mutual agreeable consciousness.

> In the modern over-populated, mechanised world of cities, no government, even though in control of the machinery of state, could maintain itself very long without some measure of active consent and cooperation in the masses . . . We live so close together, in such a network of social relations, that each individual is continually taking an active part in social activities prescribed or controlled by the government. The whole system would break down unless the vast majority of people gave a considerable measure of consent to the system generally used and the government's activities in particular.[65]

In the Neo-Functionalist tradition, Schmitter defined integration as:

> the process of transferring exclusive expectations of benefits from the nation-state to some large entity. It encompasses the process by virtue of which national actors of all sorts (government officials, interest group spokesmen, politicians, as well as ordinary people) cease to identify themselves and their future welfare entirely with their own national governments and its policies.[66]

This concept relating to international integration may likewise be applied to national integration as indeed it may be equally appropriate for integration taking place throughout the entire length of the Socialisation Continuum. It encapsulates benefits, expectations of membership being transferred to a larger collectivity <u>via</u>

identification. Functional shifts in identification are essentially "based on changing demands and expectations," a process "which originates in one functional context initially separated from other . . . concerns, and then expands."[87]

This is descriptive of the Integrational aspect of merging collectivities brought about by free and unencumbered resocialisation. A national shifting of interests from the particularistic to the universalistic. An expansion by growth of the prejudicial position to one of a preference position.

In Sum

In essence, the governing principle, the driving force of man's strength is the individual's own interest. "Social life is a bundle of interests rooted in the very nature of man."[88]

It is out of this bundle of interests that man's needs are attempted to be satisfied. Interests, as the expressions of needs, require the awareness of their necessity. Needs are innate and, hence, instructive. To become needs, they must be recognised or perceived by human minds and understood to be necessary. The needs of the nation become instrumental as the mandate for the state and collectively the state exercises that mandate. The state works either directly or indirectly through governing bodies, regulatory institutions or instructional establishments within the parameters of established patterns which become the unique custom and

inheritance of the nation. Originally it stems from an expression of integrated group ideas:

> Since group cohesion is so important in the evolutionary process, the group-making factor must be established.[89]

The group-making factor was the common thread woven throughout the fabric of the integrated nation dictating identity characteristics individually unique to that collectivity. The establishment of the group-making factor is "the cake of custom" or the tendency of descendants to resemble their progenitors not only biologically but also mentally, it is enhanced by the institution of state. This cultural pattern may be maintained[90] (i) by religion, through fear endowed with sanctions; (ii) by a persecuting tendency - a propensity for punishment, deviations from establised order; and (iii) by man's proclivity to imitate what is before him.

As man is a complex of experiences, there are many experiences in each individual. Society as a complex of groups includes also many social minds. The craving the individual has for union is satisfied by group life, groups ever widening, ever unifying, but always groups. Groups afford an interaction of minds, therefore they form the social, individual man. Collective thought, collective feeling, common will, concerted activity, the group process, collective ideas, are all harmonised, either for better or worse, in the political patterns which evolved singularly and uniquely to the nation.[91]

Follett makes the observation that collectivity does not necessarily construe homogeneity. Indeed, he argued for heterogenity:

> To say that the social process is that merely of the spread of similarities is to ignore the real nature of collective thought, the collective will.
>
> The core of the social process is not likeness, but the harmonisation of differences through inter-penetration.[92]

Inter-penetration is the process of compenetration.[93] It is a process of inter-knitting. In a society, there are given similarities and achieved similarities. Given similarities are suggestive of imitation. Achieved similarities are the result of evolution, socialisation or co-adaptation. This degree of interplay within an integrated unit is either enhanced or hindered by the rigidity of the formalised institution of its government. What people think and the society of those people are virtually synonymous. Ideology cannot be separated from the social cultural order.[94]

> Ideas play their causal dynamic goal in the individual personality as in social structure. They may promote the change or they may serve to maintain the status quo.[95]
>
> The advancement of art, science, invention and discovery in Western civilisation was made possible by changes in the total system, acceptance of changes in one cultural aspect having certain affects . . . [on] . . . other aspects.[96]

Collectivity cooperation achieves motivational synergies, consideration of others, an effective division of labour termed 'complementary', and greater and more

sensitive communication. The more a collectivity interacts with itself along these lines, the greater the degree of self-awareness or collectivity-hood. The greater the internal interaction, the greater xenophobia projected toward the out-group.

Divisions in society create active healthy tensions when confined to parameters sufficiently enough constrained to prevent unhealthy or divisional fractioning. The necessary constraint to tensions are frequently provided by elites.

> The highly attentive publics, a comparatively small sector of the whole, need to develop an understanding of their special way and the workings of the system. Other kinds of understandings and outlooks, which may be associated with considerably less in the way of over-participation, must permeate most of the population. A basic prerequisite is that the population be pervaded by (group) loyalty or, perhaps, more accurately, that that population not consist of segments each with its own sense of separateness.[97]

The condition is best illustrated by society consisting of blocks with their own history, language, culture and memories of, if not aspirations for, a separate identity. The observance of public opinion points out the incompatibility of these circumstances with democratic processes. This incompatibility comes not so much from the psychological characteristics of the mass of the people as from the fact that those characteristics invite exploitation by elements of leadership. Exploitation or reckless leadership may disrupt the process of government by diversionary appeals

that weaken or destroy the foundations of group unity."[99] Where a collectivity functions as a whole within a government, some degree of conflict is necessary, however; loyalties must transcend and be dominated by a general feeling for the whole over specific localised loyalties. This is a pattern of culture exhibited in the Western nation-states developed through a long period of society coalescence. The limits of coalescence are a process of achieved differences between national groupings and unique to each national entity. Essentially, society forms what may be termed a 'contract'.

> Society is indeed a contract . . . but the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement . . . It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all arts; a partnership in all virtue and all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born."[99]

Membership in such a collectivity forming a community of interests:

> produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for injustice in his conduct, and giving his actions the morality which they have formerly lacked.[100]

It is this continuity that transmits traditions, ideologies, myths and acceptable methods of solving problems brought about by the existence of needs. It is this continuity that also perpetuates stereo-types characterising out-groups.

Generally, the literature concludes that:

> A nation is an historically evolved stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture . . . It must be emphasised that none of the above characteristics is by itself sufficient to define a nation.[101]

It is also possible that "on the other hand, it is sufficient for a single one of these characteristics to be absent and the nation ceases to exist."[102]

It is only when the necessary characteristics are, to some degree, present that we have a nation. What determines what is necessary is fundamentally when a significant portion of these elements are present. Exactly what that may be is not possible to definitely pinpoint.

> The spirit of the people, its history, its religion, its degree of political freedom cannot be considered in isolation by their separated characteristics. They are woven together in an indissoluble fusion.[103]

The process of weaving the various comprehensive elements requisite to form the construction of nationhood into the finished production nation is unique to each collectivity. It is the process through socialisation of individuals integrated into groups and groups into larger collectivity[104] eventually forming characteristic patterns which both pervade and lend identification to the collectivity and the development of that collectivity further - to the sociological unit known as nation: it is a process necessitating intellectual exchange through communication. It is a process necessitating a language,

the more complex the process, the greater the degree of idea transmission, the higher the requirements of the formality of language. In this respect, it is possible to conclude both, that language is but a form of communication, and, communicational forms are appropriate for defining national parameters. It is also to note that language communication is the key to the psychological feeling of unity. The development of specific national unity through the movement of nationalism is the subject of the next section, chapter four.

CHAPTER THREE NOTES

[1]A general theme running throughout Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

[2]Gerhard and Jean Lenski, Human Societies An Introduction to Macro-Sociology. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 47.

[3]D. Krech, et.al., Individual in Society. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 521.

[4]Loc. cit. p. 85ff.

[5]See the introductional remarks in Lenski, Human Society. op. cit.

[6]For a discussion on the material product of culture/social structure/individuals and roles in human societies, see Gerhard and Jean Lenski, Human Socities. op. cit. p. 46ff.

[7]For a discussion on role culture, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 27ff.

[8]See David Krech, et.al., Individual in Society. op. cit. pp. 310-11; also Kenneth Gergan, et.al., Social Psychology. (New York: Random House, 1974), chapters 10 and 17; A.P. Hare, Small Group Research. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 8-9.

[9]Lenski, Human Societies. op. cit. p. 50; see also, for the rationalisation of the concept, James Harvey Roberson, The Mind in the Making. (London: Watts & Co., 1934), p. 28ff.

[10]Michael Banton, Roles: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relationships. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1965), pp. 39-40ff.

[11]The question may be asked here, whether or not industrial societies are fragile. They may be, but obviously as industrial societies, by the nature of complexities inherent with industrialisation, (i.e., interdependencies, reliances, implied trust), their expanded expectations entail a degree of network complexity which would move it out of a "fragile" consideration.

[12]See Banton, Roles. op. cit. p. 53.

[13]Loc. cit. p. 60.

[14]Hare, Small Group Research. op. cit. p. 8; also see Guy Aimard, Durkheim et la Science Économique L'apport de sa sociologie à la théorie économique moderne. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962).

[15]A definitive work on roles is found in T. Parsons and E. Shils, ed., Toward a General Theory of Action. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 91-98, 207-18, 231.

[16]For the herein used typology of need hierarchies, the reference is made to the classical work of A.H. Maslow in Motivation and Personality. (New York: Harper and Row, 1954).

[17]These appear throughout the literature as a classic scale relating to the work of Maslow. See A.H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation." Psychological Review. 50(1943):370-96. These are frequently termed "Maslow's Needs." But this is not the only representation of needs. Another notable scale is that found in Moris

Ginsburg, Essays in Sociology and Social Psychology. (London: William Henemann, Ltd. 1956), p. 130ff. Basic needs and moral ideals broken down into (1) the needs for body, food, drink, etc.; (2) the needs of the mind, to understand, to construct, to appreciate, to be home in the world; (3) the social needs, to respond, and to seek response.

[18]For a related discussion, see Alfred Kuhn, The Study of Society A Multidisciplinary Approach. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1963).

[19]Loc. cit.

[20]See section 3 of Krech, Individual in Society. op cit.

[21]James Olds, "Physiological Mechanisms." in Marshall R. Jones, ed., Nebraska Symposium of Motivation. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1956), pp. 74-77. It is interesting to note that a mode, relating to a need, is a response selector and, as such, the motive would function as a want, i.e., something that is only secondarily related to the life support of the organism. A need, if considered as a construct, that being a convenient factor or hypothetical concept which stands for a force, the psychochemical nature of which is unknown in the brain region, would be construed as a force which organises perception, appreciation, intellection conation, and action in such a way as to transform in a certain direction an existing unsatisfying situation. Everett Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change. (Homeswood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1962), p. 104ff.

[22]C. Kluckhohn, "Values and Value Orientations." in Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, ed., Toward a General Theory of Action. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 395-403.

[23]Loc. cit. p. 425; and for an interesting and good analysis, albeit somewhat detailed, see Dorothy Lee, "Are Basic Needs Ultimate?" in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLIII(1948):391-95.

[24]Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change. op. cit. p. 115.

[25]For a discussion see, Peter and Brigette Beyer, Individuum + Co. (Stuttgart: Deutsch Verlage, 1972), p. 38ff.

[26]This process, with regard to specific developed ways of thinking and treating life problems, termed "integrity," is treated briefly by C.D. Darlington, The Evolution of Man in Society. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1969), p. 628.

[27]For a discussion, see Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life. (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 289ff.

[28]See Arthur L. Stinchombe, Social Structures and Organizations. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965).

[29]Elites tend traditionally to hold standardised values and orientations rather than particularistic. See for a related military discussion, Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 89-97.

[30]For the study of exchange, a wide range of behaviour is pertinent including goal-orientation, conduct, and any sort of material or non-rational action. Weber said "the action of persons who, regardless of possible cost to themselves, act to put into practice their convictions of what seems to be required by duty, honour, the pursuit of beauty, a religious call, personal loyalty, or the importance of some 'cause' no matter in what it consists" is acceptable substance of integrated action. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 116.

[31]For functionings causal to individual attitude change, see Leon Mann, Social Psychology. (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), pp. 126-27.

[32]Quoted of Wiener in Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government. (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 77. See original: Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1965).

[33]Karl W. Deutsch, National and Social Communications. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1953), p. 96. (The original quotation appeared in italics.)

[34]Karl W. Deutsch, "The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory," in Abdul Said, ed., Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance. (Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 75.

[35]James E. Dougherty, et.al., Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York: Harper and Row. 1981). p. 285.

[36]The general idea of Talcott Parsons in The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1952).

[37]Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1967). p. 48.

[38]Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1967), p. 47ff.

[39]Loc. cit. p. 47.

[40]Hugh Seaton-Watson, Nationalism and Communism. (London: Methuen, 1964), pp. 9-10.

[41]Loc. cit. p. 107.

[42]Exceptions retaining a degree of regional autonomy are Brittany in France, Wales and Scotland in Great Britain, Vizcaya, Alava, Navarra, and the Basque in Spain, etc. See Patricia Elton Mayo, The Roots of Identity Three National Movements (London: Allen Lane, 1974) which highlights the hook-up of Nation-State, i.e., a dominant entity although consitituent participants may not have been 100% homogenized into the universalistic entity.

[43]See Josef Chilebowczyk, On Small and Young Nations in Europe. (Wroclaw: Polish Historical Library, No. 1, 1980), especially chapter one.

[44]Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. pp. 104-08.

[45]Tom Bottomore, Political Sociology. (London: Hutchinson, 1979), p. 112.

[46]Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History. Volume eight. (London: Oxford, 1934-54), p. 536.

[47]H.G. Wells, The Outline of History. (London:

MacMillan, 1921), p. 260.

[48]Carlton J.H. Hays, Essays of Nationalism. (London: MacMillan, 1926), p. 6.

[49]Carlton J.H. Hays, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. (London: R.R. Smith, 1931), p. 10.

[50]Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. (London: MacMillan, 1944), p. 10.

[51]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. Chapter 2 onwards.

[52]An example of this phenomenon is Francien: The dialect of the Ile de France, and to some extent, the Champagne, set the national standards for both literacy and colloquial French, particularly after the influence of the Language d'Oc dialect had been reduced by relative economic decline and military defeat in the Southern regions of France toward the end of the thirteenth century.

[53]Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. Quoting Leonard Bloomfield, Language. (New York: Holt, 1933), p. 52; A line running from West to East through a map of France from approximately Bordeau to Lyon to Grenoble indicates the demarcation between Langue d'Oc in the south and Langue d'Oil of the north. The second demarcational area from Lyon to Belfort indicates the eastern region of the Franco-Provencal. The core language Francien spoken in Paris within the region of d'Oil (oui) may be subdivided in the north by Picard, the northeast Wallon, the east Lorrain, south-east Burgundian, south Berrichon, southwest Portevin, west Angevin and to the north-west Norman. In the Langue docien the northwest possesses the Limousin dialect, the north the Auvergnat, the east the Proveneal, the southwest Barnais and in the west the Gascon. Each area possesses its language centre and each is an element in the constellation known broadly as French. Each area may be viewed in terms of identification by its linguistic uniquenesses, and its uniquenesses are incorporated in the conventional function of its use.

[54]In effect, speech groups reflect the 'operations of the mind'. See Bernard Bosanquett, The Philosophical Theory of the State. (London: Macmillan, 1930), p. 28ff.

[55]Standardised French emitting frm Paris is the norm for language communicated other than orally and frequently employed intra-dialectic group. Standard French is preserved by special techniques and institutions, e.g., established standards, grammar, dictionaries, schools, printing, and national radio.

[56]For a good short history of the growth and development of the English language, see Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution. (London: Pelican: 1975), chapter 4, "The Growth of Standard English," p. 237ff.

[57]For the distribution of these specific elements of political geography in Europe (especially Britain), see Geoffrey Parker, The Countries of Community Europe. (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 77.

[58]Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. pp. 18-19.

[59]Otto Bauer, Die Nationalitatenfragen und die

Sozialdemokratic. Second editon. (Vienna: Brands, 1924), p. 135.

[60]For a discussion of social imagery, see 13ff. For a discussion of ambivalent images, see p. 130ff. For a discussion on the internalisation of images, see p. 143ff. All in Trigant Burrow, The Neurosis of Man. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949).

[61]Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. p. 20.

[62]St. Augustine, The City of God. Book 19, chapter 21/24. In W.J. Oates, ed., Basic Writings of St. Augustine. (New York: Random House, 1948), pp. 497-503; also Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. p. 20.

[63]Quincy Wright, A Study of War. Volume II. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 999.

[64]The major thought in Robert Theobald, Free Man and Free Markets. (New York: Clarkson, 1963).

[65]As what is currently being done is the result of institutionalised schooling, a fact recognised early on. There are those who believe the governmental forms which paramaterise nations do much to distort socialisation, amongst them, Thomas H. Huxley: "Authorities, disciples, and schools are the curse of science, and do more to interfere with the work of the natural socialisation process or 'scientific spirit', than all its enemies." see Thomas H. Huxley letter to Professor Weldon, 9 February 1893 in Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley. Volume II. (New York: Appleton Co., 1902), p. 336.

[66]See P.E. Mayo, The Roots of Identity. op. cit.

[67]For examples of this, see Solon T. Kimball, "Cultural Influences Shaping the Role of the Child: Those First School Years," in The National Elementary School Principal. XL(1960):18-32.

[68]Chambers Dictionary, p. 1093-Religion.

[69]Loc. cit. p. 820-Morality. Compare, for example, stereotypes of Christianity in European nations, and Mohammedism in Arab nations.

[70]As, for example, the treatment of Sunday closing or no closing laws.

[71]Louis Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1954), p. 24.

[72]Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. p. 105.

[73]See Talcott Parsons, Societies, Evolution and Comparative Perspectives. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).

[74]Ralf Dahrendorf, Konflict und Freiheit. (Munchen: Piper, 1972), chapter fourteen.

[75]This is recognized by Linklater who notes that states often assert their own interests above those of their nations. Regarding morality, he states that what is important in the moral development of an international society is the fact that states refrain from asserting that they have non-negotiable rights by virtue of their sheer existence, other than the fundamental right of being

recognized as an instrument for the promotion of a local common good, i.e., the good of their nations respectively. See Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 195.

[76]Elie Kedourie Nationalism. op. cit. p. 51.

[77]Loc. cit. p. 15.

[78]A most obvious example is the French States' insistence upon the impermeability of the French language as seen through the Francophone movement of the Academie Francois. See "Francoponie une Realite Endeveur," in Forces-Quebec. 79(Automme 1987):87ff.

[79]And hence the tendency to control through domination by the state. This has led at least one author to fear the future, as a threat to human freedom. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society. (New York: Knoph, 1967). The argument is that of a value-rational motive for action by the state as suggested by Max Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. (Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1972), p. 167ff. This requires the employment of all possible considerations for the achievement of the set ends of the state. It is very scientific. "Everything in human life which does not lend itself to mathematical treatment must be excluded." (Ellul, op. cit. p. 43). It is a tendency to lead society away from the community (Gesellschaft) toward the association (Gemeinschaft) and presents a conflict of dichotomies--mass vs. personality, routine vs. creative, conventions of the ordinary people vs. inner freedom, institutional conventions vs. individuality, "the drudgery and boredom of everyday existence vs. the imaginative flight of the genius." See H.H. Gert and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 53.

[80]Kedourie Nationalism. op. cit. p. 63.

[81]W.S.F. Pickering, Durkheim on Religion A Selection of Readings with Bibliography. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 16.

[82]The state, reasserting self internally "remains a particularistic community conscious of its separation from the world beyond." Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. op. cit. p. 184. And as such is conscious of and reasserts its distinct "national consciousness." For a study of the national consciousness, see Orest Ranum, National Consciousness, History, and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), chapters one and two. See, also, chapter 6 of this paper.

[83]This is not an easy question to answer. Linklater says, "The state's first ambition is not to secure its one-side interests but to gain recognition of its responsibility for the enhancement of a particular common good." Linklater, Men and Citizens. op. cit. p. 191.

[84]Pickering, Durkheim on Religion. op. cit. p. 192.

[85]Bertrand De Jouvenel, Power, the Natural History of its Growth. Translated by J.F. Huntington, (London:

Hutchinson & Co., 1945), p. 149.

[86]Phillippe C. Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Regional Integration," in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart H. Scheingold, ed., Regional Integration: Theory and Research. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 238.

[87]See spillover in "Regional Integration," in David Shills, ed., International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences. Volume 7. (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 523; David Mitrany, "The Functional Approach to World Organizations," in A. Cosgrave and K. Twitchett, New Internatinal Actors: The United Nations and the EEC. (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 65-75; David Mitrany, "The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional," in Journal of Common Market Studies. 4(1965):119-49.

[88]Leonard Woelf, Principia Politica A Study of Communal Psychology. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), p. 155.

[89]Nicholas S. Tinashiff, Sociological Theory. (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 65.

[90]Loc. cit. p. 62.

[91]See Ramsay Muir, National-Self Government. (London: Constable & Co., 1918).

[92]M.P. Follett, The New State. (London: Longman, Green. & Co., 1918), pp. 20-27.

[93]First noted by social-philosopher, William James. It appears as if a degree of heterogeneity is necessary for a healthy and actively stimulating environment but the critical point at which particularism supercedes collectivism must not be overstepped. This may be the systole, diastole controversy and relates to the psychological need of tension as stimulation when healthy, destructive when hostile. See C.G. Jung, Psychological Types, or The Psychology of Individuation. Translated by H. Godwin Baynes. (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Co., 1933), pp. 11,179,252,263, and text general and Historical introduction.

[94]Follett, The New State. op. cit. p. 33.

[95]R.T. LaPiere, Social Change. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 291-92.

[96]Follett, The New State. op. cit. p. 34. For example, Columbus' effects on the Church Copernican doctrine.

[97]"Ideal Systems in the Individual and Society," in G.K. Zollsch and W. Hirsh, Explanations in Social Change. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), p. 34.

[98]The best example in modern times would be Hitler or Mussolini.

[99]See Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour; An Empirical Approach. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1948), p. 48.

[100]Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man The Social Bases of Man. (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 83.

[101]Loc. cit. p. 21.

[102]Loc. cit. p. 21. The critical point between necessary and sufficient enough conditions is not definitely

quanitifiable. For example, the language problems which traditionally play havoc with Belgian governments do not appear to be evident in multi-lingual Switzerland.

[103]Human Relations. op. cit. II(1949):199-231.

[104]For a further discussion on community and integration, see Ernst Haas. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Factors 1950-58. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 5ff.

CHAPTER FOUR

Nation, A Stage In The Integration Process

To understand the sociological concept of the nation is to encompass an understanding of the term "integration," for the blending of elements which produced the national units was accomplished through diverse elements integrated into a collectivity.

The concept of collectivity itself is linked to the concept of community in the senses of a Gemeinschaft, an integrated unit exhibiting degrees of homeogeneity. This notion is distinct from that of Gesellschaft, which as a form of Gestalt society may lead to a Gemeinschaft.[1] The notion of Gesellschaft is connotational of a process, Gemeinschaft with a condition.[2]

The process of socialisation, the process whereby individuals seek an extension of themselves through ever increasing action with ever increasing groups of society, is integration.[3] It is a process that produces a situation in which cultural traits and beliefs permeate the whole system,[4] creating an indigenous uniqueness. This process employs the finding of common denominators in the expanded system which necessitates a mutation of the individual unit to accomodate itself with the whole.[5] The overall process creates a degree of regional unification and a degree of cooperation.[6] But what are these units - nations? - and do they exist?

Nationalism, the Movement, the Process of Integration

The definition of integration is a major problem in the literature.[7] Different authors defining integration

differently had to develop their own set of indicators based on their own respective theories.[9] Generally they are assessments of the level of integration.[10] Deutsch settles on a convenient measure of integration by defining selected transactions, as in mailflows, etc., to indicate the degree of international integration and national autonomy in terms of interchange and transactions.[11] He generally defines the concept[12] as a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful exchange among its population. Community is used to mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group, that they have come to agreement on at least one point, that is, that common social problems must and can be resolved by the process of peaceful exchange.

Pentland defines integration as a "process whereby a group of people organised initially in two or more independent nation-states," come to institute a "whole which can in some sense be described as a community."[13] Pentland departmentalises integration into political or economic considerations.

Demereth and Peterson simply suggest that the process of integration[14] consists chiefly of the tangible, noticeable, testifiable, direct dependence, mutual or one-sided, relationships of variables upon one another and upon the whole system.[15] This is the concept of cultural synthesis, accomplished when, on one hand, the elimination

of one important element perceptibly influences the rest of the synthesis and when, on the other hand, the separate elements being transposed to a quite different combination, either cannot exist in it, or have to undergo a profound modification to become part of it. In other words, significant enough influences are exerted upon others within the integrating constellation.

Northedge[15] tends to define integration in terms of interests shaping each other in an ever continuing process of "expansion and contraction" amongst participants. He views interest groups as being the definitive criteria of communities.

Blau[16] sees integration through social eyes, as the development of 'personal bonds of social attraction', with the particularistic values of a larger community defusing into the face to face group and shaping the social relations and patterns of conduct of members.

The literature does not present a coherent meaningful and united concept of the process; rather, it particularises and highlights specifics relating to direct enquiries. This is indicative of the fact that integration is highly complex and may be viewed in a variety of ways. The word 'integration', itself as a verb, denotes a condition and not a state. The substantive usage of the term 'integration' as it applies to, for example, the French nation, denotes the degree of interaction implied within the integrating body. The term 'integration' implies many things to many people and more often than not, refers to specific isolated

movements as end-results, which may be but portions of the overall movement. A 'state' of integration denotes only the degree of an ongoing process at a given time. This is emphasized by Anthony Smith[17] in the case of France, referring to the separatist movements ongoing within a nation-state environment.

Integration focused on Europe refers fundamentally to the process of multi-national integration. A supra-nationality emerging out of a collective grouping of nations, fundamentally resulting in a European commonality or a collective European we-ness.[18]

The present task is to define the nation, the largest form of socialisation manifested by integrated society known today. Nationhood, the identifiable collectivity, is the end result of a process called nationalism. Nationalism is the result of integration through socialisation. The core concept of nationalism is group-consciousness, the love of the community, great or small, to which one belongs. For most of the evolutionary history of European society, love of the unit has been an instinctive emotion, not a doctrine. As a doctrine, nationalism is an operative principle and an articulated creed which made its appearance among the more intellectual processes of the modern world, as opposed to the concept of patriotism, which is apparently as old as human association itself.[19]

The modern growth of the idea of nationalism and the

concept of integration may be traced by way of the vehicle of political theory which, during the Middle Ages, was fundamentally associated with theology. The Christian Commonwealth with its ruler, the Pope, and the Holy Roman Emperor, had as its fundus the laws of Christendom, with authority anchored in God, whereby obedience to those laws was, therefore, a universal duty enjoined by God. This harmonious system conceived by the theologians of the Middle Ages, gave way to the realities of Medieval Europe when the kings of Western Europe began to consolidate their power and emancipate themselves from papal supremacy.[20] Requiring theoretical justification for their new-found authority, the kings found themselves central to new theories pertaining to royal absolutism which took either a secular or a religious form.[21]

The secular theory was a product of Renaissance thought, initiated by Machiavelli.[22] It was essentially a theory based on the right of the strongest, frequently justified by tradition and law.[23] The religious theory was the theory of the divine right of kings, relating to fourteenth century writings in France and England.[24] It reached its climax in sixteenth century France as a counter to anti-royalist theories of religious sects and became the official doctrine of the Stuarts while in England.

With the emergence of domestic authority came the concept of sovereignty as defined by Bodin in De Republic.[25] Sovereignty was tied to national unity and

resulted in State. The concept of national authority introduced by Thomas Hobbes in Leviathan[26] was based upon the secular theory of the right of the strongest. The modern State was seen as the antithesis to sectionalism and older forms of traditionalism which were the surviving remnants of the Middle Ages and tied the concentration of political, religious and economic powers in the hand of one ruler or sovereign authority. The theoretical framework of State, that of an original contract, was based on the concept of a rational self-interest, and the desire of all men to escape the disadvantages of the state of nature, as highlighted meaningfully by Locke in Civil Government.[27]

The fine tuning of the concept of nationalism which rendered it functional at the end of the eighteenth century was introduced by the Swiss philosopher Rousseau in Contrat Social.[28] This changed the focus of the State from crude self-interest to one of moral unity. The concept of the moral unity rendered nationalism rational. What gave moral significance to an association of individuals was the pursuit of a common aim, and the common aim of the association known as the State was the common good of all its members. It was the General Will of the free community directed towards its own common good. The common bond was based on common loyalty, vis-a-vis a community in which men were bound to each other by fear. Such a community based on a volonte general, in contra-distinction to self-interest or volonte de tous, theoretically would come into existence

when sufficient interests in common between its members were found to exist, and in which the law of that community emanated from the will of the people themselves in their capacity as members of the sovereign body.

The fundamental root of the emerging political philosophy of nationalism was based on the idea that the essence of true community was moral liberty, and the condition of moral liberty was that the laws which men obeyed should be self-imposed. Obedience to the will of another, whether he be despot or foreigner, could be based only on fear and constituted, theoretically, slavery. The civil religion advocated in Contrat Social as a substitute for Christianity, on which Robespierre modelled his "Cult of Reason",[29] was the concept of the moral relationship between the individual and the community based on self-determination and common interest. This concept is called patriotism. This concept entailed emotions and loyalties which men had hitherto directed toward their family surroundings and customs and which were now transferred to a more abstract entity, the political community.[30]

Briefly, this was the fundamental beginning of the concept of nationalism, the development of the concept of a moral sense of community resting upon a perception of common good which bound men together and took precedence over their immediate interests. It relates to an overall concep-

tualisation of common consciousness of heritage and destiny overriding short-sighted selfishness and was postulated as deliberately cultivated both by education and by institutionalisation of a civil religion based on the public good.

Moreover, the theory that sovereignty must reside in the General Will, implied by Rousseau and Locke, indicated a degree of political democratic equalitarianism and a degree of the principle of self-determination. Patriotism could only become the moral conviction of individuals when those individuals also had the obligations of citizenship; with individuals who were masters of their own destinies. The eighteenth century and the revolutions with which it ended, emphasized the ideals of individual freedom and equality without which the sentiment of nationalism could not have grown. The theory of nationalism evolved simultaneously with that of sovereignty and is inextricably bound in the Western European experience with the State.[31]

The integration which produced nationalism is fundamentally subjective. As such, it is psychological.[32] It is a condition of mind, a spiritual possession, a way of feeling, thinking, and living.

> Nationalism denotes the resolve of a group of human beings to share their fortunes and to exercise exclusive control over their own actions. Where such a conscious determination exists, there should be a State and there will be no abiding peace until there is a State. Where there is a soul, there should be a body

in which it may dwell.[33]

Nationalism incorporates the psychological desire and drive for a Nation-State, epitomised by the right of self-determination as postulated by Woodrow Wilson.[34]

The notion that before the deed is first the idea, applies to the development of nationalism and ultimately the nation and nation-state. It introduces in many respects the function of elites in the socialisation process. Elites are individuals that develop and focus on concepts or ideas and, via the introduction of those ideas into the body of society at large, lead.

The inelaborate concept of nationalism focuses ad rem on the nation. A concise typology of the concatenation of elements which through time have coalesced to form the Gemeinschaft of the nation-states as known today is not possible for in the socialisation process there is no one single element that could be concluded as essentially causal to the outcome. Such is the all-emcompassing nature of integrated society. However, some of the elements which tie and bind individuals may be isolated.

Nationhood, the Unit, the Result of Integration

The word "Nation" signifies any considerable aggregate of human beings, living together in one country, or under one rule. They are generally assumed, with more or less accuracy, to be of one race; but other bonds are sufficiently powerful to have the same uniting effect as those of blood, with the community so held

together being regarded as a nation, though the people may spring from various stocks.[35] There is no generally received definition of "nation." Common descent, common langauge, common history, common religion, common interests, ideas, hopes and aspiration - all of these enter, more or less, into the current conception - but any one of them may be wanting or two or three of them may be absent altogether and yet the community which lacks them may be called a nation. Important is the concept of a common heritage of memories and feelings and a present desire to continue their common life.

In general terms, "nation" may be defined as a community whose members are bound together by ties such as do not exist between them and the rest of the world.[36] For the most part apolitic in and of themselves, these ties assume political importance when incorporated within the notion of "state." To isolate salient ties and, in so doing, to identify the nidus of nationhood, is important, as out of an objective conspectus of ties may be created a subjective locus standi for the nation. Ties aid in the construction of a core solidarity, ethnic in-groups and social differentiations.[37]

Core solidarity is found within the core group and becomes a fundamental factor of every nation. Societies are founded by groups whose members share certain

qualitative distinctive characteristics, traits around which they structure their solidarity.[38] This core forms an ideological base which assumes in and of itself the posture of a theory of nationalism.

> A nationalist needs a theory and generally it may be asserted that any theory will do. What is really important is not an intellectual argument, but a physical fact of difference. Nationalism is simply the term used to describe the situation where a group of people claiming to have some physical characteristic in common assert their right to independence against those who do not have this characteristic.[39]

The essence of nationalism is found in the notion of <u>difference</u> which sets one group apart from another. The notion is primarily a condition of mind, and in many respects, may be the:

> feeling, or sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspiration of the nations have been expressed, attached to the common traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, having a common religion.[40]

In Western Europe the feeling of nationality, which centres on the concept and actualisational achievement of nation, is virtually inextricably related to state, for the nation or nations claims within the parameters of its own manifest destiny total independence, which often necessitates, as in the modern political arrangement of Western Europe, the political structure of states.

> The modern state is a territorial society divided into governmental subjects claiming within its allotted physical area, a supremacy over all other insitutions. It is, in fact, the final legal depository of the social world. It sets the prerograti ve of all other organ-

> isations. It brings within its power all the forms and substances of the myriad human lives with whose destinies it is in charge.[41]

The state is a collective organisation, not necessarily synonymous with the collectivity from which it is derived.

> An organisation is essentially an aggregate which acts in accordance with internal purpose. And this purpose is something distinct from the physical and chemical properties of the component parts. If the state is an organisation, the state possesses such an internal purpose distinct from the natural tendencies of the individual citizens.[42]

The state derives its being from the nation or nations within its sphere, and generally exhibits collectively the sum of their individual components and takes on the characteristics found within the nation. In the Western European experience, the states are the manifestation of their nations. And as the nation seeks independence, so also the state seeks clear autonomous sovereignty. The state is a modern personified unit incorporating the national government. It is the political objective of nationalism.

> Everywhere in Western Europe after 1815 states were making nations and nations were creating states, and both fostered nationalism, which, in turn, nursed the nations and their states.[43]

Dignity and happiness, peace and prosperity, and power and glory, were sought by peoples through their nations and the states built upon them.[44] During the last century, if they had not already done so, the peoples of Western Europe found their common historical culture and common aspirations and worked and sometimes

revolted and on occasion warred (as in 1830, 1848, and 1870) to establish a united territory and sovereign state.[45] It is helpful to note the following conspectus which presents the approximate dates of independence of modern Western European nation-states.

It is not by chance that the nineteenth century witnessed the establishment of several nation states in Western Europe, as the same sociological forces were operable throughout the European world affecting individual units simultaneously.

STATE	DATE OF ESTABLISHMENT
<u>During the 19th and 20th Centuries</u>	
Greece	1829-32
Belgium	1830-31
Italy	1861-70
Germany	1867-70
Luxembourg	1867-90
Norway	1905
Finland	1919
Ireland	1921-22
Austria (separate states)*	1919

(*peace conference of Versailles divides the Habsburg Empire into a series of nation-states)

The ties around which nationalism flourished and which ultimately produced the nation-states relate to different elements.[46] These elements are either given, as in geographical or demographical considerations; or achieved, as in cultural-social attainments such as institutions;[47] or historical definitions of events[48] which define present position

and shape future direction.[49] These form identification which is translated into independence from others and itself forms the goal of separate national or ethnic identity.[50]

The "we-feeling" is the result of a specific perception in the entire constellation of images and patterns of mutual responsiveness which incorporated to form a vertical community. The concept of community is an important factor to the social psychological consideration of integration. The social psychological consideration suggests that any changes or shifts in attitudes in this dimension have an ultimate relation to political attitudes and behaviour of individuals and may be directly causal to the creation of a community of states. The latter group of achieved elements are more difficult to locate than the given, as they are essentially non-physical elements. A problem with the literature is that the resultant feeling is often overshadowed by those phenomena that may or may not cause that feeling. By far, the weight of early literature was composed of definitive identification of elements which were seen as comprising the essence of nationhood. Only recently is found the newer trend to focus more centrally on the achieved feeling itself.

Literature Review

Mill saw nationality as a phenomenon fundamentally meaning membership of, the fact or state of belonging to,

a particular nation.[51]

> A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others - which make them cooperate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves exclusively.[52]

This feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. It may be that the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents: the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections. This is collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with some incident(s) in the past. Where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there may be a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart, which is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed.[53]

This feeling is essentially a case for national self-determination, in the form of national self-government.

> It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions, that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with nationalities.[54]

In the European experience, the community of interests that resulted largely in the establishment of free institutions, and that underline cooperation

exhibited on the national level, grew to maturity in the age of the French Revolution. That experience was the first effective movement in the modern period to posit a comprehensive ideal of community.[55] Community is not an abstract notion; it is highly personalised and most generally achieved through direct camaraderie and through its liturgy and its symbols. Personal interrelationships develop meaning through shared goals and emotions. Community is as much a mental state as a physical state. This is a position subscribed to by Mosse,[56] attributing community to an ideal which exists within specific groups. He thought it fundamental to the concept of a shared culture with the myths and symbols of the national past. The community concept of nationalism, relating to the ideal which ultimately achieved fulfillment in state or as Mazzini refers to it, 'Country', is based on a community of interests which have:

> the sentiment of love, the sense of fellowship which binds together all the sons of that territory. So long as a single one of your brothers is not represented by his own vote in the development of the national life - so long as a single one vegetates uneducated among the educated - so long as a single one able and willing to work languishes in poverty for want of work - you have not got a Country such as it ought to be, the Country of all and for all.[57]

This is nationalism placed firmly in the humanitarian sector. Mazzini thought that nationalism is a determinant for differentiating people, and:

> Probably the criterion most often applied is

> that of language but others may be used: race, religion, history. At a minimum it may only be urged that a particular nation be enabled to enjoy some degree of autonomy within a supra-national State - as, say the Scots do within the United Kingdom. But usually it is demanded that each nation - and especially a particular nation - be identified with the State on its own.[58]

Self-determination as a criteria for a given part of humanity alone places nations firmly within the confines of a physical geographically defined state,[59] and is is an extremely potent doctrine. As Kedourie indicated, it is a doctrine that:

> pretends to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states.[60]

According to Kedourie, the very word 'nation' has been endowed by the concept of nationalism with a meaning which has placed it firmly in the political rhetoric of the West and has been exported throughout the whole of the rest of the world. He stated:

> But what now seems natural was unfamiliar, needing argument, persuasion, evidences of many kinds; that seem simple and transparent. What seems simple and transparent is really obscure and contrived, the outcome of circumstances not forgotten and preoccupations now academic, the residue of metaphysical systems sometimes incompatible and even contradictory.[61]

Kedourie's analysis of nationalism states fundamentally that:

> A nation is a body of people to whom a government is responsible through their legislature; any body of people associating together, and deciding on a scheme for their own government, form a nation.[62]

Self-determination exercises self-will, is a process focusing on the definition of the self, and revolves around the concept of the nation.[63]

THE SELF: A Constituent Portion of Group Membership

Fundamental to the concept of nation is that of togetherness, suggestive of an equality.[64] A protracted period of social learning, which leads toward integration, producing a nation of common theoretical equals, is a process productive of like-minded individuals, or at least a group of individuals more compatibly minded than incompatibly minded.

Nationalism is the extension of a family. The object of nationalism is the nation. The political manifestation of nation is the State. At the very centre of the nation is the ethnie possessive of its own distinct characteristics.

The creation of a community of interests is centralised on a polis around which the ethnie is structured.[65] Man as a social animal forms more or less permanent and specific social groups. The ties that hold these groups together are those of strong sentiments.[66] The characteristics which produce ethnocentrism often are psychologically related to the individual's needs. Ethnocentrism's most obvious form is that of nationalism as the centre of corporate sentiments. In its extreme, nationalism may, as integral nationalism, become integrally repressive as it may be responsible for overwhelming and subduing internal

differentiations especially in multi-national aglomerations isolating and subjugating non-dominant ethnic forces. While subjugating non-dominant ethnic forces it is an attempt to develop an overriding common culture.[67]

Weber[68] focuses on the concept of history as relating to the notion of a community of interests and as the key to a real or imagined past. This view of history is one which is insistent on keeping 'the future as history' open to human will and resolution,[69] and is causal to a collective feeling of unity. This suggests that nationality is a process of slant necessary for interpretation. Karl Deutsch agrees[70] and posits nationality as a concept of society which begins with society as a group of individuals united by the division of labour. Out of this basis is formed social institutions and the infrastructure necessary for the development of technology as a man learns habits of working together, thereby establishing patterns[71] unique to the group. It explains characteristics which develop in the grouping, the development of classes, occupations or castes, the location of cultural centres and civilisations[72] based on culturally biased criteria relating to a community of communications - Kulturkreise. It is in the kulturkreise that the self is developed. The kulturkreise suggests the development of speech for purposes of communication[73] and ultimately a standard language (or dialect) and the possibility of

social delineation between segments of population based on dialects or linguistic stratifications. Further, it would suggest the development of wealth, capital formation and factor equipment, with the associated differential in living standards, with an apparent desire or attempt or possibility, for acquisition or class permeability.[74] Deutsch highlights the notion[75] of memories and preferences, and the development of communication links for the transfer of habits and the eventual complementarity of habits.[76] This transfer may or may not be related to language, but more importantly emphasizes the functions of memory, as those being storage and recall of information. The historical slant is apparently salient to the development of a building block of nationality.[77]

This introduces the concept of social learning[78] and is related to the speed of assimilation of changes which affect the nationality, and emphasizes the necessity for experience, especially for the assimilation or the differentiation of change (new event evaluation). The assimiliation of given change is the process facilitated by the ability to communicate over a wide range of subjects over time. The assimilation is an enrichment of culture, perhaps most evident in language, and involves the learning of many new habits and the unlearning of many old habits. It can achieve consciousness by attaching secondary symbols, i.e., 'symbols about symbols' to certain items in its current

intake of outside information, and to certain items which are recalled in memory. Natonal consciousness precedes the development of a national will. National will is the ability to either inhibit or further future learning, either partially or wholly.[79]

Authors tend to elevate communication to an identifiable characteristic of the ethnic group, from which nations evolve.

> Language before the age of nationalism was rarely regarded as a fact upon which the prestige of the group depended.[80]

But afterwards, language became central to its identity. Through language and the associated accumulation of historical traditions and memories of a people, the people or nation feel themselves identified, partly distinguishing one group of people, or nation, from another.[81] Thus, language appears to exhibit a high degree of importance, but it is not the sine qua non of nationality.[82]

Weil[83] agrees, subjugating physical or territorial motives for nations, and not subtersensuous phenomena such as language. He views nationality politically and states that "the nation, single and separate" . . . in other words IS the State: "for there is no other way of defining the word 'nation' than as a territorial aggregate whose various parts recognize the authority of the same State." Weil aligns himself further with Weber by saying "for a long time now, the single nation has played the part which constitutes the

supreme mission of society toward the individual human being, namely maintaining through the present the links with the past and the future."[84] Weil implies that the nation, in the form of state, has fundamentally taken over the traditional role of the family as being the focus for, amongst other things, the cathexis of human thought and carries with it the notion of obligation, with the reciprocal conception of rights.

> The notion of obligation comes before that of rights, which is subordinate and relative to the former. A right is not effectual by itself, but only in relation to the obligation to which it corresponds, the effective exercise of a right springing not from the individual who possesses it, but from other men who consider themselves as being under a certain obligation toward him.[85]

Social interaction implies obligations toward the social grouping and is very much related to a group of individuals located in a common territory, whereas at one time in man's social development, one had a distinct obligation toward family. Nationalism focuses that obligation more or less on the group. The obligation today centres on State as the political <u>expression of the nation</u>. Obligation is felt as a by-product of ethnocentrism relating toward the group. It is motivated by a nationalist ideology which supplies the basis for discerning illogically and eclectically one's place in the group. It is related to the feeling of identity and again relates in some general way to the views of nationalism. This highlights the non-logical aspect of nation.[86] "A major feature of nationalist thought is

the way in which it latches upon existing ideas about the nation wherever these are available and useful."[87]

It is posited herewith that the feeling of nation is that which is important, not necessarily any specific element itself.

> Elevating one badge of identity as the touchstone of nationalism often means suppressing other badges of equal or greater importance. . . . No one sort of identity among . . . [nationals] . . . can be regarded as objectively more important than another. . . . And the success of nationalism cannot be explained as a result of its superior attractions to the members of the nation by comparison with the alternative identities from which they might choose. The only constant role national identity plays in nationalism is the ideological one that nationalists assign to it.[88]

The Politicisation of Nationhood

The political aspect of nationalism, the political arrangement of individuals engaged in the movement, resulting in state is in itself a form of identification.[89] This political criteria of nationalism seeks to align nationalist ideology with more general political values; however, it is difficult to apply this distinction to a homogeneous group and to point to it as a ground for nationalism, because it develops from the very homogeneity of the grouping. The desire of the individuals in the collectivity to be politically expressive, Karl Deutsch lays as the foundation of nationalism through communications.[90] There may be a divergence from the psychological feeling of nationality, the possessers of which constitute a nation and the

politicisation of the concept itself. In the definition of nationality,

> there exists a significant movement toward political, economic or cultural autonomy, that is to say, toward a political organisation: or a market area, or an area of literacy or cultural exchange, within which the persona and characteristics of this people will predominate."[1]

This suggests difficulties with the idea of nation, because of objectivity. They relate to objective characteristics essential to its unity, that is, its language, a common or contiguous territory, a common condition or experience, community of character, or community of values. Deutsch's communications' approach is a more fundamental definition of nationality. He states that nationality is:

> an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centres and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and with the centre."[2]

This degree of meaningful communications cannot help but develop common sympathies which evolve into more emotive feelings of collective solidarity. It may be fundamentally argued that this aspect of nationality is but a basic observational premise of social nature itself, and not necessarily causal to the social entity of nation. After all, nationality, as a way of thinking, is psychological in nature."[3] The psychological approach highlights the need for people to identify with some cause or group larger than themselves.

Essentially, psychologically, nationalism is a community ideology, a community myth. The myth of nationalism is the refocusing of collectivity upon large-scale societies as opposed to small-scale.[94] If the process of change and modernity refocuses the role of people in the collective setting, there is a need for reidentification in terms of individual function and social relationships with others. Traditionalism is sacrificed and focus must be placed upon attributes which are 'carried around' with them, such as language, religion, or race. These elements afford the essential stuff of which nations are made. Modernity forces a focus upon the collective identity derived from subnascent elements, a process which is necessitated by a rapidly changing environment.[95]

The concept of rapid change during the move from traditional society to modern society underlines the psychological implications of nationalism and national identity.

> The major implication is that rapid change precipitates a breakdown of traditional identity and the coming of modernity points to the shape a new identity can take.[96]

The change concept of nationality is a very functionalist approach. It regards change both as a breakdown of old and existing patterns of social interaction but also as a prelude to a new stability.[97]

The Myth of Nationality

The myth of nationality may be attributed to a "mysterious kind of instinct, consciousness or will that leads to a union of hearts."[98] This union of hearts may be related to almost anything perceived to be held commonly, as in race. Hertz indicates the close correlation between race and nation and ascribes it to:

> the reason . . . that most people find it difficult to conceive a close social unity without a physical bond, and that they cannot think of a common mentality without common blood. An intimate solidarity of fraternity between members of a nation seems then to imply a real relationship between members of a family.[99].

If one looks at a race and defines it as "the descendants of a common ancestor: especially those who inherit a common set of characteristics: such as a set of descendants, now or then a species; a breed,"[100] one sees that the term is fundamentally a term relating to the natural sciences. It has been applied to the social sciences, and assertions have been made that racial sentiment is one of the elements that goes to make up national sentiment and national pride and helps to make a people cohesive.[101] Claiming lines of common descent may be useful if a nation is to be made a unit in the best and fullest sense.[102] The compatability of nation and race is not wholly mutually exclusive or mutually inclusive, however:

> What constitutes a nation is not speaking the same tongue or belonging to the same ethnic group, but having accomplished great things in common in the past and the wish to accomplish

them in the future.[103]

The point is made here that it is the psychological aspect, derived through historical interpretations, that are salient, not physical aspects.

> By race we should understand a continuity of a physical type, expressing affinities of blood, representing an essentially natural grouping, which can have nothing, and, in general, has nothing in common with the people, the nationality, the language, or the customs corresponding to groups that are purely artificial, in no way anthropological, and arising entirely from history, whose natural products they are.[104]

A nation is not the physical fact of one blood, but the mental fact of one tradition. Race relates to a physical type; nation relates to a common mental condition. "One is a natural fact which is already given at the dawn of history; the other is an articulated structure acquired by the thinking, feeling and willing of human minds in the course of history."[105]

The racist doctrine developed as an ideology in Europe almost simultaneously with the doctrine of nationalism. It emphasized the difference between in-group and out-group, (exacerbated by European colonialism and imperialism), fundamentally attributing the colour barrier or other visual criteria of race to what was no doubt associated with emerging patterns of society relating to wealth, which related perhaps more to the territorial or climactic circumstances.[106] Nationalism and racism are frequently correlated and are often confused, that is, identified as one and the same.[107]

There is a common descent implication both within the term 'nation' and the term 'race'. The close correlation between the two terms blurs the distinction between the social science term 'nation' and the natural science term 'race'. This is so as the nation is, among other things, the collective identity of a society,[108] and families which are racially indicative, also form a society. National individual patterns of behaviour are based on collective individually learned perceptions which suggest a high degree of intimacy implied within the nation that grows out of a family and a race which is synonymous with that family.

> Men have always remarked upon their physical differences, and have often extolled or scorned the variety of customs, cultures and physiques that divide them into social groups.[109]

The doctrine of race affords nationals the opportunity to differentiate themselves from others with regard to a set of given characteristics.[110] This degree of ethnocentrism may be defined:

> As the belief by its members in the centrality, rightness and superiority of their community, and a corresponding denial of value to other communities.[111]

This degree of ethnocentrism, central to both racism and nationalism, serves mainly to reinforce pre-existing cultural fears.[112] The concept of racism based on given biological differences amongst groups of peoples highlights the intergroup differences and fortifies in-group, out-group prejudices.[113]

Most serious writers have agreed that

> nationality is not biological and has little if anything to do with race. They have suggested that nationality somehow involves some common relationships to parts of men's physical environment/their 'country' - and to some events in the past, transmitted to the present as 'common' history, although they could not tell what made a country or a history 'common'.[114]

Deutsch suggests that nationality implies a degree of similar elements inside the minds of every individual participating in the collectivity of the nation such as values, thoughts, or feelings, which may or may not be similar but are complementary due to their compatability.[115] Interlocking habits and memories in the minds of individuals inducing them to play interlocking roles of helper and helped, or leader and led (a habitual social discipline) is an essential characteristic of a social group. Interlocking roles and common attachments to symbols imply an interlocking relation both between and intra groups.

The given fact of race contributes significantly toward, but is not a determinant of, the nation. Crone observed:

> Nations which have long records of independence have in their time received influxes of migrants who have become completely integrated. Such nations, e.g., Britain, are thus of a diverse racial position, with the stronger bonds often cultural and intellectual.[116]

The Latin, 'nation', that is, the concept of belonging toegther, relate to '<u>nasci</u>'/'<u>natus</u>', to be born,[117] which, as the root of the English word 'nation', points to the direct closeness of groups of

people related through blood and the feeling of nationality. The etymology of the term 'nation' also suggests the sociological origins of modern nations which evolved out of successive layers of developing societal groupings over time. The common sentiment collectively shared by the nation is of relative recent origin. Rome did not constitute a nation. It was a civilisation,[118] and out of that civilisation came modern European nations. Clear concepts of political entities developed in Europe as a direct result of hierarchical and conflicting feudal entities deposing the notion of a universal Christian sacerdotum.[119] It is the product of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and Enlightenment, and the consequent diminution of church influences.[120] The concept crystallises around the development of (1) the growth of the secular state; (2) the weakening of the authority of the universal church and faith as well as that of the local feudal lords; and (3) the development of a system of communications.

> The forces that led to the establishment of nations cannot be precisely isolated, ennumerated, and evaluated, for they were many, intertwined, and variously effective. . . . They were however related to royal families, the dynasties which were, at the beginning the major feudal families[121]

which played a significant role in obtaining territory, wealth, prestige, and power. These elements presented

> a cohesive force . . . whether vested in a person or a group . . . which seems to have been the reason for intensifying and bringing into consciousness the incipient feeling of neighbourliness that has been found a universal

> trait of human society. Once established and sanctified, the sentiment may well flourish, without compulsion, glorified as loyalty to a sovereign being or to a national flag.[122]

Johannet introduced another attempt at the politicisation of nationhood.

> The cause of the statue is not the marble, but the artist. In the case of nationality, it was primarily the dynasty.[123]

Implied here is the concept that any element can be elevated to the status of criteria for a nation, such as that of history. Dynasties acquired land and subjects through war, conquest, diplomacy, and marriage, etc. Their domains were strengthened and their authority solidified through royal laws and the levying of taxes for the sustenance of themselves and military actions. Slowly royal bureacracies evolved,[124] political and royal elites, later academicians especially lawyers, a process of which reduced the authority of lesser lords which constituted the backbone of the European feudal society. This process focused identity on "the crown" which became synonymous with the possessions of the monarch confined to the geographical consideration equalling the nation-state and ultimately the nation itself. This was not a fluid process. This was a process beset by setbacks. It was a process protracted over time which afforded the essential stuff from which historical recollection could be drawn and remoulded to identify national sentiment. It is essentially the historical period which affords the nation in later times the ability to look back and to analyse events, and it is

fundamentally the period which affords the fertile earth for the original germination of the collective national sentiment.

In Shafer's words, a defining criterion for nationalism is:

> a shared belief in a common history and often in a common ethnic origin . . . the common past . . . may be real or imagined. . . . In any case, to the extent that individuals are nationalist, they appear to find shared meaning in common past experience, be this actual or invented, and to feel unified because of it. Consciousness of a common heritage also gives the people a feeling of being distinct from other peoples, and enables them to have the sense of identity.[125]

History affords a culture.

> When an individual shares this culture, wishes to continue to do so, and is, in some fashion, devoted to it, he is said to be of the nation and to belong to the nationality.[126]

It is essential:

> to find [a] bases for pride [,] for a nation may not be established long enough to have accomplished much.[127]

The basis for pride may be (1) given (as in race), or (2) achieved as in historical interpretations of past events). Man is:

> behaviourally, the most flexible of all animals. Humans are born with a largely uncoded behavioural potential, the capacity to learn, i.e., to learn culture.[128]

Man appears to be shaped not so much by <u>nature</u> itself but more <u>nurtured</u> by everything human and peculiar to times and places.

What is important is:

Without this <u>recognition</u> of what is common,

> nationality cannot exist, or at any rate cannot work and live.[129]

The recognition of these singular and unique differences form the common fundus of the in-group.

> For each nationality is determined by contrast with others, and a nationality regards itself not only as distinct from others, but nearly always as possessing some exclusive common qualities, being thereby separate from others as well as united within itself.[130]

One can isolate specific elements of exclusivity such as ethnic origin; language; territory; economic interests; culture; religion; and political unity. Elements which may form a province or domain unique and exclusive to the in-group which may give rise to a means affording an out-group delineation. Whatever elements or collection of elements, either given or achieved, deemed specific to the group, are incorporated into its specific domain of reference and for a constituent element incorporated in its national mythology.

1. The Notion of Domain as a Political Criterion for Nationhood

2. A domain is that which one is master of or has domain over. It is, in effect, the scope or range of any subject or sphere of knowledge, an aggregate to which a variable belongs. Virtually anything may fall within the province of a domain and be employed by the nationalist as an essential constituting element in the formation of the constitution of nationhood and thus be considered as belonging to his nation.

When narrowly applied, it is referenced to refer to

physical beauty.

3. Territory is that which is occupied effectively not necessarily what is politically owned (domination).

4. The prima facie given difference delineating in-group from out-group of a given nation is that of territory. The Napoleonic maxim, "the politics of states is in their geography."[131] emphasizes the importance placed not only upon physical territory but on the type of physical territory inhabited by the nation. Physical structures of given societies take on political ramifications. Mackinder spoke of "an unparalleled struggle between the physical environment of a nation and a designed policy based on a national ideal."[132] Political geography[133] emphasizes the importance of territory to the inhabitants of same.

> -- Insights into human territorial relationships can be derived from studies of animal behaviour. An animal territory is a well-defined area which is regarded by a pair or a group of animals as being in exclusive preserve.[134]

It may be that possession of a territory is a natural phenomenon.

> Territory is evident at many levels in the vertebrate animal kingdom, and arguably among some invertebrates. . . . Socio-political amalgamation superceded clan forms by tribal organisations in all but the most hostile environments.[135]

This transition produced much more extensive political regions with populations of tens or even hundreds of thousands. It was usually accompanied by increased centralisation and remoteness of power. With

the "physiographical central place generally replaced by a permanent political focus differentiating in function from other settlements."[136]

Nations are often inextricably related to territory, and the ultimate political expression of the nation--the state-- is frequently ascribed to (1) population; (2) territory; (3) exclusive right to that territory by the population (sovereignty); and (4) a social arrangement administering that sovereignty (government).[137] It is an awareness of the physical environment that creates the psychological collective imagery leading toward group solidarity, a knowledge of self in something other than the form of self.[138] Domain is both physical and mental in nature.

Fundamentally the reason why territory plays an important role in the development of the national feeling may be that of security.

> Nationalism symbolises the psychic need of entire peoples; . . . for solace and protection in times of strife.[139]

These origins are both a physical and psychological haven in distress. Nationalism relating to territory is an irresistible force because of its appeal to that which is subrational, to the dimly understood instinctual core of human kind.

> The fierce power of national feeling is due to the fact that it raises from the deepest source of our being. It is the primitive stuff of which we are made, our first loyalties, our first aggressions, the types and images of our

> souls. It is fixed in the nursery and the spell of it is never lost. The thing we know as children, the standards we receive, the tones we heard, the pictures we stored in our minds, the scenery, the houses, the gestures, the prayers, the rhythms, games, shape us and colour us. They are our nationality, the essence of our being which defines us against the background of the world.[140]

Plato suggested that conflict is related to wealth, where wealth is associated with territory.[141] Hobbes supported this with his supposition that man is in a constant warring state. Territory, as a physical domain, is frequently causal to wealth creation. Wealth is based frequently on primarily climate and natural given resources. It may also be related to a fortuitous location.[142] General industrial affluence may be ascribed to temperate zones as opposed to tropical or sub-tropical zones.[143] The territory of habitation may be responsible for the development of individual characteristics. These created characteristics, as a possession of those individuals which inhabit the territory, may become part of their psychological domain. A given territory with a characteristic climate produces amongst peoples:

> First . . . a direct effect upon man's health and activity. Second . . . a strong indirect but immediate effect through food and other resources, through parasites, and through mode (sic) of life.[144]

Climate may produce national characteristics which themselves constitute an important portion of 'national domain'. Markham thought:

> Initiative, inventiveness, versatility, and the power of leadership are the qualities which

> give flavour to the Teutonic race. Good humour, patience, loyalty, and the power (sic) of self-sacrifice give flavour to the negro.[145]

These may be of economic importance:

> The nation which has led the world, leads the world, and will lead the world, is that nation which lives in a climate, indoor or outdoor, nearest to the ideal.[146]

Galbraith[147] forcefully ascribes the powerful industrial oligopolists to attitudes and patterns which developed in the industrial countries which, with little exception, comprised the so-called First World found wholly within the temperate zones. A synoptic view of climate producing a "national character" gives a pleno jure argument to the idea of accomodation, the tendency to accomodate oneself to given conditions,[148] and may thus be part of the national domain.[149]

Territorial space which Duverger says cannot be divorced from climate and natural resources is used to (1) delineate societies; (2) is required for the arrangement of societies; and (3) is a determinant of the location of societies.[150] If elevated to cognitive awareness, the psychological possession of these conditions amongst a people may be instrumental in delineating nationhood. They become a constituent portion of that nation's domain.

Quoth Montesquieu:

> Island people are more inclined to cherish freedom than peoples on the continent, . . . the sea separates (islands) from great empires, and tyranny cannot lay its hand on them.

> Conquerers are halted at the water's edge.
> Island dwellers are not engulfed in conquests
> and they preserve their laws more easily.[151]

The internal arrangement of societies are related to space as in the case of French Departements and early English shires. LePlay[152] cited the example that the Norwegian fjords produced both isolation, encouraging close family ties, and a spirit of individualism, both of which affect national character. The development, through time, of cities is related to spatial characteristics of territory. Citizens (nationals) are the product of cities (civitas)[153] which developed from a reason, that is, location of resources, availability to trading routes, military purposes, etc. Territorial areas tend to be delineated into core areas and frontier or boundary zones, all of which create a living space (lebensraum)[154] which were originally based on territorial determinants of nations. Societies had to adapt themselves to these given situations. By the process of adaptation, developing nations formed patterns and structures of society which are distinctly unique to the given society.[155] Terrain, climate, and space lent definition to society's development over time. Groups of people were given circumstances to which achieved differences among them were constructed. The achieved differences were meat for nationalist doctrine, fuel for the fire of nationalism based on the concept of differences between societal groups. The physical facts upon which they were founded are indisputably given.

What the people made out of the given became their domain. But the singularity of a physical and psychological domain owes its being to the fact that it is composed of an aggregate to which variables belong. To so conceptualise a domain is to see it holistically, a necessary condition if integration is to be achieved.

In Sum

The problems facing man either individually or collectively suggest the necessity for solutions. Within collective society, solutions must be communicated and the vehicle for such is language. Language forms not only a vehicle for communication but also comprises an element of identification, a polis for the ethni development.

To the Hellenes, the world of humanity that did not fall within the composition of their own identity were 'barbaroi' or 'barbaros', meaning foreign, a label attached to those of their out-groups. The given characteristics of race may be a determinant of out-group. Certainly the inhabitation of an out-group territory would determine out-group status. These are fundamentally given differences between nations. Another equally salient criteria for out-group status is the achieved differences between nations of which language is perhaps the most important. Race you see, language you hear.

> Language itself consists of memories incorporated in words, the latter serving as symbols for the former.[156]

Wittgenstein observed, "whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent."[157] Taken from the standpoint of self, if one does not understand another, the other must be foreign.[158]

The elementary qualities of which the social fact consists, are present in the germ form in individual minds. But the social fact emerges from them only when they have been transformed by association since it is only then that it appears. Association itself is also an active factor productive of special effects. In itself, it is therefore something new. When the consciousness of individuals, instead of remaining isolated, becomes grouped and combined, something in the world has been altered.[159]

> Social life is association between individuals. Their association refers to the widely varying forms that are generated as the diverse interests of individuals prompt them to develop social units in which they realise these - central or ideal, lasting or fleeting, conscious or unconscious, causally impelling or teleologically inducing - interests.[160]

People's associations proliferate through social space and time. Social relations unite not only individuals and groups but also groups into communities and societies, or ultimately, nations.

Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course.[161] Social relations are profoundly influenced

by common values, structures which have significance of their own, which are indigenous to each given society and relate to needs. Society structures are influenced by societies' evolutionary values and norms. Exchange transactions and power relations constitute forces that must be viewed in terms of norms and values to arrive at an understanding of the dynamics of the social structures involved and the social process of integration. Needs then are the primary motivating factor for man in society and become salient to the consideration of integration. They lie at the root of current day nations.

Integration viewed on the transactional level alone empirically quantifies interchange but gives little consideration to motives. Political considerations themselves refer to structural relationships which again give little indication as to individual motives. These two levels of consideration only when compiled with the sociological consideration can give a wholistic indication as to the motive of integrating society. For, in the final analysis, for integration to successfully and completely transpire, the social element must be engaged. The patterns of association between individuals are strongly influenced by the social context in which they occur. The analysis of social interaction from the primary level onward cannot treat interaction as existing in isolation from other social relations. The mutual attraction of individuals and the exchanges between them are affected by the alternative opportunities provided to

them with the result that competitive processes arise that include wider circles and that complement and modify the process of exchange and attraction at these imperceding levels.[1&2] The expansion of societal structures accomodating social action is integration. The expanded homegeneous social group may be considered as the nation.

If multi-national European society is to be achieved, it must be achieved by the process of socialisation which was the process that, by allowing for social expression of the individual, developed European society to the present level of the nation. Nations evolved because of a high degree of community and freedom to integrate through socialisation on the economic, political, and cultural level. Before the three levels are discussed, it is necessary to determine the degree of commonality within Europe, the subject of the following pages.

CHAPTER FOUR NOTES

[1]For a discussion of Tonnies terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, see either Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 27-29; or for a development of the discussion vis a vis the concept of Functionalism, see Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "The United States, The United Nations, and the Creation of Community." International Organizations. XIV(1960):505,10. Also, Talcott Parsons, The Structures of Social Action. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949), p. 687ff. for clarification of Toennies Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as modes of orientation (Weber). Kampf-Conflict, Vergemeinschaftung, vergesellschaftung.

[2]For background, see Bruce Russett and Harvey Storrs, World Politics: The Menu for Change. (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Co., 1981), p. 42ff.; Graham Wallas, Our Social Heritage. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1921, chapter IV, p. 77ff., "The Nation as Idea and Fact." It may be useful to think of a Gemeinschaft in terms of a politically active society, as in a village, with a council and government, whereas the Gesellschaft would be the unstructured individualism in the village, its human societal component.

[3]Equilibriation or "moving equilibriation" which modifies the system, maintaining and producing its uniqueness is analysed by Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951), pp. 27-36.

[4]Imputationally, see Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 30-36.

[5]This causes accomodation, internal colonisation, etc., which occasionally erupt into separatist movements or movements for greater autonomy, as in Scotland in the U.K., Brittany in France, and Basque in Spain, etc. For the process and examples, see Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Revival. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[6]See Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958).

[7]This is a convenient beginning point; see Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. First edition. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1953).

[8]See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfalzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 305.

[9]For an excellent summary, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement," in International Organizations. XXII(Autumn, 1968):857; also Joseph S. Nye, International Regionalism: Readings. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1968).

[10]See Karl W. Deutsch, Tides among Nations. (New York: The Free Press, 1979), pp. 6-7, 103, 145-49. N.B. pp. 159-66.

[11]See Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. pp. 84, 88-96ff.

[12]Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration. (New York: The Free Press, 1973). p. 21.

[13]Richard A. Peterson and N.J. Demerath, System Change and Conflict. (New York: The Free Press, 1967).

[14]This is the building of common imagery. For further practical examples, see introduction and text in Gerald L. Gold, Minorities and Mother Country Imagery. St. John: Institute of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1984). For developing an ethnic identity, see G. DeVos and L. Romannucci-Ross, Ethnic Identity: Cultural Continuities. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975).

[15]F.S. North[edge] , The International Political System. (London: Faber and Faber, 1976). p. 109.

[16]Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life. (London: John Wiley, 1964), pp. 7-8, 53-59, 267-90ff.

[17]See Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Revival. op. cit.

[18]For an overall introduction to nationalist movements, see A.D. Smith, National Movements. (London: Macmillan, 1976), chapter one: and, for a lead into Nationalism and Multi-nationalism, see F. Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study of History and Thought. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977), chapter 8, p. 129ff.: "Nationalism and Multi-nationalism: Political and Cultural."

[19]See, amongst many, the introduction found in G.P. Gooch, Nationalism. (London: The Swathmore Press, 1920).

[20]David Easton said, "Historically, all social knowledge was originally one. . . . With the increasing weight and differential rate and direction of the development of knowledge in the modern historical periods, however, this general corpus gradually began to break up into specialized segments." adding to the creation of small homogeneous units, the beginnings of the modern state-nation system. A Framework for Political Analysis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 11.

[21]See Cambridge History of Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). This work in its entirety or for specifics relating to different 'nations', see A.W. Ward, et.al., ed., The Cambridge Modern History. Volume XI: The Growth of Nationalities. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909).

[22]N. Machiavelli, Il Principe. Edited by L.A. Burd, (London: Macmillan, 1891), and The Prince. Translated by W.K. Marriott, (London: Everyman, 1906).

[23]See Baruch de Spinoza, Ethics. (London: Dent, Everyman's Library, 1912) and Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and Tractatis Politicus. Translated and edited by R.H. Elwes. (London: Everyman, 1891).

[24]As in John of Paris in France, or Wyclif in England. See David Thomson, ed., Political Ideas. London: Penguin, 1966), pp. 130-53.

[25]J. Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonwealth. (Originally Six Livres de la Rebublique). (Paris: 1596), Translated by Richard Knolles. (London: Everyman, 1906).

[26]Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan. (London: Dent, Everyman's Library, 1914).

[27]John Locke, Civil Government. (London: Dent,

Everyman's Library, 1905).

[28]J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. Translated by G.D.H. Cole. (London: Dent, Everyman's Library, 1968).

[29]Robespierre, Cult of Reason. Reviewed in Will Durant, Philosophy. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1926). pp. 147ff., 153ff., 187ff.

[30]General political philosophy references: Friedrich Meinecke. Die Idee der Staats Råson in der Neueren Geschichte Book Two. (Berlin: Oldenbough Verlag, 1929), p. 259ff.; also Isaac Ilych Rubin, A History of Economic Thought. Translated by Donald Filtzer. London: INK Links, 1979).

[31]For greater detail, see a study group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), the chapter entitled "The Growth of the Idea of Nationalism."

[32]For further background, see the chapter, "The Development of the National Ideal" in Carol and Kenneth Twichert, ed., Building Europe: Britain's Partners in the EEC. (London: Europa Publications, Ltd., 1981). "Nationalism . . . involves four elements: a vision, a culture, a solidarity, and a policy." p. 4.

[33]Gooch, Nationalism. op. cit. p. 5.

[34]See Woodrow Wilson on self-determination. For its expression relating to government, see The State. (Washington, D.C.: Heath and Co., 1889).

[35]R.H. Inghs, ed., Dictionary of Political Economics. Volume III. (London: Palgrave), p. 1.

[36]Loc. cit. p. 2; The unique characteristic of ties make all comprehensive taxonomies improbable, however, by the very fact that there are nations and that these nations exhibit collective uniquenesses which are fundamentally identifiable and, as such, determinants differentiating one national entity from another. These determinants may be placed in an analytical conspectus but not under the assumption that such a conspectus is all-inclusive.

[37]See Jacques Dofny and Akinsola Akinond, ed., Nationalism and Ethnic Movements. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1980).

[38]Loc. cit. p. 6.

[39]Glen St.J. Barclay, Twentieth Century Nationalism. (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971), p. 8; and Colin Williams, ed., National Separatism. (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982), especially pp. 189, 306ff.

[40]Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1954), p. 74; also Louis Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1954), pp. 196-97; A concise conspectus is not applicable due to the fact that within socialisation, any element may or may not be introduced into the process to develop a nation. For example, a well-defined geographical area, and common language, this generally is so, however, the Hebrew nation until very recently did not have a well-defined area for inhabitation, or the Swiss, who likewise are a nation but do

not have a common language.

[41]Herbert A. Dean, The Political Ideas of Harold Laski. (Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 79-80.

[42]Melvin Gellson Riggs, Theories of Obligations of Citizens to States. A doctoral thesis at the University of Pennsylvania, 1921, p. 35.

[43]Boyd Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 140.

[44]Loc. cit. p. 145. It is possible, of course, to find situations in which a plurality of nations occupy the same state, often as client to one dominant nationality which appears to be satisfactory until minority dissatisfaction occurs. See Colin H. Williams, ed., National Separation. (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1982), p. 1. For an arrangement of sub-nations, see Anthony D.S. Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1979), p. 161. Producing potential tensions, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). For an Irish example, see T.W. Moody, ed., Nationality and the Pursuit of National Independence. (Belfast: The Appletree Press, 1979). As "nationalism is a state of mind," it depends on the feeling produced through accomodation. Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. (New York: Macmillan, 1944), p. 18.

[45]Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 147. The process in many respects may be continuing as in the JURA in Switzerland, national movements in N. Ireland, or Scotland in the United Kingdom. However, central to this paper, and an idea which will be expanded upon is the idea of the state which "has such a hold on modern thought and modern institutions that it tends to be the enemy of ethnicity and ethnic autonomy, however, relative and subordinate." See David Maybury-Lewis, ed., The Prospects for Plural Societies. (Washington, D.C.: American Ethnological Society, 1982), p. 2.

[46]Classifications of elements are prevalent in literature: an excellent one is provided by Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics. (London: Nelson University Press, 1972), pp. 25-108.

[47]Louis Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1954), p. 23.

[48]Louis Snyder calls it re-creating a meaningful image. Loc. cit. p. 28.

[49]Snyder gives emphasis to a well-defined environment. Loc. cit. p. 24.

[50]Colin Williams, ed., National Separatism. (Cardiff: University of Wales, 1982), p. 3ff.

[51]E.M. Kirkpatrick, ed., Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary. New Edition. (Edinburgh: W.R. Chambers, 1983), p. 842.

[52]John Stuart Mill , Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government. (London: J.M. Dent and Son, Everyman's Library, 1944), p. 362.

[53]For a discussion of the historical developments which lead from Behershung (forma imperei) to democratic

constitutionality (forma regiminis) (p. 31ff.) and Volkssouverantat (p. 15ff.), see Klaus Hartman, Politische Philosophie. (Freiburg, i.B.: Verlag Karl Alber, 1981); as well as Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967), the chapter entitled "Fluidity of Allegiance," p. 24ff.

[54]Mills, Utilitarianism. op. cit. p. 363.

[55]Eugene Kamenka, ed., Ideas and Ideologies: Community as a Social Ideal. (London: Edward Arnold, 1982), p. 28.

[56]See G.L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (New York: Pelican Books, 1961).

[57]Mazzini in Political Ideals. Edited by David Thomson. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1966), pp. 146-47.

[58]Loc. cit. p. 148; see also Joseph Mazzini, The Duties of Man and Other Essays. (London: Everyman's Library, 1907); Bolton King, The Life of Mazzini. (London: Everyman's Library, 1912); G. Salvemini, Mazzini. (London: Cape, 1956).

[59]Or by way of territorial division.

[60]See Elie Kedourie, "Introduction," in Nationalism. (London: Hutchinson, 1960).

[61]Loc. cit.

[62]Loc. cit. p. 15.

[63]Marx and Engels held that a community of interests does not necessarily constitute the classical definition of a nation. They saw community of interests along economic lines. Working men have no country; they maintained they saw differences and antagonisms between peoples daily more and more vanishing. One idea of community of interest centers around the notion of bourgeossie and the proletariat which effectively formulated a core ideology around which Eastern European states developed post World War II. Marx's economic argument runs through dividing nations into bourgeous and proletariat. See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party. (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1975) and Marx, Kapital. (London: Everyman's Library, 1932); Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment. (Oxford: Home University Library, 1939); R.N. Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism: An Introduction. (London: Penguin Books, 1964).

[64]The aforementioned Marxian division of humanity is based on a lack of equality indeed, it is questionable if equality is actually an operational principle important to the development of collectivities. See Robert E. Lane, "The Fear of Equality," in American Political Science Review. 53(1959):35-51.

[65]J. Roland Pennock and David G. Smith, Political Science. (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1964), pp. 83-84.

[66]Gellner calls this a "social exercise." For its functioning, see Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

[67]See Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p.

150.

[66]Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schucter. Max Weber's Vision of History, Ethics and Methods. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1979), p. 196.

[67]Loc. cit. p. 201ff.

[70]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication. op. cit.

[71]This interaction Peter Berger discusses in chapter five, p. 110ff. of Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1986).

[72]Deutsch. Nationalism and Social Communication. op. cit. p. 38.

[73]Loc. cit. p. 41.

[74]Loc. cit. p. 55.

[75]Loc. cit. p. 72.

[76]Loc. cit. p. 96.

[77]Loc. cit. p. 167.

[78]Loc. cit. p. 116.

[79]Loc. cit. p. 170-177.

[80]Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 21.

[81]This is also reflected in script as in Roman, Gothic, Cryllic, Irish Gaelic, German, etc. It is important to note that language is an indicator which is in the mind. The position of the mind is what determines one's own conception of nationality.

[82]Arnold Toynbee, Nationality and War. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), p. 13; Toynbee maintained that "nationality like all great forces in human life is nothing material or mechanical, but is subjective psychological feeling in living people." The psychological feeling of nationhood is accomplished by communications. Language is functionally related to cooperation. Toynbee conceded his constitutive elements generally attributed to nationhood as including language, plus common homeland, traditions, etc. Nationality being a result achieved psychologically from these and a myriad other elements.

[83]Simon Weil, The Needs for Roots / Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 95.

[84]Loc. cit.

[85]Loc. cit. p. 3.

[86]Not illogical, for a discussion of the difference, see Vilfredo Parato, The Mind and Society. (London: Cape, 1934).

[87]See John Breuilly, Nationalism and State. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 19.

[88]Loc. cit. p. 20.

[89]A major thesis found in Carlton Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. (London: R.R. Smith, 1931); and Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism. (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

[90]Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit.

[91]Loc. cit. pp. 3-4. (1953 edition).

[92]Loc. cit. pp. 70-80.

[93]For the psychological approach, see L. Doop, Patriotism and Nationalism. (London: Macmillan, 1964).

[94]On images of large scale and small scale societies, and on the influences affecting same, see Mack Walker, German Home Towns: Community, State, and General Estate 1648-1871. (London: Macmillan, 1971).

[95]See Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change. (London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1964), pp. 147-78.

[96]Loc. cit. p. 31.

[97]Anthony Smith terms it a 'religion of modernisation' theory in Theories of Nationalism. (London: Duckworth, 1971), p. 41.

[98]Louis Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 64.

[99]Friedrich Hertz. Nationality in History and Politics. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 52.

[100]Chambers Dictionary. op. cit. p. 1064.

[101]The idea of Lord Bryce in Bernard Joseph, Race Sentiment as a Factor in History: Nationality; Its Nature and Philosophy. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1929), p. 35; see also for a general critique on race, Julian Huxley, "Race," in Europe. (Oxford: Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 5, 1939).

[102]W.B. Pillsbury, The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism. (New York: Appleton, 1919), p. 3.

[103]Ernest Renan, Qu'est Ce Qu'unde Nation?. Quoted in G.P. Gooch, Nationalism. op. cit. p. 7.

[104]Marcillin Boule, Les Hommes Fossiles. Quoted in Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 16.

[105]Ernest Baker, National Character and the Factors in its Foundation. (London: Macmillan, 1927), p. 12.

[106]Friedrich Hertz, Nationalism in History and Politics. op. cit. especially p. 52.

[107]Richard Stivers, Evil in Modern Myths and Ritual. (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1982), p. 26.

[108]See M. Banton, Race Relations. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1967), p. 37ff.

[109]Smith, Twentieth Century. op. cit. p. 89.

[110]For Race detail, see Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), p. 49ff.

[111]A.D. Smith, "Ethnocentricism, Nationalism and Social Change," in International Journal of Comparitive Sociology. 13(1972):217ff.

[112]Smith, Twentieth Century. op. cit. p. 91.

[113]For a good discussion, see Carlton Stevens Coon, The Races of Europe. (New York: Macmillan, 1943); and C.C. Thompson, An Introduction to Physical Anthropology. Second edition. (Springfield, Illinois: Union Publications, 1951); and Ruth Benedict, Race, Science, and Politics. (New York: Modern Age Books, 1940).

[114]Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. op. cit. p. 27.

[115]In developed communities, when this is no longer the case, sectarian societal relations form. See Colin H.

Williams. "Introduction," and D.N. MacIver, "Conclusion," in Colin Williams, ed., National Separation. (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982).

[116]G.R. Crone, Background to Political Geography. op. cit. p. 22.

[117]Chambers Dictionary. op. cit. p. 846.

[118]The state of being civilised: culture: cultural condition or complex, see loc. cit. p. 72. See. also, chapter five of this paper.

[119]L.D.K. Kristor, "The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries," in Annals of the Association of American Geography. (September 1959):569-82; and Kristor, "The State-Idea, the National Idea, and the Images of the Fatherland," in Orbis. XI(1967):238-55.

[120]Gunner Myrdal, ed., Asian Drama. Volume II. (New York: Twentieth Century Found Publishers, 1968), pp. 2109-10.

[121]Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 29.

[122]R.H. Lowie, The Origin of State. (New York: Knoph, 1927). pp. 116-17.

[123]Rene Johannet, Le Principa des Nationalites. Quoted in Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 29.

[124]See Hans-Eberhard Mueller, Bureacracy, Education and Monopoly. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984).

[125]Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 18.

[126]Loc. cit. pp. 17-19.

[127]Loc. cit. p. 19.

[128]Alexander Alland, Evolution and Human Behaviour. Quoted in Shafer, Faces of Nationalism. op. cit. p. 219.

[129]Robert M. MacIver, Politics and Society. Edited by David Spitz. (New York: Atherton Press, 1969), p. 215.

[130]Loc. cit. p. 216.

[131]Maurice Duverger, The Study of Politics. op. cit. p. 24.

[132]W.H. Parker, MacKinder / Geography as an Aid to Statecraft. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 121.

[133]Richard Muir, Modern Political Geography. (London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 15.

[134]D. Morris, The Human Zoo. (London: Cape, 1969); and R. Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative. (London: Collins, 1966).

[135]Muir, Modern Political Geography. op. cit. p. 15.

[136]Loc. cit. p. 17.

[137]Loc. cit. p. 28.

[138]Ernest Aster, Neues Deutschland: Nationalismus und Ethnik. (Leipzig: Meisser Verlag. 1933), p. 9. Multi-national states are not uncommon, but in such an arrangement, with little exception, one nation becomes dominant, the others cliental. The frequent problem for the English speaker to understand may relate to the historical experience of Britain. See Orlando Patterson, Ethnic Chauvinism. (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), chapter 3.

[139]D. Steven Blum, Walter Lippman: Cosmopolitan in the Century of War. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University

Press, 1984), p. 43.

[140]Loc. cit.

[141]Even Plato saw the importance of the territorial aspect of security consideration. The Republic. Book II. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945). "Then if we are to have enough for pasture and plough land, we must take a slice from our neighbours' territory. And they will want to do the same to ours, if they also overpass the bounds of necessity and plough into reckless pursuit of wealth."

[142]For a good explanation, see G.R. Crone, Background to Political Geography. (London: Museum Press, Ltd., 1967), especially p. 41; and Ellsworth Huntington, Civilization and Climate. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1924).

[143]See, also, S.F. Markham, Climate and the Energy of Nations. (London: Oxford University Press, 1942).

[144]Huntington, Civilization and Climate. op. cit. p. 3.

[145]Loc. cit. p. 35.

[146]Markham, Climate and the Energy of Nations. op. cit. p. 24.

[147]See John K. Galbraith, American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1986).

[148]Duverger, The Study of Politics. op. cit. p. 29.

[149]John Kenneth Galbraith, The Nation and Mass Poverty. (London: Penguin, 1984), chapter four.

[150]Duverger, The Study of Politics. op. cit. p. 30.

[151]Loc. cit. p. 31.

[152]See Crone, Background. op. cit. p. 17.

[153]Loc. cit. p. 59.

[154]For a conspectus, see Muir, Modern Political Geography. op. cit.

[155]For a discussion, see Anthony Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1979), chapter four.

[156]A. Brecht, Political Theory. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 38.

[157]L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. From the German. (New York: Logisch / Philosophische, Abhandlung, 1921), "Wovon man nicht sprecken kann, daruber muss man schweigen!" See also John W. Danford, Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), especially pp. 16-42, "The New Political Science and Its Dependence on Language."

[158]An individual's identity is developed through his exposure to others during socialisation. His communication with others is a key indicator, hence the linkage with language. A seminal work dealing with this relationship is Herbert G. Alexander, Language and Thinking. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1967), especially part one and pp. 7-238 and the formation of thought into definition patterns, pp. 263-84.

[159]Emile Durkeim, "Suicide," quoted in Peter Blau,

Exchange of Power. (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 12.

[160]Georg Simmel, Soziologie. (Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1908), p. 6.

[161]Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 88.

[162]Richard Rosecrance, "Concentric Circles of Loyalty," in International Relations. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 304.

CHAPTER FIVE

Community within Europe

Civilisation (Civilise + Action)[1] is the term applied to the attainment of technique either mental or physical, frequently referred to in levels, which affords differentiation between societies in one period vis a vis those of a previous period. Culture (Cult = a particular form of worship)[2] refers to the training and refinement of minds. It is the intellectual side of civilisation[3] and has to do with the particular form or application of civilised attainments.

This chapter argues sameness of Western European civilisation[4] and fundamental sameness of culture.[5] It argues that perceived cultural differentiations are cultural-traits, subsectional particularities of an overriding culture, not different and distant cultures. It is posited here that cultural-traits exist because of tast or aesthetic orientational differences. Aesthetic orientations, when micro conceptualised cloud the confusion inherent in the definitional problems of the term, 'culture'. When generalised, 'culture' has the potential of becoming a macro conceptualisation, a pre-condition essential for the development of an integrational profile. Aesthetic orientations may best be appreciated if concepts of nationalism were once again brought into consideration.

The concept of nationalism predominantly takes two distinct forms: (1) the political form; and (2) the cultural form. Political nationalism, which fundamentally derives from the spirit of 1789, contributed toward the idea

of self-determination and sovereignty of the nation. The political nation strives to form its own political constitution and to direct its own political destiny, characteristic of Western national self-determination. The cultural aspect of the national ideal is associated with peoples whose national consciousness has grown during the period when they had not yet achieved or were deprived of their own statehood. Cultural nationalism is a striving for national identity.[6]

The concept of two types of the national idea has been termed the Hans Kohn Dichotomy.[7] Such a clear-cut definition between types of nationalism may be criticised on the grounds that characteristics of both the political and cultural national ideals are exhibited in the same culture, and that their differences, rather than clear-cut, are mere shades, incorporating portions of the other. Given this reservation, it is instrumental to isolate the extreme poles for clarity.

Both political and cultural nationalism may exist simultaneously, but they, in effect, compose diametrically opposite types of nationalism. Whereas political nationalism is a striving for a pluralistic and open society, cultural nationalism stands for a closed society and generally an authoritarian uniformity. Political nationalism was historically a product of the Enlightenment, produced by general euphoric enthusiasm for the cause of mankind. Cultural nationalism was generally a product of xenophobia, focused on a narrow, self-centred, antagonistic

self-entity. Political nationalism is concerned with national political ends, while cultural nationalism looks back to the past to fundamentally non-political but more emotional history and conditioned factors. Political nationalism developed from the idea that nations grew up as unions of citizens, by the will of individuals, expressed in contracts, covenants, and plebiscites. The concept of cultural nationalism embraces the idea of a nation as a political unit centring around the irrational pre-civilised folk concept. The political ideal is legal, rational, based on a concept of citizenship and contains an appeal to individual rights. The cultural ideal appeals to collective rights and lends itself to imagination and the excitement of emotions. Political nationalism is characterised by self-assurance resulting from rationalist optimism. Cultural nationalism provides a compensation for inferiority complexes by over-emphasising reality and a degree of over-confidence.

The national feeling, which derived through the movement of nationalism produced an identifiable ethnos, a group identity.

The difference between the developed group identity patterns relates to the polarised bias of the ethnos, either political or cultural, and affords the concept of (1) political aspirations which eventually formed an ethnos, as in England, Netherlands, or Switzerland, or (2) the ethnos which strives for self-determination, as in Poland and many Eastern European nations. Regardless of the validity of the

dichotomy's existence in its extreme forms, what is salient, is the notion of common ethnos orientations. The construct of the ethnos, although superficially appearing compatible with others, may rest on radically divergent propositions.

The common Ethnos may be aligned with the concept of culture, which may further be aligned with the idea of group aesthetics, that being, a common appreciation of things.[8] If the assumption were made that integrating collectivities are more prone to so act when aesthetics are compatibly aligned, that could mean common cultures would so act more than non-common cultures. The politisation or lack of politisation of the ethnos as Kohn highlighted may indicate the primary obstacle placed in the way of European Integrational endeavours. An obstacle whose difficulties being either implied or real, relate to the politicisation of culture.

Homo erectus alone responds in any appreciable degree to the stimulus of culture,[9] as he is so educable an animal that it is difficult to distinguish between that part of character which has been acquired through education and circumstances, and that which was in the original grain of his constitution.[10]

It is not possible here to isolate the singular effects on the individual of stimuli; only patterns of behaviour can be isolated.[11]

Patterns of culture and the individual identity are so interlocked that both are reflections of each other. "A

nation's culture, includes the points of view every one has about individual social-constructs and social relations."[12]

Culture has a material and a non-material component. It includes artificial objects, institutions, modes of life or thought characterised by the group or supra-individual notion. It is unique. Culture does not travel in toto into other cultural areas, but may be transported by individuals and so become enlarged. Despite uniqueness, "no tribe is culturally a self-complete unit. Each is a borrower from others"[13] to some degree and as such is a functioning dynamic with the various traits that compose it being independent, both from within and from without.

Western civilisation may be aptly considered a common culture and not as a composite of cultures, as national doctrine decrees.[14] The Component Culture traits, those of industry, manufacturing, economic activities and organisations, political life, education, literature, science and technology, art, law, ethics and idealism permeate the entire European entity.

"Western Civilisation developed out of Germanic Kingship groups and forged ahead only after contact with Graeco-Roman culture"[15] and influences. The view may be taken that either Graeco-Roman influences diffused science, literature, architecture and law, medicine and education from Mediterrean areas to the North and West of Europe, or that the Germanic and Celtic peoples were Hellenised and Latinised to the extent that they chose to adopt or revive

aspects of those Mediterranean cultures. Whatever the position, what is important is that between these various culture groups were contacts and borrowings. The assertion of a separate English, French or German culture is a micro conceptualisation introvertedly and not system focused. Each sub-culture has borrowed traits spread from one subsidiary culture area to others.[16]

Generally cultural traits spread because of obvious utility and appeal. Adaptation or deletion of a cultural trait significantly alters the overall culture. Modernisation, specifically the technology aspect, affects culture and to a great degree affects the creation of compatibilities, if not identical entities.[17] Modernisation creates an environment both physically identical and mentally identical.[18] A time perspective would suggest an inevitable cultural convergance as modernity introduces the requirement for culture to equilibrate and accomodate advancement.[19]

Western Europe received from other areas most of the more basic and fundamental elemental traits of its culture prior to the advent of modernisation.[20] Diffusion was either slow or fast and takes on the characteristic of pseudo-acculturation. The utilisation of fructifying cultural contacts is a potent and significant factor in cultural change. When two cultures come into contact, each influences the other. Their influence is considerable if the contact is sympathetic and intimate, and, even when not, mutual influences are transmitted if contact is extended

over appreciable time.[21]

The beginnings of the new trend to diffusion of cultural traits commence with the Enlightenment[22]. The argument here is that identity is individually subjective, a unique feeling inherent in the singular entity and as such is a mental position. The convergence of a common identity developed through the growing confidence in powers of human understanding. The acquisition of reason over traditional authority and tradition, the challenge to politics, theology and philosophy presented by science, reason over superstition, intolerance over despotism, where related to the developing education and subsequent understanding of the masses. Commencing with the Enlightenment, it is, in effect, an ongoing revolution starting with the works of Newton and Locke.[23]

The growth of objective humanistic liberalism over subjective authoritarian prejudice appears to have commenced in three areas.[24] The three areas of change: the Social, Political and the Economic may be isolated as follows. (1) The Social Cultural, change began with the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), marking the beginning of the end of French hegemony; and the English Revolution (1688-89) marking the beginning of liberty and British dominion. Britain demonstrated a material and spiritual lead in this process. The consolidation of the Austro-Hungarian dominions (1687); the introduction of Russia into western civilisation (1689), with her rise to a great power (1721); as well as with the rise of Brandenburg into the Kingdom of

Prussia (1701) and the transfer of Spain from Hapsburg rule to Bourbon rule (1700), marked the beginning of an epoch of massive cultural change.[25] (2) Political. The political structure of Europe changed partly by a series of wars (internal and external) and struggles for colonial empire by chiefly England and France, and partly by the conflict for control of central Europe between Austria and Prussia and the conflict with Russian for Eastern Europe domination. A series of national alliances and coalitions and a melee known as the Seven Years' War (1756-63) led toward expansion and consolidation of the British Empire, the Prussian Empire, and the Russian Empire, at the expense of France, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, and Sweden.[26] (3) Economic, change occurred with the transfer of wealth and power from one nation to another, and from one clan to another within the same state or intra-states. The older privileged classes lost ground, prestige, and economic importance to the Third Estate or bourgeiose. Further, economic change was influenced by the developing rule of a wealthy burgher class in the Free cities of Germany and Switzerland and by the birth of either democracy or a benevolent despotism. The latter, which while still denying a share in government to the people, recognised as an obligation the necessity to provoke the prosperity and happiness of inhabitants.[27]

These beginnings of the post-Enlightenment era, were the beginnings of modernity. If it were considered that Europe had developed separate cultures during the Feudal

Period, these beginnings would mark the confluence of these separate cultures toward a common entity.[28]

> If nations actually borrow from their neighbours, they probably borrow only what they are nearly in a condition to have invented themselves. Any singular practice of one country, therefore is seldom transferred to another, till the way be prepared by the introduction of similar circumstances.[29]

The commencement of rapid change provided stimuli and circumstances conducive to frequent and rapid cultural diffusion.

As "in the realm of ideas, there are neither frontiers nor custom-houses,"[30] given the modern blending of diffusing particularities, the problem would be in defining anything specific that could be termed as belonging to a truly independent culture, and not just a cultural trait per se.

Cultural traits are interaction variables operational in a differentiated social system. A social system consists in a plurality of individual actors "interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect," actors who are fundamentally "motivated in terms of a tendency to the 'optimization of gratification'" on the individual or collective level" whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a system of culturally structured and shared "values and symbols."[31] Such a social system is identified with civilisation which is:

> not merely mechanical improvements, and greater

> speed and comfort of living; but a force of social organization in which men and women, thrown into close relations, are enabled by their diverse gifts to enrich and enlarge one another's lives.[32]

This conceptualisation of civilisation defines culture as the sum total of behaviour patterns, attitudes and values, shared and transmitted by members of a given society.[33]

It may be that distinct constituents of a given cultural configuration, may within the totality of that civilisation "make different arrangements for satisfying the needs of members and those institutional arrangements may give rise to the kinds of social behaviour characteristic of the given constituent,"[34] but these constituent entities are sub-cultural societies, portions of a whole.[35] Sub-cultural societies may "make institutional arrangements which include a formulation of aims and prescriptions of techniques, practices, and approximate timetables for passing milestones" in the socialisation process,[36] but such action does not necessarily qualify that sub-cultural society as culturally distinct. This is so as the overriding cultural prescription taken by sub-cultures are directed by ideological orientation, and within the European context, ideological orientation is highly compatible.

Civilisation

Essentially the European common denominator is civilisation. When the general functions of the concept of civilisation are examined to determine the common

quality causes, all the various human attitudes are civilised. It becomes evident that divergencies of this concept express the self-consciousness of the west, or the national consciousness. It sums up centuries of what Europeans (some) believed of themselves, subjectively superior to earlier societies or 'more primitive' contemporary ones.[37] This national aspect of civilisation emphasizes levels of technology or the development of science, etc.[38] This conceptualisation comprises only a very superficial appraisal of the surface of the physical world. The conceptualisation of the non-physical world, its component parts relating to thought, idea building and recognition of the physical can only be treated with the term "culture." "Culture" refers, essentially, to intellectual, artistic, religious facts. These facts are in sharp relief to the political, economic, or social facts of civilisation.

An objective view of world society incorporates the notion of a European civilisation, or indeed western civilisation, but only in contrast with non-European civilisations. There are more civilised attainments amongst Europeans in common, uniting them, than with non-European civilisations. Likewise, world culture would permit a European differentiation vis a vis non-Europeans. The interplay amongst cultural and civilisation variables in the globalised setting can permit isolation, of differentiated macro relationships but the interplay amongst Europeans cannot. This requires

a micro differentiation of relationships suggestive of sub-cultures. Any such European differentiation is but an unique arrangement of cultural-civilisation phenomenon and not of the phenomenon themselves. The internal arrangement variations are unique to the group traits. But these traits are not sufficient enough to suggest separate cultures or civilisations. The differences that do exist are sub-cultural constructs which relate to societal groupings.

> Man's subjective and his objective world are in constant interplay: nothing that he knows about the universe can be disassociated from the facts of his own life; and no product of his culture is so detached from the larger groundwork of existence that he can impute to his individual powers what alone has been possible by countless generations of men by the underlying cooperation of the entire system of nature.[39]

The reason why the differentiation between cultural-civilisation variables exist may be attributed to the philosophical development of man.

> Man's life differs from that of most other organisms in that individuation has become more important to him than strict conformity of type: he participates in all the characters of species and yet, by the very complexity of his needs, each individual makes a life-course of the species and achieves a character and becomes a person.[40]

The more fully the individual organises his environment, and the more skillful he becomes in socialisation through groups, the more constantly he draws on his social heritage, the more does the individual emerge from society as unique and independent.

The propensity amongst Europeans to insist upon

national differentiation may be related to the key fact that individuals are different, unique, and independent. Assuming both equal accessibility of technology and scientific attainment brought about by modernisation throughout Europe, the assumption may be made that Europe possesses a distinct civilisational and cultural-homogeneity. Do Europeans look at and perceive things differently? If so, this would be a real aesthetic differential. If there is an aesthetic differential, is it sufficient to categorise autonomy?

The Aesthetic Differential

The centuries-long tendency in Europe has been toward individuation. Individualism is reflective of relative values.[41] Roughly since the Enlightenment, the individual "has become one" in the world, and the individualist values tend to rule "without restriction or limitation."[42] The tendency has been away from universals and collectivism, toward individualism, atomism, and secularism.[43] This tendency has led to the contemporary operational imperative indicative of an open society[44] and highlights the previously illustrated conceptual differentiation of Gemeinshaft and Gesellschaft.[45] The old idea of collective unity or fellowship contrasts sharply with the newer idea of representative unity where the representative is set above the group,[46] in an organisational structure. The movement has been toward societal institutions with a a polarisation of aesthetic differentials. Aesthetic

differentials may be considered broadly as an ideological orientation. Throughout time, the European world developed a coalition in response to Napoleanic imperialistic tendencies which after 1815 gradually deteriorated and broke up into a condition of pluralistic particularism. The particularistic tendency was of such an evident nature that the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston (1836) wrote that this separation was:

> . . . not one of words, but of things, not the effect of caprice or of will, but provided by the force of circumstances. The three and the two think differently and therefore they act differently.[47]

The fact that there developed a difference in thinking may be related to the fact that at this time society was becoming highly structured, the most prominent manifestation of which was the development of the modern State. The aesthetic differentials, reflected in interests and philosophies was exacerbated by the construction of the state and was a movement which parameterised nations. The result was one of an establishment of a definite link between Nation and State or Nations (with generally one dominant, one or more subservient) and State. Palmerston indubitably referred to the distinct posture taken by States. States, if considered as essentially the construct of nations as an autonomous self-entity, tend to exhibit self perpetuating ends.[48] Society, which was previously broadly vertically independent, with the definitional element provided by state, became horizontally containerised

within a set of confining structures. States tend not to operate with the sole interest of their respective nations as principal motivation. They act "not as a matter of principle, but of expediency."[49] States appear to operate with regard to their own specific orientation and not necessarily with any particular regard to any overriding ideological orientation.[50]

This means that it is possible that arrangements made by States may not necessarily be due to an overriding concern for "community," in a Deutschen sense, but may be more for the achievement of some specific state goal, i.e., political, economic, social, or any combination thereof.[51]

A sense of community would follow from an ideological and not necessarily from a political orientation. Given the degree of preserved differences between European States and the apparent desire for integration, the absence of an ideological orientation would tend to hamper the development of 'community'. Referring again to the Kohn Dichotomy, the politisation of domestic national tendencies inhibits expansion of same.

Two positions can be stated by which this can be best appreciated in the context of international relations.[52]

(1) Position one, The notion of a Balance of Power, or the concept of an arrangement of international relations based on perceived gains by a minimisation of

disadvantage. This is essentially an arrangement based on expediency. It is an alignment of an interest formation concerned with power, or security, or advantage, and has little to do in the first instance with ideology. It may be that "ideological affinities among regimes are merely the immediate impetus" to such lateral or multi-lateral alignments,[53] not the enduring common locus.

(2)The second position, is one where alignments are made upon ideological grounds as primary interest, where ideological, cultural or other similarities are crucial to forming an arrangement.[54] This position argues fundamentally that similarities of ideology are more apt to be causal to multi-group arrangements than diversities.[55]

Position one is fundamentally related to political ends, a conception of a desired achieved goal as functioning as modus operandi for an arrangement. It may or it may not be related to the nation or a national position; it is most definitely always related to State. Position two is that of a society orientation. It is directly related to the nation and the State as executor of the national ideal. The current integration overtones made by the EEC are political and thus fall into the first school of thought, it being a system of relations relating toward political goals which may or may not be nationally oriented. The du ut des principle is evident on all levels of discussion.[56] The implication is that if the second principle were the overriding

imperative, integrational gains would be far more noticeable.

Why is it that common ideology is not operable in practice? Why is it that political considerations far overshadow social? Referring to the League of Nations, Ramsay Muir made the following observation;

> The League was a League of sovereign states, and it was definitely stated that it would not interfere with the sovereignty of its members. But the purpose for which the League existed could not be fulfilled unless there were some limitations of the irresponsible sovereignty of its members.[57]

In 1921, Norman Angell noted that his pre-war view of international affairs, his Functional idea that cooperation between states had become essential for the very lives and welfare of their respective nation's individuals, was no longer valid. He noted that cooperation no matter how essential and apparent was not taking place because of States exerting dichotomous positions. He wrote of the Functionalist argument:

> This line of reasoning is no longer valid, for it was based upon a system of Economic individualism, upon a distinction between the functions proper to the State and those peoples to the citizens. This individualist system has been profoundly transformed in the direction of national control by the measures adopted everywhere for . . . [other, most generally domestic political purposes].[58]

This condition, that of autonomous States acting for themselves he likened to individual anarchy.[59]

Chapter six of this paper will look at the problems

between the nation and the state on the homo economicus, politicus, and socius level and attempt to analyse these dichotomies between the Nation and the System, but the attention here will be drawn to the difficult conflict between ideological orientation of the nation and societal control of the state.

Ideological (Aesthetic) Operations

Aesthetic values relate to orientations and orientation to belief systems.[60] In a common civilisation configuration things material operate on a neutral level. "Technology gives us material power, and this is morally neutral: it can be used at will for either good or evil."[61] The use of material objects demands some sort of orientation, or knowledge. Public collective consensus introduces the utilisation of such objects through the concept of morality, an ideology. The gap between things physical and the intellectual abilities dictating utilisation has been termed a morality gap.[62] Governments are aggravating this disparity by operating politically in a Du ut des sphere of action and not wholly in the ideological sphere[63] for short term strategic advantage or gains. The morality gap is directly related to the meta-need of intellectual security.

The morality gap may be dehumanising society by placing priority on achievement of wealth or status or power in acquisition. The individual has been labeled a homo sapien, man the wise, not homo faber, man the

technician, because of the quality of thought which was noticeable, separating the individual from other forms of animal life. The morality gap may be placing more evidence on man's material nature, rather than any cerebral attainment,[64] and, if this is so, the existence of the morality gap, demonstrates an aesthetic differential between man in society and the State's conceptuality, personification, and actualisation of collective society.

The Causation of Aesthetic Differentials

The individuals' alignment with the physical world is a product of thought. The major influence on collective thought effecting justification of the individuals vis-a-vis the natural world, is religious. European Society exhibits common evolutionary development with this regard but yet cultural traits, aesthetic orientations are evident. Thought has developed through exposure to stimuli.[65] Prejudism or preference is a result of a lack of contact with conflictive stimuli.[66] As common collective thought weakened its bias with the idea of collective unity under Christendom,[67] the role of religious orientation was assumed to a great degree by Nationalism.[68] Through nationalism, conflicting stimuli became orientated introvertedly. Religion will be used in the following section to introduce the causality of aesthetic orientations.

Societal evolution has transformed religion and frequently religion has been used by governments for the substantiation and legitimisation of the various raisons d'etat. Protestantism and the counter-Reformation took religious notions in the direction of anti-feudalism by developing the concept of sovereign monarchal power. These notions evolved into the concept of the nation organised to promote the public weal. Generally speaking, the original concept of an equal citizenry, united in a joint religious participation transcending the barrier of birth,[69] gave way to an increasingly identified religious expression aligned with the instruments of nationhood.[70] The utilisation of the notions of religion allowed for a degree of homogenation of the society by the elimination of heretics and dissenters to rally collectivities into a national collectivity. The manipulation of belief by, amongst others, the means of forceful conversion, created a basis for political cohesion. From this foundation emerged national religions and the concept of absolute monarchs.[71]

Through the period of national consolidation, the notion of patriotism was acknowledged as to be acceptable to God.[72] As the Pontifex Maximus gave way to the Pope and Roman Law was implanted throughout Western Europe, the adoption of Christianity by that central authority anchored within the embryonic nations of Europe universally common codes and traditions. These

traditions became institutionalised in as much as there became established recognizable patterns of behaviour characteristic of groups of people and essentially European society. The violation or non-observance of such behavioural patterns caused disturbances or discomfort because it threatened widely held values.[73] Institutions are often, however not exclusively, important means of social control. Frequently institutions are given credibility by legitimisation in either overt repetition or formalised in law. During the nation-forming stage in Europe, the church was the dominant force in establishing institutions. It eventually gave way to economic institutions and later economic institutions have essentially given way to political institutions as a primary force of social control. Assuming a relatively free society, where no particular institution becomes ascendant over others, there is a distinct limitation of power evidenced by a certain degree of resistance to absorption. In such a free society, rivalry amongst institutions is characteristic of an active society. A society, based on individual preference orientations, in which one institution dominates others, especially when force or compulsive pressure is employed, does not lend itself to a situation in which human interests can afford variety. It is a society characterised by prejudicial orientations.[74] This leads to static society. It was, by far, this lack of freedom during the early period

of national development prior to the fragmentation of the universal church and the foundation of splinter national churches, that forced the permeation of religious ideals homogenously throughout Western European society. Because of this, fundamentally individually held societal ideologies possess a remarkable degree of homogeneity during the current period of European history. The achieved differences, those that form aesthetic differentials, formed during the early national period. In the modern period, these differentials through modernity are becoming marginalised.[75]

The anthropological approach to society, initiated by Durkheim postulates a close relationship between social structures and functions within given collectivities. This school maintains that religion subserved a variety of functions in society and that these functions were latent rather than explicit. Religion provided occasions of reunion, the reassertion of social solidarity and so sustained social cohesion and it has solemnised the social order. It is by this means of analysis that social control may be identified.[76] Religion prescribes moral norms which are enjoined on the people as requirements of a higher supernatural order. The Judeo/Christian tradition provides specific religiously described sanctions of behaviour. Good behaviour was the way to win merit in the economy of the Divine Order while bad deeds would incur punishments that would be visited on the wrong-doers, perhaps in this

world, but certainly in the life to come.[77] This demonstrates the inhibitory structure of individual personality which is within the sphere of institutionalised religion. Religion sanctions the relinquishment of direct impulsive gratification by an appeal to a symbolic order to the primitive cravings for universal protection and for cosmic participation. It ensures standards to which dissent in the community is made difficult,[78] and it affords a basis for aesthetic orientation. These assured standards throughout history have either been the result of individual volition or institutional enforcement. The accomodation of the early Roman Church gave way to an all-powerful, non-tolerant Roman church, which, in turn, gave way to a myriad of powerful ecclesiastical institutions through the Western world, which in turn, since the Protestant Reformation, have ultimately reversed back to a fundamental accomodation amongst ecclesiastical institutions. Societal order, as indeed the institutions themselves, have become less of a pure religious organisation and have assumed more a socio-political posture.

> The social pattern of impersonal administration appears to have been developed in the West by the Church. Persons forsook their family obligations and devoted theselves to the service of God through the service of the Church. In the language of social psychology, such persons were detached from loyalty to primary symbols and attached to the service of secondary symbols. The practice of poverty, chastity and obedience was perhaps of decisive importance in integrating the pattern of the impersonal administration which is so essential for flexible adjustment to a variety of new

> large-scale enterprises. The modern states of Western Europe were able to take over, not only the culturally established pattern, but in many cases the personnel of the Church.[79]

The well organised comprehensive system of theology which is found among Western European peoples embraces a normative element which transcends the purely speculative realm. The great ideal of a universal, cosmic, moral and ritual order imposes a binding obligation on those who acknowledge it[80] and significantly influences those that do not, for it is here that rules of conduct and morals develop.[81] The ethical code of a given society forms a part of its normative system. The normative system is the system, the body of rules, legal, or practical, which operate as orientations within the system. This influences the conduct, and regulates, individuals in that system. The whole body of rules is integrated into a unitary system and no aspect of it, no isolated body of norms, can be considered apart from the system as a whole.[82] In the more highly developed and introspective religions, norms are set up which define for each religion the idea of a world or society permeated by the spirit of that religion.[83] It is because of this that Christianity has been one of the primary and fundamental influences in the creation of Western European societies and its teachings and philosophy have acted as the basis for the development of Western European ideologies. The fundamental ideologies of the nations of Western Europe which act as a significant constituent part of their identities, are

within the European experience, overall identical; differences are individuations reflected by aesthetics and operable through individual orientations.

Orientations, in terms of cultural traits do exist. These orientations differentiate collectivities as subsections of an overall cultural constellation. Ideological orientations dictate the emphasis given treatment of the material world. At one point in time these ideologies when broadly sketched were more or less compatible. Current divergence in cultural traits today related to particular specifics frequently domestic. The mechanics may be illustrated by the case in point of England. Its political head of state, the monarch appoints, and thus, has control of the archbishopric of Canterbury, the head of the Anglican Church, an arrangement developed through the period of divine right of kings in which the political authority subsumed religious authority. Subordination of religious authority by political authority does not have to be of such an overt nature as in this example or the concept of CUJUS REGIO, EJUS RELIGIO. It could also develop by way of a general evolution of many-faceted influences.[84]

Furthermore, there is and may always have been a continuous linkage between political and religious authority. In the time of Christendom where both were exercised, more or less from the same source, effects were more or less equally distributed amongst Europe and individual Europeans. Where the political bifurcation

from the unit resulted in separate centres of political power, religious unity took on a diatropic posture. This diatropic posture was directly related to the individualistic turn of thought[65] and the exhibited particularistic character of the State. Thought both encouraged and was held hostage to action. "There are these who imply that sovereignty claimed and exercised by the State" is an undesirable thing because of its psychological power "to control aesthetic judgment".[66]

The point here is not to subjectively value sovereignty but to recognise its existence and the extent of its influence on the development of aesthetic orientations. "The Special nature of the modern state" allowing it to claim and exercise sovereignty relates to its "physical, corporeal nature. It is an extension of territory, included for its identification and defence by tangible, military expression of statehood, like fortifications and fortresses."[67] But its impermeability goes beyond the physical dimension and stretches into the realm of thought.[68] This element of control is the major contributor toward aesthetic divergences amongst European peoples. The state exercises significant influence, which if integration of nations of Europe is to be accomplished, must be overcome. It may be argued that the sovereign-nation-state is solely an anachronism.[69] If so, the concept of a "classical nation state has perhaps

lost its principal raison d'etre."[90]

This position could be supported by the notion of economic, political or ideological penetration from without. Penetration, interdependence and eventual dependency may be characteristics of the modern historical epoch."[91] The Aesthetic orientational divergences which developed during the period of state domination and may be evidenced by cultural traits today, may be converging via the penetration, interdependence, dependency nuvom. The idea of an anachronistic nation-state must holistically be considered in a time context. The nation as causal to the development of the political states both theoretically extended the mandate of perpetuation to the state and fell hostage to the state dictates, with the introduction of general literacy due to modernisation. The education function fell generally within the sphere of state control, either directly through administration or indirectly through influence, and hence the state had placed within its means the ability to become self-perpetuating. At its disposal was placed the assurance of identity control, through the socialisation process, necessary to perpetuate its devised ends. It propagandised itself where propaganda involves for its success an appeal to reason and emotion through symbolic agencies"[92] exercised ostensibly in the name of the nation but basically for its own existence.

. . . the special needs which government

> satisfies or helps to satisfy are: (1) external security; (2) internal order; (3) justice; (4) welfare; (5) freedom in varying forms and proportions, interpreted, justified and elaborated in a variety of ways, in different times and places.[93]

The functions of a state through its government is order and security. A state accomplishes this through justification, solidifying its position in the eyes of its nation(s). In effect, it makes adjustments of personalities to enable men to live and work together in the framework of the general good. "The biological and social heritage brings forward a broad variety of different types of individuals who must in one way or another be set in the enmeshing webs of social and political relations without tearing themselves apart."[94] This is accomplished by developing personality by bestowing identity recognition. Personality develops through (1) some interaction and (2) some shared values with others.[95] However, the environment must be clearly defined. Hobbes observed how this is accomplished . . .

> not only a declaration of the law, but also sufficient signs of the author and authority. The author, or legislature is supposed in every commonwealth to be evident because he is the sovereign, who has been consolidated by the consent of everyone, is supposed by everyone to be sufficiently known.[96]

A personality develops <u>vis a vis</u> an organisational community. Evidence of the boundaries of regard of the community are frequently supplied by the state.

This essentially required states to control and assure their position by way of exercising that control.

> A community must have one method of settling disputes, and it is easy to construe this as requiring that there must be one and only one rigidly formulated law establishing a hierarchy of courts and legislature competent to pronounce on every question.[97]

A government acting in the name of the state, for and in behalf of the state may, and often is, supreme over their subjects, but are characteristically "the servants of circumstance and the slaves of their own ideologies."[98] The sub-cultural ideological differences that do exist do so partly because of the personification and subsequent autonomous nature of the state, and partly because of the mere fact of difference itself.

Differences exist amongst individuals, if for no other reason than by self-definition. Individuals are different.[99] Distortions singular or aggregate occur.[100] Attitudes,[101] assessments,[102] procedures and adjustments[103] vary due to stimuli and individual. Reality, if existent and not just the product of perception, itself is contradictory.[104] Illusion or hallucination[105] play an important role. An individual as self-agent exercises freedom to ascertain and develop a conceptualisation of stable equilibration in the dynamics of physical and social life, not just the cerebral ability to wish or to will, but to also put it into practice, to actualise the power to act successfully in the world.[106] This type of determinism comes from more than an execution of

transcendent and unfettered will and a knowledge of forces involved. This awareness produces insight and imagination.[107] Correctness, integration, character, health and survival, self-realisation, ideas, norms, progress, beauty, truth, reality, adjustability, and freedom are all individual subjective tolerations.[108] The result of what the literature terms 'individual hermeneutics'.[109] Hermeneutics which are the result of "human action - (being) - and the product of conscious mental acts." By such a process, "we have produced immensely complex codes of religious, moral and aesthetic behaviours. We have, by using our ability to think, created complex political and economic organizations."[110] On the individual level, groups form <u>because of compatible exposure to stimuli in the socialisation process</u>. Compatibilities which <u>produce collated orientations</u>.[111] These orientations give the form and shape of communities along an important phenomenon axis of symmetry concluding in vertical or perceived vertical collectivity. Orientation and adjustments define relationships, either singular or group. Things look as they do, because they are perceived as they appear. Appearance is emotive or physical,[112] depending upon the stimuli. We make out of our world what we make out of it.[113] We constantly change our orientation and value.[114] And due to the individual's social requirements, he "<u>learns</u>" by intellection through imitation.[115] The closeness of

the group affects the homogeneous or heterogeneous compatibility of such learning and collective relatedness.

Discussion

Common values of various types can be conceived of as media that expand the compass of social interaction and structure of social relations through social space and time.[116] They afford substance to community. A general consensus on values amongst a given society serves as the basis for extending the range of social transactions beyond the limits of direct social contacts. A general concensus of sorts aids the developing and perpetuating of social structures, facilitating transaction beyond the life span of individual participants. Value standards are aesthetic orientations, views, impressions and opinions, held individually, which are expressed collectively. They function as a media of social life, transmitting and moulding the forms of social relationships and mediating linkages of social interactions. They resemble the concept of communication through language[117] as they lend a tangible medium to the functioning of fluid social intercourse.

Orientation through value and assessment is both individual and collective, and explains salient differentiation between individuals and between groups.

They are either individualistic as in particularistic values and opinions, or collectively expressed by universalistic values and opinions. What determines particularism or universalism is whether or not the stimuli as criterion for their development is dependent or independent.[118] The criterion which yields operational concepts of universalism or particularism is to a great measure developed throughout the relationships governed in a collectivity.[119] As an individual's status affects the impact of his approval or disapproval of, and within as a part of, the group, adoption or rejection is a matter of weight given options. The distinctive values shared within a collectivity unite same in common social solidarity and extend the scope of further uniting through the creation of integrative bonds which extend beyond personal feelings of attraction.[120] The particular shared values that distinguish a collectivity from other collectivities constitute a distinctive medium through which its members are bound together into a cohesive unit and afford that unit distinct and unique status within a group of like constructed units. The commonality of view mediates personal and collective bonds of attraction and preference. However, "What is common to humanity does not serve as a distinctive symbol of group identity."[121]

To illustrate, using the example of religion, "As Christianity spread through Europe, it [took] on new

traits with each adaptation and [lost] some old ones."[122] It developed different forms and took on different functions, but such particularistic development is not sufficient to, in terms of a mise en scene today, characterise that development of different Christian traditions as anything other than specifically cultural traits. In this example, Western Europe is functioning within the general orbit of a single civilisation with collected knowledge about religion (Christianity). It exists also within a single culture with collecitve conceptualisations of that knowledge (theology). Existent cultural traits are evidenced in adaptations of that conceptualised knowledge (sects).

Culture is spread horizontally from one locality to another. Traits which vertically develop within localities are just that.[123] Domestic traits, vertically permeating a collectivity as demi-monde are unique, but not unique enough to characterise overall cultural differentiation just as individuals are unique but do not supply sufficient enough criteria to distinguish anything other than traits, unique within an overall constellation of similarity.[124]

The development and acceptances of collective individual traits came down to the present age through a long history of thought, leading toward individualism. It was the product of the freedom of judgment over the bondage of authoritarianism. It was propelled by the

process of modernity. It is, in effect, fragmented thinking.[125] Europe is the custodian of both a common civilisation and a common culture.[126] The evolution of thought, the values assigned aspects of collective living evolved from the evolution of moral comprehension inextricably bound up with theological transformation from Religious Authoritarianism to modern secularism. The rapid change introduced within the present historical era provoked an attempt to equilibrate the system, by the development post 1815, of collectivities polarised around a series of identity-locative-polie. Such a structure of the international system produced the environment for the development of vertical traits. Vertical traits afford identity to those confined geographically to given areas, who come under the same politically induced influences. The developed vertical identity traits became institutionalised and universalised within groups and provided points of orientation for national identification.[127] The institutionalised State became the steward of that nation and as such chief propagator of discerned particularisms.[128]

The horizontal transferrence of ideological orientations became parameterised by the state and thus is today significantly synthetically verticalised, the state is the major inhibitor to further free socialisation and as such the chief inhibitor toward further integration. Generally[129] for a social system to work smoothly, it helps to have individuals with the

same conceptual picture of things or to believe the same things about matters of common interest.[130] The State autocatalyses, through the requirements of domestic structuralisation and institutionalisation, the internalisation of compatible conceptualisations by the hypertrophic propagation of their collectivity.[131] The produced state, as a Ding an sich, both cuts and divides nationalities. By capitalising on original ethnocentrism, modern ethnicism with associated trait differences has created the European pattern of uniqueness and exclusion.[132] Particularistic development, associated with politically oriented nationalism, with its myths, memories, and symbols (mythomoteur)[133] and enforced centrifugal propagation is essentially in this respect an inhibitor toward further European integration.

In Sum

Individuals are a constant. Within Europe, civilisation and culture are compatible. This would lead toward further socialised integration were it not for artificial reinforcement by State of particularistic traits. Justification of the compatibility of European homo erectus and of the States inhibiting posture toward integrated expanded society will be demonstrated in the following chapter, reflecting homo economicus, politicus, and socius.[134]

CHAPTER FIVE NOTES

[1]See William Little. ed., The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), p. 317.

[2]Loc. cit. p. 436.

[3]Loc. cit. p. 437.

[4]See, amongst an extensive literature, for an overview, James H. Robinson. The Ordeal of Civilization: A Sketch of the Development and Worldwide Diffusion of Our Present-Day Institutions and Ideas. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927. For an apprisal of change, see H. Read, et.al., ed., The Collected Works of C.G. Jung. Volume 10: Civilization in Transition. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973). Its development, W.J. Perry. The Growth of Civilisation. (London: Methuen and Co., 1924): and W.M. Flinders Petrie, The Revolutions of Civilization. (London: Harper and Brothers, 1911), especially chapter 3, p. 48ff.

[5]See Donald P. Verene, ed., Symbol, Myth and Culture. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1979), especially pp. 49-94, N. p. 219ff. and N.B. p. 271ff.; also Rudolf Rocker, Nationalism and Culture. Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee, 1937), especially chapter 12, p. 518ff. For an analysis of cultural progress and its diffusion, see Wilson Wallis, Culture and Progress. (London: Whittlesey House, 1930), chapter 2, pp. 209-380, N.B. 359ff.; and G. Elliot Smith, The Diffusion of Culture. (London: Watts and Co., 1933).

[6]See Hans Kohn. Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth-Century Nationalism. (New York: Macmillan, 1946) and Hans Kohn, "Nationalism, "in Frank P. Davidson, ed., Before America Decides. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 13-26.

[7]The concept of the two types of the national idea, --the Hans Kohn dichotomy, labels Western nationalism, or the concept of political nationalism, as essentially good, humanitarian and progressive, whereas the Eastern variety is characterised as bad, pathological, characteristic of backwardness and doomed to produce the disasters of the twentieth century. See H. Kohn, Prophets and Peoples. op. cit.

[8]Chambers Dictionary. op. cit. - 'aesthetic'. Aesthetics has to do with the individual appreciation of things cultural. Culture is the general utilisation of things physical. The constructed physical world is generally ascribed the appellation 'civilisation'.

[9]Domesticated animals respond to some of its elements but the response signifies an adaptive response to certain phases rather than to complete adaptation. See Wilson D. Wallis, Culture and Progress. op. cit. p. 5. Preliminarily, culture may be aligned with the orientation of 'hearts and minds', as implied by Caroline Bray in her book, written with Roger Morgan, Partners and Rivals in Western Europe: Britain, France, and Germany. (Gower: Aldershot Hants, 1986), p. 78.

[10]Sir Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development. (London: Everyman's Library, 1929), p. 128.

[11]When Margaret Mead studied Samoan individuals, she

found that a knowledge of the entire culture was essential for the accurate evolution of any particular individual's behaviour. See Mead, The Coming of Age in Samoa. (New York: Modern Library, 1928). To isolate individual effects of stimuli on the individual is essentially the province of behavioural psychology, a realm outside of this consideration.

[12]Mark Sullivan, Our Times, The United States 1900-1925. Volume II. America Finds Herself. (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1927), p. 1.

[13]Wilson Wallis, Culture and Progress. op. cit. p. 11.

[14]Of course, it may also be argued as both, but this position is only a manifestation of fixating on individual intensities as a phenomenon. If one were to focus on domestic culture, one could equally focus on the constituent elements of those domestic cultures down to the core group with equal ease. The point of view, as argued here, taken on a macro level, suggests cultural homogeneity throughout Western Europe. A micro view reveals traits which are politicised as autonomous cultures. For background and definition, see D. Krech, R. Crutchfield, and E. Ballachey, Individual in Society. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), pp. 339-80, N.B. p. 380. See, also, M. and C. Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), pp. 6-28, 66-73, and 753ff. Cultural relativism, stemming from Malinowski's work, suggesting cultural forces, is nearly all-sufficient in determining personality and behaviour. This would indicate the greater the micro fixation, the more exclusive the term 'culture' becomes.

[15]Wallis, Culture and Progress. op. cit. p. 15.

[16]Rome's Caeser became Berlin's Kaiser and Moscow's Tsar, English trifle became French soupe anglase or Italy's zuppa Inglese and Poland's kiosks became a fixture on French streets and their gazebos fixtures in English gardens, etc.

[17]Example - the motor car, Europe built ever better road networks, industry proliferated, petrol outlets expanded, individuals become more mobile, opening up the countryside for towny habitation, etc.

[18]As far back as 1928, it was postulated, "In relation to communication of ideas by radio, the most remote countries are only about one-tenth of a second apart. We all live in a tenth-of-a-second radio world. It does not seem likely that such a world can indefinitely support more than one system of weights and measures. It must only be a question of time, on a tenth-second world, when only one system will supervene." A.E. Kennelly, "The Metric System of Weights and Measures," in Scientific Monthly. 26(1928):149. The observation is today only partially realised by standardisation due to entities jealously guarding individual uniquenesses but the idea is well noted that concepts are very interchangeable as well as parts!

[19]A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, ("Bilateral Descent," in Man. 29{1929}:200) has written: "It is impossible to reach a complete understanding of any element of culture -

language, art, religion, social organisation - without a profound and exhaustive study of history. But it must be a real history, not conjectural history." This suggests that elements, previously isolated, when objectively viewed, through time, could demonstrate their mutation charted to demonstrate convergence.

[20]Babylonia=duodecimal system, time, dividing circles into degrees, minutes, and seconds
Egypt=notion of priesthood and monotheism, calendrical system
Greeks=art, science, fine arts, philosophy
India=the notion of zero
China=compass, perhaps gunpowder, paper manufacturing, block printing
New World=tobacco, maize, chocolate, cocaine, potato, tomato
Jerusalem=Christianity
See diffusion of traits in Wallis, Culture and Progress. op. cit. pp. 85-86.

[21]Argument from Chapter V, "The Assimilation of Cultural Traits," in loc. cit., p. 107.

[22]See William Church, The Influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolution. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1964), especially Alexis de Tocqueville, pp. 20-24 and Section III, pp. 45-60. The diffusion of cultural traits commenced with the leaders of the Enlightenment, who increasingly questioned the traditional legal, moral, and religious foundations of society, developing criticism of established order and institutions. N.B. vii.

[23]See W.H. Barber, et.al., The Age of Enlightenment. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1967), especially pp. 395-412.

[24]See the excellent work, in its entirety, Alfred Cobban, The Role of the Enlightenment in Modern History. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1960).

[25]See Lester Crocker, Nature and Culture: Ethical Thought in the French Enlightenment. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), section I, p. 3ff.

[26]See Frederick Artz, The Enlightenment in France. (Oberlin, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1968); Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise of Historicism. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1975), chapter IV, pp. 75-99, 214ff.; and S. Woolf, Italy and the Enlightenment. (London: Longman, 1972), especially pp. 1-32.

[27]See Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); and Preserved Smith, A History of Modern Culture. Volume II: The Enlightenment. (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1934), pp. 3-5ff.

[28]The author of this paper does not consider the idea of separate cultures as applicable but would suggest the idea of a common culture that isolated and consolidated certain given traits during the period of Feudalism and the period of the divine right of kings. He posits a fluidum with at times divergent and at times convergent flows.

[29]Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press reprint,

1966; original date: 1767), pp. 259-60.

[30]G.P. Gooch, Nationalism. (New York: The Swathmore Press, 1920), p. 15.

[31]Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1952), pp. 5-6.

[32]Ramsay Muir, Civilisation and Liberty. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1940), introduction and definitions.

[33]See R. Linton, The Study of Man. (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1936), p. 288.

[34]Leon Mann, Social Psychology. (London: John Wiley, 1969), p. 3.

[35]As would be any noticeable family trait, differentiating single families themselves but not sufficient to term them different types of social units.

[36]Leon Mann, Social Psychology. op. cit. p. 5.

[37]What individuals collectively think of themselves is essentially a component of personality as personality forms within the collectivity. The question could be well asked, do collectivities have their own personalities or, simply stated, is there such a thing as a national character? The answer may be yes. See Rodger Brown, Social Psychology. (London: The Free Press, 1965), p. 497; and Joseph Benson, et.al., ed., Politics, Character, and Culture: Perspectives from Hans Gerth. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982); especially chapter 8, p. 123ff. on the interesting relation to charisma, bureaucracy, and revolution; and Morris Ginsburg, Reason and Unreason in Society. (London: Longmans, 1947), part 2, chapter 7, on national character.

[38]See Norbert Elias, "Introduction," in The Civilisation Process. Translated by E. Jephcott. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

[39]Lewis Mumford, The Condition of Man. (London: Martin Secker, 1944), p. 11.

[40]Loc. cit. p. 7.

[41]Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 25.

[42]Loc. cit. p. 53.

[43]Loc. cit. p. 60.

[44]Vis a vis closed, see Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. (London: G. Routledge and Sons, 1945).

[45]The outstanding author in this field of thought is Ferdinand Toennies. See Toennies, Sociology: Pure, Applied, and Empirical. Edited by Werner J. Cahnam and Ralph Heberle. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).

[46]This is the concept of Herrschaft. See Otto Gieke, National Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800. Two volumes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934); or F.W. Maitland, Political Theories of the Middle Ages. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1900).

[47]Gordon Crail, "The System of Alliance and the Balance of Power," in The New Cambridge Modern History. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 246.

[48]See previous chapter.

[49]Hans J. Morganthau, "Alliance in Theory and Practice," in Arnold Wolfers, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold War. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), p. 185.

[50]See the general work: Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whitting, Dynamics of International Relations. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956).

[51]See George Liska, Nations and Alliance. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), pp. 12-13.

[52]See Ole R. Holsti, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliance. (New York: Wiley Publications, 1973), p. 52ff.

[53]Liska, Nations and Alliance. op. cit. p. 12.

[54]Holsti, Unity and Disintegration. op. cit. p. 53.

[55]S.H. Allen, International Relations. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1920), p. 450. Allen gives justification as follows: The Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente "were in some respects illogical and neither of them stood the strains of war or its termination--" because the member governments were too dissimilar in ideologies.

[56]Evidence of EEC du ut des is, for example, British Prime Minister Thatcher's position that she will not sanction further payments unless she sees a significant reorientation of the EEC financial household. Witness the December 1987 Copenhagen financial crisis primarily over the C.A.P. in the Community. The two positions are stated in the extreme and do not suggest precluding any combination of positions.

[57]Ramsay Muir, "Causes of Failure of New Order," in Civilization and Liberty. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1940), p. 265.

[58]J.D.B. Miller, Norman Angell and the Futility of War. (London: Macmillan, 1986), p. 53.

[59]See Norman Angell, The Fruits of Victory: A Sequel to the Great Illusion. (London: Labour Publications, 1921), p. 70.

[60]And are deeply related to communications within the socialisation process. For a highly interesting analysis, see Michel Foucault, The Order of Things. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1970).

[61]Arnold Toynbee, Surviving the Future. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 41.

[62]Loc. cit. p. 41ff.

[63]For example, aggravation could come by subsidising science and technology for further development of material power, because material power produces wealth or military strength.

[64]Toynbee, Surviving the Future. op. cit. p. 44.

[65]See F. Meinecke, Cosmopolitanism and the National State. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 10.

[66]Definition found in Chambers Dictionary. op. cit. p. 103.

[67]For the development background on Christianity,

see L.T. Hobhouse, Sociology and Philosophy. (London: Bell, 1966), chapter 6); and a call for Christian authority in the community in Peter Berger, Facing up to Modernity: Excursions in Society, Politics, and Religion. (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chapter 15, p. 182ff.

[68]J. Pennock and D. Smith, Political Science: An Introduction. (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 232.

[69]This is the basis of Christian doctrine. As Jesus Christ, God came into the world to save the whole world. His message was directed to all those that hear his voice (John 3.16).

[70]The rise of general literacy preceded individual interpretations of basic Christian doctrine. This is evidenced by the proliferation of national churches, and progressed through to multi-faith societies, as individuals, interpreting the same source documentation concluded different results. Universalism gave way to particularism. History is replete with wars and confrontations of particularistic bodies, each attempting to gain ascendency over another.

[71]See John W. Allen, A History of Political Theory in the Sixteenth Century. Third edition. (London: Methuen, 1951).

[72]Ernst H. Kantorowkz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political History. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957), chapter five.

[73]See Pennock and Smith, op. cit. p. 58.

[74]Frank Tannenbaum, "The Balance of Power in Society," in Political Science Quarterly. 61(1946):481-501.

[75]As witnessed by the tendency towards ecumenicalism today.

[76]Bryan Wilson, Religion in Sociological Perspective. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 33.

[77]Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Form of the Religious Life. Originally written in 1915. Translated by J.W. Swain. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954).

[78]In the modern setting in Britain, Lord Hallsham refers to elective dictatorship, making it difficult to dissent. Lord Avery, "Authority and Accountability," the Foundation Oration at Birbeck College, 1980, p. 3.

[79]Harold D. Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour. (London: Kegan Paul, 1948), p. 188.

[80]Loc. cit. p. 142.

[81]Loc. cit. p. 51.

[82]See L.T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1915).

[83]R.W. Williamson, Religion and Social Organization. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 233ff.

[84]As in the alignment of interests developing the concept of capitalism and the Protestant ethic, see Max Weber, Aufsaetze zur Religionsociologie. Any edition of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. (New York: The Scribner Library, 1958).

[85]This is the period of the development of modern statehood. This is directly attributed to Decartian

thinking.

[86]Alan James, Sovereign Statehood. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986), p. 257 and chapter ten.

[87]John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 40.

[88]For a counter argument, see chapter on homo politicus.

[89]See K. Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 84.

[90]Loc. cit. p. 174.

[91]Alan James, Sovereign Statehood. op. cit. pp. 171-73.

[92]Charles E. Merrian, Systematic Politics. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945), p. 102.

[93]Loc. cit. p. vii. See chapter one, "Roots of Government."

[94]Loc. cit. pp. 1-2.

[95]J.R. Lucas, The Principles of Politics. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 2).

[96]Hobbes, Leviathan. Edited by Michael Oakeshoit. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), part 2, chapter 26, p. 178.

[97]Hans Kelsen. General Theory of Law and State. (New York: A. Wedberg, 1945), pp. 407-08.

[98]Lucas, The Principles of Politics. op. cit. p. 75.

[99]For a statistical analysis on difference in adult correlation, an interesting work is Carl Duncan, ed., Thinking: Current Experimental Studies. (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Co., 1967), p. 432ff.

[100]For causation, William Ittelson, Environment and Cognition. (New York: Seminar Press, 1973). Distortion summary: p. 22. Aggregation: p. 25.

[101]Cognitive or reflex, see Alden L. Fisher, The Structures of Behaviour. (London: Methuen, 1942), p. 33ff.

[102]See D. Stock and H. Thelen, Emotional Dynamics and Group Culture. (London: National Training Laboratories, 1958), especially cognition of groups: p. 255ff.

[103]Loc. cit. p. 117ff.

[104]Sean Sayers, Reality and Reason. (Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 204.

[105]Loc. cit. chapter four, p. 49ff.

[106]Loc. cit. p. 205.

[107]See Douglas Sloan, Insight and Imagination. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), p. 31ff.

[108]Stephen C. Pepper. The Sources of Value. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958), p. 7ff.

[109]Kurt Muller-Vollmer, ed., The Hermeneutics Reader. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

[110]Hans Hass, The Human Animal. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968), p. 17.

[111]See Irvin Rock, Orientation and Form. (London: Academic Press, 1973).

[112]For a clinical analysis of vertical semety in

retinal analysis, see loc. cit. p. 7.

[113]See K. Koffka, Principles of Gestalt Psychology. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1935).

[114]See Hans Hass, The Human Animal. op. cit. pp. 18-19. Here Hass discusses the change made by religion regarding the origin of man to accomodate advances in scientific knowledge. He specifically refers to the Pope's 1950 Humani Generis where primeval man is seen as descendent from ape acquiring an immortal soul by divine afflatus in the early Pleistocene period (800,000 years ago).

[115]Loc. cit. p. 98.

[116]See Peter M. Blau, "Values as Media of Social Transactions," in Exchange and Power in Social Life. (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 263ff.

[117]See Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," in Public Opinion Quarterly. 27(1963):38-51.

[118]See Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 76-88.

[119]See Peter M. Blau, "Operating a Conceptual Scheme," in American Sociological Review. 27(1962):159-69.

[120]Reference here is to what Emile Durkheim terms "mechanical solidarity." See On the Division of Labor in Society. (New York: Macmillan, 1933), pp. 70-110, especially pp: 79, 109-10.

[121]Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life. op. cit. p. 267.

[122]Wilson D. Wallis, "The Assimilation of Cultural Traits," in Culture and Progress. op. cit. p. 113.

[123]For an interesting discussion on cultural traits, see Harold Lasswell, The Analysis of Political Behaviour. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1948), p. 198ff. He addresses the question, does a cultural particularism develop into personality traits? Cf. "Personality is a term used to refer to the way a person acts toward other persons. Culture is the term used to refer to the way that the members of a group act in relation to one another and to other groups. A group is composed of persons. A person is an individual who identifies himself with others." Loc. cit. p. 203ff. See also the seminal work, Morris Ginsberg, Reason and Unreason in Society. First edition. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1947), part two, chapter seven: "National Character," p. 131ff.

[124]See George L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. (London: John Murray, 1963).

[125]See Douglas Sloan, Insight and Imagination: The Emancipation of Thought and the Modern World. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1983), especially chapter one, entitled, "Fragmented Thinking, Broken World."

[126]Europeanness, the way of thinking, doing, interacting, architecture, old churches, city centres, and the centuries old agricultural landscape, etc., reflect a European culture and civilisation in the widest sense, separate and distinct from North America, other white colonial areas, etc. This uniqueness leads Europeans to

identify as such. See Michael Butler, Europe: More than a Continent. (London: Heineman, 1986), p. 3ff.

[127]See 'points of attachment'. Rustow, op. cit. p. 24ff.

[128]For a very interesting analysis on collective transfer of civilite, see Norbert Elias, The Civilisation Process. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

[129]See Ward Hunt Goodenough, Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological Approach to Community Adjustment. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963/1976).

[130]For a counter argument, see Anthony F.C. Wallace, Culture and Personality. (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 39-41.

[131]Edward Wilson, On Human Nature. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 89.

[132]Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 47.

[133]Loc. cit. p. 76.

[134]For an excellent review of economic, social, and political problems dealing with European integration, see Horst Reichenbach, "A Political Economic Overview," in Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitos, Integration and Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC. (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 75ff.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION A

Homo Economicus

For the attempted satisfaction of needs, the individual engages in activities in the process of socialisation.[1] To achieve a more optimal position, the individual integrates. These activities are chiefly transactions and the transactional dimension of socialisation is the primary consideration of economics. The frontier boundaries of any human behviouralist study are indecisive as those frontiers are characterised by distinct fluctuations. The focus on economics is nothing more than a convenient way of viewing activities. It is not hermetic.[2]

Provisionally the particular aspect of human behaviour dealt with by economics is that behaviour which may be labelled in modern and more general terms as having to do with Business. Business has to do with production and exchange. In this respect, it may be summarised that the whole of economic activity of humanity (the most complex of activities which is termed 'the Economic System') consists of nothing else but an immense cooperation of workers or producers making things and doing things for consumers.[3] The central focus of the Economic System is the individual, or collectively as an extension of the individual, the group, or in the modern era, the nation.[4]

> National men live for themselves, each one is a unit, self-dependent-man, as a citizen depends on the community of which they are a part - individual citizens are the <u>numerators</u> of a fraction whose value depends on the <u>denominator</u>, i.e., the nation.[5]

Interaction with the group produces group solidarity.[6] Interaction amongst <u>numerators</u> which

produces solidarity is based on a concept of core values held in common, "'Core' values and interests can be described as those kinds of goals for which most people are willing to make ultimate sacrifices."[7] Generally the closer the interrelations, the greater commonality of core values, and the greater compatibility and solidarity feeling.[8] Expansion of interrelations is the essence of integration. The root of the concept of integration is the Latin tangere, "to touch," and relates to integrare, "to enlarge" and finally integralis, "to make a complete unit".[9]

Functionalist theory supports the integration in-system growth, working together to form dimensionally greater unity. This may have been the process which produced, through time, the developed, sociologically divided entities known today as nations. However, the national evolution of society was conducted in an environment essentially lassez faire; today, this has changed. It may be that "a 'nation' has been cynically, but not inaptly, defined as a 'society united by a common error as its origin and a common aversion to its neighbors'."[10] This definition has been promulgated vociferously through action by states. The state, taking custodial power over the Nation, extends itself into the regulation of domestic affairs, doing such by way of its mandate to ensure internal order. In the consideration of the transactional dimension of social activities, this necessitates a conceptualisation of economic

Gesellschaft. The core values of a given Gesellschaft or "core interests . . . are most frequently related to the self-preservation of a political unit . . . to ensure the sovereignty and independence of the home territory and to perpetuate a particular political, social, and economic system based on that territory."[11]

In the modern economic setting, there is a severe pressure exerted upon the individual to add to his personal wealth;[12] collectively the same pressures require States to engage in similar activities.[13] Hence, the state has moved from the classical notion of preserving the peace, ensuring the rule of law, and providing required infrastructure[14] to leading, directing, and stimulating the economy. Economically, the state has, amongst others, shifted its position from a lassez faire status to that of a major actor. In Europe, post war international debate was aimed at guaranteeing a working environment inclusive of peace maintenance, which developed States as major economic participators in multi-national society.

Preferential economic arrangements have always been a feature of international relations.[15] These arrangements influence economic development through trade patterns, having likely repercussions on domestic economies. These arrangements, albeit in a diluted form, may be regarded as arrangements of economic integration. The best known example is the economic integration developed through the Imperial period of British world

hegemony, which resulted in, amongst other things, a long tradition of cheap food in domestic Britain. A more formal type of economic integration is a free trade area, membership in which produces domestic advantage by providing both import potential for raw goods and export markets for finished goods. In a free trade area, member countries undertake to remove barriers on mutual trade, whilst retaining the right to determine the level of its tariffs and the severity of other trade restrictive practices vis a vis non-members. For Europe, the most prominent post war free trade area to be created was that of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

In contrast to a free trade area is a customs union, essentially an internal free trade area, but with the distinct difference of a common imposed joint tariff vis a vis third parties. The obvious post war European example is the European Economic Community. This further joint undertaking, conducted within a common market which endorses working toward a higher degree of economic integration through coordination of domestic economic policies, is an Economic Union.[16] Membership or participation by states in a free trade association, customs union, or economic union is taken ostensibly in the name of national economic welfare.

Facilitating aid to the EFTA and EEC establishments, as well as developing general favourable international trade conditions, in the post war era, has been extended by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

The kernel of the GATT arrangements is based on non-discrimination in trade, an agreement undertaken by all contracting parties.[17] Although the GATT philosophy is opposed to preferences, it permits the establishment of both customs unions and free trade associations providing that there is an eventual removal of overall tariffs.[18] Subscriptions to these arrangements are undergone by states, for the achievement of the domestic gains implied by such action. The arrangements are de facto economic integrational arrangements and theoretically could lead, via increased multi-party economic activities, toward greater integration as in the Functional postulations.

In the German model, this may be evidenced by the 1833 creation of the Zollverein.[19] However, the unique difference between nineteenth century examples and twentieth century inter-state economics is that, whereas previously inter-state tarriffs were the key feature, today, quantitative and qualitative restrictions, exchange controls and domestic support programmes are the primary impediments to trade. This difference emphasizes the changing nature of the state. Tax, as tariff, previously was leveled as a source of income and as a feature of protectivism. Today, discriminatory practices are more directed at some domestic economic consideration, as in jobs, rather than as revenue production measures. To externally ensure its power position by an economic presence, the state must have a

functioning economy, which it seeks to protect. If a state maintains a relative balance of payments equilibrium by means of import restrictions rather than domestic financial policies, the removal of restrictions as controls, with the participation in a customs union, might generate a serious payments imbalance leading toward a net overall deficit position. To protect its economy, the effective costs of an expanded market via membership in a trading union requires tighter internal financial control, meaning more government interaction into the classical lassez faire domestic economy. Hence, Government has been thoroughly introduced into the Basic Domestic Economic equation of nations.[20]

The Governments of States tend to intervene in economic life more extensively than previously. Taxation accounts for a higher proportion of total national expenditure today than ever a half century ago, as a direct result of increased national demands on states' governments. A portion of this demand is in the form of propping up ailing industry through subsidies. Subsidation by governments may have as its motive other than economic consideration (i.e., domestic political, etc. or external). Distribution of revenues by the state, is frequently motivated by political or social reasons at the expense of economic reasons (as in defense spending in areas of high unemployment, etc.).[21] Thus, in the short run, Economics relates to the current positions of the Nation[22] (or a short term future

position) and the governmental consideration tends to be so-called nationalistic in nature, but more aptly, protectionistic.[23]

In the long run, economic well being, or an increase in per capita income, is largely due to a configuration of cultural, organisational, and institutional attitudes.[24] Culture, organisations, and institutions are very highly associated with a government's political status.[25] The dichotomy implied is that, in the short run, static position, determinalistic government behaviour influences performance. However, long term growth is the outcome of sociological dynamics.[26] Economic intervention by the state, in the short run, may or may not be economically advantageous in the long term. Because of electoral sensibility, short term gains are frequently employed at the expense of long term measures.

It is becoming increasingly more difficult for States to act independently of exogenous economic factors. In an interlocking world economy, when supply outstretches demand, the world markets tend to go into cycles of contraction as individual participants are unable to maintain adequate consumption levels.[27] National growth rates tend to follow a regular pattern which[28] influences the setting of priorities by the nation state, a pattern which, because of the political electorial cycle in most Western European democracies, tends more frequently than not, to be short term in nature. They tend to focus on immediate static results

and not on cultural dynamics. This is in the long range economically restrictive as "economic dynamics is 'the study of' economic phenomenon in relation to preceding and succeeding events."[29] The price paid for today's performance must be met by future revenues and future revenues are the result of today's performance.[30]

The macro conceptualisation of a united Europe was peace but the micro aim was to redress the decline of European influence in world economic affairs. The meso outcome, the Free Trade Area and the Customs Union, was to assure domestic prosperity while keeping abreast of foreign, non-European economies.

"It was clear that Europe would finally lose its hegemony of world power"[31] because of the economic situation brought to a head by the events of the 1939-45 war. The position was basically one of economic deterioration as (1) foreign invisible income disappeared, (2) productivity declined (declining exports resulting in increased imports to maintain a tolerable living standard) (3) terms of primary products (food, raw materials) became less favorable, and (4) doubling of the price level.[32] This post war condition fostered domestic participation in regional organisations with at least a tacit concurrence to maintain standards. This was required to provide the domestic units with the wherewithal for individual advancement. The forces that actuate individuals, keeping individuals productive are forces which aid the industrial economy as a whole -

acquisition, service, interest in others, and self, or a combination which relate to the attainment of physical or psychological needs and subsistence.[33] The average individual with a degree of enlightened self-interest is the homo economicus. The State, in the process of organising economic affairs for some reason other than the overall long term good of the homo economicus, may be, in the long run, not enhancing the individuals' best future possibilities.

The homo economicus requires an adequate array of circumstances to allow him the opportunity of maximisation. This is in essence the new role of the state. Advanced modernisation makes mandatory labour divisions, the advantages of which cannot adequately be achieved through governmental intervention.[34]

The western economic philosophy places the onus of performance on the shoulders of the individual. "The incentives to private gain, however poorly . . . [with regard to ethical considerations . . . do] provide some stimulus to effort and economy." If it is removed or partially suspended and replaced by orders from the centre, "there is no certainty in the nature of things that the machine will continue to work smoothly."[35] Activity and private goods are called into being by the market as "the sums in the hands of the consumers and . . . proportionate claims on the services of the factors of production."[36] The more the state intervenes and centralises, the less adaptable to market condition, and

hence the less viable the consideration.[37]

As world economic performance fluctuates in cycles, the more centralised the industry the less adaptable to change. In other words, the greater the governmental intrusion into the market, the less is the ability of free market forces to control development. This emphasizes the difficult role of government especially in light of its political sensitivity,[38] an endemic instability inherent in the capitalistic system.

Background

> It is generally agreed that it was the industrial revolution, in the sense of the general adoption of improved technologies of production based on the deliberate application of scientific knowledge to a wide range of agriculture and industrial problems, that permitted the relatively rapid and continuous growth of real incomes per head in countries that are today regarded as 'advanced' or 'developed'.[39]

The effective beginnings of the transformation can be placed in eighteenth century Europe.[40] The revolution was not the product of any one 'revolution' as such but was the product of the synergies of technology permeating all manufacturing and production, indeed, permeating all of the life of homo economicus.[41] Change, a willingness to depart from time honoured traditionalism accelerated with each success and diffused into ever widening areas as applicational results challenged convention. Technology and science engulf all of human society in uniquely new historical epochs.[42] The interrelatedness of cross-society connections,

transference of knowledge, results of application plus market absorption, production and raw material supply, etc. commenced noticeable cyclical relations between European states. Within these cyclical relations, the local economy became less autonomous and more interlocked and interdependent.[43] It can best be described as a new 'spirit' motivated by a new look at traditionalism.[44] As modernity advanced, linkages started to result in trade-off cycles between states, a cause, effect, cause relationship of booms and slumps occurring regularly where a rhythm of industrial activity was created as phases of prosperity giving way to phases of depression. The cyclical trade-offs were causal to great social restructuring, centralising poverty, relocating populations, disrupting or producing new markets and resource supply.[45] A great upheaval creating a new total control of wealth[46] necessitating ever greater governmental control and intervention within the domestic and external sphere.[47] The State as regulator, guarantor of 'freedom', became more and more the state of control.

Economic development that started through a series of fortuitous circumstances in England spread rapidly throughout Europe. This development created the need for economic planners who became increasingly "aware that the ingredients of economic growth are more than mere physical quantities of labor, domestic capital, foreign exchange, and so on."[48] A host of intangible elements

affected the psychological and social climate of an economy. The climate became the responsibility of government and its worries became the worries of the State.[49] The transformation of State was brought about by change. "Change implies that something is happening through time and that what was true at one time point is different at a subsequent time point."[50]

The diametric growth of means of transportation, communication, and exchange of goods, money, and ideas has helped bring about an umprecedented "inter-connectedness" between societies; the development of closer and multi-dimensional contacts between societies constitutes one of the fundamental forms of systems change in the twentieth century.[51] The new international system had as chief actors a collection[52] of states, each attempting to control its domestic environment by mediating difficulties whilst ensuring its legitimate sovereignty and external bargaining amongst more or less peers for advantage and whenever possible influence, dominance or control.

The texture of economic considerations was transformed, a transformation characterised from one of basic simplicity to one of extreme complexity. The control and dominance of States through governmental organs and institutions made the extreme complexity of economies vulnerable to exogenous considerations. As the domestic economy became more open to other than purely economic notions, it became subject to political motifs.

Not only were economic systems becoming sensitively aware of externalities, governments were also. Any effort "to make decisions purely in terms of short-run national advantages - increasing national autonomy - . . . [were resulting] . . . in trade wars, currency instability, decline of investment, unemployment, and ultimately recession or depression."[53] The apparent necessity was that of somehow regulating inter-societal relations. "Transaction flows, mutual responses, shared values, and the like" which are part and parcel of, and needing, regulation "are posited as necesary conditions for the creation of security communities."[54] For the domestic economy to function optimally it became necessary to secure economic relations assuring some sort of advantage within a community. The psychological environment for economic progress needed definitions as it is this consideration, which provides the core stimulus to the individual participants.

"The emotional commitment to 'Europe' was an important part of the milieu in which plans for the Common Market were launched."[55] The Common Market was seen as a possibility for "the creation of conditions under which stable peaceful relations among nation states are possible and likely."[56] The peaceful relations or broadly "the search for peace justified the intellectual pursuit"[57] of defining new patterns of international cooperation. "The most compelling appeal of regionalism is that the rise of regional communities may provide a

stepping-stone on the way from a world of a hundred-odd states to a world of a stable and just peace."[58] The Community, *via* economic interest was seen as not only an expansion of economic interests, but also of political interests. The tie between the economic and political spheres of activity merged. The Community concept "made it possible for Europeans to enjoy the fruits of a large market and customs union while at the same time sacrificing neither cultural identity nor political authority."[59] Coalitions are critical; the complexities of pluralistic decision-making compound the economic problems coalitions are intended to ameliorate. "Talk of a tri-lateral world - the United States, Europe, and Japan - is fashionable today; but the economic indicators suggest it is rapidly becoming even more complex multi-lateral world with overlapping networks of common interest groups."[60] A tri-polarity suggests an economically unified Europe,[61] such creating an environment for the protection of influence of *smaller* parties within a coalition of Europe. An economic *du ut des* self-defense necessity, on a shrinking globe.

Economics, in a theoretical sense, probably is the most highly elaborate, sophisticated, and refined discipline dealing with individualisation.[62] Economics deals with action within a given institutional role structure, the process of allocation of resources, i.e., "labour power" and facilities within the system.

Further, it deals with the motivational process of balancing advantages and costs with special reference to the settlement of terms and with a given role structure and a given set of power conditions.[63] The institutional role structure is defined by government action, "the harmony which is being realised is therefore a 'created harmony', created by intervention and by planned coordination of interventions. It is the opposite of the natural harmony of the old liberal philosophers and theoreticians."[64] Planning is an adoption of environmental conditions to a best possible arrangement. The best possible is defined frequently by Governments' motives which may or may not be consonant with individual long term goals.[65] The extension of the economic area in terms of the EEC for those member states or the EFTA respectively is an attempt to achieve a degree of best possible arrangements for the domestic participants. Specifically, the EEC is revolutionary,[66] but in many respects it is not achieving much.[67] The interlocking economics of advanced economies[68] is irrefutable. The need is for coordination, but is coordination that of government aims or of individual aims?

Some sort of economic coordination was behind the creation of the European Community. The need was essentially that of an expanded market for technology, induced increases in domestic production brought on by economies of scale. But creation of such a homogeneous

customs union was also causal to a more vulnerable trading area for most noticeably American manufactured goods motivating a rush to "corner" the European market. The rush to corner provoked the impassioned outcry of many, most noticeably Servan-Schreiber[69] who spoke of the possibilities of American penetration dominating European economies with effects on growth rates, investment securities, and distribution of national incomes affecting European political, social, and cultural considerations by "secret meetings" between Wall Street bankers and European cabinet ministers. The well documented history of the EEC[70] is one characterised by attempts to develop a degree of economic coordination vis a vis U.S. domination, a focus on a struggle for economic viability vis a vis the capitalist giant America.[71] The need, partly motivated by the nations of Europe (i.e., employment, consumption) and partly by the States (prestige, power) was there and recognised by the elites of Europe. The kudos of its success can be attributed to these elites; its failure can be attributed to the lack of political will.[72] The most prominent failure may be illustrated by the lack of ability to institute a common currency.

Discussion

One of the European Communities is the European Economic Community. The idea was a common market, a place for the distribution of goods. This necessitated a degree of consensus relating to the medium

of exchange, the currency and its value. An economic community is more than just a trading market. Sales is one part of an overall consideration of resource allocation, employment, and production. The intent to coordinate and harmonise was called for and implied within the community.[73] However, the actualisation proved sufficiently difficult to limit such coordination. The importance attached to the question of the introduction of a European currency is such that it consistently remained at the bottom on the list of importance by polled Europeans.[74] In a 1974-75 survey, carried out by the European Omnibus Survey the following was produced after polling device segments randomly selected of the European countries.[75]

TABLE 6.1 - COMPARISONS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD A SINGLE EUROPEAN CURRENCY (expressed in percent of those responding)

	1974-75	1976
For	54	50
Indifferent	22	7
Against	24	43

Information adapted from Table 10, p. 18, EuroBarometer, No. 23, June 1985, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.

The proportion of interviewees in favour of a single European currency remained relatively constant at 50% in 1976 and 54% in 1974-75, but the percentage of those against significantly increased. There may have been a

psychological problem in the polling as the questioners used the word "creation" of an European currency connotating the supression of a national currency. The result of this massive swing against the creation of a single country lent motivation to the creation of the European Currency Unit (ECU) as a prototypical currency and its success relating to its acceptance was tested in 1985 with a new formulated question emphasizing the ECU functioning alongside domestic units.

TABLE 6.2
COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE REPLACEMENT OF A NATIONAL FOR A EUROPEAN CURRENCY AND THE USE OF A NATIONAL ALONGSIDE A EUROPEAN CURRENCY (expressed in percent of those responding)
To the answer of the Eurobarometer question in 1985[76] of
--would you be for, against, or not mind either way if your national currency were replaced by a European currency?
and
--would you be for, against, or not mind either way if, as well as the existing national currencies, one could freely use a European currency which would be acceptable in all the countries of the European Communities?

	Replacement of national by European currency	/	Use of national alongside European currency
	1976	1985 /	1985
For	50	35 /	63
Indifferent	7	24 /	18
Against	43	41 /	19

Source: Adapted from Tables 10, 11, p. 18, EuroBarometer, p. 23, June 1985, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels.

There was evidence of a strong shifting from

support to indifference. This suggests the trend first noticed in 1975; it is easier to support a European currency when no danger to the domestic is perceived, an evidence of the psychological importance of currency.[77] The evidence of this is that the stronger the national currency on the foreign exchanges, the greater the attachment to it by domestic populations. In the spring of 1985, the European Barometer results showed the following.

TABLE 6.3 - COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE REPLACEMENT OF A NATIONAL FOR A EUROPEAN CURRENCY AND THE USE OF A NATIONAL ALONGSIDE A EUROPEAN (expressed in percent of those responding)

	Replacement of national by European currency		/ Use of national alongside European currency	
	Germany	Italy	/ Germany	Italy
For	15	63	/ 46	80
Indifferent	25	20	/ 30	13
Against	60	17	/ 24	7

Source: Adapted from Material in EuroBarometer, No. 23, June 1985, Commission of the European Council, Brussels and Europe as Seen by Europeans, Periodical 4-1986, European Documentary Series. Luxembourg, 1986, pp. 19-20.

In the spring of 1985, the Deutsch Mark was relatively stronger than the weaker Italian Lira. A breakdown of the public polled by the Community showed that age had no effect, but men with better than average education, higher incomes, and more responsible jobs were more pro and likely to support a common currency than those not so well educated, incomed, or employed.[78] Collective thinking regarding a common currency is

directly related to expectations or image perceptions of domestic performance. On the government level, as interlocking currencies would prohibit the domestic States' use of one of its most influential controls through fiscal policy, it is also not highly underwritten.[78] The problems of fluctuating currency rates exacerbates the difficulties of such things as the Common Agricultural Policy[80] and Balance of Payments. To adopt a European currency would require states to totally coordinate and harmonise economic policies effectively surrendering economic sovereignty. On December 12, 1975, the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo Tindemans, filed with the governments of the Member States, a report on European Union at the Paris Summit proposing a series of measures which included a common economic and monetary union.[81] It highlighted the necessity for economic union but because of operationality problems it was never adopted. Such a step would have been, in effect, a prescription to change an international system. Its adoption would have led to a marked increase of integration; its failure suggests disintegration.[82] To change an international system, in this case, an institution, has to do with the relationships between actors and the perceived interests of governments.[83] Currency coordination is clearly not evident. The operational imperative is d. ut des.

The establishment of the Common Market gave the

European economy room to develop, particularly as it came at a time of worldwide general economic expansion in the post war era, fueled by low energy costs and exchange rate stability under the Bretton Woods accord. The change seen by the Community has been a decline of many traditional industries and the increase for markets by the slow industrialisation of Third World economies. The Community's lag was exacerbated by its slow replacement of traditional solutions by application of technologically new solutions.[64] The recession initiated by the third oil crisis demonstrated the fact that the European Community was less successful than its main competitors in adapting to change. The Community has seen its share of world manufactured exports decline, while the U.S. maintained its share and Japan increased its share to become a significant world economic participant.[65] The main cause of European industrial decline in overall productivity is demonstrated by inadequate investment seen by the fact that vis a vis Japan with five million and the U.S. with nineteen million, the European Communities have only produced two million new jobs between 1973 and 1983.[66] This demonstrates the fact that European governments were apparently interested in something other than long term growth, expansion, and development.

Economic Protectionism[67] of regional markets from unwanted competition is not the optimal solution. The solution is a unified internal economic posture. If

currency evidences the lack of coordination, the magnitude of the problem would require a further attempt to achieve cooperation if European Economics does not become subsumed by the dictates of "secret meetings" of non-European actors. The overall object of stabilising European economic influence in world economic affairs caused the Community to adopt the notion of a unified European internal market. The Single Europe Act was designed to establish a true multi-sided economic union to achieve a viable European community in a tripolar economic world. Under the terms of Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the Community is intended to promote "throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, [and] an accelerated raising of the standard of living." This objective is achievable today only via the assumption of a corresponding position within World Economic affairs. In economic terms, it is:

> self-evident that a large market without internal frontiers could not be completed or operate properly unless the Community had instruments enabling it to avoid imbalances interfering with completeness and inhibiting the growth of the Community as a whole.[88]

The necessity of a greater degree of coalition was remarked upon by the President of the Common Market, M. Delores.[89] "It is the pace of economic integration that will determine the outcome of the world race against the clock on which European survival depends. This is why we have changed gear," referring to the new act.

"The Community . . . must assert itself at home by finding lasting solutions rather than stop-gap palliatives."[90]

In Sum

With sufficient enough interests in common allowing individuals to so do, they generally integrate. Historically, this was demonstrated in economic terms with the Zollverein, an economic arrangement which allowed for the expansion of interests through the mediation of economic needs in the form of an expanded collectivity. The creation of the Community was an attempt to apply that model to the pan-European community.[91] The model supports the theory that increased transactions lead to increased tolerance for, and eventual identification with, others. The German model was a total economic model; the European application, at least until the introduction of the Single Europe Act, is but an expanded Common Market.[92] Another difference is that Europe today is a compilation of expanded sovereign states whose interests go well beyond the maintenance of geophysical parameters. Its internationalist activities are more extensive than the essentially lassez faire of pre-1870 Germany.[93] An attempt to neutralise these difficulties motivated the Single European Act

How does the Community consider that the amelioration of the divergent members states' economic positions can be considered to achieve the goal set out

in the act? Rhetoric is more abundant than operational solutions. Overall harmonies develop in the Community through the strengthening of its economic and social cohesion.

> Such coordination serves as the framework for an economic policy consensus at Community level pinpointing the course of action to be put into effect at national level by appropriate decisions that will in turn contribute to a closer convergence of Member States' economies.[94]

The fact that such programmes are still largely imperfect and certainly inadequate highlights their complexities. The major obstacles often termed 'national interest' are fundamentally domestic political interests.[95] The homo economicus, motivated by his individual needs, reached out and pulled the State into his life, by a desire to regulate the environment for him to achieve a relative equilibrium.[96] As modernity continues, the state is rapidly becoming more restrictive. Because of its controlling nature, alternative solutions open to the individual are encumbered by lack of readily assessible alternatives and, to a great degree, knowledge.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION B

Homo Politicus

"The life of most human beings since the beginning of time has been mainly taken up with gaining food, shelter, and clothing for themselves and their families."[1] These activities, as the subject of political considerations, define the actions most prevalent in society.[2] The process of socialisation allows for the accomplishment of these activities. Integration allows for the greater definition of interaction, an equilibration for a more optimal satisfaction of needs. The formal parameters around society, the structures of which allow for the abatement of economic needs, are essentially the political structures of society. Man is an economic animal; he is also a political animal.[3]

To a great degree, history moves forward by the clashes of conflicting interests and outlooks,[4] but the outcome of conflict in a regularly growing society is likely to be governed by ultimate considerations of communal continuity.[5] It is argued, for example,

> that things get done gradually only between opposing forces. There is no such thing as self-restraint in people. What looks like it is indecision. . . . It may be that truth is best sought in the market of free speech, but the best decisions are neither bought nor sold. They are the result of disagreement, where the last word is not 'I admit you're right,' but 'I've got to live with the son of a bitch, haven't I?'[6]

This is the process of adjustment and accomodation. It is the substance of political considerations.

Changing economic considerations, and changing economic inter-relations have a direct bearing on the

political structures of society and the political relations between nations.[7] The centralised intensity demanded by modernisation created a much more formal and structured society than that of the Pre-modern period.[8] Achieving in essence a greater politisation of issues, a change in legal and political institutions and social ideology.[9] The concept of the individual, the major Grecian legacy towards European thinking[10] and its conceptualisation as it passed down from Roman times, has underwritten the democratic model upon which Western European political structures are based. The unique cultural traits regarding specific adoption of those broad ideals are the hallmark of individualistic European societies. These unique cultural traits provide a general differentiated system defining instrumentally oriented society in valuing the definite plurality of interacting actors. The developed political traits as demonstrated by institutional patterns, constitute a set of value orientation patterns relative to a specifically structured interaction situation defining (1) the individuals' goal attainment process (2) exchange relations (3) and overall cooperative relations.[11] The value orientation pattern of European culture had its common origins in the Grecian-Roman world and was passed down through association with elements in subsequent political cultures to the modern Europeans, inculcated in legitimate institutions incorporated within states.[12]

The complexion of political action has changed

radically in post-modern history. Originally it was concerned with the organisation of society, emphasizing attempts to maintain what was felt to be an equilibrium among either individuals on the micro level or states on the macro level. An equilibrium supported by shifting alignments and accomodations among individuals or groups relating to either real or perceived power.[13] The momentum was on control through stabilisation. Today, with the system-inherent complexity, the expansion of control issues has gone beyond that of maintaining an equilibrium to[14]

> economic issues related to the scope and terms of trade, economic development has emerged as a major goal . . . [domestic political considerations seem not to assume greater importance in foreign policy decision making] . . . and, the norms of international behaviour have expanded considerably beyond a focus on the use of force to questions of the most equitable distribution of welfare and the expansion of economic well-being.[15]

The exponential increase of both populations and knowledge require greater political penetration into the very intimate lives of individuals.[16] Formal structure is the characteristic of the modern age. Highly formal structured societies are, generally speaking, highly modernised societies or "high mass consumption" societies.[17] In political considerations, the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power[18] defines modernisation. The higher the ratio, the higher is the degree of modernisation and the greater the formal structure. It has been suggested that

the degree of structuralisation necessary due to the needed societal accomodations to the demands of modernity posits society "between two ages," between the political nation state and some sort of unknown future.[19] In other words, politically, society is outgrowing its present structural parameterisation.

Social change, primarily the result of economic change, is both profoundly affected by, and itself effects, political change. The causation of these multiple and inextricably linked changes is modernisation. Despite the elastic consonance of the interlinkages, political change as an independent phenomenon may be isolated by its characteristics.[20]

> First, it involves the rationalization of authority: the replacement of a large number of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, national political authority.

Secondly, political change:

> involves the differentiation of new political functions and the development of specialized structures to perform those functions. Areas of peculiar competence - legal, military, administrative, scientific - become separated from the political realm, and autonomous, specialized, but subordinate, organs arise to discharge those tasks.

Thirdly, political change:

> involves increased participation in politics by social groups throughout society and the development of new political institutions - such as political parties and interest associations - to organize this participation.[21]

This is a general model of political growth and change resulting in a general character change by

government, one shifting from laissez faire to one of greater interest awareness and influence. With political modernisation, individuals in society become, with increasing frequency, not only more cognizant of political/governmental processes, but feel the influences of that pressure.[22] The injection of political considerations, to an ever increasing degree, into the functioning of the socialisation project is due to the increase in transaction and contact among individuals. Externally, the politicalisation of inter-state activities is likewise due to increased controls.[23] The first phase of political expansion is essentially that of interdependence.[24] Interdependence is led by the cumulative effects of both the development and application of knowledge through scientific and technological expansion. Cumulative knowledge knows no geographic boundaries and hence is essentially transnational.[25]

> No matter where . . . the technological innovations emerge . . . the economic growth of any given nation depends upon their adoption. In that sense, whatever the national affiliation of resources used, any single nation's economic growth has its base somewhere outside its boundaries - with the single exception of the pioneering nation, and no nation remains the pioneer for long.[26]

Given that the "normal expansion of science that we have grown up with is such that it demands each year a larger place in our lives and a larger share of our resources,"[27] governments via political actions have sought greater control of individual and collective

endeavours. The well-being of the nation, which now depends on a finely tuned social system engaged in economic activities, requires greater coordination.[28] If both the internal and international political dimension is changing, is this structural or character? Is the nature of politics changing, or are the outward manifestations changing? What is the political consideration?

Politics has to do with the polites,[29] the citizen. The citizens' organisation in structural society is political (politeia). Essentially the aims of society are those derived from needs. Primarily needs have to do with the basic assurance and maintenance of life, with its existence. The forms of its existence, are results of society's meta-need structure.

Political needs may best be summarised by the notion of security. Primarily, political security deals with the minimalisation of danger. Meta-need political security deals with the marginalisation of anxiety.[30] The security dealing with the minimalisation of danger directly correlates with the overall object of collective living, the defence of the individuals, the defence of the collective structure of society. The marginalisation of anxiety deals also with economic security and extends to all other organisational patterning of social interaction to facilitate same.[31] The traditional concept of security, military strength, is perhaps the oldest consideration for the unification of individuals

into collective structures. Strong bows, fast boats, high walls, all demanding coordination in defence were replaced by an ever increasing sophistication of weaponry conjunctural with the advance and accumulation of knowledge. The technically induced urgency of security "through political . . . gestures and institutions" has caused "men's remoteness from modern life" to become "exacerbated."[32] Remoteness is akin to the aforementioned 'morality gap'. It is a conflict between the social and the institutionalised political element of society.

Working together to achieve a degree of security by cooperative functioning, essentially a security community, is correlated highly with integration. Such integration is evident when individuals on the group level, or states on the inter-state level, forego the use of violence as a means of settling their potential differences. Working together can be identified by way of the process when the range of transactions as well as the presumed results of those transactions constitute integration.[33] The traditional conceptualisation of government, on the internal level, that of peace keeper, is maintained through security agencies such as the police. A western European government's position is enforced by the triadic considerations of sovereignty, loyalty, and legitimacy. Externally, governments are concerned with the achievement and maintenance of a best-possible situation <u>vis a vis</u> third parties.

Externally, "militaristic, materialistic, and scientific forces have been organized to impose the will of one section of the human race upon another, regardless of any question of right and wrong."[34] In an international sovereign state system, a "fragmented" system of human society,[35] stability can only be introduced by bringing states into some sort of organic union. Where previously strength generally determined dominance, technology has brought mankind in articulo mortis with the event of new weaponry technology. The interesting result is that any necessary effort to organise society must seek alternatives to that of strength alone.

There are two essential ways of organising society, both of which are political in nature. 1) The first of these ways organises through force, political considerations, structures, organisations, or authoritarianism. 2) The second employs no force; it organises through ethical (as in religious) or mores considerations.[36] The polity of society, the scheme of its arrangement, must be grounded on an overriding principle. If force is out of the question, arrangement without force is the option. Ethical considerations are constructed upon common interests.[37] This sort of arrangement fundamentally results in international law. International law is essentially a series of bilateral or multi-lateral agreements to which sovereign states restrict themselves. It is an ethical approach to organised society based on minimum force. A type of

reciprocity agreement in harmony with the spirit of the times as measures of retaliation or force are not.[38] The idea of being between two ages, between the authoritarian state and the free association of like minded individuals is suggested in literature.

> Modern culture is drawn on too large a scale, is of too complex and multiform a character, requires the cooperation of too many and various lines of inquiry, experience and insight to admit of its being confined within national frontiers, except in the case of insufferable coupling and retardation.[39]

For clarity, if the two political positions were isolated in the extreme, on the one hand would be that of authoritarianism, and on the other, some sort of moral concensus. Simply stated, physical versus mental. The former is based on restraints, prohibitions and duty; the latter on knowledge and atttendant responsibility. The aforementioned morality gap, suggests the tending divergence between governmental action and individual perceptions. ". . . distancing of the moral self from the governments of modern states must not be confused with any anarchist critique of the state."[40] It is the natural extension of the effects on the individual of technological induced modernity vis a vis slow to change institutional governments.

It is fundamentally a change in aesthethic orientation akin to a new value revolution.

As the common denomination of reason diminishes, government must apply more authoritarian pressure to maintain its position. As it has been previously argued,

the move away from common Christendom has been causal to the loosening of common mental reasoning which was instrumental in keeping society unified through common morality orientation. This has moved toward more governmental authoritarianism witnessed by the extensive proliferations of the origins of government and their physical control on society.

Originally "both our general culture and our academic philosophy (were) in central part the offspring of a culture in which philosophy did consolidate our central form of social activity".[41]

The tendency latterly has been towards authoritarianism.

> . . . the relationship between ideology and power is viewed---not as causal but as contingent, with ideology being essentially a doctrine of political power which simultaneously defines the ends, outlines the methods for their fulfillment, and mobilises support. . . .[42]

Without a commonality of ideological orientations, authoritarianism expands. This shift may be demonstrated by looking at security.[43]

Is the need for security that which previously caused feelings of solidarity, that which motivates the same today?[44] Fear, an emotion excited by danger or the apprehension of danger[45] has at different times and places in human existence been triggered or aggravated by different things, the idea of hell, the idea of hunger, the idea of hegemony. Religion, the great mediator of fear, in previous times is, often more

than not, today pursued for its social rather than soul sparing value.[46] Religion is a cause for which few are willing to fight in Western Europe today.[47] The salience of this is that religion sets moral tone. It contributes to hope, standards, orientation, and perspective. Its lack is related to the opposite of these conditions,[48] a general pessimism. Fear of hell, fear of hunger, the fear of hegemony are all on the wane. It may be directly related to the lack of first hand exposure, making perception more difficult.[49] The tendency is such that, the further removed from World War II and conflict and hunger, the less viable those concepts are as value orientations. "Security, like so much else, is taken for granted when things go right."[50] There appears to be a greater "fear" of nuclear weapons than of war itself, perhaps because of the theoretical possibility of error and the like of Chernobyl.[51] Concern for environment, acid rain, unemployment as well as nuclear contamination are new "fears," which may be replacing the old fears of the post war era. In 1984, Harris polling determined that Europeans feel the major responsibility for worldwide tension may be attributed to the United States.[52] In 1985, a sample of German youths between the ages of 16 and 29 found that 49% believed USSR General Secretary Gorbachov honestly wanted peace, opposed to 46% for American President Reagan. In the same year, another sample found that 55% wanted equally strong cooperation

with both the Soviet Union and the United States, emphasising the message of change.[53] This may be characterised as an equidistance syndrome, where polarised political, ideological and systemic conflict no longer holds salience to perceived individual freedoms and liberties.[54] It may be that a general lack of commitment amongst European young no longer holds the values and concepts of freedom, common heritage, civilisation, the rule of law and stability in the same light as did those of the immediate post war era who formulated them in the NATO preamble. Traditional values resulted from traditional value orientations. The religious structure of Western European society offered the fundus for traditional value orientations. If concepts of frugality, diligence, discipline, piety, sexual restraints are changing, it may be a sign of the lack of those traditional value orientations being considered operational, evidenced in a changing moral tone.[55]

Discussion

The divergencies of governmental interests and the interests of nations may be evident in the consideration of things nuclear. Although Euratom was one of the first collective organisations[56] founded in post war Europe, it has exhibited general impotence in dealing with modern day nuclear considerations. The fact that not only acceptable radiation levels have not been agreed amongst Euratom signators but also that post Chernobyl action

amongst governments has not been coordinated,[57] demonstrates the fact that governments do tend to act according to their own political consideration.[58] Perhaps, more than demonstrating a divergence of interest between governments and nations, this single incident demonstrates the limits to state sovereignty.[59]

The problem which creates the gap between ideological orientations between society and government is that of perception. The problem demonstrated by Chernobyl is that of the perception of things nuclear by governments and the perception of individuals.[60] The overall key to the perception problem is sovereignty. Who is in control, the collectivity or the individual?

The contradictions in society are the result of changes in perception, and those perception changes affect political considerations.[61]

Political states exist by exerting their right to sovereignty, providing security for their respective nations, but what about the concept of providing an optimal environment for individuals to fulfill need requirements? On one side, there are needs; on the other, wants. Needs are primary, necessary for existence. Wants are artificial constructions gleaned through societal interaction. A state politically providing for current or future needs allows for the free unfolding of the individual. A state providing wants is a "thing-orientated" system. Is technology a phenomenon by which an end is accomplished or is it a self-dynamic?

Is the economy that the political state controls one in which the individual seeks fulfillment or is it a totality in itself? Does the individual unfold as he desires or is he a victim of economic expansionism? The answers are perceptional.[62]

Is the individual motivated by accountability or duty? Accountability relates to an ideological consideration or moral code, duty is given or extracted by authority. Accountability is associated with the ability to make decisions on the personal level, with freedom. It is a concrete perceptualisation, rational and emotional. It is motivated from within. Accountability is freedom leading toward individual independence. Duty[63] is dictated by others, not free but regulated, not concrete but abstract, not rational and emotional but solely rational. It is not motivated from internalised conviction, but motivated by outward pressure.[64] Perception is the outcome individually gleaned through socialisation.[65] Attempts to cybernetically guide perception development are essentially social engineering, and when so conceptualised may carry with it the negative connotational image as one of propaganda.

But the political structure of European societies, having a great effect on socialisation, does exactly that.[66] The shift from societal control through ideological consideration toward one of authoritarianism appears to be evident throughout western Europe.

The key to perception, and indeed the key to the overall consideration of politics as well as the question of integration in Europe is within the area of learning, or as suggested by political theory and education, a function of state.[67] If there is a discrepancy between what is individually and what ought collectively, it may be because the state has a degree of autonomy.

> An organism is essentially an aggregate which acts in accordance with an internal purpose. And this purpose is something distinct from the physical and chemical properties of the component parts. If the state is an organism, the state possesses such an internal purpose distinct from the natural tendencies of individual citizens.[68]

It is within the mandate of the state to correct any merging discrepancies, however, rather than attacking the society as source, and trying to change it, it may be more prudent for the state to attack itself and change. But in a political system where party political considerations effectively govern, introspection is seldom seen.[69] Governmental homiletics may be more one sided than truly an accurate reflection of society. The western political state, ostensibly created to allow individual voice, may be in the light of rapid societal change, muting that voice. This rapid social change may not be ideally compatible to large slow-moving institutional political governments. The institution of the state may be polarising interests. Polarisation of interests is, in effect, social closure, a phenomenon by which social collectives seek to maximise specific

rewards by restricting access to rewards and opportunity by group identification or specifically to a limited circle of eligibles[70] and more operationally vocalise polarised views. It is a tendency toward disintegration or societal breakdown by the building of preference groups.[71] Social closure is a search for a new identification of polis in light of rejection of the existing, motivated by lack of a general inclusive perception. This may be exacerbated by the tendency toward governmental authoritarianism.

In democracies, the primacy of politics is becoming more evident. Political and military state policies increasingly control the development of technical research and industrial production, international aid, etc.[72] But is it the state, or a powerful political group within the state? Or is the characterisation of modern political life more aptly one of a melange of different motives, different actors, different causations? A constant fluid interplay of imputational effects and results.

In Sum

There are interlinkages of political and economic considerations,[73] but also the interlinkages of domestic and foreign considerations.[74] Where does the homo politicus stand within the picture?

A functioning democracy requires a knowledgeable population. A knowledgeable population tends toward a concensus of opinion. The alternative to such a

concensus is authoritarian force. Is the primacy of problems today answered subjectively through propagandisations by states through governments by accumulated projected images or objectively through knowledge by a knowledgeable society at large? "Nothing is necessary but to show us that a thing is truly good and worthy to be desired in order to excite in us a passion for its attainment."[75] Long ago, it has been observed that governments may be no more than a necessary evil and may be necessary only because the system is underpinned by ignorance and self-interest.[76] Homo erectus needs knowledge to be able to assume the responsibilities extended through democratic governments. Conflict between ethical and political considerations, between concepts of freedom and duty are resolved best through the ability of critical thinking, itself a product of education.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION C

Homo Socius

In society, man requires interactional relationships to expand his individual self.[1] In modern society, he expands most pronouncedly through the advancement of technology. "Technological progress comes about through invention and innovation. The benefits are spread through the economy in the form of new processes and products. These new processes and products may improve productivity and the standard of living."[2] Individual selves expand through concorporational relations with others. Such concorporational relations make possible the individual participation in advancement, in both material goods or economic terms and in intellectual development or cultural attainments. The failure of Europe to significantly integrate may be because of a perceived conceptualisation of the notion of loss of autonomy. The desire to integrate is no doubt motivated by the individual gains perceived as a positive result of so doing, as in standard of living on the economic level. Basically, the individual is parameterially confined to his state. The State maybe "regarded as a coercive authority legally supreme over an individual or group."[3] A control over its society as a unit exercising such control through absolute power providing "a well defined environment."[4] Such a defined environment may be responsible for the loss of autonomy.

The environment negates ambiguity by covering (i) human development (ii) political, economic, and psychological development, and (iii) social, religious, and ultimately

cultural development. The perspicacity of the environment defines its society. Objectively, its effects on societal anthropometry are achieved through historical, political, scientific, and sociological reasoning. Subjectively, it creates an abstract condition of mind (psychological), a spiritual possession, a way of thinking, feeling, and doing. In the west, the state is causal to the creation of the nation. "For a long time now, the single nation has played the part which constitutes the supreme mission of society towards the individual human being, namely, maintaining through the present, links with the past and the future." It has taken over the traditional role of the family.[5] This nation, singular and separate, is the State.[6] "It brings within its power all forms and substance of the myriad human lives whose destinies it is in charge."[7] The enclosure offered by state contributes toward the solidarity of the enclosed, and the state is greatly related to the formation and maintenance of the nation in this regard, evidenced by the Western European State linkage. At the cost of further horizontal integration, concentration was focused on vertical linkages.[8]

The first section of this chapter characterised the individual as homo economicus, and demonstrated that his attempts to maximise his returns through socialisation, and increase those returns through integration, are to a great degree dictated by the imposed limitations of his environment, limitations introduced by the State. The preceding section on homo politicus demonstrated the

individual's requirements for knowledge, a requirement often in conflict with the dominant authoritarian structure of state. Both sections witnessed the inextricable linkage between the economic and political worlds, characterising two distinct operational motifs of man in society. This section looks more specifically at the overall consideration of man in society. Homo faber, or socius, although creating his society collectively, is restricted to its dictates. Integration can only be multidimensionally viewed and may not be confined to specific disciplines because it is fundamentally a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Man is human and to understand human society, man must be understood, if possible.

Social and political organisation has to accommodate itself to human nature, and not vice versa.[9] A necessary condition for an issue to be political is that it is the subject of dispute or debate.[10] As society is composed of individuals, each being separate and distinct, all societal considerations exhibit a political potentiality. Politics intersect with homo socius to the extent that different points of view, or orientations, exist. At least three fundamental polarities exist which require political amelioration within society. (1) The idea of man as indeed, a self-oriented individual, or the idea of man as a communitarian being. (2) The idea of society being political or apolitical and (3) the idea of man as a free and rational self thinker or a determined irrational being.[11] Literature defends all of these issues, i.e.,

Man is	(I)	(a) individual	(b) communative
	(II)	(a) political	(b) apolitical
	(III)	(a) free and rational	(b) determined and irrational

I.a. John Locke[12] put forward the notion of individual freedom, the ability to order his own life, the notion of equality, in that no one had any more power or authority over another than did that individual.

I.b. The Communative idea was put forward by Marx:

> The essence of man is the true community of man, men by activating their own essence, produce, create this human community, this social being which is not abstract, universal power standing over against the solitary individual but is the essence of every individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth.[13]

He viewed individuals as self-confident, but falling within the universality of humans.[14] "The human being is an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society."[15]

II.A. The political concept of man has been defined early on by Aristotle through citizenship. He saw man by nature as "an animal intended to live in the polis."[16] The end goal (telos) is achieved through the political community (polis). The being both dependent and interdependent. He very much maintains that this dependency and interdependency makes "man . . . a political being."[17]

II.B. The apolitical nature of the individual was put forward by J. Mill, who postulated that "acts of man will be conformable to their interests."[18] "Every

human being is determined by his pains and pleasures and that his happiness corresponds with the degree in which his pleasures are great and his pains are small."[19] Man desires wealth and power and desire is limitless.[20] Thus, "every man who has not all the objects of his desire has inducement to take them from any other man who is weaker than himself."[21] Because of this, there is an according need for some sort of order or government whereby a great number of men combine and delegate to a small number the power necessary for protecting them all.[22]

III.A. The idea of man as free and rational self-agent was put forcefully forward by Hegel who found that the "fundamental character of human nature, is man's ability to think," the unbridgeable gap between humanity and animality.[23] He found that the ability to think and reason induces self-imposed restraints, characterised by the term, "duty."[24] Duty being a liberation of self from the demands of mere impulse or what he called substantive freedom.

III.B. The concept of determined and irrational man stems from Hobbes who conceived life as a "motion of limbs,"[25] where motion is either vital, as in the circulation of blood in the body, or voluntary, as in the animal acts such as running. Voluntary motion is preceded by an internal motion, that of endeavour which itself is either (1) toward movement as in an appetite or (2) away from movement as in aversion. As man is alive,

the major attribute of life is that of constant movement, deliberation among the endeavours. The idea of will is "the last appetite in deliberating"[26] and a fact of nature as deliberations govern all life.[27]

These various theoretical approaches to human behaviour represent positions or views and orientations based on either pure theory constituting a knowledge (episteme) or based on observations of practice constituting a prudent orientation (phronesis).[28] They are approaches to human nature. It is essential to have an overall conceptualisation of human nature as "an account of human nature is intrinsic to moral and political argument."[29] "The ideas of every philosopher concerned with human affairs in the end, rests on his conception of what man is and can be" . . . the "central notion or image" of which is what "determines their picture of the world" and may be more important than the argument employed to defend the views and confute objections to those views.[30] These conceptualisations, or plethora of same, develop the identity of communities and characterise that community's mass traits.[31] The holding of values are part and parcel of human nature.[32] However, the fact that different communities hold different values does not mean human nature is different. There are "no optional extras," but all held traits are part of the concept of universal human nature.[33] Traits define the

conventions (nomos) of society.

The universality of human nature does not mean what is good for one is good for the other. The fair mediation of values is essentially the assignment of justice, and the arbitrational responsibility of domestic, or international political organisations. The concept of 'justice' has an inherent social bias; it has been said, "Justice consists in not transgressing any of the ordinances of the state of which one is a citizen."[34] But for justice to be administered, the ordinances of the state, which is composed of individuals, should be loosely enough textured to allow a position on all considerations.

If society is to organically expand, if nations are to integrate to a degree of some sort of supra-nationality, different fundamental views and orientations must be organically mediated. This requires some sort of general concensus regarding human nature. The state, as a social and political organisation, must accomodate itself to human nature, not vice versa. The central decisions facing western Europe (individual Western civilisation) is that which is composed of the tension which results between two tendencies both found within the individual. His tendency toward self-strength or independence and between his aloneness and interdependence.[35] Powerlessness, anxiety, isolation, may be producing a sado-masochistic love for the powerful

with a corresponding hatred for the powerless within society evidenced by pettiness, hostility, and even asceticism (thriftiness with feeling as well as with money).[36] Tensions can only be justly mediated in a loosely textured societal system if dissonances are to converge to develop consonances. In effect, a society composing a political system has "the task of a political system to settle authoritatively the conflicting claims of individuals and groups" if these cannot be resolved through non-political procedures.[37] The authoritative political system is a last resort, but political integrative actions in Europe's post war era are of these ilk, and not through overt organic natural mediation per se.

There are patterns of individual involvement into a social system. These patterns may be represented as being either sentimental or instrumental attachment (Loyalty) to the system.

Sentimental Attachment to the system is based on:

(i) Ideological orientation where commitment is to cultural values reflective of some sort of national identity.

(ii) Role participation is achieved through commitment to the role of the nation and its associated symbols, it is based

(iii) On a normative system of acceptance of demands based on commitment to the sacredness of the State.

Instrumental Attachment to the system is based on an
(i) Ideological commitment to institutions promotive of the needs and interests of the population.
(ii) Role participation is schemed through a commitment to social roles mediated by the system and based
(iii) On a normative system of acceptance of demands based on commitment to law and order.[38]

This illustrates an approach to the determinants in terms of interaction between individuals and government, interactions in a social setting requiring the mediation of values or justice in a functional system.

The foregoing illustrates six patterns of individual involvement in organised society and relate to sources of attachment or the motivations leading to an individual cathexis of the organised system. An individual is sentimentally attached to the system when he sees it as representing him as some sort of reflection in a central way and extension of self. For the sentimentally attached, internalised ideals make it legitimate and deserving of his personal loyalty. When the individual sees the system as an adequate or effective system in which he can achieve his own individual ends, he is instrumentally attached to the system. Loyalty is demonstrated when instrumentally attached because it provides the means for an optimally functioning society. The sentimentally attached individual who is

ideologically integrated is bound to the system by virtue of sharing cultural and social values and supports it because of the internalisation and personal incorporation of these values. Integration is more or less abstract and contrasts with the instrumentally bound individual, who ideologically views integration and support of the system in rational terms. An ideologically bound system member, an ideologically integrated individual who is instrumentally bound, reviews system performance in an ongoing evaluation process.

Certainly, there are overlappings, and at time different "feelings" would motivate connectedness with the system. But basically, the ideologically connected person expects the system, in exchange for his extended loyalty, to conform to a set of basic values. The nineteeth century capitalist Western European may, no doubt, have felt that the laissez-faire concept of government was consonant with society's values, in light of change in economic conditions, social needs, and governmental resources. The modern concept may be very much different. To assure support of the ideologically identified individual, justifications of the system's operations must be consistently put forward, which it does in public awareness or other campaigns (often through the issues consensus found in the democratic electorial process). Ideological integration can be seen as the most stable basis of support for a social system.[39] If this is so, if stability, continuity,

and cooperative strength is to be achieved, then the expansion of a social system, the integration of others into a single entity, must be based on ideology. In his discussion of international organisation, Ernest Haas[40] disclaimed "psychological interaction," but likewise claimed that organisations promoting integration internationally develop essentially an ideology of their own[41] through a commitment to an overall aim.[42] When the aim becomes institutionalised, formalised and rigid, it becomes highly political and, thus, subscription to such is often instrumental. The EEC, as an example, solicits instrumental ideological attachments from Europeans, and because of a lack of sentimental attachment, finds itself needing justification to solicit loyalty from individuals, especially when competing for such loyalties with domestic governments. For an institutionalised ideological acceptance, that ideology must be based on a minimum common denominator of shared goals.[43] This is essentially at variance with the idea of institutions exercising a "power-compliance" profile[44] and introduces the raison d'etre of such endeavours. Is the qui bono (1) mutual-benefit (members and participants), (2) economic (owners, managers, business concerns), (3) clients (recipients, service, or (4) general (the enlarged commonwealth)?[45] Is the concept of "Europe," for individual Europeans and for domestic states, to optimalise domestic aims, or to optimalise common endeavours or is it a combination of

both? Is the approach to Europe and Europeanness du ut des? Is it a value expansion of the domestic or is it a value expansion toward the concept of a commonality? Gunnar Myrdal held that the main purpose of governmental participation in international organisations is recognition, governmental bureaucracy acquires importance through such participation and only residually derives feedback from such organisations to allow it to see itself as others do.[46] In other words, it engages in such activities for specific role enhancing objectives and only secondarily for altruistic motivations. Increased governmental participation, both externally and domestically, is motivated primarily by economic considerations: breakdown of competitive markets resulting from technological and organisational developments and the sophistication of "peoples' atitudes in regard to the economic processes in which they" participate.[47] This requires governments to act both domestically and internationally as they see fit to redress the problems they perceive. Such action may or may not be compatible to individual ideologies, notions of fairness, on an international level of collectve justice,[48] or, the fair mediation of values.

The Aim of International Organisations

What is the real reason behind organisation? Is it to facilitate the socialisation process to allow individuals to advance their own need endeavours, or is it for some specific state aim? International

organisations such as the EEC with its own overlay of synthesised domestic interests may not be accomplishing integrated society if it is operating for other than very special social aims. Individual endeavours, given the expansion benefits of increased contact, produce identification orientations consonant with integration. Perhaps a more loosely textured international organisation would be more successful in allowing that degree of socialisation to increase so as to allow the development of integrational ties in a functionalist manner.

Endeavours, primarily economic in this context, are provided for by the EFTA. EFTA is a group of small European countries dedicated to the removal of import duties, quotas, and other obstacles to trade in Western Europe.[49] Highly affiliated with the EEC,[50] it maintains ostensibly only economic interests[51] and does not consciously promote integration.[52]

An example similar to the EFTA but with much wider ranging scope is the Nordic Council[53] built upon the desire of furthering closer connections beteen Nordic nations in culture and judicial and social spheres, by developing closer ties to create uniform rules in as many ways as possible.[54] A more progressive approach to structuralised compatibilty likely to yield higher degrees of ideological commonality leading toward integration. The Nordic Council is less rigid and more ideologically oriented than both the EEC and EFTA.

All three cases, EEC, EFTA, and the Nordic Union, although forwarded for collective aims, may in and of themselves produce an important residual integrational effect, quite apart from their declared aims. Allocation by authoritative decision of goals may quite often share as a mechanism for the universalistic application of an achievement-oriented system of allocation of ideals, the development of a collectivity of ideals which would influence integrational tendencies.[55]

The action may be contributory to the creation and cathexation of a commonality of values, and motives and act as a directional guidance mechanism in the creation of a general system of actions leading toward a common social system, i.e., integration. Similarly involved with degrees of economic integration, formal organisational activities, are essentially political, but could have salient social-cultural ramifications by creating an identity in a core belief system.

An identity is essentially the answer to the question, "Who am I?" The answer to such a question is on the first level, social, placing the individual with or against the contextual consideration of country, (inhabitant of a territorial unity), ethnicity (person of observable ethnic traits), occupational (doer of specific economic functions) or family (related sanguinely to specific other individuals). The social answer is a reliance on a specific group reference.[56] Individual reference is self-interest oriented which also includes

an element of group-orientation but relates most strongly with personally held concepts of self as in role vis a vis group.[57] The latter reference relates heavily with individual, the former with the overall collectivity. References are orientations and collectivity, if society expands, individual orientations will evolve after collective. "Who am I?" collective orientations may with some degree of success be implanted through political manuevering into the social system but to be successfully and enduringly implanted must be sentimentally linked with the ideology.

In Sum

Homo socius is both the product of, and the originator of his social system. His social system functioning is socialisation in action. Expansion of contacts achieving greater stimulus, is principally integration. To be considered at any point in time as successfully integrated, the ideological concepts of the group must be sympathetically internalised. Such internalisation is personal. To answer the question of "Who am I?," an attachment and bond must exist between the individual and group. This bonding occurs through free socialisation, not structural exchange.

Chapter Conclusion

The advantage inherent in Western European states, as opposed to the Eastern block states, is found in an environment where individuals can essentially, at least theoretically, achieve some sort of optimum satisfaction

in providing for own needs through a combination of individual emotions and endeavours. To continue the development of such a social system, new challenges needing response (as past challenges give way to institutional responses) require greater demands from the individual. The days of life of domestic free floating currencies are numbered, as the economic systems become more interdependent, a fact recognized by what has been termed 'educated' individuals.[54] Where the educational balance tips to the point where a significant proportion of European populations are so 'educated', this block in the way of European integration will be removed.

In the politicised climate of today, especially in a democratic setting, knowledge is needed to adequately allow for the responsible decision-making implied in democracies. Knowledge is highly compatible with education in both the formal and informal sense.[55] Knowledge provides the backup for decisions based on an array of selected options, as opposed to decisions based on unextensive prejudice. The future arrangement of society in the best possible situation would be decided on knowledge and understanding variables, be it assumptions of man's nature, or duties of collective governments. The world of the homo economicus and politicus is rapidly changing. Interdependencies are making domestic units more permeable to outside stimulants and retardants. Ultimately, the best possible

way of dealing with new international arrangements is on a basis of individual knowledge. There may be a lack of sufficient political will, at this point in time, to increase meaningful independent knowledge, because of its potential affects on existing domestic political systems.[40]

The demands of modern society are most adequately met in the democratic setting by knowledge intensivity, for in many respects, knowledge is power. Modern man, in his economic, political, and social societal complexities, requires both information and the ability to critically choose, if problems are to be adequately addressed. If further integration is the optimal future state of continental international systems, then the information and ability to discern must be nurtured and not controlled by states. After a discussion of the German integration experience, one based on education, in chapter seven, will follow a discussion on the value of knowledge in chapter eight and educational practices in Europe in chapter nine.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION A NOTES

[1]For a greater background on what could be termed 'Economic Nationalism', see Louis Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1954), chapter VI, p. 133ff.

[2]See J.R. Hicks, The Social Framework. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960). Page 3 offers economic facts and theory. For a discussion on problem of European integration, see John Pinder, "Problems of European Integration," in G.R. Denton, Economic Integration in Europe. (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1969).

[3]Loc. cit. pp. 14-15.

[4]For a discussion of 'national interests' and an attempt to demonstrate such interests extending beyond the framework of 'economic' considerations, see Brian Barry and Russell Harden, Rational Man and Irrational Society: An Introduction and Source Book. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1982), p. 67ff.

[5]For this quote from Rousseau, see Allan Bloom, Emile. (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 85.

[6]Rousseau says this solidarity is patriotism. "Love of one's Homeland is a hundred times more ardent and delighted than love of a mistress." G.D.H. Cole, ed., Political Economy of Rousseau. (London: Dent, 1946), p. 246.

[7]K.J. Holsti, International Politics. Fourth edition. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 129.

[8]In an economic sense, this can be demonstrated by the fact that the greater the interchange between participants, the closer the divergence of price levels. See Wilficido Preno, "Trade, Interdependence, European Integration," in L. Hurwitz, Contemporary Perspectives on European Integration. (London: Aldwych, 1980), pp. 77-94; Donald Puchala, "International Transactions and Regional Integration," in Leon N. Lindberg, Regional Integration: Theory and Research. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 128-59; or Karl Deutsch, "International Communication," in Public Opinion Quarterly. 20(1956):143-60.

[9]Werner Weidenfeld, ed., Die Identität Europas. (Munchen: Carl-Hausen Verlag, 1985), pp. 113-31. (See section III: Motive und Interessen, Integrationsprozesse Theoretische Erkenntnisse und praktische Folgerungen.)

[10]Julian Huxley, "Race," in Europe. (Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs: No. 25. London: Oxford University Press, 1939).

[11]Holsti, International Politics, op. cit. p. 129.

[12]For a very interesting psychological analysis of man's economic behaviour, see Stephen E.G. Lea, Roger M. Tarpy, and Paul Webley, The Individual in the Economy. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), especially chapter 20: "The Causation of Economic Behaviour," p. 526ff. For a discussion of the development of the economic strain of individual activity in the socialisation process, see Geoffrey Hurd, Human Societies. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), chapter 2: "Economic Integration in Europe."

[13]Wealth is a constituent feature of states' prestige as demonstrable evidence of power. See Bertrand de Jouvenal, Power: The Natural History of Its Growth. Translated by J.F. Huntington. (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1945).

[14]The classical notion may have been always a notion. Adam Smith put down the State's role to (1) Regulation of the Domestic (2) Inter-state relations and (3) expenditures deemed individually unprofitable. See "Sovereignty" defined in Christopher Layton, Europe and the Global Crisis. (London: Federal Trust, 1986), p. 17.

[15]Special attention to these agreements was given in the EEC Convention accord with reference to the Associated Countries. See Treaty of Rome, especially chapter 1, section 1, articles 13-19. For an excellent overview on free trade, see Norman McCord, Free Trade: Theory and Practice from Adam Smith to Keynes. (Newton Abbot: David and Charles, 1970); and F.W. Taussig, Free Trade, the Tariff and Reciprocity. (London: Macmillan, 1920).

[16]The new goal of the EEC but as to whether or not it is achieved, there remains doubt. Attention is drawn to the consideration of a general universal accepted common medium of exchange.

[17]See GATT Accord, chapter 2, articles 30-37; Treaties Establishing the European Communities. (Luxembourg: European Communities, 1978.) For a conceptualisation of the GATT, see John N. Evans, The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), especially part one, pp. 5-132. For its functioning, see the classic: Bela Belassa, Trade Liberalization among Industrial Countries. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), N.B. pp. 160-61, code of good conduct. See also Protocol Relating to Trade Negotiations General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (Geneva: 1971). For GATT detail, see Karin Kock, International Trade Policy and the GATT 1947-1967. (Stockholm: Almquist and Wiksell, 1969), especially pp. 62-94.

[18]The Treaty of Paris establishing the ECSC did not satisfy the criteria of GATT requiring that such an arrangement cover the bulk of trade between the participating countries, neither did the Stockholm Convention establishing the EFTA which excluded agriculture, but GATT council used its authority to grant waivers of these requirements. See Sidney J. Wells, International Economics. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1973), pp. 274-75.

[19]The Zollverein as the classic modern example appears throughout literature but attention here is given specifically to the treatment of this in the classic work by the major propagator of Customs Union Theory: Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950). See, also, chapter 7 of this paper.

[20]GNP=I(fS)+E+G where I=investment and is a function of savings, E=expenditures and G=government.

[21]An interesting example of the tendency of governments to intervene, in ways that they see fit, is the current debate (Post the 1987 election) in England and Wales with the government's attempted introduction of a national curriculum. It does not address the philosophical questions inherent in the question of education (socialisation and acculturation), and is projecting its program as a means of making the UK more international viably economic and competitive by emphasizing science and technology. The philosophical question of education is essentially addressed by determining the overall goal of education: is it to enrich the life of the new inductee into the socialisation process or to ensure his economic productivity? The position of the UK government appears to be to make the new member of society more economically productive.

[22]Edward A. Tiryakian and Ravel Rogowski, New Nationalism of the Developed West: Toward Explanation. (Boston: Allan and Unwin, 1985), p. 113.

[23]See for a case relating to Canada, Jean-Luc Migue, Nationalist Politics in Canada: An Economic Approach. (Montreal: C.D. Howe Research Institute, 1979).

[24]See Simon Kuznets, Toward a Theory of Economic Growth. (New York: Norton, 1966).

[25]This is an area of 'residual' considerations which is largely a measure of status, psychology, prestige, in short, has much to do with everything other than economics directly. See, in a U.S. example, E.F. Denison, Accounting for United States Economic Growth 1926-1969. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1974).

[26]In other words, if the government attempts to, in the short run, prop up an ailing industry, it may or may not be successful. Intervention may sufficiently inhibit market restructuring so that, in the long run, total growth would be inhibited because the propped-up industry has not been 'forced' to restructure, nor have the individuals been sufficiently motivated to retrain.

[27]The longer range, fifty yearish, cycles are called Kondratieff cycles composed of, first significant growth or expansion, and then a stagnation or contraction. See Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Future of the World Economy," in T.F. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, Processes of the World-System. (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1980), pp. 168-69. For useful background information on how trade cycles function, see the historical works: Alec Macfie, Theories of the Trade Cycle. (London: Macmillan, 1934); Joseph Schumpeter, "The Analysis of Economic Change," and Nikolai Kondratieff, "The Long Wanes in Economic Life," in A Selected Committee of the American Economic Association, Readings in Business Cycle Theory. (Philadelphia: Blakiston Co., 1944), part 1, pp. 1-19 and pp. 20-42. See also D.H. Robinson, "The Business Cycle in the Post-War World: An Introductory Note," in Erik Lundberg, ed., The Business Cycle in the Post-War World. (London: Macmillan, 1955), part 1, pp. 3-10; and Alvin H. Hansen, Business Cycles and National Income. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1953), part 1, "The Nature of Business Cycles," pp. 3-92. See also

Alvin Hansen and Richard Clemence, Readings in Business Cycles. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), of special interest are pp. 1-53.

[28]See W.N. Ruston, Why the Poor Get Richer and the Rich Slow Down. (Austin: University of Texas, 1980).

[29]See William J. Baumol, Economic Dynamics An Introduction. (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 3.

[30]"All the political applications of economics . . . turn on the control of wealth and the things necessary to make wealth." Hilaire Belloc, Economics for Helen. (London: T.W. Arrowsmith, 1924), p. 95.

[31]T. Balogh, The Dollar Crisis. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1950), p. 53.

[32]Loc. cit.

[33]See J.R. Bellerby, A Contributive Society. (London: Allenson and Co., 1931), especially p. 3.

[34]For the classical advantages, see Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations. Edited by D.D. Raphael. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), section 5, book 1, chapter VIII; or J. Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economics. Edited by W.J. Ashley. (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., Ltd., 1926), p. 124.

[35]Lionel Robbins, The Economic Problem in Peace and War. (London: Macmillan, 1947), p. 43.

[36]Loc. cit. p. 13.

[37]A practical example is the centralisation and nationalisation of the British motor-car industry in post war times, which because of unprofitability resulted in virtually the collapse of that industry and the disappearance of many non-economically viable motor-car names.

[38]An example is the Harrod-Domar growth model which shows the propensity to save the marginal capital-output ratio which determines how growth rate is related and as savings are a factor of income and expenditures, the higher the tax (expenditure), the lower the savings and subsequent growth. So if a government wants short term revenue for domestic purposes, for example, it could be sacrificing long term income. See E.A.G. Robinson, ed., Problems in Economic Development. (London: Macmillan, 1966), especially p. 4. See, also, Alan Peacock, Income Redistribution and Social Policy. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1954).

[39]H.J. Habakkuk, ed., The Cambridge History of Europe. Volume VI: The Industrial Revolution and After (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). Incomes, population and technological change. Chapters 1 and 2. p. 10ff.

[40]Loc. cit. p. 1.

[41]See W.D. Henderson, The Industrialisation of Europe 1780-1914. (London: Jarrod and Sons, Ltd., 1969), especially p. 7. It began more or less with coal and iron 1780-1850 and moved into steel and electricity 1850-1914 and then proliferated into chemistry, technology, communication, and onwards.

[42]See for a comment on social study connections with historical time in Peter Burke, ed., Economy and Society in

Early Modern Europe. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), especially p. 2.

[43]A classical example of interrelatedness, exhibiting not only economic connectiveness, but also with political and social ramifications, may be seen by the fact that prior to 1861, 75% of cotton used in the Lancaster Mills of Britain was imported from the cotton plantations in the southern states of America. In 1860, there were about 2000 cotton factories in the Lancaster-Cheshire manufacturing region with over 300,000 power looms and over 20 million spindles supplying employment for 500,000 operators who earned 11 million pounds per year. At this time, Britain manufactured nearly half the world's cotton yarn and piece goods, and annual exports of the industry were valued at 46 million pounds, all of which was attributed to an undue dependence upon one source of supply. With the American Civil War, the Union Northern states blockaded export from the Southern Confederate states. This created the Lancaster Cotton Famine. The supply shortage produced a grave social problem which initiated a series of political and legal moves, the first of a long series of social legislation, 1863 Poor Laws, enabling local authorities to borrow money on the security of the rates to start public works to relieve unemployment. For a fascinating discussion, see Henderson, The Industrialisation of Europe, op. cit. p. 134ff.

[44]S.B. Clough and C.W. Cole, Economic History of Europe. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1952), p. 81.

[45]E.J. Jones, The European Miracle Environments: Economics as Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), especially chapter 2 entitled, "Disasters and Capital Accumulation." It also causes governments to constantly rethink their positions; static governmental positions are in such a rapidly changing environment tantamount to destruction. For an explanation of the rapid British Economic decline, see Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy. (London: Croom Helm, 1982).

[46]See Alan Simpson, The Wealth of Gentry. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).

[47]Even war is a halcyon time for the captitalist as a class, even if it ruins some of its members in the process. See Charlotte Waters, An Economic History of England. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 157-58.

[48]H.W. Singer, International Development Growth and Change. (London: McGraw-Hill, 1969), p. ix. Also see T.S. Ashton, The Industrial Revolution 1760-1830. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948).

[49]Worries: lagging productivity in agriculture (Riccardo); population growth (Malthus); lack of markets and purchasing power (Marx); failures and interference with entrepeneurship (Shumpeter); absense and exhaustion of productive investment opportunities (Keynes); or 1930 depression, structural unemployment, 1940 expanded production in competing industrial countries even in war.

1950 onward, unparalleled expansion. The major tool for control was fiscal policy where the mechanism=reinvestment through savings capital/output=returns. As the aforementioned Harrod-Domar growth model showed, each increase in output in period one provided the basis for a further increase in output in period two.

[50]Ole R. Holsti, Randolph Siverson, Alexander George, ed., Change in the Industrial System. (Boulder, Colarado: Westview Press, 1980), p. 16.

[51]Loc. cit. p. 23 and Richard Cooper, "Economic Independence," in World Politics. 24(January 1972):159ff. The new collection of states, the new actors in the international system, is referenced in Elie Kedourie, Nationalism. (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1971), N.B. chapter 1: Politics in a New Style", p. 9ff. These new actors have as their core the nations. See Eugene Kamenka, ed., Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea. (London: Edward Arnold, Publishers, 1976). The nation-state link-up created "something far more than a vountary association: . . . it embodies in itself, though overlaid with conventional trappings, such natural and universal elements as attachment to one's native land and speech and a sense of wider kinship than that of family." From Hallett Car, ed., Nationalism and After. (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 39. For a nation-state with power, see Bertrand deJouvenal, Power: The Natural History of Its Growth. op. cit. N.B. pp. 240-320: claiming sovereignty, see Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1918), N.B. pp. 1-26, which may be responsible for the fluid interchange of human society. Exercising its sovereignty, insuring its power position, the nation-state has, wherever expedient, entered the arms race. To the question of why produce arms? J.K. Galbraith replied, "Probably because people are not left alone. They are made into civilians and soldiers to serve the interests of the nation-state to which they happen to belong." Quoted in Sadruddin Aga Khan, ed., Nuclear War, Nuclear Proliferation and Their Consequences. (Oxford: Clarendon University Press, 1986), p. 435. For a myriad of reasons, the state finds itself guiding economic activity.

[52]See Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Aggression," in Journal of Peace Research. 1(1964):96ff.

[53]K.J. Holsti, Change in the International System. op. cit. p. 27.

[54]Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957), pp. 70-78.

[55]K.J. Holsti, Change in the International System. op. cit. p. 31.

[56]Karl Deutsch, Political Community. op. cit. p. 5.

[57]Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration," in International Organizations. 24(Autumn 1970):608-09.

[58]Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification. (New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1965), p. x.

[59]James Caporaso, "Theory and Method in the Study of

International Integration," in International Organizations. 25(Spring 1971):231.

[50]DeAnne Julius, "Britain's Changing International Interests: Economic Influences on Foreign Policy Priorities," in International Affairs. 63(Summer 1987):391.

[51]For a popular appraisal and appeal for a united economic Europe, see David Sainsbury and Christopher Smallwood, Wealth Creation and Jobs. (London: P.P.C., 1987).

[52]Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, ed., Toward a General Theory of Action. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951). p. 28.

[53]As opposed to political science which is mainly concerned with power relations within the institutional system and only broadly with the settlement of terms. See Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, Ltd., 1952), pp. 74-75.

[54]Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1960), p. 80.

[55]Loc. cit. pp. 132-35, 218-23, to use his terminology. Myrdal says, "A growing identification with the nation-state, and with all the people within its boundaries, is thus a natural result of the growth of the democratic national Welfare State." Loc. cit.p. 132.

[56]See especially the argument on the contribution of the European Community, in Barnard Burrows, et.al., ed., Federal Solutions to European Issues. (London: The Federal Trust, 1977), p. 134ff.

[57]Jacob Viner makes this point that a customs-free Europe was essentially that of the world of Europe in 1870. See Viner, Customs Union Theory. (New York: Carnegie Trust, 1950). To enlarge upon that, the attempt to achieve a passport-free Europe by the year 1992 is essentially the passport-free Europe prior to their introduction as a legacy of the Great War.

[58]The ECSC, Euratom, the CAP in the EEC are all attempts to extend states' needs abatement ability by regional solutions. The evidence of interlocking economics in a global sense may be evidenced by the events of End October 1987, the "Second Market Crash" which demonstrated effectively the interrelatedness, and interdependence globally in the realm of finance, and liquid capital. And the results of extra European influences on European domestic economies. See Financial Times and The Economist of that period. Any issue.

[59]Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge. Translated by Le De Fi. (New York: Atheneum, 1968). The prophetic nature of this writing is borne out by experience. In 1980, the EC was the recipient of 51.7% of U.S. direct investment abroad. In the same year, U.S. investment in the U.K. as a percentage of U.S. investments in the E.C. was 58.5%. Perhaps this is the cause of the frequently alluded to 'special relationships' between the U.S. and the U.K. See A.M. El-Agraa, ed., The Economics of the European Community. (New York: Philip Allan/St. Martins Press, 1985).

[70]A good history is supplied by the Community itself. Reference is made to Steps in European Unity Community Progress to Date: A Chronology. European Document Series. (Luxembourg: January 1987).

[71]The enormity of the task is appreciated by statistics. In 1984, the United States accounted for 44% of OECD-GDP, the European Community for 29% (including Spain and Portugal) and Japan 15%. See D. Sainsbury, et.al., Wealth, Creation and Jobs. p. 52.

[72]Failures as in inflation, and unemployment, two considerations noticeably handled by domestic states rather than collective activities, more assuredly because of the immediate impact on electoral sensitivity and hence highly political.

[73]See Treaty of Rome, preamble onwards, in Treaties Establishing the European Communities: Treaties Amending these Treaties Documents Concerning the Accession. (Luxembourg: European Communities Office of Publications, 1978), pp. 213-14.

[74]See any Eurobarometer, (Brussels: EEC, London, various issues, 1975-1986).

[75]See Europe as Seen by Europeans: European Policy 1923-86. Periodical 4-1986. (Luxembourg: European Documentation), p. 17.

[76]See Eurobarometer 1985, supplement No. 23, sponsored by Banque Bruxelles Lambert, Brussels; Credit Agricole, Paris; Casa di Risvarmio della Provincie Lombarde, Milan.

[77]And its symbolic importance, see Europe as Seen by Europeans. op. cit. p. 19.

[78]Loc. cit. p. 20.

[79]How could a domestic state with interlocking currency plan more currency to liquify the domestic economy if the power of central banks were curtailed? Also, the psychological importance of the currency is illustrated by the fact that each state has printed upon its domestic currency symbols of domestic identity, the monarch in monarchies, and some allegorical depiction in republics.

[80]A basic price of a given agricultural commodity if fixed in real terms, would fluctuate according to the par values of currencies often increasing greatly costs of central payments made to domestic producers.

[81]See Leo Tindemans, "European Union," A Report to the European Council. Bulletin of the European Communities. (Brussels: Supplement 1/76).

[82]At least in terms of failure to further "harmonise" to create a more perfect union, i.e., go one's own way and not go collectively.

[83]See the stimulating article by Paul Taylor, "Prescribing for the Reform of International Organization: The Logic of Arguments of Change," in R.J. Vincent, ed., Review of International Studies. Volume 13. (Guildford: Butterworth's, 1987).

[84]According to a study carried out by the Commission, it is only in the field of agricultural products, raw materials and energy products that the

Community has performed satisfactorily on world markets. See The Customs Union. Third edition. EEC Periodical, 6/1983. Luxembourg.

[85]Compare a report by the Secretariat of the European Commision for Geneva, UN Economic Survey of Europe. (1984-85), with a copy of the same publication for the year 1960. See also OECD statistics on World Trade by region.

[86]The EEC, The Customs Union. op. cit. p. 12; also OECD Statistics on Employment.

[87]Economic motives for European action is discussed quite lucidly in Part B: "Economics and Social Policies," chapters 7 through 12 in Bernard Burrows, ed., Federal Solutions to European Issues. (London: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 85-160.

[88]Bulletin of the European Communities. Supplement 1/87. The Single Act/Commission of the European Community. (Luxembourg: EEC, 1987), p. 7.

[89]This is a statement by Jacques Delors, President of the Commission to the European Parliament, at Strasburgh, 18 February 1987. See 1/87 Supplement to the Bulletin of the European Communities. op. cit.

[90]For the content and scope of the solution, see "European Union Draft Treaty and Resolution," adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984. In Bulletin of the European Community. (Luxembourg: EEC, 2/1984).

[91]Amongst the several references on the historical background relating to the development of the community, attention is drawn to: C.D.E. Collins, "History and Institutions of the European Community," in A.M. El-Agaa, ed., The Economics of the European Community. (London: Philip Allan/St. Martin's Press, 1985), p. 11ff, "The Schuman Plan of 9th May 1950," Documents on International Affairs: 1949-50. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951), pp. 315-17; and the Spaak report: M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Comite Intergovernmental Cree par la Conference de Messina. Rapport des Chefs de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires. (Bruxelles: Etrangeres, 1956).

[92]An interesting point, the German state, although frequently minting their own currencies, and frequently using those of other German countres interchangeably was conducted in an essentially central Bank economy. Individual companies issued their own currencies. To standarise the acceptance of this variety of currency it was often tied back, if not synonymous with, a basic acceptable media of exchange, that being, precious metal. A condition which does not exist today.

[93]An interesting expansion of governments' interest, and also an example of general tendency to politically go-it-own way, is that of France who in 1983-84 placed a currency restriction on French francs going abroad to curtail the outflow of francs. This was a measure to stimulate the home economy at the expense of others.

[94]Official Journal of the European Communitiy. C 240, Volume 30, 7 September 1987, p. 3.

[95]For a good dicussion on economic development in

Europe, specifically the inequality of the distribution of the benefits of economic union, see Geoffrey Barraclough, "The EEC and the World Economy," in Dudley Seers, et.al., Integration and Unequal Development: The Experience of the EEC. (London: Macmillan, 1980). See also Sidney Pollard, The Integration of the European Economy since 1815. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974).

**For example, wanting legislation to control cartels, housing standards, utilities, pay notes, retirement, etc.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION B NOTES

[1]W.W. Roston, The Stages of Economic Growth A Non-Communist Manifesto. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), p. 91.

[2]For a justification of politics as a need for organisation," see Josephine Klein, The Study of Groups. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), chapter five, p. 57ff.

[3]The seminal work on political geography, with its detail of national aid and international symbolism, (p. 203) in chapter 11 (p. 199ff.), in Karl Deutsch, Tides among Nations. (London: Collier Macmillan, 1979); also useful is Preston E. James and Clarence F. Jones, ed., Political Geography. (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1954), pp. 169-78.

[4]The basic view of the Marx-Hegel concept of society. See Unwin Books, ed. The Essential Left. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), pp. 7-146.

[5]Roston, The Stages of Economic Growth. op. cit. p. 151.

[6]C. Curtis, A Commonplace Book. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), pp. 112-13.

[7]See the general theme of Simon Kuzwets, Economic Growth of Nations. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971), specifically p. 37.

[8]Loc. cit. p. 76.

[9]Loc. cit. p. 348. This does not mean that restructuralisation is a requirement. See Alexander Gerschenkron, Reflections on the Concept of 'Prerequisites' of Modern Industrialization. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), especially pp. 35-51.

[10]And refined by way of the individual incorporated in Christian traditionalism.

[11]For a discussion, see Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1952), p. 74.

[12]The entire text gives evidence of the commonality of origins and the conceptualisation through history yielding similarity in overall patterns today in Western Europe. See Orest Panum, National Consciousness: History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1975), p. 4ff.

[13]Edward L. Morse, Modernisation and the Transformation of International Relations. (London: The Free Press, 1976), p. 1.

[14]Equilibrium was often associated with security and its maintenance through force.

[15]Morse, Modernisation. op. cit. p. 2.

[16]See, for example, Richard A. Falk, This Endangered Planet. (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 132-59 and Bernard Brodie, "The Impact of Technological Change in the International System," in Journal of International Affairs. XXV(1971):209-223.

[17]These have been identified as The Netherlands, West Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, The United Kingdom, Belgium, New Zealand, Australia, Sweden, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada, and the U.S. See Bruce Russett, World

Handbook of Political Science Indicators. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 298. To this list may be added Japan, and, to some extent, Korea, Italy, and perhaps Spain. However, what is important is that it is fundamentally European in origin.

[18]More simply put, "I regard a society as modernized whenever small decreases in uses of inanimate sources of power could not be made up by increases in animate sources of power without far-reaching social changes. Not the least of such changes might be radical increases in death rates." Marion J. Levy, Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors. (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 3.

[19]See Zibigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages. (New York: Viking, 1970).

[20]This is despite "planned integration." See G.R. Denton, "Planning and Integration: Medium-term Policy as an Instrument of Integration," in G.R. Denton, ed., Economic Integration in Europe. (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1969).

[21]Samuel Huntington, "Political Modernisation: American vs. Europe," in World Politics. XVIII(April 1966):378.

[22]For an example of this penetration of society by political factors, which took place in the Pre-unification German Model, see Kolinsky, Martin, Continuity and Change in European Society. (London: Croom Helm, 1974). Forces that affected the power and authority of ruling princes: p. 21ff. George Priest, Germany since 1740. (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1914). Wars between German states: pp. 10-22. French degradation: pp. 46-54. An overview of events: p. xiii-xiv. J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany 1815-1914. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948). The argument forwarded in chapter IV, pp. 82-103 and section 26, chapter V, p. 107ff. Heinrich Friedlaender, Economic History of Europe. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1953). Descriptions of the Vormaerz period (pre March 1848) in Germany: p. 87ff. Herbert Heaton, Economic History of Europe. (New York: Harper and Bros., 1936). General economically induced political penetration as through trade: pp. 571ff., 658ff.

[23]F.S. Northedge discusses expansion of contacts internationally in The International Political System. (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), p. 109.

[24]International interdependence discussed to great extent in Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations. (London: The Free Press, 1976), chapter five, p. 114ff.

[25]Although there are attempts to curb transnationalisation of knowledge, most notably by patent laws or industrial secrecy: or politically as in the case of the U.S. attempts to withhold computer knowledge from the Soviet Bloc states.

[26]Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate Structure, and Spread. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 287.

[27]D.J. deSolla Price, Science since Babylon. (New

Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 113.

[28]The literature ascribes most forcefully the cyclical nature of political consideration to an inevitable historical cycle, much as the cyclical economic considerations. 1890 to 1960 delimits more or less "the great divide between two ages in this history of mankind", the age of "modern" and the age of "contemporary" history. Geoffrey Barraclough, An Introduction to Contemporary History. (New York: Basic Books, 1964), p. 2. See also Hajo Holborn, The Political Collapse of Europe. (New York: Knopf, 1951).

[29]Chambers Dictionary. op. cit. p. 993.

[30]Security is a word derived from the compounding of two Latin terms meaning freedom from anxiety. See Lionel Curtis, World War, Its Cause and Cure. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 123.

[31]There are arguments both ways on what is security, but the assumption here is that political security takes primacy over economic. For the definition of the term, see Chambers Dictionary, op. cit. p. 1173.

[32]The argument is principally directed at the international level of consideration, but is perfectly applicable as well to the societal consideration. See Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1968), p. 11.

[33]Although abstract, this definition as well as the description of transactions are shown by Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level. (New York: Doubleday, 1954), pp. 33-40 and Deutsch, "Towards Western European Integration: An Interim Assessment," in Journal of International Affairs. XVI(1962):especially pp. 99-101.

[34]Lord Davies, The Seven Pillars of Peace. (London: Longmans, 1945), pp. 148-49.

[35]Curtis, World War, Its Cause and Cure. op. cit. pp. 77-78.

[36]J.F. Dulles, War, Peace, and Change. (London: MacMillan, 1939,57), p. 9.

[37]For a view of the positive advantages achieved through war (or the interim spaces between wars), see Walter Alison Phillips, The Confederation of Europe. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1914), especially pp. 298-99. Of the abortive pre World War I attempts to internationally organise, although it failed, he says, "It set the tradition of that feeling of common interests among nations, the growth of which is the strongest factor making for peace."

[38]An idea expressed by President McKinley in Buffalo, New York, one day before his assasination on 5 September 1901. See Nicholas Murray Butler, The Family of Nations: Its Need and Its Problems. (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1938), p. 358.

[39]Thorstein Veblen, An Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation. (New York: B.W. Huebsch Co., 1919), p. 39.

[40]Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology. (London: Duckworth, 1982), p. 237.

[41]Loc. cit. p. 35.

[42]Zibigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict. (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 387.

[43]Authoritarian vis ideology, or force and reason are the two concepts treated by Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. Two volumes: (1) Thinking and (2) Willing. (London: Secker and Warburg, 1978). N.B. the argument on choice, all in volume 2, pp. 70ff., 89ff., 120ff.

[44]This analysis is loosely structured on the work of Wilfred A. Hofmann in "Whence the Threat," in NATO Review. (No. 3, June 1987), p. 8. For a general background, see also NATO Handbook 1986. (Brussels).

[45]Chambers Dictionary. op. cit. p. 460.

[46]Hoffmann, "Whence the Threat," in NATO Review. op. cit. p. 10.

[47]16% in a 1982 survey, see Europe as Seen by Europeans - Ten Years of European Polling 1973-83. (European Documentation, 1983).

[48]Lack of hope, lack of standards, lack of orientation, and perspective characterises many of the European youth today, and may be emphasised that church attendance has dropped significantly to c. 5-10% in Europe today. U.K. - :11%, p. 428. England alone - 9%, p. 432. Patrick Johnston, Operation World. (Bromley: STL Books, 1986).

[49]Hoffmann says "Nor do at at least fifty percent of the young perceive an external threat." In "Whence the Threat," in NATO Review. op. cit. p. 18.

[50]Attributed to NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington, loc. cit.

[51]42% fear of nuclear weapons in Federal Republic of Germany / 16% fear of war in same. 32% fear of nuclear weapons in The United Kingdom / 26% fear of war in same. See Ten Years of European Polling. op. cit.

[52]This was pre-Libya Bombardment, pre-Gulf escalation. See Hoffmann, "Whence the Threat," in NATO Review. op. cit. p. 11. Specifically the finger was pointed toward the U.S. by 41% of Germans and 37% British.

[53]Loc. cit. p. 11, the Allensbach Insitute findings.

[54]See Gregory Flynn, Public Opinion and Atlantic Defence. (No. 6, December 1983); Sir Clive Rose and Peter Blakes, Perception and Reality: An Opinion Poll on Defence and Disarmament. (London: 1986); "General Report on 'Public Opinion and the Alliance'" presented to the North Atlantic Assembly in 1986; and "European Opinion after the Missiles," (Journal No. 6, November/December 1985).

[55]A rather surprising finding is illustrated in Hoffmann, "Whence the Threat," in NATO Review. op. cit. p. 12, with reference to a European Values Project (Northampton, U.K., 1984) which showed only 43% overall NATO-Europeans (compared with 71% Americans) were willing to fight for their country in unavoidable war. But as Hoffmann suggests, such pollings, often conflicting, may be of uncertain validity as indeed, unique to human behaviour generally, one really doesn't know what one will do until presented with the opportunity of choice.

[56]Euratom Founding Date: 23.3.1957.

[57]For a current review of immediate measures taken after Tschernobyle, see Basler Zeitung, "Wie Regiert Europa auf die Verstrahlung?" (6 Mai 1986, No. 104).

[58]The radiation problem in Tschernobyl was first detected late in April 1986. Immediately, the Federal Republic of Germany, through a massive public awareness campaign through the media informed its citizens and, by 1 May, a general European holiday (May Day), encouraged the population to stay indoors and to refrain from eating fresh produce. Germany has an active Green lobby. France, on the other hand, who more than any other Western European country depends the most on nuclear produced electricity, withheld not only such warning, but any formal information. The result was that west of the Rhine, May Day was celebrated as normal outside, whilst a few hundred yards to the east, Germany stayed indoors.

[59]"Weil der Mensch ein Mensch ist, wird er auf die dauer nur eine solche Kulture lieben und bejahen konnen, die ihn in seiner Bedurftigen sielischen und leiblichen Existenz Akzeptiert und Bestatigt." (As individuals are individuals, he will only in the long run accept the culture which his spiritual and physical existence can accept.) Very cryptically observed by Dieter Duhm in Aufbruch zur neuen Kultur. (Munchen: Kosel Verlag GMBH, 1984), p. 15.

[60]See Wermut Pflantze, "Tschernobyl," in Die Ziet. (9 Mai 1986, no. 20). Pflantze terms the "Gemeinsames Haus Europa" apparent, superseding the "begrenzten Souveranitat" of the previous period.

[61]For an analysis of the Swiss experience, see Hans A. Pestalozzi, Nach uns die Zukunft. (Bern: Zytglogge, 1979), chapters one through three.

[62]Perception relates to values. "Values not mediated through concrete social structures" which "tend to become tenuous, frail, and, in the long run, unsupportable." See Anitoi Etzzionie, The Active Society. (London: Macmillan, 1968), p. 13.

[63]"Modern industrial society tends to be uniformist and rootless, and the citizens far removed from those who control their destiny." "He has lost his personal identity. His day to day existence gives him greater wealth . . . but on the other hand denies him a sense of belonging." In other words, duty prevails as a modus operandi. See Patricia Elton Mayo, The Roots of Identity: Three Movements in Contemporary European Politics. (London: Allen Lane, 1974), p. 2.

[64]See Pestalozzi, Nach uns die Aukunft. op. cit. p. 125.

[65]In discussing requirements for the establishment of amalgamated security - communities, Karl Deutsch talks about the importance of orientations around value, see Political Community and the North Atlantic Area. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957), p. 47ff.

[66]See Karl Deutsch, Politische Kybernetik, Modelle und Perspektinen. (Freiburg: Rumbach Verlag, 1966), pp. 99-110.

[67]Maurice Duverger, The Story of Politics. (London: Nelson Publications, 1972), p. 236ff.

[68]Melvin Gillison Rigg, Theories and Obligations of Citizens to State. A doctoral thesis at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1921. p. 35.

[69]An interesting situation is that those wanting and vocally advocating structural change are seldom in political power positions as witnessed in the June 1987 British election where the third and most minor party, the SDP/Liberal Alliance advocated a more equitable proportional representative change. The two more major parties, the Labour and Conservative Parties, gave it no consideration.

[70]Frank Parkins, ed., The Social Analysis of Class Structure. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1977), p. 3. This may in some degree relate the perception of gains (advantages) held by such groups as the IRA, Old school associations, the Conservative Party, etc.

[71]Seymore Martin Lipset, "Value Patterns, Class and the Democratic Polity," in Lipset and Reinhardt Berdix, ed., Class States and Power. (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1953), p. 161; Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. (New York: Oxford Press, 1947), pp. 115-18.

[72]M. Friedman, An Introduction to World Politics. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1951), p. 8.

[73]For conditions and programs relating to the modern period of European economic upheaval, see Christopher T. Saunders, ed., Regional Integration in East and West. (London: Macmillan: 1983), pp. 5ff., 67ff., 161ff., for east-west detail.

[74]For a good discussion relating to NATO, see Bernard Burrows, The Defence of Western Europe. (London: Butterworth, 1982), pp. 1,2,38,131, etc.; for a greater background of political/economic linkages in the social sphere, see Herbert Heation, Economic History of Europe. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1936/48), especially p. xxx, p. 716ff., a discussion of labour conditions and regulations.

[75]W. Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1976, original date: 1798), p. 137.

[76]Loc. cit. p. 168.

CHAPTER SIX SECTION C NOTES

[1]For an expanded discussion on the interconnectedness of total knowledge, see E.B. Haas, et.al., Scientists and World Order. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), chapter 3, p. 36ff.

[2]F.V. Meyer, Problems of a Mature Economy. (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 81. Cf. "Modern life is characterised by a great outpouring of energy . . . to better the lives of society." Edward Spicer, ed., Human Problems in Technological Change. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952), p. 13; and, for diffusion of innovation discussion, see David Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society. (New York: The Free Press, 1952); Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovation. (New York: The Free Press, 1962); and E.M. Rogers, Modernization among Peasants. (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1969).

[3]Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1954), p. 18.

[4]Loc. cit. p. 24.

[5]Simon Weil, The Need for Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties toward Mankind. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), p. 95.

[6]Loc. cit. p. 95.

[7]Herbert A. Deane, The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski. (Hamden, Connecticut: Archer Books, 1972), pp. 79-80. In essence, the state is heavily correlated with the development of modern social consciousness, genetically correlated with social and political phenomen. See Jozef Chlebow Czyk, On Small and Young Nations in Europe. (Warszawa: Polish Historical Library No. 1, 1980), p. 11ff.

[8]The general theory of Czyk. See specifically "Main Factors and Leading Faces." Loc. cit.

[9]Christopher Berry, Human Nature. (London: MacMillan, 1986), p. xiii.

[10]Loc. cit. p. 1.

[11]This argument is briefly set out in general by Berry. Loc. cit.

[12]John Locke, Two Treatise of Government. (New York: Menton, 1965 {1690}), chapter 8: "Second Treatise of Government."

[13]Karl Marx, Early Writings. Translated by G. Benton. (London: Hammondsworth, Penguin, 1975 {1843,44}), p. 265.

[14]Loc. cit. p. 327.

[15]Karl Marx, Grundrisse. Translated by M. Nicolaus. (London: Hammondsworth, Penguin, 1973 {1857}), p. 84.

[16]Aristotle, The Politics. Translated by E. Barker. (Oxford, Clarendon, 1946), p. 5.

[17]Loc. cit. p. 11.

[18]James Mill, An Essay on Government. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1955), p. 18.

[19]Loc. cit. p. 48.

[20]Loc. cit. p. 63.

[21]Loc. cit. p. 49.

[22]Loc. cit. p. 50. It may be argued that all community life is political but here "apolitical" suggests a more or less formally structured society rather than a political society per se.

[23]G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Translated by H. Nisbet. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 {1830}), p. 50.

[24]G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right. Translated by T.M. Knox. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1942 {1821}), p. 107.

[25]T. Hobbes, Leviathan. (London: Everyman's Library, 1914 {1651}).

[26]Loc. cit. p. 29.

[27]Loc. cit. p. 99.

[28]Christopher Berry, Human Nature. op. cit. p. 29.

[29]Allen Ryan, "The Nature of Human Nature in Hobbes and Rousseau," in J. Benthall, ed., The Tenets of Human Nature. (London: Allen Lane, 1973), p. 3ff.

[30]Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 298.

[31]Berry, Human Nature. op. cit. p. 41ff.

[32]Loc. cit. p. 46ff.

[33]Loc. cit. p. 58ff.

[34]J.K. Davies, Democracy and Classical Greece. (Glasgow: Fontana, 1978), p. 120. Justice is a concept derived through collective values and often institutionalised and enforced through common subscription, and is, hence, appropriately so defined.

[35]Erick Fromm, Escape from Freedom. (New York: Holt, 1941). This is the central thesis of this book.

[36]Loc. cit. pp. 211-12. Fromm was discussing the results of findings amongst German lower classes, but the argument may be generally applicable to society at large.

[37]Discussing formal arbitration and mediation of differences. See Stuart A. Scheingold, The Rule of Law in European Integration. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1965,76). The inference here is gleaned from p. 314. It extends formally to "the authoritative allocation of values for a society." See David Easton, The Political System. (New York: Knoph, 1953), p. 134.

[38]See H.C. Kelman, "Patterns of Personal Involvement in the National System: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Political Legitimacy," in J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy. Second edition. (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 280.

[39]This is supported by Jeanne N. Knutson, in Handbook of Political Psychology. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973). Because "Commitment . . . rests on basic values rather than on the sanctification of specific norms, procedures, or symbols, the individual is prepared to support novel procedural and institutional alternatives as long as he perceives them to be in line with system values." p. 280.

[40]Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964).

[41]Loc. cit. pp. 93-95.

[42]He leans heavily on Philip Selznik, "Foundations of the Theory of Organization," in American Sociological Review. XIII(1948):32. See footnote 32 in Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. op. cit.

[43]Haas, Beyond the Nation-State. op. cit. p. 119.

[44]As discussed in Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. (New York: Free Press, 1961).

[45]Blau, P.M., et.al., Formal Organization. (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), p. 42-81.

[46]Gunnar Myrdal, Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organisations. (London: Oxford University Press, 1955), p. 13.

[47]Gunnar Myrdal, Beyond the Welfare State. (London: Duckworth, 1960), p. 31.

[48]As in the refusal of Britain to act with the Common Market to declare economic sanctions on the minority white government of South Africa under the proclaimed ideology that it would hurt the common man, but may in actuality be related to the fifteen million metric tonnes of cheap high quality coal imported from South Africa to Great Britain, or the fact that Britain, having no gold reserves of its own, is dependent upon South African gold exports. Or the collective European idea of Russia being intent on subsuming the West in Communistic takeover vis a vis the idea of other issues more pertinent than the concept of Evil Empire.

[49]See EFTA: What It Is, What It Does. (Geneva: EFTA Press and Information Service, December 1984).

[50]EFTA and EC meeting in Luxembourg in April 1984 agreed on guidelines for greater cooperatin between respective participating countries in a "Special Relationship."

[51]As far as economic can be separated from political, but the low political profile is emphasized by the fact that the 9 April 1984 meeting mentioned above was followed by a 23 May VISBY (Sweden) meeting which was only the fourth time all the EFTA Heads of Government and Ministers met to determine lines of "Special Relationship" collaboration.

[52]Its activities can be judged by the following list of its standing committees:

(1) The Economic Committee

(2) The Committee of Technical Barriers to Trade

(3) The Committee of Trade Experts (Standardisation policy)

(4) The Committee of Origin and Customs Exports (legal advisors)

(5) The Consultative Committee (representatives of domestic industry, commerce and trade) See Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the European Trade Association. (Geneva: March 1985).

[53]Established 1962 between governments of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden.

[54]See Preamble to "Treaty of Cooperation between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden," (Helsinki: 23 March 1962, amended 13 February 1971 and 11 March 1974) in Cooperation Agreements between the Nordic Countries. (Stockholm: Nordic Council, 1978).

[55]Talcott Parsons, et.al., Classification of Social

Systems and Their Components. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 208.

[56]See Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. (New York: Free Press, 1962). There Lane found individuals to answer the questions on the individual level in terms of "imaginative" or "cooperative," patient, etc., relating toward personality which is tied to conflict and perception, need achievement, aggressivenes, dependency, etc.

[57]Identity in core beliefs is discussed in Jeanne N. Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology. p. 110; and for the EEC definition of society, see The European Community and Culture. (Luxembourg: EEC Official Publication, 1985).

[58]As witnessed in the previous national disposition towards a single European currency.

[59]Informal knowledge, as in knowledge and awareness of others, increases "integrational" feelings and tendencies. See "British Attitudes to the EEC" in Journal of Common Market Studies. 5(1966):49-62; and R. Inglehardt, "Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity," in Comparative Politics. 3(1970):45-71.

[60]For example, British economic performance, and the lack of skills in British industry has been known for over one hundred years, but the political will to address adequately the problem never existed. See Sainsbury, Wealth Creation. -op. cit. p. 59.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A Model of Modern Integration

The recent historical event, the integration of Germany, is relatively well documented in literature. What were the causes of perceptual change which led the autonomous states[1] and principalities of central Europe to successfully integrate into the modern State of Germany at the end of the nineteenth century? It is beneficial to look at the historical reasons for this integration and to determine if there are any compatibilities suggesting a focus on the consideration of modern European integration. Europe, a collectivity geographically contiguous in the latter portion of the twentieth century, is very much comparable with the contiguous units of Germany a century earlier.

The essence of integration is, on the basic level, why one interacts with another, the notion of interaction. The fact that the individual interacts, is not enough. Transaction alone is not an indication of integration. It may be; however it is not fundamental, for other motives could result in a high degree of integration. Why we interact with another is the product of perception.

Retrospective history attributes the economic development of Germany in the middle of the nineteenth century[2] to the Zollverein. This is so primarily because the Zollverein was the most significant visible novum of the period, and partly because of the immense political importance attached to the Zollverein. How much of that economic development was due to the Zollverein and how much

of it was due to the better road conditions, the result of the introduction of mass transport, the laying of a railway chaussee, the spread of knowledge which no tariff could stop and the general rise in intellectualism, cannot be determined.[3] Ascribing it to the Zollverein may be a post hoc, ergo proper hoc consideration.[4] The 16 years between the first Prussian Tariff (1818) and the Zollverein (1834) were years that saw 75% of the states of Germany[5] being laid with track. In 1834 three quarters of Germany was virtually waiting to cross state frontiers. The time was right for a customs union, not vice versa. In 1818, Germany, before the Rail Age, was highly rural,[6] hence the customs union was of little importance. It was a pre-industrial period. Commerce was not developed. The states were agriculturally self-sufficent. They had little, if anything to trade.[7]

The unification of Germany was first and foremost intellectually stimulated. It was an intellectual stimulation which affected everyone singularly, because of its deep-seated individualism, and, collectively, because of its humanitarian appeal. In Great Britain and in France, the culture-oriented historiography of the 18th century exemplified by Voltaire and Gibbons gave way to a nation centred, politically orientated approach to the past. However, in Germany, historians looked back to political traditions which were very different from those of Britain and France.[8] The concept of Staat, as in the Hohenzollern monarchy of the Prussian Reform Era,

Obrigkeitstaat, centred on an aristocratic and bureaucratic bias. The understanding of history and its application was, from the standpoint of the historiographer's approach, not so much a descriptive recipe for a modern location as in the case of Western Europe, but more a calling up of past motifs as justification of the current position.[9] In the German understanding and contemplation (Anschauung), the Humanitätsideal of Herder, Goethe and Kant took prominence.[10] The conceptualisation of the German past by Herder "merged with the broader stream of Romantic philosophy,"[11] and took academic license, extrapolating emotive appeals to future generations of readers. Herder wrote:

> The purpose of our existence. . . is to develop this incipient element of humanity fully within us. . . . Our ability to reason is to be developed to reason: our finer senses are to be cultivated for art: our instincts are to achieve genuine freedom and beauty: our energies are to be turned to the love of man.[12]

Typifying German historiography, Herder invoked illusionary motifs in the construction of a Humanitätsideal which was typical of the German approach to historiography. Indeed, this idea of historiography is in and of itself a part of overall German history. It is not so much history for itself but rather it is history that touches general and social inter-relationships at every point.[13] Germany set out to write its own history, and did so in humanitarian terms, setting a romantic ideal which influenced profoundly the

developments of the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe. "Man possessed thought, but ideas possessed men."[14] Goethe developed the ideal which eventually possessed the German mind,[15] and the acceptance was made way for by Kant.[16] German historians regarded the final establishment of German unity in 1871 essentially as 'their work'. The victory of Prussia over the remainder of Germany which had been preached from the 1850's onwards was seen as having been effectively prepared by means of "influential teaching."[17] The possession of the mind was through a debate to enable the nation to discover its supreme values.[18] Further ideological concepts were introduced into the intellectual system of the developing German mind by Ranke,[19] who formalised the character of the nation. He held that the State was the political expression of the people, and as such, part of the divine plan. The State is thus ipso facto expansionist. It must grow if not to be eclipsed by a neighbouring state, and hence, the State's most important function is its foreign policy.[20]

Ranke held, that war was the father of all things.[21] It was the motor of history.[22]

> Nations may proceed in friendship alongside each other for centuries if their paths do not cross: however, at some stage . . . they must, if they continue to strive ahead, finally confront each other in hostility. This is because they are all striving towards the same goal: Therefore the attainment of that goal by one, means the decline (Untergang) of the other. So any friendships between nations are only a postponement of hostility.[23]

German foreign policy developed inextricably with the notion of a single Germany. Weltpolitik became central to its thinking. This development prompted Lord Acton (1882) to remark, "They brought history into touch with the nation's life, and gave it an influence it had never possessed, . . . and they were for themselves the making of opinions mightier than laws."[24]

The reason why the writings of German intellectuals had such a resounding effect on the developing German mind may be because it began in a period of isolation. This is perhaps best typified by Ranke's own beginnings. He came from Thuringia, at that time, "dead to modern life."[25] Thuringia, its schools, the first in Germany, were nurseries for grammarians and philologists. What was taught there had not changed since the time of the Reformation. At a time when, in France and England, the reign of the applied sciences had begun, "when the intellectual horizons receded until it almost reached the end of the earth," in Thuringia, people still had their orientation turned towards the past.[26] More importantly, unlike the western countries of Europe, for the Germans there was no political life. Schools were the center of intellectual life and it was there that patriotic feelings, awakened through literature, developed.[27] This development took place alongside the new development of German democracy[28] and class mobility. New equality, fired by passionate idealism[29] turned the idea of Germany into a labour of

love.[30] The atmosphere of idealism in universities was promoted by brotherhoods, and was heavily influenced by Romanticism,[31] and provided the seat for patriotic enthusiasm.[32] It was against this backdrop that the first revolutionary Prussian Tariff law (1818) was introduced and the Customs Union of 1834. There was a movement afoot, a struggle against conservatives, a desire to try the new, which produced a social transformation.[33]

The social transformation fired a further transformation in all spheres of commerce and banking, the non-political areas open to public access. The interesting question introduced by the Zollverein was "What way?" A complete subordination to Prussia or a free association? Association or harmony was accession or Zollanschluss; a union was Zollverein. The rapid congealing of German interests and its eventual unity was because of an individual stand taken by the German states vis a vis Prussia as the dominant party. It was not a de ut des association but an all encompassing union. Such a union produced total interdependence. "The consciousness of mutual dependence, the recognition that there could no longer be any separation from the great fatherland, were impressed upon all the habits of the nation by the petty experiences of every day life."[34] It was this indirect political influence, this functionally-developed interdependence, which developed through the Zollverein, that is of historical importance, and directly relates to

the unification of 1871.

In the German model of integration, there is a remarkable "kinship between the history of the economic unification of Germany and the history of the political unification."[35] Neither tendency toward unification, the econemic or the political, proved effective until that point when after futile and repeated attempts, any other alternative other than succumbing to Prussian hegemony proved impractable.[36]

The customs union developed into an amorphous league allowing Prussia to encircle the totality known today as Germany.[37] It was essentially a "patriotic struggle . . . incited by the intellectuals" that centred around the focus of Prussia,[38] that developed the nationalism that unified the people.[39] It was animated by almost a fervent and self-righteous rejection of the West, triggered by Napoleon, a rejection of the Enlightenment. It identified the nascent German nationalism with a hatred of the French and the alien.[40] The Aufbruch of the people was led by the youth (Burschenschaft). With their irrational and semi-religious adoration of the German people and their mission against the West which, early on, dominated the minds of Germans,[41] an Aufbruch, which took place in an atmosphere or environment of political neutrality for "the German state of the nineteenth century, could rely neither on a politically alive nobility, nor on a bourgeois serving as a positive basis for the state."[42]

The German mind was produced in isolation and cerebrally, especially in the period from 1760 to 1830 when there was no unified powerful Germany. Without restriction, the mind grew. "There are certain qualities which, when controlled, enhance the productivity of the mind. When they are given free rein, however, they can grow to dimensions destroying human measure."[43]

The position of the German mind contrasted greatly with that of the French or the English. The Germans emphasized becoming, infinite, measureless; the French, being, finite and measured; and the English, reasonable and useful.[44] The German attributes of becoming infinite, and measureless, amounted to Romanticism which coupled with historicism, and fused with Prussian concepts of authoritarianism, produced the integrational movement.

1848 was a pivotal year for the Germans. The national assembly in Frankfurt of that year[45] marked not only a national discussion on unification, Kleindeutsch (with Prussia), or Grossdeutsch (with Austria), but marked also a crisis in the evolution of German unity. Before 1848, the movement was idealistic. After 1848 it was realistic and practical, concerned for the first time with political problems.[46] For the middle classes it meant change. Before 1848, unification was the province of the educated elites with general spiritual, artistic, dramatic, and cultural aims. After 1849, it became the province of a culture of enterprise,

of capitalism, of power as the educated youth took hold of the developing economy. Spiritual, general aims gave way to positive, concrete and tangible interests[47] which developed into German particularist tendencies[48] and matured into integrated unity.[49]

Discussion

German integration commenced in isolation, first with a general notion that slowly evolved into an ideal. It captured the minds of the young with intellectual appeal and, via their enthusiasm, engulfed the totality of the population. It was initially apolitical and, only latterly, took on the important political dimension, at which time it focussed on Prussia. German integration was achieved through a perceptional change, away from isolationistic particularisms to general knowledge of self as a collectivity. Using the model of Germany and contrasting it with the overall atmosphere of Europe today, its success can be ascribed to its conceptualisation and internalisation in the minds of, and lives of, every German individual. Today, there is no such concept capturing the imagination of Europeans.[50] There does not seem to be any universal ideals, either in literature or music, permeating the European culture with a European idealism today. This is all the more remarkable, given the apparent ease of public awareness through the media.

If Europeanism as a movement was alive in 1945 as a direct result of the futility of total European War,

although spin off particularistic movements toward that goal evolved; it is questionable if it is still alive in 1988. It is questionable whether the idealism which captured Germany's imagination could ever appeal to the particularistic interests of European states.[51] This is evidenced by the lack of meaningful state interaction, where meaningful negotiation would take on the characteristic of addressing a common task, communally and not protective of particularistic interests.[52] The lack of any warranted Europeanism is evidenced by the almost non-existence of its idealistic promulgation. Where the idea of Germany took hold on still political ground, the idea, today, of Europeanism has been seeded on not only political ground, but in the current of political winds. Germanism was an intellectual movement born of the mind. Europeanism is more an emotional movement born of fear and disgust; a reaction to war. Germanism was a Humanitätsideal, an ideal based on the collectivity of mankind, the post war Europeanism ideal degenerated to a domestic centred one. Although there may be room for discussion about the real role of the German Customs Union, it did produce a near total interdependence which, in turn, produced the idea of German existence through German dependency. E Pluribus Unum within the current European Customs Union; total dependency, is not evident as demonstrated below by the 1983 export figures of the community members:

Table 7.1.1.
The EEC as Export Main Customers of the Following Countries

Belgium	Denmark	Germany (Federal Republic)	Greece
70%	48%	48.1%	53%
Spain	**France**	**Ireland**	**Italy**
50.5%	49%	69%	46%
Luxembourg	**Netherlands**	**Portugal**	**United Kingdom**
70%	72%	57.6%	44%

Because of the great reliance of the EC member countries on foreign markets other than the EEC, i.e.,

Table 7.1.2

Belgium	Denmark	Germany (Federal Republic)	Greece
30%	52%	51.9%	47%
Spain	**France**	**Ireland**	**Italy**
49.5%	41%	31%	54%
Luxembourg	**Netherlands**	**Portugal**	**United Kingdom**
30%	28%	42.4%	56%[55]

Source: The data above has been extrapolated from the appropriate countries' statistics found in The Import/Export Microtables, annual statistics of foreign trade by countries, OECD statistical files, OECD, Paris, 1984.

Domestic interests are required to substantially look beyond the EC for markets of domestically produced goods. The EC does not have the E Pluribus Unum focus on self or total interdependence with Europe. Modern European domestic units are much more self-reliant than were German units in the middle of the previous century. Domestic self-reliance inhibits the growth of collective notions of unity. Part of the problem is that the economy, through technological development, expanded and

grew, within collective Germany and, in post war Europe, already existed and expanded beyond Europe. Transactions in the German model were more concentrated upon Germany than European transactions are concentrated on Europe in the modern period.[54]

The development of the Zollverein offered a Prussian based model and forced the taking of a position vis a vis that model by all the German states. Prussia was then the core. The Community today does not have a core model and any attempts to synthesise one, to focus the attention of Europeans on Brussels, as attention was focussed by Germans on Potsdam/Berlin, is short-circuited by other happenings, such as the location of the Parliament in Strassburg or the floating meetings of the Ministers of States and Heads of Government Councils. A cathexis of thought is often aided by a physical object or locus.

In the German model, the idea evolved first and, only latterly, was implemented into,[55] an evolving political system. With the idea of Europeanism evidenced by its long and painful gestation lasting through a decade of debate, there was born a political idea, complete with attendant protective interests and ulterior motives of keeping France and Germany apart, but more so in supplying expanded markets for some economies of scale production, in a protective customs union. The idea of Europeanism for the sake of Europeanism was, to a great degree, a second thought--if that. What forced the

general congealing cathexis of Germanness, a xenophobia vis a vis France and the West was its hatred of the French, a common enemy. This may be similar to the NATO projections of a common enemy, but the pressure that permeated the German society intellectually may not be of the magnitude of fear perceived by the notion of the East, by the Iron Curtain.[56] Forty years of peace may have dimmed that focus if it was popularly felt[57] at the close of the war[58]

Where German nationalism was born of an idea developed in isolation, Europeanism was as much North American as European.[59] Where German transactions increased internally both with the concept of Germanism and the rise in, and application of, technology, post-War Europeanism developed amidst a high degree of foreign economic penetration and a significant foreign control of technology.[60]

Germany was led by Prussia. Europe does not have such a single and specific lead. Germany had a polis. Europe does not have such a clear centre. Germany was brought together by hatred. Europe does not exhibit that degree of emotional commitment. Europe attempts a rapport, a detente. Germany had, and Europe is lacking, a significant commitment to an ideal. Idealism became internalised and as such became a force for action, functioning as a force for an actor's cognitive orientation.[61]

Although many of the conditions and circumstances

are different between last century Germany and current century Europe, one thing, by examining the German model, is apparent. Economic transactions are just that, a sign of the frequency of interaction, not per se a sign of integration. Political integration followed social and economic interest in the German model. In modern Europe, it appears to lead. The German model demonstrates clearly that the requirement of integration depends on individual conceptualisation and internalisation, synonymous with knowledge. Integration depends on individual perception and understanding. The Zollverein, relatively apolitical, developed an amorphous cast which became the vehicle for German integration. The highly politically sensitive EEC is rigid and may not attain that which did the Zollverein. Markets and dependencies were regional in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth, they are global.[62] Focus is not introspective, perhaps because of the failure to fixate on the idea.

Idea

> The ideas of economist and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, and distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back . . . the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the general encroachment of ideas.[63]

What is today's idea in Europe? Modern society has

removed men from their age old struggle of authority, either authority subjecting man to natural elements or the authority subjecting man to the unquestioned authority of a ruler or binding tradition. Authority, positively or negatively, was involved with security; freedom from authority increases insecurity. The process of modernisation and urbanisation costs the security of community and the breakdown of tradition. The advances of technology have brought European man to the threshhold of satiating human needs. No longer completely directed and challenged by the struggle against society and oppression, individuals may be projecting their attention toward humanity at large. Human rights have taken on meaning, both within Europe, and vis à vis Europe and the rest of the world, influencing relations and attitudes to third parties. Values, thoughts of oppression and assumptions of world scarcity, have introduced the concepts of democracy, science, and technology into the lives of individuals.

"And many may feel, . . . that they are dwelling between two worlds, one dead and the other powerless to be born."[64] The ambivalence of the two worlds[65] is exacerbated by the individual's secondary need for acceptance.[66] Anomie, motivated by the "mass, impersonal organisations and institutions which overwhelm the individual and create widespread feelings of inadequacy,"[67] leave the individual in a general state of confusion. The values and assumptions of a commercial

society may be leading the individual to see himself in terms of disposable (meaningless) consumption, as commodities in the marketplace.[68] Once the level of basic needs is reached, a new challenge must be set.

> To have failed to solve the problems of producing goods would have been to continue man in his oldest grievous misfortune. But to fail to see that we have solved it and to fail to proceed thence to the next task, would be fully as tragic.[69]

Human rights, and general humanity at large, may be the next task. But the formulation of the idea of the next task does not yet appear to be clear, nor to have fully crystallised. On the other hand, if it is even more consumption, with even more wealth accumulation, at the expense of even more numbers of humanity; that idea must crystallise. It appears, amongst these two alternative ideas, the latter is more custom than the former. Whatever the idea, it is a perception functioning as a modus operandi.[70] It is also "a framework or a scheme of values against which is cast and evaluated the needed knowledge"[71] for its accomplishment. The needed knowledge is, in many respects, advanced or inhibited by domestic states.

The Germany of the last century had an idea, and from that idea followed action. Today, action precedes ideas to such a degree, that technological development has thrown man into a state of disequilibrium because not only are ideas not precipitating action, ideas have

fallen well behind action. The ideas of Germans evolved around Germany. It may be that the new ideas of western man are developing around a new conceptualisation of man. The conceptualisation of the German ideas was around the geographic limitations of Germany. The new conceptualisations of man, as in the idea of basic human rights, know no geographical or political bounds other than the earth itself. It is global. The framework or scheme of the values that are being developed, the ideas of man, may be more global than regional, extending beyond the continental limitation of Europe. Following the German model where ideas came before political expression, the new political expression of Europe may be extra-regional, i.e., planetary.

A wider general dissemination of knowledge is necessary, and the ability to make critical choices is needed.

> Information would be desirable. . . . By these means, not only might the welfare of mankind be enhanced, but also the individual's ability to detect and to resist manipulative efforts, however these might be directed at him."[72]

Before the backdrop of Europe and its secularisation into domestic political units, the individual held as internalised the notion of oneness, promulgated by the concepts of Christendom. Secularisation in thought led to the ultimate notion of democracy and society as a collectivity of individuals. The resultant individuation of collectivities produced the patterned state system known today, but further inroads into self and freedom

would suggest the development of a new reality. "Reality [exists] not in nature or the external world, but in the mind of man."[73] If society, satiated of primary needs, is in disequilibrium, because of the loss of old ideas, then a new reality, awakened by man's capacity to reason, could supply the void in self, with regard to self's relation to the universe, with new ideas. There may be a modern tendency towards the single free unfettered individual, idealised in liberal democratic capitalistic Western Europe, to start to refocus on the general body of mankind (a rebirth of the Christendom idea, without necessarily the idea of Christ). Such an idea requires a new political expression. If this ideal is extending beyond observable geopolitical frontiers, that political expression would likewise extend beyond such frontiers.

The individual may prefer freedom, but he, likewise, because of his collective status, requires government.

> Yet the enjoyment of it [freedom] is very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of others; for all being Kings as much as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condition which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers; and it is not without reason that he seeks out and is willing to join in society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual preservation of their lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name - property.[74]

The form of the new government, the new political

expression of expanded society will be a product of the new values and goals adopted by public consciousness. They will be the product of the ideas held by the collectivity at that point in time.

In economic terms, the breakup of Christendom's world was a form of individualistic specialisation, a focus on the immediate, tangible, and present. With the technology and demands of the pre-modern world of scarcity, a narrow specialisation and division of labour may have been efficient and necessary. At that point in man's evolutionary development, fixation on the domestic entity may have been the most manageable means of development. The Gestalt of the post modern world requires more; it requires a degree of cybernetics, a knowledge of the interrelational parts and interfunctionings akin to integration.

> Survival of the individual depends upon the development of a nervous system in which differentiations (that is, specialisation of function) is balanced by integration (that is, the control of partial activities by the organism as a whole). The evolution of the human race is now threatened by the failure of integration. That integration is a social function, necessary both within individual national societies, and, in the interests of our common humanity, between those societies.[75]

Survival may, to a great extent, depend upon integration, especially in the face of advanced technology. Traditional values, concepts, and illusions regarding societal organisation are changing. The power-authoritarian sovereign state of yesterday is

becoming more and more open as it is succumbing to more and more permeations from without. Western European states have developed nations with cultural relationships which, if integration is to result, must change.

These relationships are patterns of orientation toward objects among the members of their nations.[76] Patterns of orientation are the internalised aspect of objects and relationships which include (1) a cognitive orientation, based on knowledge and belief; (2) an affective orientation, a feeling; and an (3) evaluational orientation based on judgment and opinion.[77] Cognitive orientations as well as evaluational orientations have a high corallary with ideas and less directly affect feelings. Orientations are triggered by ideas, perceptions, and impressions. Perceptions and impressions are highly individually subjective. Ideas are both objective and/or subjective, and are both individual and collective. They are motivators of action,[78] catalysts to the systems in which the collective action takes place. The social, economic, and political systems are specific systems in which specific actions take place. Cultural systems are in contrast to specific systems, systems of symbolic patterns which are created or manifested by individual actors and are transmitted among social systems by diffusion. Action within a system or multiple of systems is either cognitive, affective, or evaluational motifs for action and interaction stimulated by ideas.[79]

Ideas are powerful motivators. In the German model, the ideas of unity, the idea of the impossibility of anything else but collective identity, subsumed alternatives until as a stimulator, the object was achieved through compatible, common values. Common values are (1) when an individual wants the group in which he and the others belong to achieve a certain group goal which the other also wants, or (2) the individual intrinsically values conformity with the requirements laid down by the other.[80]

In the period immediately after the war, the 'idea' of a European collectivity was expounded, perhaps most vociferously by the 'father of Europe', Jean Monnet.[81] Monnet, himself, felt "man's finest profession is that of uniting man."[82] Following in the tradition of the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Gustave Stresemann and the French Prime Minister Aristride Briand (the two of whom received a joint Nobel Peace Price in 1926), Monnet attempted to fire enthusiasm for the high ideal of Europeanism. This was not an easy task[83] in post-war Europe, where after 1945 the free countries had the main tasks of (1) economic and political reconstruction and (2) safeguarding peace.[84]

If Monnet was successful in generating an idea and not an ideal, that ideal rapidly gave way to the practical and pragmatic political considerations of operationality. In 1947, the economy of the European countries, as well as social considerations, were visibly

deteriorating. Economically, the Marshall Plan was proposed.[85] At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris (12.7.1947), Foreign Minister M. Molotov refused Soviet participation in an all-European programme of reconstruction.[86] The political division of Europe into Eastern and Western zones of influence and the Western zone's participation,[87] in an economic organisation heavily financed by the U.S., represented a major practical defeat to the ideal of a Europe developing out of Europe by itself. The idealism fostered by private initiative developed into a public political movement. It is central to this argument that the high ideals needed for inspiration have slowly devolved into banal practicalities, which may have directly contributed to the politically encumbered progress of European integration today. The first actual large-scale post-war European congress was convoked in the Hague (8 to 11 May 1948) and carried the ideal

> to support with all our powers those men and governments who work for a great purpose, both at home and abroad, in our political and religious life, in our professional and trade union circles. For this is our last chance for peace; this is the only pledge of a great future for this generation, and for those to follow.[88]

Throughout the following decade, the idea of a universal and united Europe gave way to fragmented pragmatic institutions involving but a portion of the total whole. Schumann's plan for a European Coal and Steel Community (Paris, 25 July 1952)[89] originally had

only six members. But, in time, other organisations of states in Western Europe followed in the form of the EEC, EFTA, and the non-aligned.

What are the operational ideas of European society today? What, if any, are their common values? As systems change, is Europe integrating? Does it want to, or is it disintegrating?

The idea of "Europe" is highly political. If one looks at the political system of Europe, it is noticed that there are patterns or types of political cultures.[90] (1) Parochial, where patterns are highly particularistic without specialised political roles (as in primitive societies); (2) Subjective political culture where the individual is aware and has orientations around the structures of government, but with a high degree of orientation around the out-puts (rather passively involved); and (3) Participative political culture where the individual is actively oriented around both inputs and outputs (active involvement). With a cognitive orientation, there is a high frequency of awareness, or positive feelings toward allegiance, apathy, and alienation. With an affective orientation alone, there is a high degree of feelings toward allegiance, no feelings toward apathy, and negative feelings toward alienation; the same with evaluative orientation.[91]

In their seminal study on political culture,[92] Almond and Verba found that the estimated degree of impact of national government on daily life by the

nation was as follows for three selected nations:

Table 7.2 IMPACT OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ON DAILY LIFE
Percentage of Respondents Who Said Government Has:[93]

	U.K.	Germany	Italy
Great impact	33	38	23
Some impact	40	32	31
No impact	23	17	19
Other	-	-	3
Don't know	4	12	24

Source: Adapted from Table 1, p. 80 in G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972).

They found a large portion of Britons and Germans seeing their government as having some effect on individual lives. The Italians were less perceptive of governmental impact.

The same was illustrated by a similar research into the impact of local governments.

Table 7.3 IMPACT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON DAILY LIFE
Percentage of Respondents Who Said Local Government Has:[94]

	U.K.	Germany	Italy
Great impact	23	33	19
Some impact	51	41	39
No impact	23	18	22
Other	-	-	2
Don't know	3	8	18

Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table 2, p. 81.

The results here suggested a rather large majority of Britons and Germans are cognitively orientated to governmental action. Further research showed that amongst those cognitively oriented, the impact of national or local government was seen as beneficial.[95]

The obvious question that arises is this: what individuals exhibit cognitive orientations? Here their research made a significant finding. Their results as to the educational differences on the estimation of impact of government revealed the following:

Table 7.4
Estimation of Impact of National Goverment
Percentage who say the national government has:[96]

(Abbreviations used: A=primary or less schooling, B=some secondary schooling, C=Some university education, D=no schooling)

	U.K.			Germany			Italy			
	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	D
Some effect	70	76	92	69	83	92	48	72	85	24
No effect	25	21	8	18	14	8	20	19	13	17
Other	0	1	0	0	0	0	3	2	2	6
Don't know	4	2	0	14	2	0	29	7	-	53

Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table 4, p. 87.

From this study can be extrapolated a direct linkage between education and participative involvement with government. Perception of participation in societal arrangements is related to knowledge, if education and individual expansion of knowledge can be equated. In other words, the more one knows, the more inclined one is to be involved in governmental processes, either actively or passively. The less one knows, the less active he is, the more passively he participates. This was substantiated by testing individuals who follow governmental affairs as below:

Table 7.5
Percentage who report they follow government accounts:[97]

	U.K.	Germany	Italy
Regularly	23	34	11
From time to time	45	38	26
Never	32	25	62
Other	1	3	1

Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table 6, p. 89.

And individuals paying attention to political campaigns, as below:

Table 7.6
Percentage who say they pay attenton to political campaigns:[98]

	U.K.	Germany	Italy
Pay much attention	25	34	17
Pay little attention	47	34	25
Pay no attention	29	27	54
Other and don't know	0	5	4

Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table 7, p. 89.

This demonstrates cognitive orientation to government. Cognitive orientation is linked to awareness and awareness to 'knowledge of' or education. The following, as reported by Almond and Verba, are percentages of those in their study that follow politics regularly or at least from time to time, by nation and education.

Table 7.7
Awareness of Government Impact and Exposure to Politics by Education Level:[99]

	Primary or less education	Some secondary education	Some university education
U.K.	60	77	92
Germany	69	89	100
Italy	24	58	87

Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table

10, p. 4.

The higher the educational level, the more awareness of political structures and happenings in society, the more cognitive the political orientation. "Thus, on the higher levels of education one finds in all nations a uniformly higher proportion who follow politics."[100]

The connection made between cognitive orientation and positive 'feelings' toward governments align themselves with (1) the positive 'feelings' toward a single European currency (discussed in homo economicus section) (2) the cognitive orientations needed for the ameliorations of divergent value within society (justice, as discussed in homo politicus) and (3) the emotional commitment to structural organisations (discussed in homo socius) for societal (ethical) control. The pattern indicates orientations, the product of knowledge and critical choice positions, sympathetic toward an eventual European integration, and suggests positive correlations with education.

This is significant when regarding European integration, as the very nature of European society is highly political, the demands of which require high literacy levels. Capitalistic democracies are essentially knowledge-demanding societal structures. The more competitive the economics system, the more economic knowledge is required; the more complex the societal system, the more knowledge of political structures is required if cognitive orientation, commitment,

dedication, in short, loyalty, is to be extended to the system.

The need for adequate basic knowledge, synonymous with education rests on the need for comprehension of basic concepts, the need for conceptualisation.[101] Conceptualisation need not be right or wrong, true or false. It can be direct or indirect, dependent or independent of influencing factors. All that conceptualisation requires is clarity.

Elites Focus on Ideas

Clarity frequently but not specifically relates to elites.[102] Elites project ideas upon which the masses can focus: they promote the conceptualisation of thoughts--thoughts which either originate with the elites themselves, the product of their own independent cerebral output, or the output of society's widely held thoughts.[103] History is often written in terms of biographies of elites. This simple conception of history relates to the idea that "no time need have gone to ruin, could it have found a man great enough, a man wise and good enough."[104]

> History is the essence of innumerable Biographies. But if one Biography, nay, our own Biography study and recapitulate it as we may, remains in so many points unintelligible to us, how much more must these million, the very facts of which, to say nothing of the purport of them, we know not, and cannot know!"[105]

History notes key individuals, frequently several to their time as being essentially "those with the most

power in a group."[106] Elites provide political formulas:

> the truth is that they answer a real need in man's social nature: and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual face, but on the basis of a moral principle.[107]

Individuals as elites, exercise a moral force internalised within the masses.[108] The more diverse and complicated a society is, the greater its demands upon political leadership, and the more complex the leadership structure, as it must be suffused throughout the body of politics as well as exerted by persons or positions of highest authority.[109] These individuals, when exercising elite power, focus conceptualisation on ideas and accomplish tasks.

Germany had, in contrast to present Europe, strong and vociferous elites, intellectual and political, representing different ideas and thought, but each into the same voice promulgating Germanness.

By themselves governments cannot exercise the degree of moral suasion possible by elites. Governments do adjust polity to society (or society to polity) in a rather inept process of diagnosis and marginal adjustment or "piecemeal social engineering,"[110] although occasionally social trends cumulate semi-autonomously to give a "movement in and of itself through a destructive urgency or thrust."[111] But by far the most dynamic

and fastest general cathexis building is accomplished by a single individual who, with clarity and appeal, focuses mass attention. Masses are the public; their attention is their opinion. Elites thus influence public opinion. Public opinion or public attitudes are important to European democracies. A "working" definition of public opinion is a conceptualisation of "those opinions held by private persons which governments find prudent to heed."[112] Image projection frequently is manipulative[113] when applied by elites and it affects public opinion. As images or political ideas are employed as activators[114] of public consensus. In democracies it is helpful when individuals possess knowledge to assist the internalisation of ideas[115] to balance elites projections.

Conclusion

> The individuality of man, unavoidable by his nature, which is, now, through ignorance, a cause of so much dissension of the human race, will become the cause of more intimate union, and of the increase of pleasure and enjoyment. Contrasts of feelings, and opinions which have here been, hitherto, causes of anger, hatred and repulsion, will become sources of attraction as being the most easy and direct mode to acquire an extended knowledge of our nature and the laws which govern it.[116]

The idea of integration may have always been just subnascent to historical developments. Why else could an idea such as European Integration repeatedly trigger moral conversional responses?

Unification is an ideal, a lack of any such ideological cohesion is not necessarily the equivalent of

anarchy. People who developed the ability to live with a variety of conflicting ideologies are able, as it is often put, to agree to disagree.[117]

"Amongst committed Europeans, it is the vision of a united Europe, which brings them together, and European union is the goal to which they would like to commit public interest and allegiance."[118] The trouble is in the commitment area. Commitment is in many respects synonymous with the 'Idea' of Europe. Is the idea motivated by self-assertion, a fear of being subsumed by greater forces? Is it an idea of friendly arbitration between near neighbours for domestic advantage, or is it a genuine feeling of togetherness because of a common cultural heritage, common civilisation, common ideologies?

Europeanism[119] is an appeal to wider motivation, a European motivation, capable of incorporating as constituent portions, any differences in race, culture, or language that fall within its sphere. A social system transcends all that separates; it is capable of unifying loyalties to a single union. Economic stability in the face of American economic problems, the retreat and re-entrenchment in America of American multinationals, a meaningful independent European nuclear deterrent for defence, in the face of a potential reduction of American military presence in Europe, may be motivations forcing Europe into an idea of itself. However the focus is not specific and may be spread over too many points, that is,

NATO, the EEC, the EFTA, the Nordic League, in the Hague, etc., to make a meaningful, exact, and clear cathexis of Europe in the minds of Europeans. There is an alternative to largeness, anathema to super-power Europe being somehow squeezed into homogeneity between bipolar giants may be vented by the concept of smallness. Not a re-creation of past power images, but acceptance of present realities. Largeness is akin to a degree of homogeneity, functional smallness to heterogeneity. How does Europe envision its future?

Testing respondents' moods, the EuroBarometer found the following results toward the 'idea' of a single European area. A survey question in 1986 was worded as follows:

> Lots of things still have to be done to make it easier for people and goods to move about more freely among the countries of the European Community. Some countries want to speed this up; others hesitate or are against. What do you think about the idea that in five or six years' time, people, goods, services, and capital can freely move about or around the countries of the Community as they do inside one country at the moment?

Table 7.8

In the tables which follow, these abbreviations are used: B=Belgium, DK=Denmark, D=Germany, F=France, IR=Ireland, I=Italy, L=Luxembourg, N=Netherlands, U=United Kingdom, G=Germany, E=Spain, P=Portugal, EC=Economic Community Weighted Averages.

In this specific table, these abbreviations are used: AC=Agree completely, AS=Agree to some extent, DS=Disagree to some extent, DC=Disagree completely.

For or Against a Single Europe Area:[120]

	B	DK	D	F	IR	I	L	N	U	G	E	P	EC
AC	52	32	42	50	48	51	58	53	28	61	69	72	47
AS	38	35	44	31	40	37	25	34	41	26	26	24	36
DS	7	17	11	13	9	7	12	7	18	7	4	3	11
DC	3	16	3	6	3	5	2	6	13	6	1	1	6

Source: EuroBarometer 25(June 1986):22, table 10.

Respondents did not indicate a resounding image or vision of a European collectivity. It is interesting to note, the highest response comes from persons in Spain, Portugal and Greece, new member states who no doubt see benefit in a collectivity due to d● ut des motivated economic interests. Economic interests as evidenced in trade are also high amongst Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands. The disappointing low 'vision' of Europe amongst some of the older members may likewise be exclusively reflecting popular disillusionment with the EC's performance. The low British response may be connected with the fact that those in Britain most opposed to the channel tunnel, a fixed link between their island and the continent tend to be older women with fixed political views - basically, those who grew up in an imperial period, with global-wide empirical views, indicating involvement with national and symbolic factors.[121] Individuals with a fixed different view.

The concept of seeing collective future projections is allied with trust. For the March/April 1986 period,

trust amongst the European community members was found to be as follows:[1,2,12]

Table 7.9
Perceptions of Trustworthiness amongst Community Members toward other Community Members:

	B	DK	D	F	IR	I	L	N	U	G	E	P	EC
B	--	13	9	16	5	3	12	25	8	11	15	6	10
DK	16	--	21	13	7	5	12	22	15	15	15	8	14
D	12	21	--	15	9	15	20	12	15	21	20	10	15
F	13	11	18	--	7	8	18	10	4	20	14	16	12
IR	7	13	9	9	--	3	9	9	9	9	14	5	9
I	7	7	7	5	4	--	13	5	6	12	21	6	8
L	27	12	13	15	5	3	--	23	7	9	13	6	11
N	16	21	20	11	8	7	16	--	19	14	17	9	15
U	13	23	14	8	15	7	12	16	--	17	12	10	11
G	4	10	9	6	3	5	6	7	7	--	15	5	8
E	6	8	11	8	5	8	7	6	4	13	--	8	7
P	4	7	13	7	3	2	9	7	7	7	13	--	8

Source: EuroBarometer. 25(June 1986):35-38. table 19.

The percentage that found other Europeans very trustworthy is depicted above and contrasts sharply with the trust levels those surveyed had for themselves as below. (Per March/April 1986)

Table 7.10
Percent of Respondents Who Found Their Own People to Be Very Trustworthy[1,2,25]

B	DK	D	F	IR	I	L	N	U	G	E	P
27	26	43	22	21	16	47	19	19	41	39	25

Source: EuroBarometer. 25(June 1986):47, table 25.

This indicates that if the states in the community were considered as a homogeneous society, with an intrinsic trust, the coefficients, as depicted immediately above, fall significantly short of the levels

required for cooperative interaction.[124]

What are the factors involved in trust? What are the conditions for common vision perception? Knowledge, specifically, public knowledge.

> The basic problem in this context can best be illustrated by considering briefly the ways in which national and sub-national political systems make their pressure felt among citizens. Essentially they do this by offering services to and making demands on, the individual citizen in a way that establishes a direct and controlling link between them.. This link is forged virtually at the moment of birth and continues to the grave--and even beyond.[125]

A felt contact through interaction which increases with the expansion of governmental authority envelops in a dense nexus the individual, inhibiting movement by restraints and obligations, making its presence 'felt'. The feeling and envelopment is underwritten by peripheral and ancilliary symbols[126] fortifying the political reality of nation-statism. Contact correlates highly with knowledge, and knowledge is related to the dissemination of information.

The European supplement of The English 'Times,' the German 'Die Zeit eit', the French 'Le Monde', and the Italian 'La Stampa'," would not sell on its own and is unlikely to interest more than juat a small proportion of the readers of the newspapers distributing it. The International Herald Tribune "which is widely read throughout Europe"[127] is fundamentally an extension of New York papers, that is, non-European in origin. This has an affect on the dissemination of information and may

be biased by other than European considerations.

The information needed for a promotion of an idea, the vision of Europe, must be clear and incorporate a degree of involvement and participation. The key to idea internalisation,[128] is through transactions[129] as in the Zollverein which promoted knowledge. This knowledge was not significantly biased from outside. Knowledge is fundamentally related to 'feelings' of trust and acceptance of others. If the fact of the matter is that the world is now one characterised by a high degree of active politicalisation of issues, subsuming that obstacle appears to be only possible in a democratic environment where configurations with greater degrees of knowledge are more greatly diffused amongst the polity. For European society to focus on the idea of Europeanism, any attempt to expand society would require the injection of significantly higher levels of knowledge. Knowledge injection need not be considered a malevolent attempt at propagandisation. However, it would be if attempts were channeled toward a preconsidered end such as only within the context of the EEC. A substantive injection of knowledge would focus on the idea first of Europeanism. Once crystalised, the 'how' of the scheme would be through the 'meltdown' process of socialisation. If integration is a social process, it requires, ultimately, individual accomodation to the idea. Individual accomodation is not achieved through political or economic means. It is achieved through social means,

through knowledge and awareness, through the long and continued process of meaningful interchange analogous with the development of community.

CHAPTER SEVEN NOTES

[1]In actuality, at the end of the eighteenth century, Germany was divided into over three hundred states, kingdoms, electorates, duchies, imperial cities, ecclesiastical territories, estates of imperial knights, etc. See W.O. Henderson, The Zollverein. (London: Franck Cass and Co., 1959), chapter 1: "Germany in 1815 (1) Political Divisions," p. 1ff.

[2]See J.H. Clapham, The Economic Background of France and Germany 1815-1914. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1928), p. 96ff. Also, for a general background on German development, see A.W. Ward, et.al., The Cambridge Modern History. Volume XI. (Planned by Lord Acton, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), p. 411ff.

[3]Charles Moraze, The Triumph of the Middle Classes. (London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1952), p. 136ff.

[4]Clapham, Economic Background. op. cit. p. 97.

[5]The term "Germany" here refers essentially to the North Alpine area, Germany being the name applied to this area by Tacitus, the Roman historian, and in its precise definition refers to but one of the tribes of these peoples. See Tacitus, Die Germania des Tacitus. Translated by Rudolf Much. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1937), and The Annals of Tacitus. Translated by George Ramsay. (London: John Murray, 1904), especially book 1, pp. 1-99.

[6]Clapham, Economic Background. op. cit. p. 29.

[7]Its isolation is seen in the fact that different systems of currency, weights and measures were commonly employed throughout the area. The following illustrates the diversity within the German states.

Money: Thaler - Prussia
Florin or Gulden - Austria
Mark Banco - Hamburg
Mark Current - Hamburg

Length: Meile (League) - 4 3/4 miles
Fuss - Varied in different states 10 inches to 1 foot, 1 inch
Elle - Varied in different states, Prussian = 2 feet, 2 inches
Klafter - Varied in different states, according to the size of fuss. A klafter was six times a fuss.
Ruthe - Varied in different states, the commonest was Rhine-ruthe, 4 yards, 6 inches

Volume: Scheffel - Varied among the states, Prussia 12 gallons
Eimer - Varied among the states, Prussia, 15 gallons; Wittenberg, 65 gallons

Area: Prussian Morgen - less than 2/3 of an acre
Acker - varied in different states

Weight: Prussian Zentner (Hundred weight), 100 pfund
Zollverein pfund, 1 1/10 pound.

[8]Georg G. Iggers, The German Concept of History (Middleton, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1968), p. 718.

[9]Loc. cit. p. 10.

[10]Loc. cit. p. 11.

[11]Loc. cit. p. 37.

[12]J.G. Herder, Ideen zun Philosophie der Geschicten Menschheit Samtlich Worke XIII. p. 189, quoted in Iggers, loc. cit. p. 38.

[13]Eckert Kelm, quoted in H.U. Wehler, Der Primat der Innenpolitikin. (p. 254), cited in John A. Moses, The Politics of Illusion. (London: George Price, 1975), p. 7.

[14]Moses, The Politics of Illusion. loc. cit. p. 10.

[15]With Goethe, we have amongst other things, a perfect example of cultural borrowing. To the Germans, the story of Faust was lost all but in Staufen, Baden, where Marlow, the early English contemporary of Shakespeare, discovered and wrote it up. This, in a traveling Punch and Judy minstrel show, was reintroduced to Germany and the young Goethe, in the middle of the eighteenth century. Germany owes the discovery of its ideal Dr. Faustus to the English. Goethe, along with the Brothers Grimm traveled the German speaking area recording local folklore and publishing same, introduced what has become the traditional cultural heritage of the German people. History even records the idea of German nationality to Goethe and as culturally borrowed in the call "Vive la Nation" heard by him 20 September 1792 at the French cannoning of Valmy. See Irving Babbitt, Democracy and Leadership. (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1924), pp. 129-30.

[16]Kant, another interesting example of cultural borrowing, the King of Konigburg, was a second generation Scottish Cant. For his contribution, see Kleine Weltgeschecte der Philosophie. (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1981), pp. 390ff., 628ff.; Christoph Helferich, Geschicte der Philosophie. (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlag, 1985), pp. 185-198ff.; as well as Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1946), especially pp. 494, 629, 749.

[17]Moses, The Politics of Illusion. op. cit. p. 10.

[18]For further detail into the German "Volksgeist," see Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 26ff.

[19]See Leopold von Ranke, Die Grossen Mächte - Politische Gespräche. (Göttingen: University of Göttingen Press, 1958).

[20]See Moses, The Politics of Illusion. op. cit. p. 15.

[21]As did Heroclitus before him. War=conflict, for its effects on societal change. See chapter two of this paper.

[22]Ranke, Die Grossen Mächte. op. cit. p. 37.

[23]Kurt Riesir, Die Ranke - Renaissance. (Baline, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1962), p. 57.

[24]Lord Acton, German Schools of History. Quoted in Moses, The Politics of Illusion. op. cit. p. 53.

[25]See reference to Ranke in Antoine Guilland, Modern Germany and Her Historians. (London: Jarrod, 1915), p. 68ff.

[26]Loc. cit. pp. 70-71.

[27]Notable forerunners: Theodore Mommson, Heinrich

von Sybal, Heinrich von Treitschke.

[28]See the development of man and culture in Emil Stuke, Deutsche Sozialgeschicte (Halle: Maissenhofen, 1920). Stuke stresses the social development, especially after 1848. ". . . doch der demokratissche Grundung in der neuer Gesellschaftsordung trat, und immer mehr hervor, jeder redite jeden mit 'Sie' an, in der Kleidung war Millioner oft von einfachen Manne kaum zur unterscheiden, und nach 1848 ab Rauchen auf der Strassen nicht mehr verboten war, tut die Zigarre ihren Siegesgang in allen Standen an." p. 119.

[29]The idealism is demonstrated by the historian von Treitschke, Germany's greatest historian of the time, who wrote his friend, von Sybol, "I grow too easily excited. but in time I hope to become a historian." Quoted in Heinrich von Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century. Translated by Eden and Cedar Paul. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. xiii.

[30]This is because of a cogniscent national identity. To see how it functions, see Anthony Smith, Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. (London: Martin Robertson, 1979), chapter four: "Colour, Race, and National Identity," p. 86ff.

[31]At Jena in 1815, with a student population of 350, there were recorded 147 duels of honour. Von Treitschke, History. op. cit. p. 197.

[32]Drinking, duels, songs and sentimentality produced amongst other things a new youth best typified by the Burschenschaft, a cultured group of intellectuals highly given over to Vaterlandsliebebetween 1815 and 1830. Loc. cit. p. 100.

[33]See Section III, p. 221ff. of loc.-cit. for historical background and p. 227ff. for the rapid reform of accompanying fiscal reforms.

[34]Loc. cit. p. 237.

[35]Loc. cit. p. 239.

[36]See note 62. below.

[37]As the general intellectual level rose throughout the nineteenth century in Germany, the ideal of Germany spread through arts and sciences fed throughout the system by the Feuilleton. Von Treitschke, History. op. cit. p. 267. German intellectual attainments may be characterised by Richard Wagner's "Parsifal," where victories of the Will overcome self. A value of redeeming pity and hope for a regeneration of sinful man through resignation or asceticism picked up by Nietzsche with the will-to-power relationship (denial of materialism) which developed into nihilistic pessimism or dionysian, the hypothesis of Becoming, of eternal recurrence, the concept of a man becoming a Superman (Zarathustra). See Henri Lichtenberger, Germany and Its Evolution in Modern Times. (London: Constable, 1913), p. 338.

[38]Prussia as focus started when the Elector of Brandenburg became King of Prussia in 1701, and the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor on 18 January 1871.

[39]Hans Kohn, ed., German History: Some New German Views. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 18.

[40]See Hans Kohn, "Arnot and the Character of German Nationalism," in American Historical Review. LIV(July 1949), p. 116ff.

[41]See Kohn, German History. op. cit. pp. 18-19.

[42]Rudolf Stadelmann, Moltke und der Staat. (Krefeld: Sherpe, 1950), p. 414.

[43]Kohn, German History. op. cit. p. 20.

[44]Loc. cit. p. 20.

[45]In St. Paul's Church, where the participants often sung the refrain, "So weit die Deutshe zunge klingt," from the famous patriotic poem, "The German Fatherland," by Ernst Moritz Arnot. See Kohn, German History. loc. cit. p. 25.

[46]Henri Lichtenbergen, Germany and Its Evolution in Modern Times. Translated by A.M. Ludovici. (London: Constable and Co., 1913), p. 114.

[47]Loc. cit. p. 115.

[48]Loc. cit. p. 121.

[49]For a review of the development of the German ideas and aspirations, see Frederick Hertz, The Development of the German Public Mind. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962), especially chapter 4, p. 420ff; G.P. Gooch, The Modern World: A Survey of Historical Forces. Volume II, entitled Germany. (London: Ernest Benn, Ltd, 1926), especially chapters IV, V, and XV; J. Haller, The Epochs of German History. (London: George Routledge and Sons), chapters I-IV, X-I; J.H. Clapham, The Economic Development of France and Germany 1815-1914. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,, 1928), chapters IV, IX, and XIII; William Harvey Maehl, Germany in Western Civilization. (Montgomery, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1981), parts VI-X.

[50]As characterised in Churchhill's 1946 United Nations of Europe speech in Zurich (19.9.46) which had a truly sensational impact, for it represented both the response to the overwhelming desire for peace among peoples of Europe and, in a continent where poverty, revenge, and hatred reigned, posited a hope and generosity and the first steps toward reconciliation. Steps to European Unity. (Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications of the European Community, January 1985), p. 10. See also German Trade Union Federation, ed., European Integration: From the Idea to the European Economic Community. (Dusseldorf: Federal Committee, 1963), p. 15.

[51]For an overview of today's idealism, see A Journey through the EEC. (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, June 1985). See also European Integration. loc. cit. the entire work; the importance of idealism is shown in Max Kohnstamm, Jean Monnet: The Power of the Imagination. (Florence: European University Institute, 1981). German idealism had such a dramatic impact on German society that its effects were shown in literature, music, language, and art. The name ascribed to the period is Sturm und Drang. For references of the impact, see Ulrich Karthaus, Sturm und Drang und Empfindsamkeit. (Stuttgart: Reclam Jun., 1976), especially pp. 9-18ff.; Volk and Wissen, ed., Sturm und Drang.

(Berlin: Volkseigener Verlag, 1967), especially pp. 15-54, and for Herder's influence, see pp. 75-148, and effects, pp. 516-27; Ulrike Garbe, Beiträge zur Ethik der Sturm und Drang Dichtung. (Weida in Turingen: Thomas & Hubert, 1916), especially chapter II, pp. 23-29, and the tendency for an 'individual revolution', p. 117ff.; Klaus Herrmann and Joachim Müller, Sturm und Drang. Weimar: Thüringer Volksverlag, 1954), pp. 1-54; and the comprehensive overview of the positions of the various contributors to the movement in the entire work, Heinrich Wilhelm von Gerstenber , et.al., Sturm und Drang. (Heidelberg: Lambert Shneider Verlag, 1972). A good English language overview is found in Roy Pascal, The German Sturm und Drang. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1953), especially chapters 1 through 3, pp. 1-86. N.B. chapter 7, pp. 217-32: History and p. 300ff.: Achievements.

[52]This is essentially Monnet's idea of lateral thinking or of a balance sheet. Jean Monnet, Memoirs. Translated by Richard Mayne. (London: Collins, 1978), especially pp. 126-27. Monnet himself indicated this difference when he made mention of the obstacles that had to be surmounted in order not to lose "the race with international anarchy" (p. 82). Meaningful negotiation is "establish[ing] the habit of teamwork" (p. 82). Monnet said, "Without a doubt, the selfishness of men and of nations is most often caused by inadequate understanding of the problem in hand, each tending to see only that aspect of it which affects his immediate interests" (p. 83). That is why Monnet's balance sheet calculation must be undertaken; for the presentation of the "problems as a whole" and where, to his thinking, essential (ibid.).

[53]A review is found in the OECD 1983 Statistical Review. (Paris: OECD, 1984).

[54]This relates to community and communication intensity. See Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. Eighth edition. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978), pp. 158,87-88. For habit formation, see pp. 116-22.

[55]For a good account of the social change felt in Germany during the time, see Charles Moraze, The Triumph of the Middle Classes. op. cit., primarily chapters 1,4,9,13.

[56]On 5 March 1946, at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill again demonstrated his ability to focus the thoughts of men by employing the Iron Curtain concept. "A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied Victory . . . From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent." You Magazine. (February 28, 1988):3.

[57]It may have been a political projection In the war, Russia was, after all, an ally. Many knew that Germany was the aggressor, and Russia aided the west by marching from the east to subdue the enemy.

[58]The height of the Russian projection as an enemy may have been the greatest during the blockade and wall around Berlin (1947-1961).

[59]The first major European organisation was what has now become the OECD, the organisation in Paris to distribute American Marshall Aid for the reconstruction of Europe - working together was a side line to an economically viable European partner for trade.

[60]Penetration may be demonstrated by the amount of imports from other than the EEC. In the year 1981, these were, as a percentage of total national imports, as follows:

Belgium and Luxembourg	40.7		
Denmark	52.1	France	51.8
W. Germany	51.8	Greece	50.0
Ireland	25.3	Italy	59.3
Netherlands	47.6	U. Kingdom	60.6
Portugal	62.0	Spain	71.0

Source: Reciprocal of the data found in A.M. El-Agram, The Economics of the European Community. Second edition. (Oxford: Philip Allan/St. Martin's Press, 1985), table 3.8, p. 61.

[61]See Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1952), pp. 47-48.

[62]A fact highlighted by the British Prime Minister Thatcher at the annual Lord Mayors banquet, (Mansion House, London, 16 November 1987) along with the interesting idea attributed to Abba Eben, the Israeli War Minister during the Six Day War, "History shows us that men and nations act prudently after exausting all other alternatives." Before eventual unified adoption of the Zollverein by the various German states, all political options were explored. Adoption came at the end of the process. Perhaps, after all political options are exhausted in Europe, the EEC will be the vehicle for unification.

[63]John Maynard Keynes, quoted in Martin Tharcher, Leadership and the Power of Ideas. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. xvii.

[64]Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1930), chapter III, p. xxvii.

[65]The ambivalence releases pressure to achieve. This is discussed in Margaret Mead, And Keep Your Powder Dry. (New York: William Morrow, 1942).

[66]The idea of being a member of the "team," see David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Changing Character. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950).

[67]See William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1956), and Kenneth E. Boulding, "The Jungle of Hugeness," in Saturday Review. (March 1, 1958):11-13,50.

[68]The general thesis of Erich Fromm, The Sane Society. (New York: Rinehardt, 1955).

[69]John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958), p. 356.

[70]For Nazi Germany, it was "Du bist Nichts: dein Volk ist alles." See Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, Systematic Positions of Social Psychology. Volume 1: Historical Introduction. (Reading, Massachusetts:

Addison-Wesley, 1954).

[71]Robert Goldwin, ed., Toward the Liberally Educated Executive. (White Plains, New York: Fund for Adult Education, 1957), p. 76.

[72]M. Tharcher, Leadership and Organization: A Behavioral Science Approach. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), p. 19.

[73]Tharcher, Leadership and the Power of Ideas. op. cit. p. 43.

[74]John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government. (London: Dent and Sons, Everyman's Library, 1953), II., p. 179.

[75]Lord Walter Russell Brain, "Science and Antiscience," in Science. (April 9, 1965):194. (Parentheses in the original.)

[76]See for an excellent analysis of cross-cultural civic patterns, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 15.

[77]See Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 53ff.

[78]Loc. cit. p. 52.

[79]For an interesting discussion of comparative political systems, see Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," in Journal of Politics. XVIII(1956):103ff.

[80]Parsons and Shils, Toward a General Theory of Action. op. cit.

[81]See Jean Monnet, Memoirs. op. cit.

[82]Max Kohnstamm, Jean Monnet. op. cit. p. 5.

[83]It was not easy because there were many and highly divergent views. The contentiousness of the proposition can be demonstrated by W. Churchill, who in 1929, said, "England is linked with Europe, but not included in Europe. She does not belong to one continent alone." Quoted by Max Cohen-Reuss. "Die Entdeckung Europas." (Stuttgart: Gewerkschaftlich Monatshefte, 1950), p. 363. This is a clear reference to the British Empire, an attitude no doubt expressive of a national opinion evidenced in the British rejection of a plan put forward by Briand at the Geneva League of Nations meeting on 5 September 1929, for an economic and political union in Europe. A 17 May 1930 French Memorandum demanding a "United Staates of Europe" suffered the same rejection. See European Integration. op. cit. p. 11.

[84]In Zurich, Churchill said (19.9.1946), "I am now going to say something that will astonish you. The first step in the recreation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. . . ." The aim of the 'partnership' was first and foremost peace. Quoted in Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation, Die Europaishe Wirtschaftrat. (Bonn: FMEC Handbuch, 1956), p. 9.

[85]On 5.6.1947, American Secretary of State George Marshall recommended a programme of European reconstruction under the condition that all countries should draw up an

overall plan which should apply to all. In a Harvard speech, he said, "It is evident that before the U.S. government can proceed much further to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on the way to recover, there must be some agreement among countries of Europe on the requirements of the situation, and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this Government." Quoted in Der Europaishe Wirtshaftrat. op. cit. p. 15.

[86]It is difficult to attach dates to political events. However 2nd July 1947 may be designated as the date on which Europe was divided between East and West. Along with the Russian refusal were those of Poland, Czechoslavakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Roumania, and Yugoslavia.

[87]The Western Zone signing a Convention on European Cooperation (16.4.1948) which lead to the OECD, later the OECD in Paris. See H. Rieben, Die Schweiz und der Gemeinsame Markt. (Lausanne: Centre de recherches eurpeeenes, Ecole des H.E.C., Universite de Lausanne, 1960), N.B. p. 23ff.

[88]W. Rohn, Europa Organisert Sich. (Berlin: W. Schmidt-Verlan, 1955), p. 29.

[89]See text of French Foreign Minister Robert Schumann's Press Conference in Paris (9 May, 1950) in Robert Schumann, Europaische Gemeinshaft. (Bonn: Verbindungsbund der Europaishen Gemeinschaften, 1961).

[90]Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. op. cit. p. 17ff.

[91]Loc. cit. p. 22.

[92]They looked at the U.S., U.K., Germany, Italy, and Mexico. Reference here will be made to the European portion of their research.

[93]Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. op. cit. p. 80.

[94]Loc. cit. p. 81.

[95]Loc. cit. p. 82.

[96]Loc. cit. p. 87.

[97]Loc. cit. p. 89. It may be useful to think in terms of the television as an educational medium. This is supported by the general proclivity for individuals to watch daily news broadcasts. This 'education' heightens a knowledge of current events and either passive participation (one does not react) or active participation (one is outraged or so otherwise motivated to write, demonstrate, discuss with neighbours, ad infinitum). This is an area of behaviour-pattern noted in the literature. An excellent overview is found in Trigant Burrow, The Neurosis of Man. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), pp. 81ff., 99ff., and its effects on bias, pp. 28-29ff.

[98]Almond and Verba, Loc. cit. p. 89.

[99]Loc. cit. p. 94.

[100]Loc. cit.

[101]This relates to elites, individuals capable of focusing attention. For a lead into elite theory, see

Arnold Brecht, Political Theory. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), p. 58ff.

[102]The seminal work on elites is Vilfredo Pareto, Mind and Society. Translated by Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston. (New York: Harcourt, 1935), but reference is also made to Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of Elites: Introduction and Bibliography. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1952).

[103]Lasswell focuses on the association of concepts originating in society being pinpointed and labeled by elites, elites who are essentially drawn from that society. He noted, "The elite of democracy (the ruling class) is society-wide." Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Personality. (New York: 1948), p. 108.

[104]Thomas Carlyle, Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the Heroic in History. (New York: Alburt, 1841), p. 15.

[105]Thomas Carlyle, "On History," in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays. (New York: Appleton, 1871), p. 22.

[106]Lasswell and Kaplan, Power and Personality. p. 201.

[107]Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class. Translated by Hannah D. Kahn. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937), p. 71. Etzioni himself advanced the idea that groups with fewer elites are more likely to be successful, a matter of focusing and not defusing attention. The hypothesis being, "Unions having one elite will be more successful than those having two, those with two more than those with three." Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification. (New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1965), p. 69.

[108]See further material in the following which relates to a contemporary version of the concept of a ruling class. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

[109]J. Roland Pennock and David G. Smith, Political Science. (New York: Macmillan, 1964), p. 74.

[110]Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957), pp. 51-59, 64-70.

[111]Pennock and Smith, Political Science. p. 75.

[112]V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy. (New York: Knoph, 1961), p. 14.

[113]Between states especially, see Robert J. Ervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 70ff.

[114]Success of which is shown by history, see J.G.A. Pocock, "Political Ideas as Historical Events," in Melvin Richter, ed., Political Theory and Political Education. (New York: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 139ff.

[115]See, for Etzioni's analysis on unions where he relates success to fewer elites, James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzfraff, Jr., Contending Theories and International Relations. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 428.

[116]Robert Owen, Book of the New Moral World. (London: Effargham Wilson, 1836), pp. 74-75.

[117]Lee Cameron McDonald, Western Political Theory: The Modern Age. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,

1962), p. 497.

[116]Ernst Wistrich, "Promoting the European Identity," in Bernard Burrows, Geoffrey Denton, Geoffrey Edwards, ed., Federal Solutions to European Identity. (London: The Federal Trust, 1977), pp. 62-63.

[117]See M. Spicer, "An Argument for a European Nation," in New Europe. (Spring 1976), cited in loc. cit. p. 63.

[120]EuroBarometer. 25(June 1986):22.

[121]A Gallup Poll quoted in loc. cit. pp. 24-25. It may also have to do with the fact that the older group of Britons had a negative experience with Europe in the form of world war.

[122]Table 19 in loc. cit. pp. 35-38. In order to glean these results, the questioners asked, "For each country, please say whether, in your opinion, they [the other EC members] are in general trustworthy, fairly trustworthy, not particularly trustworthy, or not at all trustworthy?" EuroBarometer. 25(June 1986):26.

[123]Table 25 in loc. cit. p. 47.

[124]For indication of how these figures were derived, sampling methodology and sample structure reference is made to loc. cit., pp. 64-65. It is difficult to postulate why nations tend to but little trust their nationals. It may be related to domestic political perceptions. Trust is important because "Europe is not a simple thing, because it is not a concept which everyone can construe in his own way: it is a realistic enterprise requiring not only technical powers, but a nation's trust in itself and trust in the good faith of its partners." Quoted by Pierre Werner in Les racines et l'oeuvre d'un grand Europeen Robert Schumann, a brochure produced for the centenary of the birth of Robert Schumann. (Luxembourg: June 1986). From loc. cit. p. 46.

[125]A speech by Roy Pryce, European Commission Director of Information, (August 1986) printed in part in Bernard Burrows, et.al., European Solutions of European Issues. op. cit. pp. 64-65.

[126]Banknotes, membership, stamps, habits, customs, flags, anthems, national ceremonies, etc.

[127]Burrows, et.al., Federal Solutions to European Issues. pp. 66-67.

[128]See Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock Publications, 1952). For internalisation of expressive symbols, see p. 387; of cultural patterns, pp. 36-45; and of value acquisition, pp. 52,53,211.

[129]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1978), see especially p. 84, also pp. 20,21,178-180,290.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Knowledge

The process of socialisation, as discussed in chapter two of this paper, demonstrated the linkage between integration and learning. As society expands, contact, confrontation, communication, exchange, and ultimately dependence, both physical and psychological, result. Individuals are drawn through the process into quantitatively expanded integrated collectivities.

The expanding society process is virtually identical with the individual process. A child becomes aware of, communicates, and exchanges with, others, developing interdependencies, and integrating with ever increasing sectors of society as he grows and matures. Learning precedes integration. The learning process itself is a process of knowledge accumulation.

Applying this basically functional process to the notion of expanded, integrated Europe would suggest that the more knowledge of otherness, the greater the potential for integrated society. But is this so? Is knowledge alone sufficient?

This section commences with a review of current teaching practices in Europe, specifically language learning in schools, to determine the degree of otherness being taught to school age children. Language learning incoporates a process of other-awareness and may be used as an indicator of European learning. The greater the learning intensity, the greater the acquired knowledge of the subject societies.[1] Increased knowledge of others enhances the

possibilities for the creation of ties. The amount of language (foreign) learning going on in Europe, may, under this assumption, be instrumental and overall, beneficial in the creation of pan-European ties.

In order to isolate the language learning taking place, it is necessary to make a few locative remarks.

Table 8.1
Age at which compulsory education begins and ends[a] (as of 1977)[aa]

	Begins	Terminates	Average Duration
Austria	6	15	9
Belgium	6	14	8
Denmark	7	16	9
Finland	7	16	8-9
France	6	16	10
Germany	6	15[b]	9
Greece	5 1/2	15-16	9
Iceland	7	16	9
Ireland	6	15	9
Italy	6	14	8
Luxembourg	6	15	9
Netherlands	6	16	10
Norway	7	16	10
Portugal[c]	6	14	8
Spain	6	16	10
Sweden	7	16	9
Switzerland	6-7	14-16	8-9
United Kingdom	5	16	11

[a]In countries where beginning and ending dates are not uniform, the range is given.

[b]In Germany, part-time compulsory until age 18

[c]In practice, termination is on reaching 12-13.

Source: Composed of a summarisation of materials presented in the appendix of this paper gleaned from a myriad of domestic ministries therein referenced.

Table 8.1 indicates the extent of the compulsory schooling undergone by the young in Europe. Outside of

the home, the school is the primary source of learning. Hence, the position 'learned' in the school setting is fundamentally instrumental in the building of the overall opinion held by the young.

Table 8.2
The average age ranges for the level of education is:[3]
(Abbreviations: P=primary, S=secondary, H=higher (post secondary, or tertiary), C=compulsory, N=non-compulsory)

	P	S	H	C	N
Austria	6-9	10-18	19-23	6-14	19-23
Belgium	6-11	12-18	19-23	6-13	14-23
Denmark	7-11	12-19	20-24	7-15	16-24
Finland	7-13	14-18	19-23	7-15	16-23
France	6-10	11-17	18-22	6-15	16-22
Germany	6-9	10-18	19-23	6-14	15-23
Greece	6-11	12-17	18-22	6-11	12-22
Ireland	6-11	12-16	17-21	6-14	15-21
Italy	6-10	11-18	19-23	6-13	14-23
Netherlands	6-11	12-17	18-22	6-15	16-22
Norway	7-13	14-19	20-24	7-15	16-24
Portugal	7-10	11-18	19-24	7-12	13-24
Spain	6-9	10-17	18-22	6-15	16-22
Sweden	7-12	13-18	19-23	7-15	16-23
United Kingdom	5-10	11-18	19-23	5-16	17-23

(The omissions of Iceland, Switzerland, and Luxembourg related to OECD presentational omissions.)

Source: Composed from a summarisation of materials presented in the appendix of this paper.

Language learning, a basic source of 'otherness' learning, increases as the child progresses through the school system. Table 8.2 illustrates the compulsory component of the average extent of educational possibilities within European systems.

What is important is the focus on compulsory

education. Although language education is distributed throughout the educational curricula, the compulsory exposure, as an indication of a minimal exposure, is of importance.

The appendix hereto attached presents a profile of compulsory education in Western Europe, highlighting the extreme diversity of formal education being offerred. The diversity reflects operational assumptions of those particular collectivities.

Given the diversity of eduction streamings and programmes, the following may be gleaned as a sound assumption of the average school leaver's exposure to a second foreign language.

Table 8.3
(Abbreviations: A=Not possible to conclude compulsory educational system without having had a high exposure to at least one second language. B=difficult to leave school without a second language. C=The norm is to have had a significant exposure. D=Very much possible to have not had significant exposure. E=Exposure marginal to nil.)

Austria	B	Belgium	B
Denmark	A	Finland	B
France	C	Germany	B-C
Ireland	E	Italy	C-D
Luxembourg	A	Netherlands	B-C
Norway	A	Portugal	E
Sweden	A	Switzerland	A
United Kingdom	C-D		

Source: Composed from a summarisation of materials presented in the appendix.

If Switzerland were used as a multi-linguistic example of a successful political and economic homogeneous entity, it is correct to infer that, on the

individual level, a basic knowledge of at least one other language contributes toward the effective solidarity of that multi-lingual collectivity. Although it possesses four 'national languages', a significant knowledge of 'other languages' appears to be operational, this affords a basis for a communications-community. A communications-community is capable of making significant and meaningful cross-group ties on and at the biographical level. Here, linguistic ability gives the impression of aiding the building of a collectivity.

From this impression may be gleaned an approach to Europeanisation. This somewhat typical approach appears to be a pattern. Small continental countries tend to place a higher formal significance on language learning. These countries also tend to place a degree of importance on 'otherness' or social learning by supporting such in other than language classes.

Belgium, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands, as countries stressing language learning, seem also to place an average emphasis on Structural Europeanism,[4] the idea of a single European area; Denmark, however, does not. This may be economically linked, as both the Danish satisfaction with life,[5] and general happiness[6] are higher than the Benelux countries, and so is their disposable per-capita income.[7]

If the notion of Europeanisation is correlated with trust (table 7.9, p. 348ff.), the smaller countries which appear to emphasize language learning appear also to

trust their European neighbours more than do large countries that do not.[8] Amongst Community countries, core countries seem to register higher degrees of Europeanism than do periphery countries, multi-language countries more than monolingual, poorer countries more than richer countries.[9]

This seems to suggest a relationship between economic and political motifs with social integration motifs. This is the du ut des syndrome. Because of this linkage, the Community polling material cannot be made sufficiently unbiased to yield adequate image material.

Language learning itself does not ensure integrational feelings. It only better equips the individual with first hand knowledge of others which may or may not lead toward a greater understanding and eventual feeling of commonality. Such learning is generally a component of education which itself is an "organized and sustained communication designed to bring about learning."[10] Formal learning is influenced by the state, either positively as in the case of Austria, where "otherness" is examined neutrally and the idea of Europe is forwarded, essentially as an ideology, or negatively, such as in Britain where the idea of Europe is pragmatic, very political, and inextricably intertwined with the organisation of the European Community, and as such not encouraged.[11] The state's position, as socialisation leader of its nationals, has a key influence on public consciousness.

To the question, why is Europe not integrating, one must look to the state, and the answer appears to indicate that there is no significantly manifest desire for such integration to take place, other than that which is economically or politically necessary du ut des. Sir Geoffrey Howe's speech to the London Chamber of Commerce (3 April 1987) fairly typically forwarded the position of Britain toward Europe - one of personal gain,[12] a position more or less typical of European fellow EC domestic governments. Despite the erosion to sovereignty in the political, social, and economic spheres, governments appear reluctant to foster the idea of Europe as an ideology. Fostering such an idea could be termed social engineering, and the critique may be leveled: why should such a European idea be planted in the minds of the individuals? The obverse is also a legitimate consideration, the fact that self-identity is fostered, why should that be crystallised and implanted?

The fact that a national identity appears to take precedence over that of a European identity suggests that governments are socialising their populations against Europeanisation. National currencies, flags, and war memorials in churches, postage stamps, sport competitions, and a myriad of other phenomena all carry distinct national bias. All of these influences underwrite the individual's learning process, his awareness, and perception of others. This awareness is nation-oriented. The general learning process produces a

general "knowledge" cathexized in the individual on the uniqueness of particularism.

Knowledge: A Precondition for Awareness

An individual's attitudes not only embody a provisional appraisal of what for him is significant reality; they also serve to mediate the kinds of relationships he maintains with others and the kind of conception of self that he wants to maintain.[13]

> For any society, an existential base creating certain common experiences interpreted through certain cultural premises by men with certain personal qualities in the light of certain social conflicts produces certain political ideologies.[14]

Attitudes and ideologies highly correlate. An existential base - "subject and term explicated by the sociology of knowledge" - is the social vehicle of any questioned ideology.[15]

Because of an inherent compulsion to believe certain core elements of a given belief system,[16] there is a general goal reference or telos common to a given society toward which, either consciously or partly unconsciously, ideologies and beliefs group. States of Europe appear to be supporting domestic national ideology.

Common experience indicates common thought, and is a subscribed common function by which society develops cohesiveness.[17] The cultural premises are commonly found values, epistemologies, and particular specific beliefs.[18] The individual input is the effect of the sum total of personal qualities applied during social

conflict, the elevation of tensions in the system, and the prime inducement for change.[19] The individual input, his personal qualities, bear influential weight on the formation of his political ideologies or attitudes. Hence, individual endowments influence attitudes. Individual endowments, given a degree of normality, are the product of socialisation.[20] "If what is learned early in life is indeed influential in later years, the implications of early idealisation may be of singular importance,"[21] when understanding why people think as they do. Early idealisation is the product of early socialisation, which may be summarised as early learning equals early education. In Europe, this period of first learning is highly biased toward the particularistic.[22]

Early learning and environmental learning, have both a positive and a negative bearing toward perceptions of others.[23] Positive learning in an environment positively disposed to outsiders, tends to greater degrees of acceptance and possible trust. Conversely, negative learning in a negatively disposed environment, tends toward perceptions of hostility.

> All the general problems of perception and communication inherent in any interpersonal, intergroup, or interstate relationship are invariably exacerbated in nearly direct proportion to the intensity of the threat perceived by the units in a conflict situation.[24]

Groups' perceptions are always changing, representing

ideological change brought about by circumstances such as modernisation and other events in the normal passage of time. Ideology is a prime effective instrument of power[25] when directionally and goal orientedly manipulated. In the hands of institutions, it becomes an effective force akin to power. In terms of national identity, ideology, when intertwined with the nation "could be one of the major instruments for . . . developing"[26] commonalities. Once identification is made, the individual, reinforced by symbols, is often willing to sacrifice a great deal for the sake of that commonality.[27]

Education is a major factor in the creation of knowledge.[28] Knowledge of identity, ideology, and (broadly) group, is a major force in the creation and cohesion of the nation, either consciously or semi-consciously, employed by a system for the solidarity of a nation-state commonality.[29] Education enhances perspective. It is responsible for a positive disposition toward others and otherness. When inwardly focussed, it frequently develops xenophobia. Narrowly focussed, it crystallises the notion of collectivity, constricting the individuals to the nation. If the parameters were relaxed and redrawn, it would promote crystallisation of the individual in a multi-nation perspective.[30]

An Example

A recent report by the Youth Offices of the Federal German armed forces drew attention to the problem of perception and perspective currently held by the young with regard to their national security. "The understanding of the basic principles of our security policy is made difficult by the fact that many young people lack a historical knowledge . . . [they are] . . . suffering also from a blurring of concepts."[31] Lamenting the lack of commitment by the young to traditional European security questions and views of remedial problem solving action, it indirectly but forcefully underlined the fact that history or historical knowledge is paramount toward cognitive perceptions. Is a militarily secure peace, 'non-peace,' or is the concept of law and order in society, a 'structural violence'? The answer is based on perceptional orientation gleaned through the early learning process. These perceptional views demonstrate the mighty tool of knowledge when controlled by established authority, which can greatly affect the culturalisation of the young through structured imagery projection, through education, media, etc.

If for Europe, the media portrays the tripolarity or multipolarity of the world system in terms of superpowers, is it any wonder that sociologically Europeans view issues in abstract terms?[32]

This abstractness may lead toward a creation of a

listlessness, or disengagement. The mental and sometimes physical conflict induced into the system by change is the result of cultural lag. Cultural lag is when traditional solutions and arrangements are no longer compatible with the demands of newer needs. To provide all that is needed, to give purpose and significance to new solutions, is "an enormous educational task involving politicians, political scientists, historians, sociologists, trade unionists, media experts and the clergy."[33] It is the product of knowledge, and highly susceptible to the bias placed on the received knowledge of the system.

Collective knowledge, channeled through social collectivity, had a great bearing on the development and construction of the national consciousness evidenced during the nation building period of European history. Collective learning is, in effect, dependent upon the knowledge available to the collectivity as a whole. Its importance was illustrated by Richard Rose in a sample highlighting the case of Britain, as below:

Table 8.4
Justification for Supporting Systems of Government

	Agree %	Disagree %	Don't know %
It's the best form of government we know	77	19	4
It's the kind of government the people want	66	25	9
We've got to accept it, whatever we think	65	32	3
It usually provides the right things for people	49	40	10
It's good because it's traditional	44	49	7

Source: Politics in England Today. (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 127, table IV.1.

Governments reinforce national society through the fact that it is all that is fundamentally known; in other words, not much else is known. This may be expanded to include the notion that as not much is known about otherness, our-ness is the best.

It is not surprising that the idea of nationality and eventually nationhood went side by side with the general advances of popular literacy and numeracy associated with broadening general education.[34] The spread of education in Western Europe produced greater popular knowledge of self and of otherness in the already existing nations of Europe, and significantly added the development and conceptualisation of self amongst the newer states.[35]

> Once the process of group consciousness started, there appear also the deliberate pioneers and leaders of national awakening. There appear grammarians who reduce the popular speech to

> writing; purifiers of language; collectors of folk epics, tales and songs: first the poets and writers in the revised vernacular: and the antiquarians and historians who discover ancient documents and literary treasures - some genuine, some forged, but all of them tokens of national greatness.[36]

National pride and symbols arise, such as Rule Britannia, Marseillaise in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Deutschland uber alles in the twentieth, which support particularisms and highlight exclusion of others. Symbols, maps, anthems, flags are taught and impressed upon the young by educational processes, national indoctrination by informal group pressure and the media of mass communications as well as "by all the coercive powers of the state and its system of compulsory public education."[37]

This notion of collective consciousness is built on the idea of communications and is why nationalism and nation state building is highly correlated with language. Accepting this reasoning supports the idea that a nation is formed and evolves when reinforced through communications, when a . . .

> relatively large community of human beings has been brought into existence who can communicate effectively with each other, and who have command over sufficient economic resources to maintain themselves and to transmit this ability for mutual communications to their children as well.[38]

A human network of communications exists when such a system is capable of self-maintenance and reproduction, and has a potential for further developing self. This definition ties collective knowledge to communications

and the notion of an autonomous environment. This was the pattern of development historically in Western Europe. But is the degree of knowledge, communication, and autonomy necessary for sustaining particularistic units still present in the European international system? Autonomy, as indicated by modern life, may be passe in Europe.[39] The precocity of associations with limited collectivities may be challenged by advancements in learning, widening the barriers to traditional European entities. The communications - economic sustainment - reproductive chain, is weakening. The indication is that the advanced world is becoming rapidly non-autonomous, more generally knowledgeable, and mono-linguistic.[40] Unbiased knowledge is becoming a functional necessity to modern life.[41]

In the past, the nation state environment accounted for the stable condition necessary for expanded development and the growth necessary for the diffusion of best practices in technology and commerce. This environment was also responsible for the founding of manufacturing, for a self-propulsion of market forces,[42] and for an inward focus of learning. The EEC, as a customs union provided for the freedom of movement of goods and of factors of production, basically an enlargement of an area constructed for efficiency in resource allocation in an environment where discrimination was absent.[43] It was in this respect

only an economic extension of the national collectivity. These spatial arrangements are, in the light of technological advance, becoming challenged, restrictive and, in some respects, non-advantageous. Knowledge is thrusting exchange beyond such frontiers.

Western democracies, functioning *via* a received popular mandate, require an intellectual level equivalent to the challenges of modern society if that democracy is to find its optimal position in a multinational order. Current international socialisation is primarily characterised by *interactions*, mostly *transactions* of an economic nature, with little effective individual impact regarding fundamental, generally held, knowledge of 'otherness'.

Cycles of Development

In history, there have been cycles of activity characterised by periods in which domestic entities both developed internally and related to others externally in an ever-changing international system. The period, from 1845 to 1875,[44] was a hegemonic period, centring around the role of Britain.

From 1875 to 1945 was a period in which all features were reversed. It was a non-hegemonic order, which was followed by another period (1945-70), which was a new hegemonic order similar to the first but with the United States as the fulcrum.[45] Since 1970, the international system has changed again toward a non-hegemonic or polar hegemony, with the breakdown of

Bretton Woods, the energy crises, and latterly the financial crisis of the modern period.

A hegemony is like a centaur, half man, half beast, a combination of consent and coercion, [46] leading, guiding, directing political, economic, and to some extent, social activities. Its present absence means, for Europe, a loss of leadership as an identification role model. The choice of what is to come next in Western European democracies, is ultimately a decision depending on the democratic polity. It will be a product of that polity's general knowledge.

In a Rousseauean sense, "Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains."[47] The chains are of his own making, through structuralisation of society and arrangements of convention. Decisions made are taken within the context of reference. The structuralisation of society, in an economically advanced capitalistic society constitutes both points of reference and chains. Capital, the spirit of individual advantage (entrepreneurship, the urge to make a profit), markets implying means of transportation, wage workers (separation between ownership and wage earner), the acquisition of raw materials, and capital intensive industry[48] require, because of the great abstraction, separation of the individual from economic transactions. The result is a high degree of structuralisation, organisation, for assurances of fluidity of the system.

The arrangements of conventions, needed in a

harmoniously functioning complex society may likewise be considered as chains. Forces, institutional or sociologically moral, function as cohesive binding agents, as substance moulding individuals into set patterns of behaviour. The "economic history of modern Europe is the record of the impact of industrialism upon an older and more stable organisation."[49] The impact of econcomic development, that is, increasingly sophisticated transactions, relates to the requirement for higher degrees of structuralisation within the system, necessitated for the transmission of knowledge and know how. The impact is in increased organisation of society.

This increase of organisation produces tensions. Two positions are evident and suggestive of these tensions. On one hand, "one man is made to carry human knowledge to its furthest point," and on the other, "many find the ability to read a dangerous thing."[50] Tension brings about a quest for freedom from tension, through a need for control by subjective dictates and critical thinking. This action provides the force for social cohesion or ethical ties. The tools needed for society to make a choice are controlled by the authority in those societies.

Authority

Tension raises an interesting phenomenon, the question of authority. The sociological movement over time, aided by philosophical reasoning, has focused

attention in Western culture, on the individual.[51] The concept of democratically free societies are the result. The political authoritarianism of the past has been the focus of that movement. The result has been the diffusion of authority from a central sovereign above society to an authoritarian web of government encircling society. Previously, authority if one so desired, was far removed from the individual. He could get on with this need fulfillment as a nominalist, only marginally associated with the sovereign. Today, governmental penetration into the individual's private life is such that authority structures are constantly evident, frequently causing tension amongst individuals, between individuals and society, or government in general.

As the individuals' interests are centred within their own world, the interests of others are, for them, 'less urgent',[52] and in order for governmental authority to be recognised, it must penetrate the private world, underwriting authority through communication.[53] Individuals in sociological settings have perceptions and thoughts shaped through language.[54] As a good deal of interpersonal communications is an attempt to locate with words and signals, "the quantitative coordinates of a given relationship along a finely textured matrix of interactions."[55]

Concepts are perceptual lenses for shaping thought.[56] For authority to be recognised, and to be brought into the near-zones of individual life,

communication must be structured to so yield that result. It is not by accident that the term Parliament stems from the verb parier, to speak.[57] Governments paint pictures through speech, "strong talk," "election talk," "official comment," and "negotiation." These are pictures that image their authority. Words (verba) are suggestive of deeds (facta). Higher degrees of literacy, associated with greater developed cognitive evalutional abilities, make it increasingly more possible for the individual to personally evaluate actions of governments. Governments are forced through language (or the lack of disclosure) to fortify their positions to prevent inroads into authority. Authority and the individual, as divergencies arise, are placed into the resulting tension situations. For authority as sovereignty, must ultimately be recognised. A modern state cannot "achieve a comfortable monopoly over the use of social communication. Consequently, the authority of the state is uncertain and unabsolute, constantly threatened."[58] The control that governments have, although not exclusive, relates to the formation of ideas. Power is exercised through the educational system.

Communication is conducted within the functional parameters of a culture. The parameters of culture also include a codified system of beliefs,[59] for communication implies both deliverance and acceptance of concepts. Both, in order to be effective, have to be within the same contextual restraints. Hence, belief

systems[60] support communications and likewise support authority. This was first theorised by Weber who related the nature of a belief to its source.

> Charismatic Nature of Belief
> Belief that an individual (group) is enclosed with superhuman abilities to make good decisions for a collectivity
> Charismatic Source of Belief
> Religions: Scripture, prophecy, signs, etc.
> Secular: Demonstrated abilities, personal attractiveness
>
> Traditional Nature of Belief
> Belief based on length of acceptance, opposed to 'new' untried concepts (ancient)
> Traditional Source of Belief
> Custom, habit, superstition, conviction, etc.
>
> Rational-Legal Nature of Belief
> The System embodies highest levels of normative efficiency, effectiveness, etc. Protected by constitutional guarantees
> Rational-Legal Source of Belief
> Sophisticated indoctrination, presupposing widespread literacy and growth of bureaucracy as cause and effect of system.[61]

Authority structures in Western Europe spread throughout the above schema, however, governmental authority is at this point in historical development centralised around a Rational-Legal posture.[62] The strengths of rational-legal authority rest on a degree of programmed acculturation in a conditional collectivity of high literacy.[63] This is the biased knowledge presented in school, available and compulsory for all new society members.

The individual's freeing of self from traditional conceptualisations of authority in Western historical

evolution has been produced by the general acceleration of advances in knowledge and in its accumulation. It has been related to the increased emphases on the individual in Occidental Cultural evolution. Where once political authority may have rested upon common belief systems, ideologies, or ethics (based on Christianity), it is now anchored in duty, power, and physical restraints (as found in capitalism). As literacy advances, indoctrination becomes more intense. It has been suggested in literature that[64] the post-industrial societal trend is toward an anti-institutionalism, a trend which supports a new hedonism, a hedonism based on affluence and on a commercially fostered ethic of consumption. In many respects, this anti-insitutionalism, the break-up of a social order, is highly individualistic, based on immediate, impulsive gratification of needs.[65]

Hedonism may be a trend toward a new standard based on action, related not to conceptualised authority but on responsibilities of acting, and upon personal insights.[66] This is a counter-culture movement, borne out by new styles of management, new structural ethics, secularisation of religion, human potential movements, self-realisation, self-improvement, etc., which suggests that new hedonism is a stress on simplicity and community, shaped by personal freedom. The expressions of personal freedom are shaped by learning, or the absence of same.

The extension of authoritarian considerations, intertwined with the learning process, illustrates the cause-effect relationship of society interaction, specifically, the great effect institutionalised learning has on the belief structure of society.

In a study of British children, Dowse and Hughes found that the higher the educational level of parents of children, as well as the child's own education, the higher the political awareness and general knowledge.

Table 8.5
Children's political knowledge as a function of their education, parents' education and class

(Abbreviations: H=high, L=low)

Rank	Parents' Education	Parents' Social Class	Child's Education	Child's Rank on Political Knowledge	% High Political Knowledge
A	H	H	H	1	87
B	L	H	H	2	69
C	H	L	H	3	63
D	L	L	H	4	59
E	L	H	L	5	18
F	H	L	L	6	13
G	H	H	L	7	12
H	L	L	L	8	7

Source: Robert E. Dowse and John Hughes, "The Family, the School, and the Political Socialisation Process," in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology. (London: Macmillan Press, 1976), p. 188, table 88. The conclusion, as well as the methodology, is contained therein.

As the demonstrated political knowledge of the new inductees to a political culture is heavily biased by his own and his parents' education, the tendency is that the more authoritarian the system, the more authoritarian the

child. There is a direct linkage. Conversely, it is to be noted, if the system were liberal, or indeed had any other orientation or ideological persuasion, it could also be theoretically socialised in the young.

The obvious question is, do the institutions of society consciously attempt to control socialisational development or is it by chance? The answer may be "both." The fact that the system is there, does indeed mean that is exercises an influential force. However, the conformity to any set patterns of behaviour is enforced. Further, if one were to take England as an example, historical evidence does show occasional bias toward social engineering. In the language of the Old Poor Law, the chief aim of education was "to set the poor on work."[67] Education had a specific aim. The aim or purpose of education is not here of issue. What is important here, is that there is a bias which is exercising control over the educational process, either directly or indirectly, and, through that process, the system in general.

In a study on the 1974 British election coverage, those that watched the government broadcasting system registered the following satisfaction:

Table 8.6
Views on the Impartiality of the BBC Coverage of the 1974 Election Campaign

Completely satisfied	38%
Less than completely satisfied	62%

Source: "The February 1974 General Election on Television," A BBC Audience Research Department Report, in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics. (Macmillan, 1976), adapted from table 10, p. 304.

Although different respondees perceived the coverage differently, 62% found it somehow biased.

The increased concentration of ownership of the media, as illustrated below, would present also the potentiality for the transmission of knowledge with a distinct bias.

Table 8.7
Concentration of Ownership of Daily and Sunday Newspapers

The three leading corporations' percentage share of:

	Total Daily and Sunday Circulation	Total Daily Circulation	Total Sunday	National Daily	National Sunday
1948	46	45	61	62	60
1961	65	67	84	89	84
1976	64	49	80	72	86

The Proportion of the Total Market Accounted for by the Leading Five Companies in Selected Main Media Sectors in Percentages

		% Controlled by the leading five
Commercial Television Programmes	(transmitted)	50
National Dailies	(circulation)	91
National Sundays	(circulation)	96

Source: David Coates, The Context of British Politics. (London: Hutchinson, 1984), adapted from table 33, p. 209.

The basic growth of the individual from authoritarian acceptance to critical thinking and ultimate responsibility are actions which may eventually challenge existent establishmentarianism. This is done by seeking new future alternatives to social arrangements quite distinct from current authoritarian structures. This action is a dichotomy as the individuals' growth (knowledge accessibility) is controlled, to a great extent, by those social institutions which may ultimately be challenged by those very same individuals.

Discussion

Collective behavioural control may be through either conditioned or moralistic alternatives, or through socially imposed image-precepts called rights or wrongs.[68] These psychological restraints on action, along with physical restraints are both controlled and developed by states through governments. "All the ties that hold men together in any society, all the needs and all the hopes that depend on their society for realisation, prompt them to law-abidingness."[69] Compatible interaction based on law-abidingness produces a 'mystic' civil obedience, and is based on "Custom . . . affective ties . . . a purely material complex of interests, or . . . ideal motives,"[70] and develops a type of legitimacy. This interactional accomodation and subscription to basic behavioural patterns is the result of socialisation and because of the prominence in the process of the educational learning process, amounts to

learning effectively controlled by governments.

One learns the acceptance of traditional authority or the acceptance of a given position or view by the "handing down" process.[71] The political framework of socialisation is institutional, family, peer group, the school system. social groupings and eventually secondary institutions such as political parties or associations.[72] The stages in socialisation are generally first (1) submissive, (2) accountable, and (3) participatory.[73] The difficulty of deciding ultimately what "motive" is operational for having individuals obey authority is appreciated when realising that authorities almost always possess at least potential power and influence. The difficulty is in ascertaining whether subscription is through desire or obedience, or simply a kind of "anticipated reaction" in response to the power or influence that underlies authority. In other words, when does authority really work as authority?[74]

Oppenheim suggests, "Those in power normally succeed in securing compliance with their decisions simply because they possess authority."[75] That is because individuals "have formed the habit of considering official enactments to have binding force, regardless of whether they approve of them" or not. In his consideration of Herrshaft, Weber found that a command with a specific content will be obeyed by individuals out of the "probability that by virtue of habituation, a

command will receive prompt and automatic obedience."[76] In other words, "when the [desired] behaviours do not occur there is no authority, whatever may be the" proper "theory of organisation."[77]

Authority, in order to be such, must be recognised. States claim national authority. By both physical and institutional means, they enforce that position. When not done successfuly, tensions develop and eventually the questioning of authority leads to a crisis of authority. Such a crisis is a result of knowledge introduced into the socialisation process free from the prevailing bias. It is based on a perceptual change taking place in the minds of the collective individuals, divergent from that held by the power authority. Resistance or opposition to traditional forces, is frequently induced by modernisation and the fact that things today are not as they were before. So the answers of today's problems would not necessarily be those that answered yesterday's problems.

In as much as organised behavior results "when each of the coordinated individuals sets for himself a criterion of choice that makes his own behaviour dependent on the behaviour of others" in complex society, the individual "sets himself a general rule which permits the communicated decision of another to guide his own choices."[78] Patterns of normality are important. These are, generally, the sum total of projected or received patterns, emitting from the institution. Higher

literacy challenges acceptance and conformity to the patterns after a degree of independence is reached.

"An individual on becoming associated with an organisation, will be more likely to adopt its goals in place of his own if he has hope of changing those he finds unsatisfactory or repugnant."[79] This is a fundamental idea embodied in democracies and in integration. An internal functioning of the individual in systems through perceptions of participation in one or all institutional benefits is necessary. A failure to so perceive participation tends toward dis-integration. This institutionalisation of authority aims at the smooth continuation of collective action, failure leads to disfunctions.[80]

As life is "experienced everyday . . . in terms of differentiating degrees of closeness and remoteness[81]," otherness knowledge, its application and appreciation is the key to successful integration. However, as knowledge expands the requirements of the individual for greater amounts of learning, all forms of authority come into question. The heterodoxy is that, on the one side, the system is trying to influence socialisation to assure its legitimacy, and, on the other, that legitimacy is being challenged by the increasing levels of literacy.[82]

This paper has argued that most of this knowledge has been filtered through a state-led social system and

biased toward the maintenance of that system. This view substantiates the fact that states' insistence on sovereignty, the prima facie inhibitor to further European integration, is a claim based and perpetuated by the domestic states' own action. Can these be overcome?

This paper has put forward the role of Elites in society as one which enables the population to focus on ideas and thus cause action to be accomplished by society's collective efforts. Here, is appreciated both the functionalist and the neo-functionalist views. The functionalists see society integrating, through the process of socialisation and the Neo-Functionalist sees it happening by way of elite-led activity.[84] Chapter 7 quoted Thomas Carlyle, who noted that history appears to be a compilation of biographies of individuals. By virtue of the fact that certain individuals' names appear to be transmitted to further generations, there appears to be an implication of importance attached to the accomplishments of those individuals. In many respects, a good portion of these may be considered the elites of their period.

In illustrating the ideological beginnings of German unity in chapter seven, this paper presented the effect of a concerted action amongst elites. In the German model, elites fixed onto and projected one common idea, the collective totality of man. Out of this idea, the idealism of a German-ness evolved. Lessing's Nathan der Weise, specifically the "ring parable," and Beethoven's

Ninth Symphony (fourth movement ode: "Alle Menshen werden Bruder") are but two examples. If for nothing else, both of these individuals are in the history books for their appeal to a higher ideal.

Who are those amongst the elites of today that will go down in the biographies of history as integration elites?

If Monnet is considered as one, it is the suggestion here that, in the post-Monnet era, there has been an inexorable decline of idealism, a lack of a concerted voice focussing the attention of the masses on Europeanism. Unfortunately most elites[83] are not completely self disinterested servants of the public.[84] Their "circulation" is an important mechanism of social equilibrium,[85] and as orientations tend to be less ideological and more pragmatic,[86] they frequently take on the characteristic of a ruling elite, a minority whose performance regularly prevails in cases of potentialities of conflict over what become political issues.[87] These elites tend to be power elites.[88] Power elites are highly pragmatic, vis a vis ideological and tend to be biased.[89]

Eventual integration depends on the total integration of society, not necessarily elite portions of that society. If the elite portions integrate and stimulate further domestic support for integration a la bonne heure. Such action would be an isogogic step requiring internalisation amongst the masses over time.

In British history, the events of 1066 may be considered of this sort. The events of 1215, however, suggest that it was not successful. In Politics in England Today, Richard Rose suggests that the common and identifiable American identity out of a polyglot base, stems from an overt commitment to that end by the school system. He furthers: "English school children (and their teachers) take their Englishness for granted. In the words of one elderly life-history respondent, schools taught patriotism 'in the form of prayers and history.'"[70] If patriotism, or nationalism, is taught by society's school systems through prayer and history, would not Europeanness be the end result amongst the masses if school systems, by the same means, taught it as such? Universalism, not particularism, as an ideal, appears to be the missing ingredient necessary for European integration. The efforts of elites to support that end continuously, and in a clear voice, is missing. The present system supports particularism in terms of national superiority. Monnet, for this reason, disliked nationalism. He said, "Equality is absolutely essential in relations between nations, as it is between men."[71]

Open Education: The Key to Europeanisation

Acculturation, the parallel process to socialisation, is a process whereby the old and current value systems, belief patterns, and societal structures, are handed down and projected into the future. An historical study of society assumes that, through

education, present day problems become clearer when attention is given to major directing forces and how those forces affect today's problems.[92] The education process is based on underlying assumptions. Conflict over assumptions has been a major component of societal growth as traditional assumptions handed down from the past vie with new assumptions forwarded by those who advocate change.[93] Traditionalists look to the past for solutions. Progressives, in the light of changing social and intellectual conditions, sponsor new solutions.[94] Hence, the educational process, specifically the formal component thereof, is integrally related with the collectivity of each period through time.[95] Patterns for historical periods, which influence the posture of education, may be suggested by the following questions:

The Individual Institutions

Political Institutions	What happens to education when the state is predominantly monarchic, aristocratic, democratic, nationalistic, liberal, fascist, communist?
Economic Institutions	What happens to education when a society is predominantly agricultural, feudal, commercial, capitalistic, individualistic, industrial, collective?
Social Institutions	What happens to education when a society is marked strongly by family, or clan and tribe groups, class distinctions, urban life, the middle class, organised labour, heterogamous racial or ethnic groups?
Religious Institutions	What happens to education when a society is dominated by one

church, or is divided by many?[96]

Not only is the method of education distinct to collectivities, but also the conception of what constitutes knowledge and the social role assigned to knowledge. The status of organised knowledge has a direct bearing upon the the kinds of education that are instituted.[97] In a collectivity, the role of education supports that collectivity's underlying values.

When religious, aristocratic, and humanistic traditions confront secularism, democracy, and science, the collectivity, in the modern epoch under heavy influence of the state, must make choices among conflicting traditions and values.

Politically, the historical trend has been a balance of societal control between <u>external</u> authoritarian structures and <u>internal</u> moral codes leading toward an ever increasing reliance upon the former at the expense of the latter.[98] Education, as a means of authoritarian control providing[99] the formalised central element of the learning process, is currently purposely focussed on the nation, when incorporating a wider view, it would allow individualised internalised 'feelings' of expanded collectivity.[100]

The early champion of the European movement, Monnet, disliking the notion of nationalism, equated it with the spirit of <u>domination</u>. Nationalism is based on inequality: he envisioned a spirit of equality. He said, "National sovereignties can oppose one another;

nationalism in one country fatally provokes nationalism in the others."[101] Further, he said, "For a long time, people spoke of European unity. But words, general ideas, good intentions were not enough. Concrete action was necessary to bring that idea to reality. That action was started by the Schuman Plan,"[102] and resulted in the European Community. This political movement was a movement toward European integration. This is an ideological attempt to dismantle national particularistic collectivities in an attempt at limiting domestic national authority.

> Only very recently we have started to accept in the relations between our nations what we accept in the relations between men in one country: that force does not prevail, that differences be resolved by common rules, by common institutions.[103]

Common allegiance to new institutions relies on slow incremental identifications with larger groups. The slow pace is a direct result of the fact that it, being highly political, is substantially influenced by the domestic actors. And, thus they have coloured the goals put forward by those actors.[104]

"On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides"[105] what the people are to think! Deutsch held that nationality

. . .

> means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centres and leading social groups by channels of communication and

> economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and directly with the centre.[106]

His model was a vertical integration model, not a horizontal model. It is a model based on total society and not elite society. If multi-nationalism were built ostensibly upon the same model, it is not possible to consider integration occurring without greater internal communicated knowledge. Where the external is merged to create an expanded, internal society, there is need for greater social knowledge. The current attempt to integrate by elites' activity appear to follow the Nakruma maxim: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be added unto you."[107]

The fact that Europeanism is not being universally advanced is evidenced by the fact that elite commitment is not apparently sufficiently extensive, and that the individual, in both the formal and informal setting, is not sufficiently confronted with idea of Europeanisation to affect conversion.

Europeanisaton

Introducing Europe into domestic educational programmes[108] could occur, not by 'denying' any past historical perspective, but by opening that perspective up to include wider collectivity. In A Cultural History of Education, Harold Benjamin said,

> One of the most characteristic features of human culture is the development of organised bodies of knowledge as tools of maintaining and improving life, and one of the most destructive ways in which cultures differ is in their conception of knowledge and the social role they assign to it.[109]

One of the roles asigned education in a culture is to control domestic culture, it could also be instrumental in expanding it.

In organising post-war Europe, emphasis was given the economic consideration because "History teaches that in such a quarrel (over economic disequalities) the recourse has always been to force."[110] It was thought that some degree of economic integration would enhance the long term prospects for peace. If life develops from small to large,[111] commonality was postulated as growing functionally from small beginnings, achieving eventual integration. Economic dependencies or interdependencies are more (if any) to do with peace maintenance. Economics may be the Casus Belli. Education is, as a stimulant, integrational. Laws governing human life may be fundamentally determined by economic factors,[112] but integration through socialisation is a meeting of the minds through mind - cooperation.[113]

Whereas previously humanity was the common denominator, today, nationality has assumed that position, and limited socialisation to the domestic entity,[114] a condition in part related to the control of the nation by the states and partly due to the demands for exactness brought about by modernisation.

If static peace is the desire of interactional relations, it must be sought. "We who are living now cannot ensure peace for ever, because we shall not live

for ever."[115] Consequently, if a dynamic integration were sought, peace would become less illusive, less of a political activity, more a reality. Such dynamics are a part of cerebral activity, an orientation, an image of collectivity. Some states in Europe, albeit, the smaller states, may be already embarked on this collective imagery through social channels. In this respect, largeness may be a handicap.

While society evolves, and becomes formalised, the structures of the formal evolution further strengthen the form of evolution. Change has induced the need for more learning. Knowledge acquisition, although essentially a matter of individual aptitudes, falls within the influence of government.[116] Interestingly, the advancement of knowledge is causal to disequilibration, and stabilisation is achieved through nothing more than a new way of solving problems.

Integration vs. Domestic Authority

What does this have to do with European integration? Sovereignty is the supreme, unrestricted power of a state, but perhaps "the traditional concept of sovereignty . . . is of little relevance today. In part, this is a consequence of changes in the world at large, and in part, it is the result of change in the nature of Government and the scope of its authority."[117]

Integration requires the reduction or an alteration of traditional state authority. Given the politically sensitive elected nature of goverments, the current

system requires a status position pre-disposed towards self.

Britain's rejection of the Shuman plan in 1950 and De Gaulle's withdrawal from the military structures of NATO in 1965 show that a traditional concept of sovereignty held by states and elites fixed on the central idea of self may have been responsible for the notion that participation in large international wholes can only reduce the influence of individual nations.[116]

The preoccupation of self by individual nations is primarily causal to international tension. The current attempt to politically integrate is designed at venting tension by the constitution of international institutions shifting the domestic focus from self to the expanded collectivity. But rigid international organisations have a long history of disintegration[117] because of the d. ut des component of the organisational arrangements, that is, arrangements of groups of participators, and not accomodations within a single expanded group.

Factoring down groups achieves greater cohesion, more capable of understanding and addressing change. Openly, factoring down is possible only by (1) taking an expanded holistic view, as opposed to a particular view and (2) through knowledge of alternative points and positions. The basic common denominator found within Europe is its individuals. The creation of structures with permanence requires their participation and the

particularistic knowledge of each other collectively as self.[120]

In the midst of international change, to answer the question, 'Is Europe integrating, or disintegrating?' is a question that directly addresses the creation of Europe in the form of individual knowledge of a collective self.[121] Because primary knowledge is dispersed via formal education, it is a question addressed the Educational systems of domestic European states.

In Sum

The classical historian Henri Pirenne introduced a new idea into the study of antiquity which may be beneficial to the analysis of integration. The Pirenne thesis,[122] simply stated, was that the decline of the Roman Empire was not necessarily due to the constant intrusions from the north by a tide of Germanic peoples, but was more related to the rise of Mohammedanism. Specifically the lossof the Mediterranean unity (mare nostrum as the Orbis Romanus) meant the loss of linguistic cohesiveness[123] and resulted in domestic fragmentation characterised by historians as the Dark Ages.[124]

Linguistic communications allow for the interchange of conceptualised ideas. It allows for the verticalisation of thought formalising ideologies which afford the development of a telos as an end goal for action. As demonstrated by the German-Prussian experience, communications, favourable experience, such

interchange, and intercourse lead to new, expanded nationhood, by loosening the ties to traditionalism. Education was the vehicle which allowed (both formally and informally) the development of expanded society by challenging the old ideology of conservatism, the idea that things are better unchanged. Conservatism is an ideology based on the premise of (1) aristocracy, or a traditional ruling elite (2) autonomous or self-stimulated[125] desire to hold onto the past, or (3) situational considerations[126] which suggests it is easier to hold onto the past. Conservatism rests on the acceptance of traditional authority. Unbiased education challenges this position.

As previously illustrated in both the Almond and Verba study and the EC analysis on the adoption of a common currency, the profile of individuals most likely to exert a degree of favourable disposition toward a collective perception are those individuals who are, to a great degree, 'educated'. Education, the internalisation and conceptualisation of knowledge, has this ability because it produces an open-mindedness, as opposed to a closed-mindedness.[127] Knowledge tends to loosen the ties to traditional authority, as it produces more reliance upon individual liberty.[128] Psychological sociological literature posits for conceptualisation fixation the two opposing poles of authority and liberty.[129]

Looking at authority alone, the movement toward

authority is that of authoritarianism. Authority is essentially a fixed way of looking at situations, a traditional structuralism, a posture taken by individuals. Its rigidity is highly correlated with closed-mindedness and prejudice. It is based on what is known (table 8.4). It is oriented in ethnocentricism, and in nationalism.

Liberal thinking is concerned with open-mindedness, looking for new solutions, a position akin to choice made by the availability and recognition of possible options.[130] It is based on a selection from variables.

The mixing of these two positions in a political sense gives rise to societal tensions. Western European Nation-States are generally characterised as liberal democracies. Democracy best embraces the liberal open-mindedness. However, within Western democracies, varying from time and circumstances, different degrees of authoritarianism are evident.

The two positions, authoritarian and liberal, relate to society and to integration and ultimately to knowledge in the following manner. By definition, society, as a collectivity of individuals in development, has some sort of meaningful order. Order, as far as it relates to control, has two aspects. Society is controlled either (1) externally or (2) internally.

(1) External control was, at one point in time, in the hands of one individual, a Sovereign. External

controls are given the appelations of power, might, strength, or violence.[131] Through the evolution of modern society, external control is best emphasized by the term, 'authority'. A characteristic of modern government is its high degree of authority, its control of daily individual life was brought about through (a) demands placed upon it by those under its jurisdiction; (b) or its own self-perpetuating autonomy; (c) or its demands resulting from the modernity-induced complexities of current life.[132]

(2) Internal control of society is exercised by what is best described as a common morality. Individual subscription to codes of morality are individual, highly singular, and discrete. In the period best characterised by Christendom, external control and internal control highly correlated, both being balanced with the conceptualised notion of religious theology. Hence, religion is frequently an identifying attribute of a national collectivity, because those 'religious' tend to respond to stimuli in manners consonant with the dominant theological orientation.

Through the period of modernisation, the balance between internal and external control shifted to where external control assumed dominance evidenced by both the increases in laws, regulations, and other restrictive controls by externally exercised authority, and the decrease in the prominence of internally sanctioned restraints through religion.

The importance of this is that the external controls take on the characteristics of rigidity and formality, and are frequently more descriptively articulated than the prescriptive controls of a 'higher moral'. Internal controls are more related to ideological orientations than external, are often less formally structured, less reliant on logical articulations and more personal. Internal controls are self-reliant,[132] external, system-reliant. Self-reliant orientation focusses on the broad aspects of humanity in counterdistinction to the system-reliant orientation focussed on the collectivity.

As demonstrated in the German model, the open-mindedness during the nation building process rested on education, knowledge, and high idealism. The two German-led World Wars rested on that states' retreat to system-reliance, and authoritarian acceptance. This demonstrates the fact that the knowlege producing ideological orientation which resulted in a humanitarian outlook and societal expansion which giving way to a prejudicial lack of knowledge (burning of books) and an introspection, an ethnic centred authoritarian ideology.

Authority demands obedience![134] The articulated necessity of external control mandates specific language. That explains the high correlation between formal language groups and nation-states. "Humankind's primary intellectual experience is linguistic."[135]

> We start all our reflections with the world already formulated in words. Aristotle puts it: We start with 'what the world is said to

> be'. 'With previous knowledge', we set out; if not with what 'the world knows', at least with the world already sorted out into the categories of our institutionalised language habits.[136]

These habits are "intelligibilities"[137] representing orientations when fed into the system through knowledge acqusition and relate to the high correlation between language identification and national character.[138]

If life is characterised by a series of contemplation (theoria) and action (praxis), constraints in praxis are introduced into the system by either self-imposed controls or externally imposed controls. A controlled system yielding to group structures is essentially authoritarian.

The theoria-praxis tension propels the individual through socialisation to integrate individually with ever increasing circles of exchange, as nations themselves quantitatively expand into integrated society-set fixed institutional arrangements. Authoritatively dictating external restraints (praxis) are modified through re-thinking (theoria) in the long run, accomplished through learning, both experienced and formally.

The rigidity of political empirical a priori argumentation inherent in national governmental institutionalised structural regimes requires further knowledge for control, especially in the face of a declining ideological commitment as a viable basis for societal collectivity cohesion.

Only through unbiased knowledge acquisiton can

traditional control be abnegated. For European integration, this means only through the introduction of more knowledge into the system can sufficiently enough open-mindedness acrue to promote an individual profile disposed toward societal expansion. This knowledge is necessary for the logical re-evaluation through linguistic interchange of traditional external control and the (fundamentally) non-logical (highly emotional) building of an ideological telos exercising internal control.[139]

CHAPTER EIGHT NOTES

[1]For example, the general levels of English usually are presented in terms of a geographic or societal overview of England, which extends to advanced English classes immersed in English literature.

[2]Educational Statistics in OECD Countries. (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1981), p. 22, table 1.

[3]Loc. cit. p. 58, table 36.

[4]Euro-Barometer Public Opinion in the European Community. (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, June 1986, no. 25), p. 22, table 10.

[5]Loc. cit. p. 5, table 2.

[6]Loc. cit. p. 7, table 4.

[7]Denmark in a Nutshell: Facts about Denmark. (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1986).

[8]Euro-Barometer. "Trust in the Peoples of the Community," (June 1986), p. 29, table 14.

[9]Euro-Barometer Public Opinion in the European Community 1957-1987. (Brussels, March 1987 {Special thirtieth anniversary edition}), p. 18, graph 4.

[10]International Conference on Education, (Geneva: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 1975), p. 2.

[11]The last but one election was fought with the leader of the Labour Party, the second legitimate contender, openly advocating withdrawal from the Community.

[12]A speech by Sir Geoffrey Howe entitled, "The British Presidency: Springboard for the Future." Foreign and Commonwealth Office Correspondence 21 May 1987 / European Community Department. The whole tone was Europe for self gain, nothing else.

[13]Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, The Handbook of Social Psychology. Volume I. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1968), pp. 60, 63, 111, 131-32, 135, 339-42: as well as the classic, F.C. Bartlett, Remembering. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), which reproduces the phenomena of both perception and memory, learning and thought to attitudes.

[14]R.E. Lane, Political Ideology: Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does. (New York: Free Press, 1962), pp. 415-16. See also Lane, Political Man. (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 170-72.

[15]D. Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties. (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 127ff.

[16]The general conclusion of Talcott Parsons, The Social System. (London: Taverstock, 1951).

[17]For argument, see R.E. Lane, "Patterns of Political Belief," in Jeanne Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), p. 85ff.

[18]Lane, Political Man. op. cit. p. 171.

[19]See Knutson, Patterns of Political Psychology. op. cit. Also, L. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict. (New York: The Free Press, 1956).

[20]For a fascinating discussion of political

socialisation, see the article by that name by Richard G. Niemi, in Knutson, Patterns of Political Psychology. op. cit. p. 117ff.

[21]Loc. cit. p. 124.

[22]See D. Easton and J. Dennis, Children in the Political System. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969).

[23]The formation of perception or attitude is discussed at length throughout the literature. For an excellent new treatment, see Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 58ff.

[24]Marshall R. Singer, Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relations. (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 34.

[25]An argument regarding China and the Soviet Union, generally applicable here. See loc. cit. p. 394.

[26]Loc. cit. p. 395. Singer used the term "states," rather than "community," or commonalities.

[27]Loc. cit.

[28]Education, as far as defending interests of the collectivity in an environment of a competitive political state, is nicely analysed in David B. Abernathy, The Political Decline of Popular Education. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1969).

[29]See the section on educational perspectives in Singer, Weak States. op. cit. p. 396.

[30]The term, 'education', is not dissimilar to the term propaganda. Propaganda is the manipulation of symbols to control controversial attitudes. Education is the manipulation of symbols (and other means) to transmit accepted attitudes (and skills). See Harold Prositansky and Bernard Seidenberg, Basic Studies in Social Psychology. (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston, 1965), p. 618.

[31]NATO Review. (Bruxelles: von Muryenwinkel, June 1987, no. 3).

[32]See p. 13 of loc. cit Basically the line of reasoning is directed toward NATO justification, but the arguments, as here treated, lend themselves to the idea of perception, per se.

[33]See p. 13 of NATO Review. op. cit. The argument, as here applied, holds true to conceptualisation of issues in general. The author of this paper does not hold the view that a specific focus must be taken, but holds the view that, given a modicum of individual intelligence, society will take its own course, the course society chooses best.

[34]It is also not surprising that in the Western European experience, it resulted in the democracy ideology. The terminus ad quem of a political modernisation process has been summarised by regime classification as (1) traditional (2) modernising: Personal (charasmatic) (3) military (4) single party (authoritarian) (5) modern democratic and (6) totalitarian. See Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations, Problems of Political Modernization. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1967), p. 148ff.

[35]Consider Germany and Italy.

[36]Karl W. Deutsch, Tides among Nations. (New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 29.

[37]Loc. cit. p. 29: and the classical work in this area: Carlton H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism. (New York: Macmillan, 1926); as well as Carlton H. Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. (New York: 1931).

[38]Deutsch, Tides among Nations. op. cit. p. 29.

[39]An exception in Europe may be Albania, a country which appears to exhibit a society sufficiently closed as to indicate linguistic, economic, transferance still on an isolated national level. But this appears to be by governmental design and not popular intent.

[40]English appears to be the major second language being taught and learned among non-English mother tongue Europeans and a significant portion of technologically advanced literature seems to be printed in English necessitating state-of-the-art knowledge in science and technology coupled with English proficiency. (See chapter nine.) Further, it has been frequently suggested that when Kohl and Mitterrand, the German Chancellor and the French Prime Minister, hold conference, their translators talk in English. Further, although there are no mother tongue speakers in the EFTA, English is the official language and etc., etc.

[41]For an excellent essay on the change in the public spirit of Europe, see George L. Mosse, The Culture of Western Europe. (London: John Murray, 1961), p. 213ff.

[42]A conclusion made in chapter seven of E.L. Jones, The European Miracle. (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1981), p. 149.

[43]Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 1. For a general discussion of customs unions, see loc. cit. pp. 1-43.

[44]For pax Britannica discussion and the following pax Americana, see Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond the International Relations Theory," in Journal of International Studies. 10(Summer, 1981):126-55.

[45]Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method," in Journal of International Studies. 12(1983):162ff, especially p. 171.

[46]Used by Gramsci in Selections from the Prison Notebook. Edited and translated by Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey N. Smith. (New York: International Publications, 1971), pp. 169-70. See originator, N. Machiavelli, The Prince. Edited by Robert Adams. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), pp. 49-50.

[47]J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses. (London: Everyman's Library, 1968), chapter one, p. 3.

[48]A listing provided for the mechanisation of industry. In Shepard Bancroft Clough and Charles Woolsey Cole, Economic History of Europe. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1952), chapter XI, p. 393.

[49]Loc. cit. p. ix.

[50]J.J. Rousseau, New Heloise. v.3, quoted in William

Boyd, The History of Western Education. Fifth edition. (London: Adam and Charles Block, 1950), p. 297.

[51]The beginning point of Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum.

[52]Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 227. What one knows best, that to which he has become accustomed, "is the great guide of human life." See Hans Kelsen, Society and Nature. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1946), p. 250ff.

[53]The instrumental language is forcefully demonstrated in Michael Shapiro, ed., Language and Politics. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984).

[54]David V.J. Bell, Power, Influence, and Authority. (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 5.

[55]Loc. cit. p. 7.

[56]They "paint a picture" for the receiver. See Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), chapter one.

[57]Bell, Power, Influence, and Authority. op. cit. p. 10.

[58]Loc. cit. p. 13.

[59]See T.D. Weldon, The Vocabulary of Politics. (New York: Penguin Books, Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1953/1975), p. 64ff.

[60]Things to be believed=credenda. See Charles E. Merriam, Political Authority. (New York: Collier Books, 1964, original date: 1934).

[61]Max Weber, "The Social Psychology of World Religions," in Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed., From Max Weber. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 259ff.

[62]The corollary is high between identity with a system and authority acceptance. For an excellent analysis, especially a schematical depiction, see Roland Robertson and Burkhart Holyner, Identity and Authority. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980), especially chapter one, specifically p. 37.

[63]For a very thorough overview of this significant developmental trend, reference is again drawn to loc. cit. in its entirety.

[64]See Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[65]Philip Rieff, Fellow Teachers. (New York: Harper and Row, 1973) and Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith after Freud. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). Rieff characterises the new hedonism as the last remains of a people who live in a void.

[66]Gertrude Huehns, Antinomianism in English History. (London: Cresset, 1951), chapter one.

[67]John William Adamson, English Education 1789-1902. (Cambridge, 1930). Is this much different from the aim incorporated in the government's current attempt at structuring the educational system in England and Wales?

[68]Trigant Burrow, The Neurosis of Man. (London:

Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 227.

[69]R.M. MacIver, The Web of Government. (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 59.

[70]Max Weber, quoted in Talcott Parsons, Theory of Social and Economic Organizations. (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 325.

[71]Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces 1950-1957. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958). Haas takes the view that integration may indeed better proceed by 'handing down' by elite activities for and in behalf of, but separated from society, however, Haas does conclude, "In modern European setting, groups previously exposed to active international value-sharing find it easier to achieve this responsiveness," which leads to integration, i.e., knowledge and integrational idea linkages. See Ernst B. Haas, "The Challenge of Regionalism," in Carol Ann Cosgrove and Kenneth J. Twitchett, ed., The New International Actors: The United Nations and the European Economic Community. (London: Macmillan, 1970). p. 76ff., especially p. 88.

[72]Richard Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, Political Socialization. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969). See also Charles E. Merrian, Systematic Politics. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1945). The stages in socialisation appear to be generally aligned with the notion of getting to know a situation after diverting attention to it, and then trying to participate. Curiously enough, Pareto thought that, rather than receiving a 'known', there should be some sort of ethical discussion, though logically futile, but tending to 'fix' understanding, rather than mere participation as rote action. See Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind in Society. Translated by A. Bongiorno. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1935). section 2.

[73]See G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

[74]Bell, Power, Influence, and Authority. op. cit. p. 57ff.

[75]Felix Oppenheimer, Dimensions of Freedom. (New York: St. Martins Press, 1961), p. 32.

[76]Weber, in Parsons, Theory of Social and Economic Organizations. op. cit. p. 153.

[77]Herbert Simon, Administrative Behavior. Second edition. (New York: Free Press, 1957), p. 125.

[78]Loc. cit.

[79]J.K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), pp. 135-36.

[80]Bell, Power, Influence, and Authority. op. cit. p. 68. Consider the relevance of the current Scottish devolution debate.

[81]Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. p. 227.

[82]The resistance to the evolutionary united nation state put forward by the founding fathers of America was based on the realisation that the dangers of centralisation, specifically a centralised system of public education, could be employed to "politicize as well as socialize growth."

See a discussion on multiculturalism with reference to the American experience in Fred G. Burke, "Bilingualism/ Biculturalism in American Education: An Adventure in Wonderland," in The Annals. (March 1981):164ff.

[83]Vilfredo Pareto labels them as economic (entrepreneurs) rentiers, speculators, military lions, and political foxes. See his masterful work: Treatise on General Sociology. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1935), chapter on elites.

[84]Frequently, they want power or a certain life style. See Peter Burke, Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth Century Elites. (London: Temple Smith, 1974), p. 35.

[85]Argued by Pareto, Treatise on Sociology. op. cit. and Burke, loc. cit. p. 10.

[86]As argued by Robert D. Putnam, "The Case of Ideology," in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics: A Reader on Political Sociology. (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 479-510.

[87]Requiring (1) a well defined minority (2) conflict situations and (3) evidence that the minority regularly prevails. See Robert A. Dahl, The Power Elites. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1956), p. 156ff.

[88]See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany. (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1965). Viewed and classified by dimensions according to interests in (1) social position and type, and (2) political interests and attitudes, p. 229.

[89]The maxim, 'the pen is mightier than the sword' highlights their usefulness. Modern power elites are described in the third world discussion. Patrick Cole, Modern and Traditional Elites in the Politics of Lagos. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975): Seymore Martin Lipset, et.al., Elites in Latin America. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 13ff. emphasizes the prestige motivation. A historical slant is shown in David Spring, ed., European Landed Elites in the Nineteenth Century. (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Lawrence and J.C.F. Stone, An Open Elite? England 1540-1880. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); as well as the excellent work, R.S. Neale, ed., History and Class. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983). Elites' influence on social and some political structures and institutions is nicely shown in the idea of the Ecole Polytechnique of Ezra Sulieman, Elites in French Society. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 47ff.

[90]Richard Rose, Politics in England Today. (London: Faber and Faber, 1974), p. 151.

[91]Quoted out of context, but typical of his idealistic approach to integration. See Jean Monnet, Memoirs. (London: Collins, 1978), p. 97.

[92]R. Friedman Butts, A Cultural History of Education. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 1. See also the classic: William Boyd, The History of Western Education. Fifth edition. (London: Adams and Charles, 1950), chapters VI (pp. 152-68), VII (pp. 183-208), VIII

(pp. 209-38) and XI-XIII (pp. 280-458). For specifically the English trend, see J.W. Adamson, English Education. (Cambridge, 1930), part III, especially chapters XII-XVII (pp. 323-497).

[93]For a philosophical approach to how such society forms the individual, see Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938), especially chapter XIII, Organisations and the individual, and how it creates overall power structure in society, p. 140ff, Power over opinion: as well as Aldous Huxley, Ends and Means. (Chatto and Winders, 1951) on education, chapter XII, p. 177ff., where Huxley circumscribes functions of education (p. 178), nursery school emphasizing freedom, intelligence, responsibility, and co-operation; and secondary school, passive acceptance of tradition and either (a) domination or (b) submission. Huxley says (p. 166), "Early conditioning . . . does not irrevocably and completely determine adult behaviour: but it does unquestionably make it difficult for individuals to think, feel, and act otherwise than as they have been taught to do in childhood." This results in the creation of a degree of social control. See William Goode, The Celebration of Heroes: Prestige as a Social Control System. (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978), especially chapter one: "Social Control through Prestige Process." See also Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952). Further, it is not to be assumed that individuals resist change. "It has become something of a commonplace to say 'People resist change,' but a generalisation that has many more facts to support it is the opposite." People accept change. See Edward H. Spicer, Human Problems in Technological Change. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952), p. 17.

[94]The traditionalist and the progressivist positions are akin to authoritarian and liberal positions. Literature characterises both positions. The traditionalist-authoritarain is frequently aligned with passion and prejudice. See Morley Roberts, Bio-Politics. (London: Dent, 1938), chapter one: "The Social Organisation," where social life is characterised by way of cells (p. 8). The whole is basically a study calling for a freedom from prejudice and passion. A freedom akin to progress, different positions akin to different rates of progress throughout society. See William Fielding Ogburn, Social Change. Revised edition. (New York: Viking Press, 1950). The liberal position is outlined in Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949) and Roger Brown, Social Psychology. (London: The Free Press, 1965), p. 497ff. on the construction of personality.

[95]Butts, A Cultural History. op. cit. p. 2.

[96]Loc. cit. pp. 3-4.

[97]A current British example is the contemporary public debate (October 1987) sparked in the British press by the proposed new educational bill introduced to reform the 1944 educational act. A key feature is a fixed curriculum

ostensibly geared at making the child economically productive, i.e. emphasis on science and technology.

[98]See William Connolly, Legitimacy and the State. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p. 126. The conflict develops between authority and leadership or dux and rex in defining the role of the state. See Bertrand de Jouvenal, Sovereignty. (London), pp. 40-70.

[99]Of connected interest, see Butts, A Cultural History. op. cit. pp. 4-5.

[100]Education is viewed as the key to orientational change. From ethnocentricism, the idea of traditional, authoritarian to liberal "open"-mindedness conducive toward an integrational posture. See Jeanne N. Knutson, Handbook of Political Psychology. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973), pp. 168, 17ff., 45ff., 52ff., 73ff., 139ff., 143ff.

[101]Jean Monnet, L'Idee d'Europe dans l'Histoire. Forwarded by J.B. Duroselle. (Paris: Dendel, 1965), p. 11.

[102]3 October 1965 at a ceremony at Scy-Shazelles to honour Robert Schumann. See Cosgrove and Twitchett, The New International Actors. op. cit. p. 196.

[103]Monnet, L'Idee d'Europe dans l'Historie. op. cit. p. 12.

[104]For a discussion on the preoccupation of self by states, relating toward its reinforcement of nationality in the context of German and European romanticism, see Alexander Ruston, Ortsbestimmung der Gegennart. (Zurich: Rentsch, 1950-57). Volume 2. p. 451.

[105]Paraphrased. See Sir Ivor Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 56.

[106]Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communications. (Boston: Wiley, 1953), p. 75.

[107]Quoted in Dankwort A. Rustow, A World of Nations. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute), p. 7.

[108]For an example see the seminar held at the University of Durham 11-12 July 1983 in Euroidnews. (London: U.K. Centre for European Education, 1984, no. 15, supplement no. 1, 1984).

[109]Harold Benjamin, ed., A Cultural History of Education. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), p. 4.

[110]Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace and the Terms of Its Perpetuation. (New York: Huebsch, 1919), p. 366.

[111]Loc. cit. pp. 49-53.

[112]Albert Demangeon, Le Declin de l'Europe. (Paris: Payot, 1920).

[113]For a discussion on co-operation by universities and academics, see Edouard Herriot, The United States of Europe. (London: George G. Harrogs, 1930), p. 208.

[114]Loc. cit. p. 208. Consequently, education in more than one country is highly improbable and generally very difficult.

[115]William Beveridge, The Price of Peace. (London: Pilot Press, 1945), p. 88.

[116]En passant: This is really the old social control=internal independence vs. dependence question of

classical theorists. See "Individuation, Societalisation and the Civil Religion Problem." in Roland Robertson, Meaning and Change. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972).

[117]Edward Heath, The Place of Sovereignty in an Interdependent World. (London: The Wyndam Place Trust, 1984), especially p. 3.

[118]Loc. cit. p. 4.

[119]Witness the League of Nations. The only way out of this cycle was suggested by A. Linklater, in Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations. (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 191. "The growth of a more rational form of inter-societal life requires that the restatement of a wholly internal point of view should be resisted," i.e., expected knowledge.

[120]This is most forcefully brought home by Leopold Kohr, The Breakdown of Nations. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957).

[121]In a study attempting to characterise by style the content of current issues discussed in Britain, Robert Putman found a high percent of respondents who had either a vague or only an in passing orientation to any group benefits: 19%; or no orientation: 67%. See "The Case of Ideology," in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics. (London: Macmillan, 1976), table 1, p. 486.

[122]Henri Pierenne, Medieval Cities: Their Origins and the Revival of Trade. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925), pp. 3-55 and Pirenne, Mohammed and Charlemagne. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939), pp. 140-41, 147-50, 265-85.

[123]It was from the sea areas that the spread of the culture continued, e.g., monasticism, the conversion of Anglo-Saxons, etc. See H. Pirenne, "European History," in A History of Europe. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1939).

[124]Although the theory is much contested by historians, it is herewith mentioned to highlight the integrational utility of language. For positions on contesting theories and theorants, see Alfred F. Havighurst, Problems in European Civilisation: The Pirenne Thesis, Analysis, Criticism, and Revision. (Boston: D.C. Heath and Co., 1958).

[125]Autonomous, best characterised by the "New Conservatives," are those that hold on to traditional solutions because of their apparent beneficial utility. For a political discussion on the effects learning has on conservatism, see "Learning and Liberalism," in Edward Shils, The Calling of Sociology and Other Essays on the Pursuit of Learning. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 289ff.

[126]For a good discussion on the ideology of conservatives, see W.J. Stankiewicz, ed., Political Thought since World War II. (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1964), p. 356ff.

[127]For an excellent practical example, (especially relating to the Scottish experience: chapter six), see Max Gluckham, ed., Closed Systems and Open Minds. (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1964), N.B. p. 152. "Education and Social

Mobility."

[128]Chambers Dictionary, op. cit., as does Oxford, etc., sets authority at the opposite pole of liberty. p. 82.

[129]Psychological, sociological literature on authority suggests that extreme conservatism could lead toward a closed mind which could develop into totalitarianism. For the classic in this field, regarding effects in the German-Jewish context, see Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1958).

[130]In the annual Lang Lecture, Lower College Hall, 26 January 1988, St. Andrews University, Gordon Wilson elaborated the political expression of liberal thinking in recent UK history. The pre-World War I liberal UK government was discussing extensively the transfer of a great degree of autonomous home rule from London to Dublin, however it was interrupted by the War, and subsequent Irish-British confrontation, whereby Dublin separated itself.

[131]Violence being the favorite word employed by Hannah Arendt. See Between Past and Future. (New York: Penguin, 1968).

[132]For background analysis, attention is drawn to p. 33ff. of Steven Lukes, ed., Power. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986). See also S. Cohen and A. Scull, Social Control and the State. (Oxford: Martin Robinson, 1983), especially pp. 17-38.

[133]Reference is made to aspects of Praxis and Techne in social control formal thought. Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice. (London: Heinemann, 1971).

[134]Ivan D. Illich, Celebration of Awareness. (New York: Doubleday, 1970), p. 17.

[135]John E. Skinner, The Meaning of Authority. (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1983), p. 45.

[136]J.H. Randall, Jr., "Metaphysics and Language," in The Review of Metaphysics. (June 1967):592.

[137]Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. Translated by Gem Anscombe. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), p. 11ff.

[138]Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 207.

[139]The elite literature focussing on the charismatic character highlights the leadership relation between, on the one hand, the elite, and, on the other, the group. The elite, often by reducing logical concepts into very simple linguistic verbiage, "speaks" to the non-logical groups by conveying with a minimum of verbalised thought, perhaps jesticulation, etc., such highly emotive ideals, characterised as such slogans as "free speech," "equal rights," "right to live," "women's rights," "human rights," "human dignity." See A.W. Gouldner, ed., Studies in Leadership. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), part four, pp. 471-664. For a historical overview of the development of the phenomena, see George Macmunn, Leadership

through the Ages. (London: Maclehouse, 1935); and Julian Hirsch, Die Genesis des Ruhmes. (Leipzig: Verlag Johann Ambrosius Barth, 1914), p. 27ff. The concept of logicality and non-logicality is introduced into literature by the classicist, Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society. Four volumes. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1934), especially volume 1: Non-Logical Conduct. See, also, Franz Borkenaw, Pareto. (London: Chapman and Hall, 1936), p. 21ff. p. 91ff. For studies in leadership, see G. Lowell Field and John Higley, Elitism. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); Alvin W. Gouldner, ed., Studies in Leadership. op. cit. For an understanding of leadership's function, see Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938); William J. Goode, The Celebration of Heroes. Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978). For the relationship between authority and liberty, or, as some call it, ambivalence, see Ralf Dahrendorf, Life Changes. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1979), p. 88ff.; and Dennis Gabor, The Mature Society. (London: Secker and Warburg, 1972), p. 144ff.

CHAPTER NINE

Conclusion

It is a difficult thing to develop an exposition of the salient functionals inherent in the integration process, as a paradigm for the analysing and assessing of integration or dis-integration. The very question of integration, the ramifications of its demonstrative complexities, in light of international change, requires a unique approach akin to an analytical framework. A framework that is centred on man in society, as social, is vulnerable to individual interpretation.

The major difficulty in approaching the question in this manner is that the consideration becomes exposed to external operationals, rendering conclusive and substantive empirical evidence problematic. This is not singular to this specific inquiry, but is evidenced by specialist literature in the field which, attempting to overcome same, draw a tight postliminary parameter around highlighted facets. It was the specific attempt of this analysis to avoid this loss of plasticity to encapsulate the process of integration in its entirety. By sacrificing measurability, it developed a general plexus of interacting relationships requisite for the understanding of the overall whole of integration.

Review

For Europe, in light of technological advanced modernity (p. 2ff. above), the consideration of integration has developed a new urgency. Generally, social integration is undergone for benefit. For whom and what type of benefit

is subject to theory (pp. 6ff.) The concrescence of society thus involved undergoes changes which are observable, as are the requisites for that concrescence. Basically, the coalescence undergone by the process produces an ethnos, making the concause of collectivity an individually sententious reality (p. 23). What evolves is a social community or social unit functioning as a total system with subsystems differentiated by activity, functioning within the overall. The process of integration is one in which total autonomous systems merge with a detrition of particularistics into a singular nomic unit. The integrated unit exhibits centripetal tendencies creating solidity absorbing previous particular units into the universal either hetero- or homogeneously. History references successful and unsuccessful attempts at integration. It is significant to note, that the degree of success is high when integration is underwritten by the individual, motivated by internalised personal and often altruistic motivations and affinities, and low when introduced by elites stimulated by a construct of political motivations (pp. 27ff.).

The essential and fundamental process undergone by an individual in a social system is that of socialisation (pp. 52ff). Socialisation affords the establishment of contact and development of patterned behaviour establishing roles, which create expectations of performance of both self and other. A sui generis entity evolves. What evolves for the society is a society with distinct characteristics, and for the individual a person with a distinct personality. The

unique attrition of particularistics, merging into commonality and universalistics, is the outcome of socialisation. Initially, a *quid pro quo* activity develops eventually through the buffetings (pp. 62ff) of the overall process into a degree of altruism. The 'I' consideration merges with the 'us' position. Action and beliefs solidify, creating collectivity. For the individual, the produced self unites with the societal product of *natio*.

The process of socialisation is an aspect of the theory of Functionalism in action. Functional interaction (pp. 74ff.) affords identification as a *state of mind*. Observable national stereotypes are the outcome of the process and evidential of the group uniqueness. The achieved uniqueness relating to political and economic considerations observable in the overall social system becomes a psychological position of the participants in the process and simultaneously define the boundaries of exclusion for those not so incorporated.

It is significant to highlight that the total process is very complex and freely structured, highly unique and tends toward what may be termed a *peritus optimus* bias.

It is here, if social European integration is to evolve, that the attrition of uniqueness is to be introduced. As the individual merges with society during socialisation so, too, may social systems merge. Such action is integration (pp. 96ff.). The dependencies and interdependencies which characterise integrated society are a process of free and unfettered exchange and interaction.

As identity is individually unique, it must be independently achieved. Individually achieving such is not imposed only by outside stimulus. It is also by internal cognisant or non-cognisant action. Identity becomes an internalised value (pp. 105ff.) distinct and shared.

Here is made more full the Deutschian model of community, offering theory to incorporate a fuller understanding of the process (pp. 35ff.). Much confusion is expressed as to the whole concept of communication. To suggest that language, a substantial portion of communication, is the criterion for the identification of uniqueness, is to obfuscate the issue. It diverts attention to what language does. The function of language, as evidenced in the myriad instances of its utilisation, is to convey thought. The importance of a Deutschian language community is not the sharing of a the language per se, but the sharing of the contents of the mind. Much of the meta-needs accomodated for (pp. 97ff) during socialisation are done by mental posturing vis à vis third parties. Much is by way of anoesis, a sapient positioning facilitated by language. This positioning is what gives individual and society definition, and is the result of interaction. Definition in terms of moral structure fills the inane and lends substance to the meaning of community. Language is only a vehicle. The reason why European collectivities exhibit uniqueness is not because of the variety of the languages spoken, but because of the variety of different patterned mentally induced responses to meta-need

situations. Switzerland is an example with its many languages but identical Swiss mentality (pp. 110ff.).

At this point is appreciated the individual particularities of nations. A nation as a social unit functions as an informally structured Gesellschaft (pp. 141ff), a homogeneous social totality providing a mental environment for its nationals. A state is a Gemeinschaft, a political unit providing an essentially physical environment. A successfully integrated society is a society in which the totality of its individual constituents, or at least a significant portion thereof, have achieved the highly unique and internalised attainment of thinking and perceiving others within the system as belonging to the system. National consciousness is socially conscious.

European Community endeavours undertaken in the name of promoting further integration are political. There is no substantive evidential proof that successful social integration may be achieved in this manner, not directly at least. If somehow the political manoeuvering triggers sufficient and sustained individual internalised cathexation of community, it would be. But there is precious little historical evidence of this. The Western European tendency of politicising nationalism (pp. 194ff.) was instrumental, if not causal, to the current state system. Although the frequently expostulated position is one suggestive of a series of nation-states, an examination, evidenced by devolutional outcries, suggests not so much homogeneous national societies but heterogeneous state societies.

France, Spain, Britain, and Belgium are examples.

A truly integrated society, as nothing more than expanded social community, is where Europeanism is writ larger than any domestic identification. It would be where the ethnos has been enlarged to incorporate divergencies in an essentially ineluctable, identifiable entity. This integration is not so much political, as it is individual and highly mental (p. 201). Given the common civilisations, and basically a common if not identical utilisation of the attainments of civilisation, as witnessed by culture, a further fluidity within the social world could and may very well produce a European identity akin to a supra-nationality of Europeanness. The fact that this does not appear to be the present case is because of the domestic political content inherent in the modern reality of Europe. This was the failure of Functional theory addressed by Neo-Functionalist theory. The Neo-Functional argument is persuasive in overcoming the obstacle. "Integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre."[1] The outcome of this shifting and realignment is a new political community. This reasoning is in keeping with the politicisation of nationalism evidenced in the true Western European tradition of historical events. The EC, as an example, if successful in creating a political European entity, in the long run, would be just as successful as the aforementioned European states. It would produce a

heterogeneous political community, tied together by politically extracted loyalties, conventions and nominative patterns of unity. It is the argument herein contained that this sort of community is not a socially integrated community. Social integration is not the process of incremental kinesis of elites, but it is of the kineses of individuals.

> It is evident that the long term evolution as well as the current functioning of the Community institutions is fundamentally a matter to be determined by the national governments concerned. Supra-nationality has contained no genuine escape from sovereign states. It may be a step toward federal unity, but it is a step taken by governments, which retain the capacity to decide whether to take further steps forward, to stand still, or to retreat.[2]

Monnet understood the true nature of integration. He understood it as a mental task. "At no time must the study take on the character of a negotiation. It must be a common task."[3] A negotiation incorporates the maintenance of a pre-prejudiced position in a d. ut des confrontation. A common task is a balance sheet approach, assessing conditions and postulating goals focussed on collective, not domestic advantage.

By taking a long term historical view of the social process of integration, there appears to be an important sequencing of events. First, the idea of collectivity, frequently stemming from a notion of universality, which eventually evolves into pragmatic politicisation of the ideal (pp. 320ff.). This is a sequence from the mental to the physical as ideas are translated into action.

Ancillary to this sequence is the political consideration of societal control through either a common adherence to an overriding, individually realised ideal or control by what may be termed force (pp. 207-08). It is noted here that in the absence of an overriding dedication to the ideal of a Europeanism in the Monnet sense, EC endeavours are of the latter genre. Collectivity builds by politicised force through institutional and other restrictive manoeuvering, often subsuming ideological orientations. The motivation is supplied by notions or perceptions of advantage and mandatory accommodation not by any particular normative ethical code subscription.

Table 6.1, supported by table 6.2 (pp. 253-54), demonstrates the psychological implication in economic terms of collectivity perception within a given community. When strong cognitive perceptions of domestic strength abound, expanded economic interchange lessens in urgency and appeal. This, in the context of the EC, demonstrates the do ut des principle. Nothing seems to be gained through expansion if the domestic unity is perceived stronger. Hence, it supports the assertion that the EC endeavours, at least in this respect, show a marked lack of ideological appeal. This economic consideration may be expanded to incorporate the general notion of the worth of expanded community. Table 7.8 (pp. 346-47) shows that 53% of polled community nationals show anything but complete agreement with the idea of a

single European area.

This suggests that, as far as can be extrapolated from what has been essentially couched in economic terms, more than half of the respondents show reservation to the idea. The indication is that there is no apparent resounding notion of advantage. This demonstrates that advantage, as opposed to ideological commitment, is the major consideration. In the absense of ideological commitment, it would imply the politically induced integration will only be as successful as the Neo-Functionalist elites' success in converting segments of domestic population to collectivism.

This is indeed a dismal prospect, if that is all that there is to it. It implies a political positioning amongst twelve participants for a maximisation of particularist advantage or at least a minimising of particularist disadvantage.

The Future

The theoretical discussion within this analysis, coupled with empirically testifiable facts where possible appear to illustrate an alternative. Firstly, the findings summarised in table 7.4 illustrate that the higher the level of education, the greater the political awareness (pp. 339ff.). This may be expanded reasonably to substantiate the fact that the greater the amount of education, the higher the general environmental awareness. Literacy, as a form of education (p. 341), allows for greater individual exposure to stimuli. The

ultimate value derived is dependent upon both the stimuli inputs and the individual (or collective) utilisation in terms of outputs. Higher educated individuals were found to be more favourably disposed toward the notion of an integrated Europe. There is no substance to suggest the type of support these individuals ascribe to collectivity, i.e., materialistic or ideological. It may indeed by combinations of both. But by noticing the linkage between education or knowledge and favourable dispositions as empirically justifiable, psychology demonstrates the effects education may introduce, i.e., a shift from prejudice to preference based on choice.

During socialisation, the child changes from an individual, self-oriented status and merges by way of education and interchange into a contributor. The child's original 'give me' orientation evolves to a 'give you' or sharing orientation. It is an incremental movement from the self-centred particularistic to an orientation based in society. Much the same appears to be happening to the individuals that experience greater levels of education. Particularism tends to merge into altrusim. Jean Monnet indicated this to be his particular case. He also suggested "cooperation between nations will grow from getting to know each other better, and from interpenetration between their constituent elements and those of their neighbour."[3] This is a position substantiated by the findings of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture,[4] and suggests a

valid assumption for general human behaviour (pp. 341ff.).

Here, it is necessary to recall types of attachment to a social system. Generally these types are either sentimental or instrumental (p. 265). Sentimental attachments are essentially those received and accepted. Instrumental attachments are essentially those made by self cognition. Sentimental attachments frequently align themselves with prejudice, because that is what is 'known' (table 8.4), and may be the major source of public support for social systems. These imply the need for governments to re-emphasise by symbols and verbiage.the collective identity (pp. 315ff.) throughout the entire acculturation undergone within the socialisation process within the parameters of the collectivity. Instrumental attachments are those aligned with higher levels of knowledge, suggestive of a choice being made by some sort of evaluation amongst variables.

At this point, it may be assumed that, if this is so, integration would be the natural result of plain knowledge expansion. The evidence does not suggest this to be directly dependent. It is not so much knowledge or the form of knowledge, but the application: what is done with the knowledge. The fact that Europe exists today as a plurality of different social systems, each educating their young, in the distinct confines of their own linguistic parameters and achieved cultural trait traditions, demonstrates that the knowledge that is

received is domestically biased toward the nation (or state).

Essentially, the same information is being learned by German children in German, and French children in France, each biased toward those states, producing nationals stereotyped as such. This is substantiated by table 8.5 that shows that political awareness amongst educated children of educated parents exhibit a linkage, and the fact as highlighted by Richard Rose,[5] that the persuasions of adults carry through noticeably to children. If political positions of adults are reflected substantially onto the child's orientation, then it is fair to assume general biases and prejudices likewise reflect.

This exposes the paradox in sovereignty. Sovereignty as ultimate authority must be recognised and because of the personnel turnover of society, authority must be constantly exhibited as such. Since the post-Keynesian introduction of the welfare commitment into the realm of government responsibility,(evidenced by the ever increasing taxation in general terms, required by governments to discharge the welfare requirements (pp. 265ff.) and exacerbated by the centralisation of early collective socialisation through education brought about by modernity) the state has been forced, with ever increasing verve, to fortify its claims to ultimate authority. Because of the electoral sensitivity inherent in modern Western European democracies, it has

effectively forced the state to give consideration to the domestic, over and above any consideration to the expanded system as a whole, other than what it exactly does, substantiating and enhancing its d. ut des position. It is evident that yes, the states' insistence on domestic sovereignty is the major stumbling block toward more rapid Europeanisation and that, yes, it is such because of the states' own doing, required through its own necessity.

Present endeavours undertaken in Western Europe could conclude eventually a higher degree of European coalescence dependent on political considerations. This does not necessarily imply nor does it effectively suggest substantial change associated with the understanding of the concept of social integration. It suggests, rather, a more tightly political environment, in many respects more restrictive, more innibiting, more formal and more structured. It suggests something analogous to a multi-national political state. This suggests that the crux of Europeanisation is found within that educational process. The form that integration today is taking is based on the assumption of allegiance being ascribed to through cognition. Allegiance of a much more enduring nature is that that is based on one's own intellection. Individual intellection produces allegiance through choice. Subscription to allegiance through choice is of self-volition. Subscription through cognition only is an appeal to duty and akin to force or

violence.

Consider again the process of education. Language learning dismantles the barrier of bias inherent within mono-lingual acculturation. It forms a linguistic bridge to the minds and thoughts of others. Monnet's linguistic knowledge aided him as "in later years, . . . I have never had to fight against reflexes," programmed into him by the bias of an unending stream of mono-linguistic inputs. The paucity of quantitative evidence makes this a theoretical assertion. However, there may be a slight indication of this in considering the fact that the EFTA country of Austria has been cited in the British national press the first week of April 1986, as contemplating EC membership. Table 8.3 illustrates the fact that it is difficult to leave Austrian schools without at least a substantial knowledge of a second language. The appendix review of Austrian educational practices, from which this information is gleaned, holds Austrian education as an example, because it notably exposes the student formally through civic instruction, and informally through mandatory language learning, to 'otherness', and it also encourages critical choice. This is the functioning of attachment through knowledge and choice leading toward the achievement of desire. Through the democratic political process, knowledge in the hands of the electorate has the potential of inhibiting institutional bias.

The Outcome

Change is, in actuality, revolution.[7] Classical political theorists were interested in the problems of cyclical change,[8] attributing revolutionary feelings to a discrepancy between the individual's wants and their perceived situation, a discrepancy giving rise to profound political disagreement. Contemporary theorists distinguish between genuine political revolution and other phenomena such as student or urban movements. Revolution may be . . .

> an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more of the traditional systems of stratification . . . of a political community, which involves a purposive elite-directed attempt to abolish or to reconstruct one or more of said systems by means of an intensification of political power . . .[9]

This conceptualisation is one that places revolutionary change in the category of emotion-laden utopian ideals and emphasizes the role of elites.[10] Emotion-laden ideals are an "expectation that the society is marching toward a profound transformation of values and structures, as well as personal behaviour."[11] This degree of intensity, if ever existent, no longer appears to be the <u>modus operandi</u> of European activity. Integration, because of its logical appeal to either economic or political considerations, either domestic or collective, appears to have lost its immediate post-war urgency, its emotion-ladenness, its cognisant social level appeal[12]. Integration appears to be focussed on the desire to "get ahead."[13] If Europeanisation is no longer an emotion-laded idea, what, if anything, is? If

the "pathos of novelty" which has traditionally accompanied the emotion-laden idea, involving "the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold"[14] is no longer, what is? Is it possible to determine the direction of current and future movement?

There may be a new area of emotion-laden ideas, a new question of interest emerging within the minds of individuals. A revolutionary idea incorporates a vastly improved pattern of human relationships in a future realisation. Such a revolution describes a more perfect social situation - more freedom for the individual, greater individual equality, more awareness of commonality and feeling of community, not necessarily political, not necessarily economic, but <u>social</u>. Peace, human dignity, human rights, even the environment, may be the transcendental ideas with emerging popular appeal. Whereas revolutions of the past were attached to distinct geographical identifiable areas.[15] the revolutions of the future appear to be forming without such parameterisation. The emotion-laden ideas of the future may be inevitably humanistic, and not nationalistic [16] or if this is so, the new emotional ideals of a broader humanistic nature are compatible with the humanistic ideals that characterised the first stages of German integration in the German model.

The forces that compact the ideals may also be

humanistically felt.[17] A society which in one phase of its history may be highly integrated and disposed toward intense external conflict might at another time undergo domestic disintegration and experience serious internal disorders,[18] as did the states of Central Europe that effectively dissolved and reunited into the 1871 German entity after the seeds of humanism took hold. This may be related to the decentralisation tendencies within Europe today. The greater decentralisation in France under the socialists and provincial higher autonomy in Holland or the British folk-led devolution movements may result in a relaxation of central authority in the long term which would be preludial to broader humanistic centralisations.

The disintegration necessary for re-collectivisation on a larger scale may be the result of collective action or the calculated pursuit of individual interests. These individual interests create a gap or Anomie between individual orientation and collective structures.[19] The gap widens as a result of modernisation between institutionalisation of social control and the need for structural change and is exacerbated by the pressure toward collective action to restore shared beliefs.[20] The critical guidelines are (1) addressed to the degree to which various strata or groups within the old collectivity are participating or not participating in the political system and (2) the ability of the old system to respond flexibly to various new demands and (3)

the extent or effectivenes of old controls.[21]

The key to disintegration may lie in the considerations of: (1) The extent to which individuals in collectivities feel themselves more loyal to, than critical of, a system: (2) The extent to which elections are participated in, taxes are paid, military service is performed: (3) The extent to which intellectuals educated within the system are absorbed in system: (4) The extent of system "safety-valves" such as economic competition, channels of criticism, expression of new ideas: (5) The extent of relatively stable cohesive social groups, such as churches, armies, trade unions, farmers' organisations, professional associations, political parties: (6) The pattern in which symbolic social honours, political power, economic benefits are distributed among individual groups in system: and (7) the proportionate allocation by various groups of fear-hostitility attitudes inside and outside the collectivity.[22]

Disintegrational tendencies may be domestically evident by increased vocal criticism, poor electoral turnout, the brain drain, controls on competition or governmental censoring, the current decline of church attendance and trade unionism, poor perceptions of perceived advantages to current collectivities and the vocalisation of decentralisation or devolutional alternatives, the economic societal divisions or the lessening of the perception of 'the fear of Russia'

throughout Europe.

If this is so, then perhaps the greater force which would motivate eventual Europeanisation is not on the overt, political, economic level, but more to be found on the underlying social trends in which individuals are involved.[23] These individual forces are products of conceptualisation, images, the net result of individual understanding based on individuals' own acquired knowledge. Some states in Europe equip through formal education their young to deal with social questions: others do not. The smaller states, perhaps because of their smallness, exhibit a greater degree of determination to increase individual cognition, others dismiss it.[24] Language study contributes toward individual cognition by decreasing linguistic barriers to collectivisation.

As with the word "Europe" itself,[25] the ideas held by Europeans toward the notion of European integration are unclear.[26] In actuality, European integration is postulated as a 'process of political . . . transformation,' however, to achieve it, it must be "also [a] far reaching social transformation."[27] Such a process is not without difficulty.[28] The approaches taken within literature; cultural, anthropological, political science, sociological, economic, or legal[29] reflect, fundamentally, a mono-disciplinary view and, depending on the discipline's approach, propose opposing paradigms.[30]

Integration necessitates a focus on the individual, as it is he who ultimately socialises into integration. The mono-disciplinary views summarily overgo the individual's feelings, his emotion-laden subnascent feelings or conceptualised ideas. They focus on aspects which may or may not peripherally affect, but not specifically encapsulate, the individual's attitudes. The aspects on which they focus are Trans-national institutions, governmental institutions, economic transactions, or conditional phenomena, political sovereignty, authority, power, or elites. They all have concepts which have to do with quantifiable, descriptive, or prescriptive conditions of cooperation, which may, to a greater or lesser degree, influence the individual's constructed attitudes.

Attitudes are the basis for communities of attachment,[31] as they are, in principle, "shared opinions of large groups of people (sometimes called "publics"[32]) which, in theory, at least can "exercise influence over individual behavior, group behavior, and governmental policy."[33] These may not have a direct linkage.

"The institution or maintenance of a democratic system is not contingent in any immediate sense upon public opinion. In the long run, though, it may well be that democracy thrives only where people actively support it."[34] Such collective attitudes may be either the product of a leading (bubble-up)[35] or a lagging

(trickle-down)[36] process. That is an upward flow model, from public to elites or a downward flow model, from elites to public.[37]

Societal growth is best conceptualised in an organic model. The organic evolution model lays important emphasis on the individual's own commitment to expansion, a commitment gleaned through either experience or education. Although the leadership function exercised by elites appears to have a great effect on the collectivity, that function appears to be inversely proportional to the leadership ability of the collectivity itself as time shifts from the short run into the intermediate and long run.

A political short or intermediate integrational attempt, led by elites, would be characterised by that of, for example, the Austrian-Hungarian or Sweden-Norway unions, or the occupations of various European areas by Hitler or Napolean. An example of the long run societal influence is demonstrated by the growth of most Nation-States, as France, Britain, or Italy.

The close-knit cultural community,[38] once united, albeit loosely, under Christendom, is now fragmented, disintegrated, and polarised.[39]

These states polarised, on these dates, into what has been termed the liberal democracies of Western Europe. They came into being and were recognised as constitutional democracies, and as <u>nation states</u> in a time when economic evolution could no longer be contained

within distinct geographic boundaries. The curiosum of the post-constitution period, brought about by the general evolution and proliferation of knowledge, was in the introduction of state sponsored educational processes, a politically induced function directly affecting the social evolution process, and reinforcing individual identity.

Integration as change in the recent past appears to have been coupled with a humanistic idealism, exemplified by "God has given you your country as cradles, and humanity as mother; you cannot rightly love your brethren of the cradles if you love not the common mother."[40] This thought gave way to a particularistic-nationalistic bias. This bias is what the politicisation of integration is attempting to redress.

As "in the modern world, Europe has to rely on itself,"[41] the international regime of the EC, desperately realising the necessity for successful integration, seeks to unite through perhaps the greatest continuing international effort yet known to Europe exclusively. But, as history has repeatedly witnessed, political or elite endeavours have but marginal long term success. Lasting success appears as collective movements lead not necessarily from the top down, by efforts of elites, but bottom up, by the action of the population at large.[42] Ideological commitment[43] is necessary for a successful population-led end-result. The pen may indeed be mightier than the sword. It may be in the

realm of a utopia, but the conceptualisation of the idea precedes concentrated action.

This organic model of European growth is a conceptualisation of society as . . .

> a number of persons with a locus, . . . some permanence and a history. . . . The broadest grouping of people who share a common set of habits, ideas and attitudes, live (sic) in a definite territory and consider themselves a social unit.[44]

Idealism is an essential, albeit often overlooked, component of the overall integration process, ". . . the unique trait of human society - the thing which transforms the primitive grouping into a new emergent reality - is the system of symbolic communication,"[45] shared within the community[46] The fixation on the appropriate <u>locus</u> amongst individual Europeans will determine the eventual outcome of integrational attempts.[47] It depends on (1) communication, but more on (2) collective symbols. Europeans are at the end of a period in which their history, habits, attitudes, territory, and indeed their whole thought, has been focussed inwardly on themselves, their domestic nations, and the nation's political states. Through increased modernisation, their increased perviousness is unavoidable.

This perviousness will eventually lead to further integration. If primarily conducted by way of political moves, the situation will slowly change international systems <u>via</u> the constructs of crypto-integrational

institutionality,[48] and integration will be long in coming. If, however, the lead was implanted in social endeavours, it would be much more rapidly achieved. Holistically viewed, what keeps Europeans from seeing themselves as Europeans, individuals sharing portions of like territory, with like attitudes and like history and habits, is nothing more than the slant which their states put on these phenomena and stimuli. To integrate may be, in real terms, nothing more difficult than to change that slant, to allow it to happen as it has qualis ab incepto. The challenge is worth the try, for "until you have tried, you can never tell whether a task is impossible or not."[49]

> It is the duty of a patriot to prefer and promote the exclusive interest and glory of his native country: but a philosopher may be permitted to enlarge his views, and to consider Europe as one great republic, whose various establishments have attained almost the same level of politeness and cultivation. The balance of power will continue to fluctuate, and the prosperity of our own or the neighbouring kingdoms may be alternately exalted or depressed: but these partial events cannot essentially injure our general state of happiness, the system of arts, and laws and manners which so advantageously distinguish, above the rest of mankind, the Europeans. . . .[50]

CHAPTER NINE NOTES

[1]E.B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe. (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 16.

[2]I.L. Claude, Jr., Swords into Plowshares. Third edition. (New York: Knopf, 1964), p. 103.

[3]Jean Monnet, Memoirs. (London: Collins, 1978), p. 83.

[4]G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972). N.B. chapter 3, "Patterns of Political Cognition," p. 79ff.

[5]Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics. Third edition. (London: Macmillan, 1976), pp. 74ff., 87ff.

[6]Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit. p. 44.

[7]As in the industrial revolution.

[8]J.D. Dougherty and R.L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey. (New York: Harper and Row, 1981), p. 313ff.

[9]Mark N. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1974), chapter 1, p. 1ff.

[10]See Robert Putnam, "The Case of Ideology," in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics, op. cit. pp. 479-509.

[11]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, op. cit. p. 314.

[12]Ideas are not necessarily an ideology, see definitions in Chambers Dictionary, pp. 622-623, op. cit.

[13]Getting ahead is based on a self conceptualisation of personal advantage akin to hedonism and is seldom altruistic. Ibid. Chambers, c. 561, p. 34-5.

[14]Hannah Arendt, On Revolution. (New York: Viking, 1965), p. 21.

[15]As in the fortuitous raw material, ingenuity, and industrial conditions isolated to England which produced the first industrial revolution.

[16]See Frank E. Manuel, "Toward a Psychological History of Utopias," in Daedalus, XCIV (Spring 1965), especially pp. 303-09; and Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. Translated by Louis Wirth and Edward A. Shils. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovonivich, 1964). An indication of what may become an overall trend was given by Inglehardt, who disagreed with the notion of Karl Deutsch that Europe would remain a collection of nation-states (not become a supra-nation entity). "The ensemble of the present public moods would not be much help to statesmen who would lead their countries toward a greater, deepened union. Rather, they may facilitate general expression of good will, combined with policies of temporising, caution, national consolidation, and only gradual and sectional advance toward somewhat greater European integration. Bolder steps towards substantially greater European unity would have to be 'sold' to mass opinion by the sustained and concerted efforts of leaders and elites." K.W. Deutsch, "A Comparison of French and German Elites in the European Political Environment," in Deutsch, L.J. Edinger, R.C. Macridis, and R.L. Merritt, eds., France, Germany, and the Western Alliance. (New York:

Scribner, 1967), p. 127. In contrast, Inglenardt found a fundamental change in values and attitudes taking place among younger Europeans in France, Germany, and Holland, suggestive of a rise of "Europeanness." R. Inglehardt, "An End to European Integration," in American Political Science Review, 61(1967):91-105. He later suggested a development of an emergent supra-national identity in Europe. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977).

[17]I.E. a concept of ideas relating to the totality of mankind. Indeed, Reagan apparently expressed a humanistic ideal to Gorbachov at the Iceland Summit when he said that the U.S. and Russia would be united if a threat were perceived of Martian invasion. BBC, Sunday, 29 November, the David Frost/Reagan interview.

[18]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, op. cit. p. 321.

[19]For a discussion on the development of new interest, specifically an occupation with universal human rights, see Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation-State, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1964), chapter 11: Human Rights, p. 336ff.

[20]Charles Tilly, From Modernisation to Revolution, (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978), chapter 2; Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1968); and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

[21]Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories, op. cit. pp. 322-33.

[22]Loc. cit. p. 333.

[23]The trend, which may be indicative of future developments, the general de-emphasis of the limiting focus on the nation-state, is circumscribed in the Globalist literature. See Barbara Ward and Rene Dubos, Only One Earth: The Care and Maintenance of a Small Planet, (Stocknolm: Inche, 1972).

[24]In Britain, this is called derogatively "Peace Studies," and receives a very low priority within the government's agenda of interests. See any popular publication, especially around election time, June 1987.

[25]The etymology of the word, "Europe," is uncertain. It may be from the Semitic oreb, ereb, meaning western or from the Homeric epithet for Zeus, i.e., the far seeing (eurus=wide, ops=eye). See J.B. Duroselle, "Europe as a Historical Concept," in C.G. Haines, ed., European Integration, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957). For early Mediterranean cultures, it was first associated with myth, as the daughter of Agenos, King of Phoenicia, seduced by Jupiter in the shape of a bull. Later, it was associated with science as one of the three 'grand divisions' of the earth, 'superior to the others in the learning, power, and abilities of its inhabitants.' See D. Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European

Community. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 1ff.

[26]The collective ideas held by individual groups are fundamentally reflected by political ideas. Factors which affect political desire for European unity are summarised in A. Spinelli (1957-1966). "The Growth of the European Movement since World War II." in C.G. Haines, ed., European Integration. op. cit.

[27]R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), p. 14.

[28]Puchala compares the process to an elephant and researchers to blind men manipulating portions of the whole animal to determine its size and shape. See D. Puchala, "Of Blind Men, Elephants, and International Integration," in Journal of Common Market Studies. 10(1972):267-84.

[29]See M. Hodges, European Integration. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972); and L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold, Regional Integration: Theory and Research. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971).

[30]Optimism: G. Liska, Europe Ascendent: The International Politics of Unification. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1964). Pessimism: E. Bendit, Europe at Sixes and Sevens. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961); S. Holland, Uncommon Market. (London: Macmillan, 1980); L. Barzini, The Impossible Europeans. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1983). Reservation: M.T. Florinsky, Integrated Europe. (New York: Macmillan, 1955); L.N. Lindberg and S.A. Scheingold, Europe's Would-Be Polity. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1970); S.R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964); Anxiety: M. Rutherford, Can We Save the Common Market? (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981).

[31]Attitudes are the constituent elements of a 'we-feeling'. See D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. (London: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 332; P. Taylor, "The Concept of Community and European Integration Process," in M. Hodges, ed., European Integration. (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1972), p. 205; R.J. Harrison, Europe in Question. op. cit. p. 18.

[32]S. Oskamp, Attitudes and Opinions. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 16.

[33]W.P. Davison, "Public Opinion," in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. (London: The Free Press, 1968), p. 188.

[34]D.O. Sears, "Political Behaviour," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson, ed., The Handbook of Social Psychology. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley), 1969), p. 414.

[35]R. Putnam, "Comment," in L. Tsoukalis, ed., The European Community: Past, Present, and Future. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983).

[36]A. Etzioni, "Social-Psychologocal Aspects of International Relations," in Lindzey and Aronson, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology. op. cit.

[37]See Miles Hewstone, Understanding Attitudes to the European Community. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 18.

[38]C. 800-1450 A.D. See Europe: An Emergent Nation. (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 2.

[40]See Dankwart A. Rustow. A World of Nations. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1967), p. 290; Giuseppe Mazzini, quoted from his speech at Milan (25 July 1848) in Robert Stewart, ed., A Dictionary of Political Quotations. (London: European Publications, 1984).

[41]Jacques Delons, (EC Commissioner), in a Reuters report, "EC after Summit Failure, Warned of Last Chance," in International Herald-Tribune. (Monday, 7 December 1987), p. 2.

[42]Witness the greatest twentieth century example of a popular supported movement of this type, the Russian Revolution. See Isaak Mints, How the Revolution Was Won. (Moscow: Novosu Press, 1987) and Glimpses of the Revolution. (Compiled by Novosti Press). (Moscow: Agency Publishing House, 1987), and Vladimer Gurevich, et.al., Seventy Years of Soviet Government. (Moscow: Novosu Press, 1987), chapter one: "The Soviet Revolution.

[43]Ideological commitment can be demonstrated by the fact that Continental Europeans celebrate Armistice Day, the day World War I was finished, the Germans, not having been ideologically committed, laid down arms and ceased fighting on one day,, as opposed to the fact that World War II is commemorated by a series of days, Normandy Invasion, Italian Campaign, First crossing of the Rhine, Bombing of Dresden, Berlin, etc., leading to a general VE Day which is not a holiday. The ideological commitment to World War II by the Germans saw extensive fighting on all fronts until on each front they were defeated.

[44]Kimball Young and Raymond W. Mock, Sociology and Social Life. (New York: American Book Company, 1959), p. 28.

[45]Loc. cit. p. 52.

[46]Identical with definition of education=the manipulation of symbolic (and other means) to transmit accepted attitudes (and skills)=knowledge. See Solomon E. Asch, Social Psychology. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 618ff.

[47]For an overall discussion on the importance of ideology, see T.M. Newcomb, and E.L. Hartley, ed., Readings in Social Psychology. (New York: Holt, Rinehardt, and Winston 1947).

[48]For an excellent and comprehensive overview of structure's effects on society, see Ino Rossi, ed., Stuctural Sociology. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and Fred E. Kate, Autonomy and Organization. (New York: Random House, 1968), especially the introduction.

[49]Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit. p. 321.

[50]Edward Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. (London: Methuen, 1896-1900), chapter XXXVIII, p. 931.

APPENDIX
Survey of Compulsory Educational Practices in European States[1]

Austria

In many respects, the Austrian approach to Europeanism may be exemplary. Its ultimate object is a system characterised by humanity and freedom from fear.[2] The attitude taken by the government was heavily influenced by the effects of World War II[3] and its intent is to produce "conscientious and responsible members of society" encouraged to develop an independent judgment and social understanding, to be open-minded to the philosophy and political thinking of others and to participate in and with both Austria and Europe.[4] Modern languages are taught as a constituent compnent of that ideal[5] and its adherence is assured.[6]

Both the humanitarian approach to education with its openness and European approach, and its extensive foreign language suggests a compulsory educational system geared toward the formation of minds potentially favorably disposed toward openness, based on knowledge, with the facility for independent cultural choice. The Austrians possess a disposition conducive toward integration.[7]

Belgium

The structure of education in Belgium is highly marked by the country's own distinct problems, primarily the strife caused by the political unification of what appears to be two ethnic groups, the Flanders (French) and the Wallonians (Deutsch). The problem is exacerbated by the religious divisions roughly associated with the linguistic. As of July 14, 1975, there has been a significant step toward the creation of a pluralistic system.[8] A pluralistic system is fundamentally a system given over to accomodation of the underlying philosophical and linguistic divisions of the Belgian society. Two patterns emerge, the Old Humanistic which centres around Latin study and the new humanities which centre around modern langauges.[9] Regardless of previous exposure, all students, based on the results of examinations, are placed in a Classical language stream or a modern language stream which frequently mirrors the philosophical orientation of their origins.

The impression of the Belgian educational system is that a preoccupation with their own linguistically centred problems overshadows any general commitment toward the creation of a European consciousness, despite Brussels as the headquarters of the Community.

Denmark

The Denmark education is compulsory, however, school attendance is not. Foreign languages are an eminent feature of their educational system and amongst those that attend school, English is compulsory for at least four years.[10] The Danish Folkeskole "prepares pupils for sharing in the activities and decisions of a democratic society and for sharing responsibilities for solving the problems that face society."[11] Responsibility mandates knowledge, and knowledge is increased by full exposure of the individuals

to outside structural stimuli. The model for education, the Folkskole, has been adopted throughout the Scandinavian countries[12] and is coordinated by the Ministry of Education to ensure standard learning levels.[13] The impression of the Danish educational system, similar to Austria, is one of a small country, educating its young to be social contributors in an expanded (interactional) environment.

Finland

Education is compulsory, although it is not mandatory for students to attend. It is of a comprehensive school nature (as in the Danish Folkeskole) and Finnish citizenship mandates compliance (either attendance or not) with its standards. The duty of citizenship is to acquire a bilingual country (Finnish and Swedish) and every child is taught two languages compulsory, other than the mother tongue. 86 percent of students undergoing compulsory education elect English as an A-level course, meaning for an extended period. Languages are taught openly, with cultural content and complements compulsory history which covers aspects of Finnish, regional, and European topicality.[14] The impression the Finnish education system makes, not discounting its historical ties and dominations, is one emphasising literacy in a multiple of European languages.

France

Education in France is a constitutionally enshrined function of the State and is conducted either direct or by contract with (95% Catholic) the state. Streaming into foreign language study is compulsory from class six to class three. Students that continue to the completion of secondary education (70%) enter the lycees, either professional or general. Foreign language learning is a prominent feature of the lycees curriculum. The languages taught are dependent on the facilities of the scool with English and secondly, German, Spanish, and Italian taking prominence.[15] The general impression is that languages are taught as a constituent component of understanding others.

Germany

All day compulsory school for all children between the ages of six and fifteen, and the coordination of various types of school was adopted in 1946.[16] This introduced a protracted debate on content and type of education in Germany, greatly intensified by the Bundesstaat governmental structure where the Bundeslander[17] are generally responsible for education. The SPD holds the idea of comprehensive schools for all. The FDP believes in greater competition between different types of pupils.[18] The result is seen by the emphases which vary in the Bundeslander according to political party dominance. The Lehrplane is accordingly different. However, coordination is achieved at the broad level with compulsory education which on the Grundschule level includes Social Affairs

(Sozialkunde). The system is replete with examinations in all schools at all levels to assure a basic learning.[19] An interesting aspect of the German higher educational system is that students are expected to avail themselves of a Wunderjahr, a year's study abroad, a modern revival of an old German custom suspended during the Nazi era. The loose structuring of the German educational system reflects its constituent foundations,[20] but central coordination appears to ensure an extensive exposure to foreign language study.

Ireland

Primary education in Ireland is managed by boards composed of parents, staff, and religious authorities. Although teachers are paid by the Department of Education, content is highly influenced by local will. As of 1971, an official curriculum laid down by the Department of Education has aimed at broadening local education to include social studies. Post primary education is under private management. To obtain government funding, some loose curriculum guidelines are suggested, which include a desire for language exposure, but, despite a system of state inspectors, does not appear to insure instruction.[21]

Italy

Article 34 of the Italian Constitution states that "Education is available to everyone. Elementary education, imparted for at least eight years, is compulsory and free."[22] Central coordination is not strong and hence a uniform picture of any compulsory language exposure is not possible. What is possible, however, is to glean the effects of positive coordination for a perceived goal. In the Directive for a Long-Term Educational Plan for the Period Successive to June 30, 1965, the state began allocating a figure in excess of five percent of the national income toward education. The result is that, at the expense of Classical education, scientific instruction has registered an increase of five hundred percent in the first decade.[23] The marked economic improvement of the Italian economy may be directly correlated with this governmental shift in education,[24] borne out by the fact that Italy has had higher university enrollments since 1970 than any other European nation.[25] As university admittance is based in part on foreign linguistic ability, this would suggest a substantial achievement of foreign language knowledge.[26]

Switzerland

Despite its complexity, school in Switzerland from the emergence of compulsory education at the beginning of the last century shows common characteristics. Because of its multi-national nature, education tends to be liberal, tolerant, and emphasises broad-mindedness. The Cantonal System, as in the Bundesland System in Germany, is primarily responsible for compulsory education. Compulsory is at least one other national language (Romanisch, German,

French, Italian). All school leavers must sit examinations, so some degree of foreign language exposure is assured.[27] despite a recognised provincialism.[28]

Norway

More than ninety percent of Norway's young people continue education beyond the compulsory period.[29] The 1969 act concerning basic school and the Supplementary Act of 1975 give all citizens the same statutory right to education.[30] Norwegians have a great latitude in selection of educational courses, however, "major subjects" within the compulsory period include English. English is compulsory for all pupils from the fourth grade onwards, and a second foreign language may be chosen in the eighth year.[31] Another example of direct state influence on the socialisation process is evident in Norway by the ANT compulsory topics, a series of compulsory instruction covering the use of alcohol, narcotics, and tobacco.

Sweden

Every county in Sweden has a county education board appointed by the State. It functions as the liason between the State and the community and is responsible for curricular supervision. The compulsory component of the Swedish curriculua is conducted within the nine year comprehensive school. Within this school, all students take the same subjects at the primary level. Englisn is compulsory from grade three (or four). Options are introduced in the senior level and French and German or another "home language" must be included among the optional subjects. The first two are more popular than the third.[32]

Holland

The educational system in Holland is highly centralised. Here centralisation provides an extremely effective method of creating an effective educational system. Schools in Holland are divided amongst Public (26%), Catholic (41%), Protestant (26%), and private (7%), and are administered by the several times amended Compulsory Education Act of 1900. The syllabus of the schools, in accordance with the act, is worked out to achieve an amelioration of state and school goals. Higher schools (Gymnasium and Atheneum) require either Dutch, Greek, Latin, and one modern language (French, German, or English) or Dutch, Greek, Latin, and two modern languages. Frisian is an optional subject, as is also Russian, Spanisn, Esperanto, and Hebrew.[33] English is contained in the overall school plan required by all schools as taught subjects.[34] Although a very diverse system, centralisation maintains the achievement of broad curriculum content aims. Language proficiency is one of these aims.

Luxembourg

In many respects, Luxembourg is a linguistic puzzle. In other countries, such as Switzerland, several languages

are also spoken, but they are almost always limited to definable regions. In Luxembourg, this is not the case. Here, various languages are superimposed almost hierarchically. In all levels of society, oral communication is in the Luxembourg, a Mosel dialect of frankish-germanic origin. The German language, because of its relationship to Luxembourgese, is favoured by the popular classes. French by the intellectual elite. French is used as much as possible. German when it is indispensible.[35] French is the official language of the authorities. This sort of multi-layered linguistic system places a heavy burden on the educational institutions. Primary school itself is taught in German. As compulsory education advances, French replaces German as the medium of instruction with the result that, at the end of the schooling, German is treated as a foreign language. Throughout most of the secondary school program, English is compulsory.[36]

Portugal

Primary education in Portugal does not carry any foreign language exposure. Preparatory education does include, in its syllabus of ordinary courses, French, English, and German. These courses are offered either in direct preparatory education or TV preparatory (Telescola). In the seventh year of schooling, languages are mandatory. Those who continue past the compulsory schooling have greater exposure. Since EEC affiliation, Portugal has been undergoing a process of school reform to not only attack illiteracy, but also raise the general standards of living through greater popular education.[37]

The United Kingdom

British education tends to exhibit a high degree of flexibility.[38] Currently, the whole educational system in the United Kingdom has undergone, and is contemplated to undergo, change, as results are politically reassessed, reviewed, and reshaped to, "in the light of difficult economic circumstances and a substantial drop in the birth rate,"[39] develop a 'better school' system. In the current political climate, the government's basic attempt appears to be at forcibly educating for not so much personal rewards but more public rewards.[40] Using education directly, as a means for achieving distinct political aims, "to encourage institutions to improve their management and planning, and to become more flexible and responsive to the economic . . . needs of the country"[41] the government has tended to control, and through the adoption of muted reforms, will enhance control *via* guidelines over the direct process.[42] These are broadly to include English, mathematics, and science, some study of the humanities including history, religious, and physical education, and "most pupils should also study a foreign language."[43] As compulsory education falls within the reach of local councils, little compulsion is placed on a set taught curriculum other than the aforementioned guidelines. The

respective departments of education have a significant tool at their disposal for guiding local education.[44] It appears as if the new emphasis in Britain on the centralised curriculum will, if adopted, include a "balanced curriculum," including "foreign language(s)"[45] in order to standardise the British Educational System.

APPENDIX NOTES

[1]Because of difficulties in obtaining objective information, Spain and Greece are excluded from this appendix.

[2]Government policy declaration of May 1983. See The Austrian Educational System Austrian Documentation. (Vienna: Federal Press Service, 1984), p. 5.

[3]Loc. cit. p. 8.

[4]Loc. cit. pp. 9-10.

[5]Austria Organisation of Education 1978-80. (Wien: Bundesministerium fur unterricht and kunst, 1981), p. 33.

[6]Loc. cit. p. 37.

[7]For further information, see "Adagogische Freiheit," in Marian Heitger, Recht der Schule. (Wienne: Erzienungsampt), pp. 108-11: and Rudolf Weiss, Grundfragen der Erzienung / Sozialisation. (Innsbruck: Wagner, 1978.

[8]Eric Deloof, Education in Belgium. (Brussels: Inbel, 1977), p. 5.

[9]Loc. cit. pp. 30-31.

[10]Factsheet Denmark / Compulsory Education in Denmark. (Copenhagen: Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984), p. 2.

[11]Loc. cit. p. 3.

[12]Factsheet Denmark / The Danish Folk High School. (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1984), p. 8.

[13]A typography of Educational Departments' jurisdiction is found under "undervisningsministeriet," in Factsheet Denmark - Administration and Organisation in Denmark. (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1983), p. 9.

[14]The information presented was gleaned from correspondence between myself and the National Board of General Education, Helsinki, specifically with the Head of the Educational Department, Vesa Lyytikainen, and the chief inspector, Anneli Tella.

[15]See France, la Documentation française. (Paris: ISBN, 1984).

[16]Werner vom Busch, ed., Bildung und Wissenschaft. (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1984), p. 139.

[17]Bundeslander Bade-Wurtenberg, Bavaria, Bremen, Hamburg, Hesse Lower Saxony, Northrnine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Platatinate, Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein as well as Berlin (West) are responsible for the greater part of the educational system. The federal government only sets guidelines.

[18]vom Busch, Bildung and Wissenschaft, op. cit. p. 143.

[19]Manfred Neuber, Bildung and Wissenschaft. (Bonn: Inter Nationes, 1987).

[20]See Article 2, section 1 of "The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany."

[21]Education Factsheet 1/84. (Dublin: Department of Foreign Affairs).

[22]Italian Constitution, partially represented in A Quick Glance at Italy. (Rome: Governmental Information Office, 1969).

[23]Questai l'Italia. (Roma: Servize Informazioni e Proprieta Letteraria Artistica Scientifica, 1971), p. 121.

[24]Substantiated by Educational Statistics in OECD Countries. (Paris: OECD, 1981), p. 126. The overall benefit of this accelaration of education is dramatically highlighted by the rapid jump forward of GDP which in 1987 placed Italy third highest per capita in wealth production in Europe behind Germany and France respectively, outstripping Britain.

[25]Loc. cit. p. 40.

[26]Substantiated by the Italian Information Service (Edinburgh: Instituto Italliano di Cultura).

[27]Education in Switzerland. (Bern: Pro Helvetia, 1984).

[28]Monica Nestler, Adult Education in Switzerland. (Zurich: Pro Helvetia, 1983), p. 13.

[29]Education in Norway. (Oslo: Ministry of Church and Education, 1982), p. 10.

[30]Loc. cit. p. 13.

[31]Loc. cit. p. 15: also The Norwegian Basic School. (Oslo: Basic School Council, 1981), p. 29.

[32]Fact Sheets on Sweden. (The Swedish Institute, November 1985).

[33]N.J. Von Dijk, The Kingdom of the Netherlands Facts and Figures Education and Science. (Zoetermeer (Hague): Foreign Information Division of the Central Internal Relations Department, Ministry of Education and Science).

[34]"Newsletter," (Zoetermeer: Ministry of Education and Science of the Netherlands, 3-85, number E2).

[35]This linguistically blurred area is a historical anomaly. The distancing from German may be related to the effects of World War II and the brief attempt post-war to elevate Luxembourgisen to a language in itself.

[36]Luxembourg, Statistical Yearbook 1985-86 Education Enseignement et culture. (Luxembourg: Department of Education).

[37]Portuguese System of Education. (Ministry of Education, International Relations, 1985).

[38]Education in Britain. (A Central Office of Information reference pamphlet, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1985, no. 15/85), p. 155.

[39]Loc. cit. p. 155.

[40]The White Paper, "Better Schools," published by the Government Information Office. (London: March 1985), highlights the goal of raising standards in schools in England and Wales to increase, for example, ethnic minority groups' societal productive potentials.

[41]See The Development of Higher Education into the 1990's. (London: The Government Information Office, 1985).

[42]Curriculum of Education in Britain. p. 160.

[43]Loc. cit.

[44]But, as perhaps as much as forty percent of the school leaving population do so at the first available opportunity without school leaving qualifications, it appears as if a large portion of the school leaving

population do so without foreign language exposure, reference made to correspondence with Mr. Watt, Scottish Educational Office, January 1988. For educational attempts in Scotland to standardise education, see "Factsheet 29." (Scotland: Scottish Information Office, HMSO, 1984). Scottish Consultative Committees involvement in curriculum building, "Factsheet 21." (Scotland: Scottish Information Office, HMSO, 1984), and generally, "Factsheet 15 on Scottish Education," (Scotland: Scottish Information Office, HMSO, 1987).

[45]Overall curricular framework in "Curriculum and Assessment in Scotland: A Policy for the 90's," a consultation paper, (Scottish Education Department, November, 1987).

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